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2ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the experience o f humanitarian relief charity in the Sudan from 
1986, the creation o f Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in April 1989 and its 
experience to 1996. This historical analysis also situates OLS within the 
international relief system. OLS experience generally provides an important case 
study in the mixture of motives and views in contemporary international affairs and 
the subsequent difficulty we have in theorising within that experience. Throughout 
1989-96, OLS was able to establish an environment on which the rights o f internally 
displaced persons to relief food and security was possible. This was within the 
context o f a continuing civil war, where relief objectives were at odds with the 
military objectives o f the combatants, the diverse views of the donor governments, 
and the technical difficulties of delivering aid in such circumstances. The 
instruments used by OLS to gain access to those needing aid involved the use o f 
humanitarian norms, principles and agreements to shame and, sometimes, sanction 
those denying access. These rhetorical devices are relevant to other war affected 
areas and constitute a useful development in humanitarian intervention. The 
theoretical implication o f this development for our understanding o f international 
relations is briefly explained in the conclusion.
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PREFACE
The idea for this study grew out o f my four years experience in the combat zones of 
Southern Sudan where, during its first eight years, the United Nations-led Operation 
Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was mounting major international humanitarian programme. 
This is the first comprehensive academic assessment o f the effects o f the broadly 
accepted international humanitarian norms' in OLS initial eight years history -  
1989-96. Apart from numerous and discrete agency programme evaluations, and my 
own work2, the only other attempt to see OLS as a whole was in 1991.3 While being 
an important contribution, this work did not assess in any greater depth the effects 
that humanitarian principles and rules have on the warring parties’ behaviour. Even 
the comprehensive review of OLS4, which was commissioned by the Department for 
Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)5, did not address fully the impact o f such political 
devices on the Khartoum government and the SPLM/A respectively. The 1996 OLS 
review made a comprehensive general evaluation o f the impact o f OLS programmes, 
the problem of co-ordination, and cargo prioritisation, subjects which are beyond the 
scope o f this thesis. Nonetheless, together with my earlier work, these two 
publications have provided an inspiration for this thesis.
1 By defining “norms” as standards o f  behaviour and not just behavioural regularities, this thesis 
stress one important point. That is, norms are about behaviour, not directly about ideas. This accords 
with the best known definition o f norms in the international relations theory literature, found in the 
regime literature which considers norms to be one component o f regimes. According to Krasner, 
regimes are “principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor 
expectations converge in a given issue-area” that serve to “constrain immediate, short-term power 
maximization” . Quoted in Ann Florini, “The Evolution o f  International Norms”, International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, 1996, p. 364
2 S. 0 . Efuk, The Politics of Food in Sudan, London, M. A. Dissertation, Department o f  Journalism, 
The City University, 1990
3 Larry Minear, Humanitarianism Under Siege: A Critical Review o f Operation Lifeline Sudan, 
Trenton, NJ., The Red Sea Press, 1991
4 DHA, Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Review, Nairobi, Department for Humanitarian Affairs, July, 
1996
5 DHA has since been re-organised and is now known as the Office for the Co-ordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
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METHODOLOGY
This thesis is based on fieldwork, and the basic methodology was that o f open- 
ended and semi-structured interviewing, and documentary collection and analysis. 
The questions were largely formed through participant observation, as well as 
through a process of group discussion during workshops, conferences, analysis of 
documents, and field reports. Interviews were conducted with international civil 
servants, NGO officials, embassies o f donor governments based in Nairobi (Kenya), 
Kampala (Uganda). Other sources o f material included UN annual reports, 
assessment, reviews, reports and various NGO reports. Some of the official 
documents were from DHA offices in Geneva and New York. Within the framework 
of examining the modus operandi o f OLS, the two studies of the Southern and 
Northern Sectors were chosen to contrast the usefulness of humanitarian principles 
and rules. From a combination o f field visits and discussions with project staff, 
military commanders o f the main armed movement, and beneficiaries, I collected 
perceptions, opinions and information on humanitarian principles and rules. 
However, three factors had complicated the process of gathering accurate and 
precise information about the effects o f humanitarian principles and rules.
1. I was constrained by the unwillingness o f my senior UNICEF/OLS colleagues 
to share sensible information.
2. Reliable information on the humanitarian efforts of non-governmental 
organisations -  both national and international - was frequently unsatisfactory, 
and sometimes did not tally with findings on the ground. NGO field reports were 
often full o f self-congratulatory material.
3. It was not possible for me to visit OLS Northern Sector because o f the risk to my 
own personal security, but I was able to interview some visiting government 
officials, as well as make use o f the official government and OLS reports and 
review documents.
Thus, this thesis reflects the perceptions of the Sudanese, donors and OLS aid
agencies, situations, achievements in the context o f humanitarian norms and 
principles, and challenges posed by war. Therefore, this thesis should be understood 
as trying to accurately portray the attitudes, insights and opinions o f the 
humanitarian players, governments and their beneficiaries, rather than on a material 
analysis o f aid and its consequences. In other words, the degree o f the suffering or 
the impact o f OLS programmes are not within the scope o f this thesis.
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INTRODUCTION: ANALYSIS OF THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES
I. Overview
The conceptual framework of this thesis is that international humanitarian norms, 
principles and rules are intended to bring about communication and constructive 
dialogue over the issues such as humanitarian access, human rights and democratic 
governance in a civil war context. This thesis was inspired by disagreement between 
the Sudanese government and “international community”6 on what Norms and 
Principles should govern a right to humanitarian operation. The ways that new 
“normative”7 understandings emerge and become salient in domestic contexts, and 
then come to infuse international politics, is a worthwhile subject of analysis.8 
International norms can determine many elements o f the ways in which states relate 
to each other. Norms, such as Geneva conventions and Convention o f the Right of 
the Child, can affect both sources o f disputes among states and patterns of 
humanitarian operation. There is an extensive literature on the effects o f norms 
generally in international relations, and more specifically the effects of discursive 
practice on both states’ perceived interests and their behaviour.9 This thesis is a 
contribution to that debate. Relevant to this study are claims made by Pluralists, 
Realists (neorealism and neoliberalism), Solidarists, and Social constructivists on 
the significance o f norms in the international system. Despite the challenges posed 
by competing ethical traditions, these conflicting theoretical claims have provided
^ The concept of international community is used in this thesis to refer to the United Nations, donor 
states, international bodies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
7 The word normative in this thesis refers to the setting of standards o f  behaviour in international 
relations which governments and non-state actors ought to meet.
8 See, for example, Cortell & Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact o f International Norms”, 
pp. 73-81; Ellen Carol Dubois, “Women Suffrage around the World: Three Phases of Suffragist 
Internationalism”, in Caroline Deleaney & Melainie Nolan (eds.), Suffrage and Beyond: International 
Feminist Perspectives, New York, New York University Press, 1994, pp. 252-274
^ The structural realist paradigm is most persuasively detailed in Kenneth Waltz, Theory o f 
International Politics, New York, Reading, Mass., Anderson Wesley, 19979; Hedley Bull, The 
Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics, New York, Columbia University Press, 
1979; Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations 
Theory, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, Vol. 10, 1981, pp. 126-155; Friedrich 
Kratochwill, “Errors Have Their Advantage” , International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1984, pp. 
305-320
14
this thesis with the moral architecture necessary to critique and assess the behaviour 
o f the parties to the Sudanese conflict, as well as the foreign policy behaviours of 
donor states. This author is sympathetic to the social constructivist claim because it 
does not deny that power and interests are essential elements for humanitarian 
action. Another usefulness of constructivist approach to this thesis is its 
encouragement o f communication and dialogue as a way o f internalising norms in 
state domestic affairs.
II. Pluralist10 International Society Theory
The relevance o f this theory to this thesis is that it identifies state sovereignty as an 
obstacle to “humanitarian intervention” 11. For pluralists, international relations are 
constituted through rational fixed principles o f interaction and coexistence, for 
example, sovereignty, diplomacy and international law. Denying an analogy 
between national and international societies, a common identity or culture is not 
necessarily seen as a precondition o f international society. Within this approach, 
states are the only members of international society.12 This theory identifies an 
additional obstacle, namely, the problem of how to reach a consensus on what norms 
and principles should underpin humanitarian action.
10 The term pluralism here should not be confused with the idea o f pluralism found in the literature 
on interdependence and transnationalism. Hedley Bull first used this term to refer to the debate within 
the international society tradition in his chapter on the “Grotian conception o f  international society in 
Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigation, London, Allen and Unwin, 
1966. See also Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International 
Society, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 27-32
11 “International humanitarian intervention” here may be understood as the crossing o f  borders and 
infringements on sovereignty carried out in the name of the international community in form o f the 
UN, states, and non-governmental organisations. In this thesis, thus, the term humanitarian 
intervention brings together many different parties and discourse communities in novel combinations. 
Intervention carried out with the permission o f the legitimate government for the purpose o f  putting a 
halt to human rights violations committed, for instance, an insurgent faction or even recognise 
authority, in a civil war can be characterised as a humanitarian intervention. The concepts 
“intervention” and “humanitarian” are used here interchangeably. Both involve states and therefore 
international law and international relations, good governance, relief and development. For an 
analysis o f  these concepts, see Wil D., “Humanitarian intervention in the 1990s and Beyond: An 
International Law Perspective”, in Jan N. Pieterse (ed.), World Orders in the Making: Humanitarian 
Intervention and Beyond, London, Macmillan, 1998, pp. 181-206
^  For a pluralist approach see Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World 
Politics, London, Macmillan, 1977, pp. 23-38
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Hedley Bull defined the pluralist conception as one in which states are capable of 
agreement only for certain minimum purposes, the most crucial being reciprocal 
recognition of sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention.13 The subject of 
humanitarian intervention is a difficult one for theorists o f “international society” 14 
since it is the archetypal case where it might be expected the society o f states would 
agree to privilege individual justice over the norms o f sovereignty and non­
intervention. Pluralists are sensitive to considerations o f individual justice, but argue 
that humanitarian intervention should not be permitted in the face o f disagreement 
about what constitute extreme human rights violations in international society. For 
over three centuries, understanding o f world politics has been structured around two 
intrinsically linked principles o f international order associated with the Westphalian 
legacy: state sovereignty, and the norm of non-intervention.
The emergence o f the modem state system, based on the secular sovereign 
nation-state, signified at its inception a fundamental choice to prioritise sovereignty 
over human rights, and order over justice, in the international affairs. Many 
pluralists are worried that in the absence o f a legitimised consensus on what norms 
and principles should govern a right o f unilateral or multilateral humanitarian 
intervention, such a right would undermine international order. This moral defence 
of the non-intervention principle is based on the United Nations (UN) Charter. The 
most important legal prohibitions against intervention are contained in Article 2.4 of 
the Charter, and it states that “No State has the right to intervene, directly or 
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal affairs o f any one S tate...” .15 
International order, and hence well-being of all individuals, is better served by 
upholding the principle o f non-intervention than by allowing humanitarian 
intervention in the absence o f a consensus on what considerations are to count as 
humanitarian. However, after the Cold War, these pillars o f the Westphalian order 
have been exposed to growing pressures, leading many interventionists to argue that 
it is time to critically review Westphalia.
13 See Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 67
14 This author is aware o f  the theoretical contradictions as to what “international society” means. For 
the sake o f  this empirical thesis, “international society” is regarded as a socially and politically 
constructed phenomenon, with normative principles underpinning the construction process.
15 Quoted in Kelly Kate Pease and David Forsythe, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, and 
W orld Politics”, Human Rights Quarterly, No. 15, 1993, p. 292
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III. Political Realism
Humanitarian intervention looks odd from realist perspectives on international 
political behaviour because it does not conform to the conceptions o f interests that 
they specify.16 Realists would expect to see some geostrategic or political advantage 
to be gained by intervening states. Neorealism and neoliberalism -  the main theories 
about the content o f international relations - might emphasise economic or trade 
advantages for interventions. Advocates of each approach have their own 
assumptions about the rules and principles that constitute international society. 
Neorealism and neoliberalism, see norms as standards o f behaviour that can alter the 
calculations o f costs and benefits and constrain the options available to policy 
makers, but again norms are exonenised. In neorealism, which focuses on security 
issues, norms reflect the distribution of power among states and have only limited 
influence as intervening variables between power distribution and international 
outcomes. Because this distribution of power is the main important determinant o f 
actor behaviour, change in international relations, including norm change, comes 
about when this distribution o f power changes.17
In contrast, neoliberals, who have worked primarily on economic interactions 
and have a relatively optimistic view o f the likelihood of sustained international co­
operation, tend to accord those intervening variables a more enduring and significant 
influence than do neorealists.18 Yet in both approaches norms o f international 
behaviour are dismissed as being determined by factors exogenous to the theory. 
Although international relations scholars have increasingly recognised the 
importance of humanitarian norms and ethical reasoning in international affairs, 
political realism continues to serve as the dominant paradigm in IR; and, though 
realism does not deny humanitarian principles, it allows little room for moral 
reasoning, focusing instead on the quest for national security and promotion of 
economic and social well-being. Thus, the realist attack on the role o f humanitarian 
norms in international politics continues along three major lines. First, international
16 For a detailed analysis o f  the role o f norms in international relations, see, for example, Martha 
Finnemore, Defining National Interests in International Society, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 
1996, chapter 1
Ann Florini, “The Evolution o f  International Norms”, 1996, p. 365
18 Ibid.
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code of “morality” 19 is lacking.20 Other realists such as E.H. Carr argue that a 
common code o f morality requires a common community.21 The sharply divergent 
traditions, values, ideologies and behaviour o f states are taken as evidence that either 
no international code o f morality exists at all, or if  it does, that it has no political 
value or meaning because it is so widely violated. Second, that international anarchy 
is inhospitable to humanitarian norms and principles. For realists, the lack o f central 
global authority is one o f the most prominent factors explaining the ineffectiveness 
o f international norms of behaviour. The extreme form of this argument, based on a 
Hobbesian view o f the international system, is that competition and lack o f trust 
among states is so intense that security becomes an overwhelming preoccupation. 
This realist conception of the international system assumes that states act always and 
only in the strategic pursuit of predefined preferences. Such a conception o f political 
behaviour corresponds with Habermas’ concept o f strategic action: the instrumental 
pursuit o f self-interest, cut off from public justification as states pursue their survival 
and self-interest in a competitive system.22
For many structural realists, national survival itself becomes the highest moral 
principle to which all other moral principles must be subordinate and that justifies 
the maximisation of national power. Third, that the ethics o f responsibility preclude 
humanitarian principles. Arthur Schleister was quoted as saying: “Saints may be 
pure, but statesmen, alas, must be responsible”.23 This statement implies that 
humanitarian norms may be useful for the lives o f non-combatant civilian 
population, but are incompatible with the responsibilities of statesmen. The above 
analysis shows that realist and liberal approaches to international politics do not 
explain humanitarian action as a practice, much less change in that practice over
19 The word morality derives from the Latin mores, meaning custom, habit, and way o f life. It 
typically describes what is good, right, or proper. According to Mark R. Amstutz, moral values have 
at leas three distinguishing features: they command universal allegiance, they demand impartiality, 
and they are largely self-enforcing. International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global 
Politics, Boulder, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999, p. 2
“ 0 David Halloran Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949 
-  1989, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 9
21 Edward .Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations, 2nd ed., New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1964, p. 169
22 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, Cambridge, M.A., MIT Press, 1996, p. 359; see also 
Marc Lynch, “The Dialogue o f Civilisations and International Public Spheres”, Millennium: Journal 
o f  International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2000, pp. 307-330, p. 317
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time, because o f their exogenous and static treatment o f interest. Investigating 
interests requires a different kind of approach. Attention to humanitarian norms and 
the way they structure interests in co-ordinated was across the international system 
provides such an approach.
IV. Solidarist International Society Theory
In contrast to Realism and Pluralism, the solidarist elements o f the international 
society concept is underpinned by common humanitarian values as a standard of 
conduct. The normative underpinnings o f the international society approach are 
expressed through the “ethical dimension”24 within the English School tradition, 
recently reflected in their research on human rights norms in international politics.25 
Solidarists argue that there is a legal right and a moral duty o f humanitarian 
intervention.26 The distinguishing feature o f this ethical dimension is the duality of 
its moral world, in which next to the political sphere, an individual sphere is 
established. According to Nicholas Wheeler, it is supposed that a sense o f cross- 
border moral responsibility for humanity is based on an individual moral 
understandings o f the good life and the principle o f solidarity.27 In this case, 
international relations are, thus, underpinned by political and personal moral values. 
For them, the concept of salience highlights the varying strength o f norms of 
international behaviour -  defined by Cortell and Davis as “prescriptions for action in 
situations o f choice”28 -  within the domestic debates.
Humanitarian norms give rise to “feelings o f obligation by social actors and, when 
violated, engender regret or a feeling that the deviation or violation requires
23 Quoted in Robert DeVries, “A Critique o f Political Realism”, in Kenneth W. Thomson (ed.), 
Community, Diversity, and a New World Order: Essays in Honor o f Inis L. Claude, Jr., New York, 
University Press o f  America, 1994, p. 239
24 The term ethical dimension is used in Nicolas Wheeler & Timothy Dunne, Good International 
Citizenship: A third way for British foreign policy, International Affairs, Vol. 74, 1998, pp. 847-870
25 Vincent, Human Rights in International Relations; Wheeler & Dunne, Good International 
Citizenship
26 See Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International 
Relations Theory, Boulder, Colorado, Westview, 1989, pp. 4-5: Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and 
Decisions, pp. 61-63
27 For an analysis o f Solidarist perspective, see Wheeler, N.J., Saving Strangers, pp. 33-51 
Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact o f International
Norms: A Research Agenda” , International Studies Review, Vol. 2, Issue 1, Spring 2000, pp. 65-87
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justification”.29 Some International Relations scholars have reached similar 
conclusions from empirical research. For example, Kathryn Sikkink found that 
norms, rules and principles have important effects by way o f domestic political 
processes, and they offer an important critique o f the Westphalian state sovereignty 
as currently constituted.30 Solidarists stress substantial values and a common 
tradition as the normative foundation of international society, which is based on the 
principle o f solidarity. They emphasise an ethical universalism that is served as a 
moral standard o f conduct. Within this approach members o f international society 
are both states and human beings. Therefore, next to regulative norms emphasised 
by pluralists, humanitarian norms are stressed as essential constitutive elements of 
the international society.31
V. Social Constructivism
Social constructism addresses some of the same normative issues addressed by the 
English School (solidarist approach), but from a different vantage, and thus with 
different effects. Prominent institutionalists from the rationalist and constructivists 
schools argue that the strength of a norm is a function o f its level of 
institutionalisation, which means the embedding of the norms tenets in the state’s 
constitutional, regulative, or judicial system.32 However, recent constructivist 
approaches on norm internalisation point out that next to political pressure and
29 Cortell & Davis, “Understanding the Domestic the Impact of International Norms”, p. 69. For a 
similar view o f salience, see Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics”, 
International Organisation, Vol. 53, No. 2, 1999, p. 381
30 Kathryn Sikkink, “Human rights, principled issue-networks, and sovereignty in Latin America”, 
International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 411-441
3* For a solidarist approach, see Vincent R.J., Human Rights in International Relations, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1986
Examples include Andrew Cortell and James Davis, “How Do International Institutions Matter? 
The Domestic Impact o f International Rules and Norms” , International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 40, 
1996, pp. 451-478; Audie Klotz, “Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and U.S. 
Sanctions against South Africa”, International Organisation, Vol. 49, No. 3, 1995, pp. 451-478; 
Andrew P. Cortell & James W. Davis, “Understanding the Domestic Impact o f International Norms: 
A Research Agenda”, International Studies Review, Vol. 2, Issue 1, Spring 2000, pp. 65-87
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economic sanctions, “social learning”33 and “complex learning”34 are important 
factors in normative change. “Social learning involves a process whereby actors, 
through interaction with broader institutional context (norms or discursive 
structures), acquire new interests and preferences -  in the absence o f obvious 
material incentives. Put differently, agent interests and identities are shaped through 
interaction”.35 The socialisation o f norms is not explained as an outcome of 
interaction, but as an interaction-process with an open end, in which communication 
and dialogue are important mechanism to internalise a norm. Communication and 
dialogue are seen as necessary preconditions for long-lasting, peaceful, co-operation 
between actors. Thomas Rise suggests that social constructivism encompasses not 
only the ‘logic o f truth seeking or arguing’.36 ‘Arguing’ in this thesis implies that 
actors try to challenge the validity claims inherent in any casual or normative 
statement and to seek a communicative consensus about their understanding o f a 
situation as well as justifications for the principles and norms guiding their action.37 
The goal o f such communicative action is to seek a reasoned consensus; in arguing 
mode, humanitarian actors try to convince each other to change their casual or 
principled beliefs in order to reach a reasoned agreement about validity claims.38 In 
contrast to solidarist approach, which treats actor identities by assumptions and thus 
their interests as fixed and given, these constructivists open up the black-box of 
actor’s identity by pointing to the transformation of material and ideal interests.
VI. CIVIL SOCIETY
Apart from Solidarist and constructivist approaches, there is also a civil society 
perspective o f the significance o f humanitarian norms, rules and principles. The 
concept o f “civil society” is taken here to refer to a political space where voluntary
33 Jeffrey Checkel, Sanctions, Social Learning and Institutions: Explaining State Compliance with 
the Norms o f European Rights Regime, Paper presented at the workshop on ‘W hy do social actors 
comply? Comparing European and International Norms’, European Consortium for Political 
Research, Mannheim, 1999, pp. 6-7
34 For a detailed analysis o f this perspective, see Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f  International 
Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999
35 Checkel, Sanctions, Social Learning and Institutions, p. 6
36 Thomas Rise, “Let’s Argue: Communicative Action in W orld Politics”, International 
Organization, Vol. 54, No. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 1-39, p. 6
37 Ibid., p. 7
38 For a detailed analysis o f the role of communicative action in world politics, see Jurgen Habermas, 
Between Facts and Norms, Cambridge, M.A., MIT Press, 1996, p. 359
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associations seek to shape the rules ( in terms of specific policies, wider norms and 
deeper social structures) that govern one or the other aspect o f social life. Recently, 
more attention is being paid to the role played by NGOs in shaping policy agendas 
and, in particular, in leading campaigns towards the establishment o f global regimes 
for such developments as banning land mines, and so forth39 For the sake of this 
study, this concept includes only religious organisations, local community groups, 
relief organisations, transnational human rights advocacy networks, think tanks, 
academic institutions, and peace movements. In the rural areas, these institutions of 
civil society are seen by many scholars as enunciating a more participatory, 
grassroots mode of operation, and were regarded as being effective in targeting the 
poor.40 It is evident that NGO activities aimed at enhancing rural communities and 
exposing them to interactions with the state enable these communities to act on their 
own. In other words, for the rural communities, more NGOs means that more voices 
can be heard in the process of making and implementing policy, and participation in 
the voluntary associations fosters attitudes and practices o f civility and 
compromise.41
However, in a civil war context, civil society is seen as being weak and 
vulnerable to domestic political pressure. The fact that the institutions o f civil 
society claim to have developmental and human rights goals does not render them 
immune to particularistic interestes, nor does it mean that they automatically 
contribute to democracy and equality.42 Africa’s history o f ethnic division has not 
only communalised its political institutions but also its civic institutions. The 
problems that arise out of such a history were acutely aggravated by civil wars of 
1980s. In a war situation, civic institutions have generally tended to reflect the same 
divisions that have come to characterise the political system. According to Peter 
Uvin, during the Rwandan genocide o f 1994, institutions o f civil society were 
divided along ethnic lines: “There were many organisations and church leaders who
39 See, for example, Keith Tester, Civil Society, London, Routledge, 1992; Nelson Kasfir (ed.), Civil 
Society and Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives, London, Frank Cass, 1998
40 For a detailed analysis o f civil society in the Third World countries’ rural areas, see, for example, 
Robert Chambers, Rural Development: Putting the Last First, Essex, Longman, 1983; Michael 
Cemea, “Culture and Organization: Social Sustainability o f Induced Development” , Sustainable 
Development, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1992, pp. 18-29
41 Michael Cemea, “Culture and Organization: Social Sustainability o f  Induced Development”, p. 24
42 See Lemarchand Rene, “Uncivil State and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became Reality” , Journal 
o f  Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1992, pp. 177-91
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subscribed to the dominant racism and eventually took active part in the 
genocide”.43 Indeed, in regions affected by civil wars, even the most neutral 
organisations such as religious institutions can be become targets o f repression or 
violence. In the Horn of Africa, for example, most civil society structures were 
destroyed, and several trade union leaders, academics and journalists either fled their 
respective countries or were imprisoned.44
Despite this gream civil war situation, I argue that the concept o f civil society 
is useful for understanding the role o f nonstates humanitarian actors in international 
relations. Like so many concepts o f political theory, civil society has been invoked 
increasingly in recent IR theory.45 It has been adopted in various formulations (such 
as global, transnational or international civil society) in order to analyse the 
increasing proliferation o f non-state actors in world affairs. Thomas Risse-Kappen 
argues that the ability o f transnational actors to promote norms (principled ideas) 
and influence state policy is dependent on domestic structures understood in terms 
of state-societal relations.46 This means that the introduction o f norms into the 
domestic discourse may come from state or societal actors and often takes the form 
of demands for a change in the policy agenda.
VII. THE AIM OF THE STUDY
The issue o f norms of international behaviour is an important case study o f how 
states and parties to the conflict situation behave towards the starving and war 
affected populations. Thus, the aim o f this thesis is to demonstrate, through the case 
study of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), that the usefulness o f humanitarian norms
43 Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, Kumarian Press, 1998, p. 
172
44 See Stephen N. Ndegwa, The Two Faces o f Civil Society: NGOs and Politics in Africa, Kumarian
Press, 1996
4~* See Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activist Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics, Ithaca-London, Cornell University Press, 1998; Charles Taylor, “Modes of 
Civil Society”, Public Culture, Vol. 3, No. 1, Fall 1990, pp. 95-118; R. Tester, Civil Society, London, 
Routledge, 1992 Martin Shaw, “Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements 
Approach”, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1994, pp. 647-667; Ronnie 
Lipschutz, “Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence o f Global Civil Society” , in R. Fawns & 
J. Larkins (eds.), International Society After the Cold War, London, Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 102 
See Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction”, in Thomass 
Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic 
Structures and International Institutions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995
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and rules in a civil war setting strengthens the case against the Realist denial of 
norms significance under conditions o f anarchy, and Pluralist claim that principles 
of sovereignty and non-intervention make humanitarian action in state’s domestic 
affairs difficult.
In measuring behavioural changes resulting from international norms, this 
thesis will use Sikkink methodology. According to Sikkink, there are two stages 
upon which one can measure the effects o f humanitarian/human rights norms on 
state behaviour.47 The first stage start with the state denial o f the legitimacy and 
refusal to co-operate with any international human rights pressures or interventions. 
In the second stage, the state would accept the legitimacy of international human 
rights practices, as evidenced by its statements in international forums, ratification 
of the relevant human rights treaties, and co-operation with international human 
rights organisations but not changes in domestic repressive practices. Sikkink argues 
that the passage from denial to lip service seem insignificant but suggests an 
important shift in the shared understandings of states that make certain justifications 
no longer acceptable.48 In the context o f this chapter, the endpoint o f this continuum 
would involve the above recognition of legitimacy and co-operation and also a 
concrete response to international pressure that changes domestic human rights 
practices in the context of an intra-state conflict.
VIII. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
There are two main reasons why Operation Lifeline Sudan case study is significant. 
First, Sudan represents a case where we would not expect such norms of 
international behaviour to have any serious impact. This is because the hard-line 
Islamic regime in Khartoum was extremely resistant to compromising its notion of 
Islamic homogeneity. Even if  not an accurate portrayal o f Sudanese society, the 
ideal o f Islamic culture was seen as contributing to the Sudan’s national identity. In 
addition to this, the GOS was hostile toward Western values, and claimed that 
humanitarian principles and rules were nothing other than American conspiracy to 
undermine the emerging Islamic state in the Sudan. This has wider implication
47 Sikkink, “Human rights, principled issue-networks, and sovereignty in Latin America” , p. 415
48 Ibid.
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because the content, the substance, the extent and limits o f international norms 
within and without specific historical and ideological contexts is still hotly contested 
by the international relations scholars and practitioners.49 It is clear, however, from 
the theoretical analysis above that the focus of scholarship on norms -  like that of 
political realism -  has been at the level of the international system, with norms held 
to affect state behaviour by providing solution to co-ordination problems50, 
providing language and grammar o f international politics51, and constituting states 
themselves.52
Second, reconciling humanitarian values with those o f the constitutive norms 
of Westphalian state sovereignty53 has become a daunting task for both scholars and 
practitioners alike. In Sudan there was a contest over both sovereignty and the 
meaning of sovereignty between the state, the opposition movement, and 
humanitarian players. The context took place mainly in Southern Sudan, a swathe of 
land between territory controlled by the Government o f the Sudan (GOS) and the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). This region was overseen and 
administered by a number o f actors: the Sudan government, the SPLA and the 
United Nations and its major donors. This disjunction between the Westphalian
49 For a discussion o f the heightened complexity o f  humanitarian assistance see, Adam Roberts, 
“Humanitarian Action in War: aid, protection and impartiality in a policy vacuum”, Adelphi Paper, 
No. 305, 1996 ; Paul Taylor, “Options for the reform o f the International system for humanitarian 
assistance”, in John Harrison, (ed.), The Politics o f Humanitarian Intervention, London, Pinter, 1995; 
Mark Duffield, “Complex Emergencies and the Crisis o f Developmentalism”, ID S Bulletin, Vol. 25, 
No. 3, October 1994; Kevin Cahill, (ed.), A Framework for Survival, Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters, New York, Council of Foreign Relations and 
Basic Books, 1993
50 Arthur A, Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic W orld” in Stephen 
Krasner (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 115-140; 
Liisa Martin, “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism”, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 4, 
1992, pp. 765-792
^ 1 Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions o f  Practical and Legal 
Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1989; Nicholas Onuf, World o f Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International 
Relations, Colombia, University o f South Carolina Press, 1989
52 See, for example, William Coplin, “International Law and Assumptions about the State System”, 
World Politics, Vol. 17, No. 4, 1965, pp. 615-635; Martha Finnemore, National Interests in 
International Society, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1996
53 This thesis treats the notion o f sovereignty as a “social contract” . It is an idea devised by social 
beings. It can change along with changing circumstances. Thus, state sovereignty is not some 
immutable principle decreed in fixed form once and for all time, but rather an argument about state 
authority whose meaning and scope are constantly subject to re-evaluation. See Thomas J. Biersteker
& Cynthia W eber (eds.), State Sovereignty as Social Contract, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1996
25
organising principles and international humanitarian norms had created dilemmas 
for the UN agencies working in the Sudan during 1986 to 1989. However, much of 
OLS rational diplomacy during the period 1989-96 was to deal with this 
contradiction between the affirmation o f universal humanitarian norms and the 
reaffirmation o f the international society (society of states) principles o f territorial 
sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic social issues.
IX. ORGANISATION OF THE CASE-STUDY MATERIAL
In order to understand the technical sophistication o f OLS in tackling the mixture of 
motives and views prevalent in such politically charged operational war 
environment, this thesis was guided by four questions: what where the obstacles 
which led to the establishment o f OLS as a solution?; What policy instruments did 
OLS use to dialogue with the parties to the Sudan conflict and the donor states?; 
What effects did these rhetorical devices have on the behaviour o f the Sudanese 
government, the rebel movement and the donor governments?; and what lessons can 
we learn from the experience o f OLS for our understanding of international 
relations? Thus, this thesis was structured into six chapters as follows:
Chapter 1 examines the multifaceted context o f humanitarian crisis in Sudan 
by answering the question: what were the obstacles which led to the establishment 
o f OLS as a solution? The chapter answers this question by first providing a 
historical overview of the issues in the Sudan conflict, and their consequences in 
terms o f humanitarian emergency.54 These issues -  economics, religious and 
identity -  are important and relevant to this study because they form the background 
of the current humanitarian disaster in the Sudan on which the UN has been called 
upon to intervene. This will then be followed by a typology o f  famine, and the 
events leading to the establishment of OLS as a solution to the obstacles to external 
intervention. Chapter 2 answers the second question by describing the debate on the 
local legitimacy of the OLS normative position, the plans o f action, and the
54 The inclusion o f post-1996 literature should be seen as an attempt by the author to show that at the 
time o f writing up this thesis OLS was still surviving against the odds of its uncertain operational 
environments. Substantive case study chapters 2, 3 , 4 , and 5 contain some post-1996 data on OLS.
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agreement over humanitarian norms and principles that underpin humanitarian 
operation.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are case studies and they answer the third question. That is, 
these broadly accepted international policy instruments (norms, principles and rules) 
will be assessed in order to show their strengths and weaknesses in a civil war 
situation.
Chapter 3 examines the different agendas o f the donor states, and assesses 
whether these agendas were influenced by humanitarian norms and principles or that 
these rhetorical devices were merely state instruments o f foreign policy. 
Accordingly, the focus here will be to examine the difficulties that humanitarian 
action presents for states and the moral considerations applied in the decisions of 
leaders o f states to commit their resources to intervention in support o f the Sudanese 
citizens. The impact o f such political devices will be seen from the extent to which 
Western and neighbouring states -  USA, European and IGAD -  acted as regard the 
declared aim o f promoting OLS humanitarian programmes, and democratic 
governance in the Sudan.
The significance of chapters 4 and 5 is that they are an attempt to compare and 
contrast the effects o f humanitarian norms and principles in areas controlled by the 
sovereign authority in Khartoum determined to protect its territorial integrity and 
those controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A). 
Chapter 4 examines the effects o f the Ground Rules -  which were established as 
framework for OLS interaction with the opposition movement - on the behaviour of 
the SPLM/A, and the extent to which such change in behaviour allowed the 
implementation o f programmes such as good governance, capacity building and 
development in the Southern Sector. Chapter 5 assesses the impact o f these policy 
instruments or technique on the behaviour o f the host government.
Chapter six contains thesis summary and conclusion. The conclusion of this 
thesis is that throughout 1989-96, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) was able to use 
international humanitarian norms and principles to create a conducive environment 
on which the rights o f internally displaced persons to relief food and security was 
possible.
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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND TO MULTIFACETED HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN 
SUDAN. 
1 . 1 .  OVERVIEW
This first chapter provides a background to the Sudan multifaceted humanitarian 
relief crisis, and it does this by answering one specific question: What were the 
problems for which the international community established OLS as a solution? The 
argument o f this chapter is that the armed conflict in Southern Sudan illustrates that 
action resulting in internally displaced persons is an intentional, deliberate strategy 
of the parties to the internal conflict, and not just a consequence or unintended effect 
o f the hostilities between the Government o f the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A).55 Parallel to the main 
argument, is a consideration of the role o f the international community in the form 
o f the UN in the Sudan disaster relief management response. Therefore, the 
successful launching o f OLS as a UN humanitarian programme is viewed here 
against the absence o f effective international humanitarian intervention in 1986-88, 
when the deaths of half a million persons from the famine and war are believed to 
have occurred.56
In early 1984, a UN good offices mission, within which the United Nations 
Emergency Office for Sudan (UNEOS) represented the humanitarian component, 
was based in Khartoum. The UNEOS, the first in the line o f international agencies 
concerned with disaster emergencies, was responsible for emergency relief in the 
Sudan from 1984-1986 when the Government o f the Sudan closed it down.57 During 
this period, UNEOS was co-ordinating relief efforts in the areas of the north affected
55 The strategic use o f displacement by the parties to the conflict has become common in intra-state 
conflict. But the solutions to them are seems not to be the same. For example, on the Kosovo conflict, 
see William Haiden, “The Kosovo Conflict: The Strategic Use o f  Displacement and the obstacles to 
International Protection”, Civil Wars, Vol. 2, Spring, 1999, pp. 35-68
56 Alex de Waal, “Starving Out the South, 1984-9” in Daly M.W. and Ahmed Alawad Sikainga 
(eds.), Civil W ar in the Sudan, London, British Academic Press, 1993, pp. 165-72
57 Ibid., p 161
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by drought, and not mandated to deal with the problem of the internally displaced 
population in the south of the country. During that period, donor states were still 
unwilling to yield authority to the UN agencies, and they sought once again to limit 
UNEOS responsibilities owing from the emerging displaced persons problem.58 
Thus, UNEOS was created as a temporary, small international agency that would 
pose no threat to state interests or national sovereignty, imposed no financial 
obligations on states, and provided no commitment to internally displaced persons. 
When the natural disasters ended in early 1986, UNEOS was then forced to hand 
over all its relief activities to the government owned Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission (RRC). It was only in April 1989 that assistance to the southern 
Sudan’s displaced persons was organised within the framework o f the United 
Nations-led Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). OLS was a political arrangement 
between the Government o f the Sudan (GOS), the UN and member states, and its 
mandate was to deliver relief aid to all internally displaced population in areas 
controlled by the parties to the conflict. During 1989-96, OLS was responsible not 
only for protecting the internally displaced in the Sudan war zones, but also for 
catalysing and co-ordinating the efforts to assist them materially.
Operation Lifeline Sudan had a lynchpin position in these networks and had 
set its headquarters in Lokichoggio, northern Kenya, for direct liaison with the 
numerous international and local relief agencies operating in the rebel controlled 
territories. The importance o f OLS is that throughout the period discussed in this 
thesis, it provided the international community -  governments, UN and NGOs - with 
a moderate voice in a violent “civil war”59 setting. As the story o f OLS was rooted 
in the Sudan’s history, I will therefore begin this chapter with an overview o f the 
war. A brief historical description o f the issues in the conflict will give the reader a 
panoramic view o f the humanitarian challenges facing the United Nations and other 
major players. The usefulness of revisiting these historically important issues in the 
Sudan conflict is based on the understanding that most humanitarian operations fail 
because those who carry out such activities are not often aware or informed o f the 
complexity o f the conflict. After analysing the structures and attitudes prevalent in
58 UNICEF/OLS, Humanitarian Principles, Nairobi, 1990, p. 1
5 ' “civil war” refers to violent conflicts between two or more parties for control o f political authority 
in a state or part o f it. Such conflict can take the form o f conventional battles or prolonged guerrilla 
warfare.
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the Sudan conflict, the chapter will then describe the different stages o f famine, 
followed by an analysis o f the reasons, which made the international community 
establish OLS as a solution.
1 . 2 .  THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SUDAN CRISIS
An brief analysis o f the nature and extent o f Sudan’s political, social and economic 
crisis is important because it has influence on how OLS framed humanitarian norms 
and principles to guide its programmes in a civil war setting. The various Sudanese 
scholars have different analyses of Sudan political, economic and social problems, 
and the different proposals for the future, but they are in fundamental agreement that 
the answers to those problems lie in a national solution. However, a section o f this 
length cannot be expected to deal thoroughly with such issues; all it can do is to map 
out briefly the main issues in the conflict which have created the humanitarian crisis 
in which Operation Lifeline Sudan was established to solve. There is a traditional 
literature which clearly show that identity, religion and economic marginalisation 
were the factors which led to the outbreak of North-South conflict in 1983. For 
example, Peter Woodward argued that the forces of sectarianism have resulted in the 
development o f ‘symbolic’ nature to both ethnicity and religion in Sudan60:
The three major elements o f  Sudanese politics — religion, ethnicity, and 
class -  all relatively flu id  structures in a changing society, were being 
employed fo r  the maintenance o f  the multiparty system. But clientelism 
through which that operated was necessarily selective, and so regions 
deprived on one or more count were particularly likely to fe e l neglected 
or worst. The south was effectively excluded on all three accounts. The 
south lacked economic development and an indigenous trading class out 
o f  which some effective party base might have been constructed; it was 
largely alienated on the religious score; and its indigenous ethnic 
structures had never been as effectively tied into the state as was the case 
in the north.61
Peter Woodward, Sudan 1898 -  1989: The Unstable State, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1990, pp. 180- 185
61 Ibid., p. 134
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Woodward explained that various religious political parties in the North used 
symbols and language o f ethnicity and religion in response to social forces in order 
to maintain a sense of culture and community. To expand further Woodward 
arguments above, this thesis divides Sudanese Muslim political thought into three 
categories, each with a different approach to the multinational nature o f the 
Sudanese state but seems to be united in their desire for an Arab national identity. 
The first may be called the “secularist” because it rhetorically embraces the 
legitimacy of Sudan multinational territorial state. Its proponents -  most o f whom 
are drawn from the Sudanese Communist Party -  may be further divided into two 
strands. One strand o f “Islamically sensitive” secularists attempts to appropriate, co­
opt, or coexist with Islam in mutually supportive but separate spheres. Islam is 
regarded as a key source o f national identity but otherwise devoid o f practical 
political significance. Another strand sees organised Islam as a threat to national 
integration or modernisation and therefore attempts to eliminate Islam from the 
Sudanese public life. However, these two strands share one thing: pan-Arab 
nationalism. As the events in the Sudan show, the Sudanese Communist Party has 
yet to disengage convincingly the link between religion and politics. Not 
surprisingly, the Party remains peripheral to the Sudan Islamic discourse.
The second category is that o f the “Islamic pragmatists”, and they are mainly 
members o f the Umma and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) respectively.62 Their 
aim is to reconcile Islamic ethical ideals with the prevailing Sudanese realities (the 
multinational nature o f the Sudanese state). Several pragmatist thinkers, including 
Sadig al-Mahdi, the leader o f Umma party and Mohammad Uthman al-Mirghani, 
DUP leader, have acknowledged that the country is facing identity crisis and that 
something must be done to reconcile Sudan perceived Islamic and Arab identity 
with those o f the African ethnic groups. President Omer Beshir, who is a member o f 
the Khatmiyya sect, belongs to this category.
The third category comprises those who may be called the “Islamic 
cosmopolitans”, and who are drawn from the ranks o f National Islamic Front (NIF). 
The latter argue that Sudan must be an Islamic state, and that the country’s national 
identity should be Islamic. Islamic thinkers such as Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of
62 For an analysis o f the impact o f these parties on Sudanese political system, see Sidgi Awad 
Kabalo & Ray Bush, “The Sudan State: continuity and change”, in Sudan: Environment and People, 
Durham University, Sudan Studies, 8-11 April, 1991, pp. 185-209
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NIF, believe that any compromise solution to the North-South conflict will 
undermine Muslim solidarity, and thus stop the progress o f Islamic project. As 
stated above, all these three categories share the believe that Sudan national identity 
should be Arab, though each have different strategies o f how such a vision should 
implemented. The real challenge facing this Sudanese Muslim political thought is 
the war in the south o f country, where the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) 
is fighting for the right to self-determination for the people o f Southern Sudan. As 
Martin Daly has observed, looking inside the country appears to reveal two different 
national visions, which are increasingly proving to be irreconcilable:
The civil war that has been under way since 1983, no less than that 
which lasted from  1955-1972, has as one o f  its principals causes 
fundamentally opposing views o f  what it means or should mean to be a 
Sudanese....Resolution o f  the conflict may therefore involve a major 
change in the social and political structure o f  the Sudan ”.63
What Daly seems to be saying is that since these two identities appear to be 
incompatible or irreconcilable, unless one side succeeds in imposing its will to the 
other, the country may have to accept partition. For Daly, the demise o f the Addis 
Ababa arrangements and evident failure o f the process o f national recociliation 
occurred against a background o f economic crisis.64 While Daly and Woodward 
have emphasised the role o f religion and identity as contested issues in the North- 
South relations, other scholars have paid attention to the socio-economic condition 
o f the country as one o f the factors in the civil war. One o f the scholars that has 
written on the impact o f the North-South conflict on the Sudanese economy is Mark 
Duffield, and his work has been cited throughout this thesis. In his recent to report to 
the European Community Humanitarian Office, Duffield explained that since the 
nineteenth century Sudan’s commercial economy had been concentrated in the Nile 
regions o f the north.65 He explained that an important and long-term characteristic of
63 Martin W. Daly, “Islam, secularism, and ethnic identity in the Sudan”, in Gustavo Benavides & 
M artin W. Daly (eds.), Religion and Political Power, New York, State University o f  New York Press,
1989, p. 83
64 Daly, M.W., “Broken Bridge and Empty Basket: The Political and Economic background o f the 
Sudanese Civil W ar”, in M.W. Daly & Ahmad Alawad Sikainga (eds.), Civil W ar in the Sudan, 
London, British Academic Press, 1993, p. 21
65 Mark Duffield, Sudan: Unintended Consequences o f Humanitarian Assistance, A Report to the 
European Community Humanitarian Office, The University of Dublin, Trinity College, November 
1999, p. 53
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this economy was that its profitability had depended upon the existence o f cheap 
labour which, to a significant degree, lacked freedom, citizenship and political 
rights: “ ....Sudan post-colonial governments have progressively undermined the 
position that southerners (the people o f Southern Sudan) had achieved in the 
colonial local government structure. This process has been taking place over several 
decades and significantly deepened during the current war. While southerners are by 
law Sudanese citizens, their incorporation into the northern economy coincided with 
the Islamisation of elite politics and the decline in secularism....”66 Other scholars 
have also examined the Sudanese political crisis from socio-economic perspective. 
For instance, Sidgi Kabalo and Ray Bush pointed out that the post-colonial 
Sudanese state was characterised by political instability and poor economic 
performance.67 They provided statistical evidence, based on the World Bank 1990 
report, to prove their case: “ ...Total long term outstanding debt and disbursement is 
US$ 8.4 billion which is equal to 74.6% o f Sudan’s gross national product....”68 The 
effects o f this poor economic performance, coupled with unfair distribution o f these 
scarce resources between the North and the South, has indirectly fuelled the civil 
war.
Sidgi and Bush also share Woodward’s view that the failure o f the 
successive Sudanese government to resolve regional and ethnic disparities was a 
significant element in the crisis o f the state soon after independence.69 Douglas 
Johnson extended this analysis o f the crisis o f the Sudanese state to include the 1972 
Addis Ababa Agreement, among others, as one of the main reasons for the outbreak 
o f the conflict in 1983. According to Johnson, the humanitarian crisis, that have 
encouraged the international community to intervene on behalf o f the civilians 
displaced by war, arose as a result o f the failure o f the Addis Ababa Peace 
Agreement “to secure significant political autonomy for the south; to establish a 
measure o f regional control over the south’s autonomy and the direction o f its 
development; to include the south in any significant way in the running o f the 
central government; (4) to resolve the issues o f the border territories o f Hofrat an-
66 Duffield, M., Sudan: Unintended Consequences of Humanitarian Assistance, p. 53
67 Sidgi & Bush, “The Sudan State: continuity and change”, pp. 186-7
68 Ibid. p. 186
69 Ibid., p. 187
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Nahas/Kafia, Abyei and Chali” .70 Interestingly, Johnson’s analysis shows that the 
failure o f the Addis Ababa Agreement to bring political stability and economic 
development for the Southern region had provided the basis for the 1983 rebellion 
against the Sudanese state.71 In summary, most of the scholars cited above have 
identified three main reasons which led to the outbreak o f the conflict in 1983.72 
First, there was considerable suspicion at the announcement that Egypt and Sudan 
would jointly build a canal at Jonglei to provide 4.7 billion cubic metres o f water 
annually. In addition to the charges o f southern neglect, Jonglei was seen as an 
example of Sudanese-Egyptian integration in practice, and this too was deeply 
feared in the South as leading to further marginalisation and discrimination against 
the region. Second, the issue o f equity of access to state power and resources have 
been determined in a pre-emptive fashion in favour of the hegemony of the northern 
Arab Sudanese. For example, the economic benefits which southerners had hoped 
for, and been promised in 1972 by the ruling elite in Khartoum, did not materialise, 
despite the discovery o f oil in the south.73 The third was the redivision of the south 
into weak autonomous regions and the imposition of Sharia law in September 1983. 
President Nimeri decision redivide the South into three weak autonomous region 
was seen by southerners as further evidence o f Arab northern attempt to suppress 
and marginalised the region politically and economically.
The analysis above shows that there is a very strong concern nurtured within 
the northern elite about the necessity o f promoting a strong state that has effective 
authority that cannot be contested by the peripheral regions, non-Arab and non- 
Muslim ethnic groups. This was seen by the manner with which the military junta in 
Khartoum attempted to institute authoritarian Islamic federal framework as the only 
legitimate framework for articulating, mobilising and aggregating diverse demands 
and claims on the state. Racial, linguistic and religious categories have become the 
basis for crucially important power relations that have resulted in the peoples who
Douglas, “North-South Issues”, p. 120 
Ibid., p. 119
Woodward, “Sudan: Threats to Stability”, Conflict Studies No. 173, London, The Institute for the 
Study o f Conflict, February 1985, pp. 1 -  22; Douglas Johnson, “North-South Issues”, in Woodward, 
Sudan After Nimeiri, pp. 119 -  138. For a recent detailed analysis o f the Sudanese conflict, see, for 
example, Ann Mosely Lesch, The Sudan -  Contested National Identities, Indianapolis, Indiana 
University Press, 1998
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live in the northern and central Nile Valley wielding disproportionate political and 
economic power.74 Indeed, throughout the years following independence, the 
Khartoum government, with its military machine and unshakeable electoral 
majority, was under no pressure and felt no need to make overtures to the African 
people in the south of the country. The South affected by exclusionary and 
discriminating policies reacted in frustrated opposition and withheld support for the 
political system which it considered o f questionable legitimacy. Relevant to this 
thesis is the fact that the conflict has led to the collapse and destruction of 
institutions in virtually all parts of Southern Sudan and fringing areas such as the 
Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile. All parties to the conflict were human rights 
abusers. In terms o f humanitarian consequences o f the war, the scale of suffering 
was staggering. The UN estimated that some three million Sudanese were displaced 
in 1986-88, and that half a million deaths resulted from disease and starvation.75 The 
section below will identify the events leading to mass starvation in Southern Sudan.
1 . 3 .  THE TYPOLOGY OF FAMINE CRISIS
The realist will argue rightly that destabilisation and displacement o f non- 
combatants were strategic imperatives for both parties to realise their objectives. It is 
these strategic imperatives that led to famine in Southern Sudan during 1986-89.76 
Three principal stages can be identified in the genesis o f the famine from 1986 to the 
period when the international community launched OLS. The first stage, which 
began from January to December 1986, saw an intensification of the war, including 
SPLA laying siege to government-held garrison towns, and increased use o f militia 
forces by the government. Throughout the year, the SPLA attitude to relief was 
uncompromisingly hostile. The most important causes for this famine were the 
results o f deliberate policies adopted by the insurgents. Both the government and the 
SPLA denied food to the civilian population in the war zones. The policies o f
7-’ For a discussion of oil politics in the Sudan, see Raphael Badal Koba, Oil and regional sentiments 
in Southern Sudan, Discussion Paper No. 80, Department o f Geography, Syracuse, Syracuse 
University, 1983
74 Ann M osely Lesch, Sudan: Contested National Identities, Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 
1998, p. 3
75 DHA, “Emergency Assistance to the Sudan: Summary of Urgent Humanitarian Requirements” , 
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denying relief did not create the famine, but made it much more severe when famine 
occurred. These tactics included obstructing relief supplies, distorting commercial 
food markets and preventing famine-stricken populations from following “coping” 
strategies (for instance searching in the bush for wild foods).77 Even where these 
activities did not directly create starvation, they left rural people so destitute that 
even mild climatic adversity, such as drought or flood, made them vulnerable to 
famine. The government attitude hardened in the second half o f the year. The 
argument o f the national authorities was that by not adhering to the laid down 
government policies -  which included supervision o f relief aid going into the rebel- 
held areas -  the UN and NGOs were flouting the constitutive norms o f state 
sovereignty. Given the importance o f such norms to the pluralist international 
society theory, this left no room for Western donors and relief agencies to operate 
policies based on the neutrality o f aid without alienating the government. The 
donors chose to go along with the government relief directives.78
The second stage, which was from December 1986 to September 1988, saw a 
slow build up of the famine, culminating in the mass deaths by starvation of 
displaced people from Bahr el Ghazal during the middle o f 1988.79 The two years- 
long fighting between the SPLA and the government forces and the resulting 
destruction o f infrastructure, compounded by successive years of drought in the 
south as well as in the central and western parts of the Sudan, have generated 
greatest number o f the world’s internally displaced population.80 According to 
World Refugee Survey 1993, the number o f the displaced in the Sudan hovered 
around 5 million by the time international community was struggling to establish 
OLS. In Khartoum, displaced persons were believed to constitute approximately 40
76 For an analysis o f the degree o f famine and suffering, see Millard J. Burr, Quantifying Genocide in 
the Southern Sudan, 1983 -  1993, Washington D.C., US Committee for Refugees, 1993
77 Alex e Waal, “Some comments on militias in the contemporary Sudan”, in Daly M.W. and Ahmed 
Alawad, Civil War in the Sudan, p. 150; see also, David Keen, “The Functions o f Famine in 
Southwest Sudan: Implications for R elief’, in Macrae J. & Zwi A. (eds.), W ar and Hunger, pp. 111- 
122
78 Millard J. Burr, Quantifying Genocide in the Southern Sudan, p. 15
79 UN, Emergency Situation in Sudan: Urgent Humanitarian Assistance Requirements, Geneva, 
DHA, November 10, 1988, pp. 4 - 11
80 UNHCR, UNHCR’s Operational Experience with Internally Displaced Persons, Geneva: Office o f 
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Division of International Protection, 
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per cent o f the city’s population.81 This massive displacement resulted from raiding 
by government militias, and scorched-earth tactics o f  the regular army and the 
SPLA, which rendered much of northern Bahr el Ghazal and central Upper Nile a 
wasteland. The SPLA siege o f government-held towns was tight, and army officers 
were said to have made private fortunes from speculating in grain and other 
commodities in short supply. During this period, relief programmes were mostly 
ineffective.
The third stage, which was from October 1988 to September 1989, saw the 
situation improved in the rural areas following the military gains by the SPLA, 
which prevented raiding by government militias. In the garrison towns, however, the 
famine intensified, as the SPLA noose became tighter. The famine also came to 
world attention at this point. The donors tried to initiate relief efforts while still 
conciliating the government. By December 1989, the failure o f the policy o f 
conciliation became increasingly apparent. For the first time Western donors took 
decisive action at the cost o f opposing the policies o f the government, and took 
initiatives to influence the course o f events.8-2 The SPLA was also influenced by the 
donors to change its tactics and to accept food relief. But as the international 
community was trying to establish a mechanism for relieving the suffering o f the 
civilian population, the war broke out again, and the government, under pressure 
from the military establishment, announced its intention to crush the SPLA by force 
of arms. A combination of deliberate policy and ineptitude served to deny relief food 
to the needy population o f Southern Sudan during the years 1986-88.83 The 
deliberate policy operated at several levels. In Khartoum, the government and the 
Military High Command made a series o f decisions that effectively prevented relief 
programmes.84 As Mark Duffield explained:
....Merchants, militia leaders , politicians and army officers connived 
together to cause and profit from  this famine. They armed militia groups, 
organised the sale o f  looted livestock, put captive labour to work on 
commercial farms, prevented relief from reaching the area and, through
81 UNHCR, Operational Experience with Internally Displaced Persons, p. 50
82 Haider A., Note for the Record: Sudan Donor’s Meeting, 23 March, 1989, New York, March 28, 
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83 Millard J. Burr, Quantifying Genocide in the Southern Sudan, p. 2
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circuits o f  the informal economy, dispatched some o f  the proceeds 
abroad as capital flight. Although the poor suffer as a result o f  the 
‘disaster’ o f  war and famine, through the process o f  actual adjustment 
the powerful and well-connected frequently gain
These decisions may not have been made with the deliberate intention o f creating 
starvation, but that was one of their foreseeable consequences. In addition, the GOS 
connived in and implicitly encouraged local administrators and military 
commanders to obstruct relief.86 The government, like the SPLA, hampered the 
relief effort by bombing towns, and restricting aid flights to the south. Not 
surprisingly, the situation o f persons displaced as a direct result o f the conflict in the 
south was particularly worse than those affected by the drought. Subjected to 
appalling living conditions in camps and shanty towns around the country, used as 
pawns by both parties to the conflict for which denial o f humanitarian assistance 
became a political and military tool, and forced to endure a coercive policy of 
relocation, the majority o f the internally displaced southerners had found themselves 
in an extremely vulnerable situation. NGOs such as the Sudan Council o f Churches 
(SCC), Sudanaid, Oxfam-UK, Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF) and the International 
Committee o f the Red Cross (ICRC) alerted governments and UN agencies to the 
food shortages in the south in 1986.87 The NGOs also sought to mount their own 
relief initiatives, which lacked the international visibility and political support, 
which might have helped sustain them.88
But as described in the next section below, the humanitarian imperative to 
provide food and protection for non-combatants in the Sudan was decisively limited 
or effectively impaired. The realists argue that when both parties to the conflict 
turned to the use o f force in the above setting, invariably strategic calculations on 
the utility o f forced displacement had overridden international normative 
prohibitions against violating the human rights o f non-combatant civilians. This
85 M ark Duffield, “Where Famine is Functional”, Middle East Report, September/October 1991, p. 
29
86 S.O. Efuk, The Politics o f  Famine in Sudan; de Waal, “Starving Out the South”, p. 171
87 At the same time as famine occurred, the Sudan government did its best to invoke sovereignty and 
use bureaucratic obstructions to keep relief food from starving southerners (the people o f  southern 
Sudan). See, Francoise Jean (ed.), Life, Death and Aid, the Medecins Sans Frontiers Report on World 
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poses virtually insurmountable obstacles to giving effect to international 
humanitarian action. Thus, the section below describes the earlier humanitarian 
relief obstacles that led to the launching of Operation Lifeline Sudan as a solution. 
Such a description is necessary because the failure o f such earlier relief efforts and 
the human suffering that became an embarrassment to the international community 
as pictures o f  starving women and children were flushed all over the world, forced 
the Sudanese authorities and the UN to overcome the obstacles posed by pluralist 
international society theory.
1 . 3 . 1 .  SOVEREIGNTY AS OBSTACLE TO INTERVENTION
Pluralist claim that the constitutive principles o f state sovereignty and non­
intervention make intervention difficult in states’ domestic affairs is useful in 
understanding why it was difficult for international community to intervene into 
Sudan internal affairs on humanitarian grounds. In 1986-88, the UN, donor states 
and NGOs encountered six major obstacles which directly resulted from GOS use o f 
its sovereignty. The first obstacle was in March 1986 when the GOS threatened to 
close down CART (Combined Agency Relief Team)89 because o f policy 
differences. CART was set up in the Southern Sudan capital, Juba, with the support 
o f the European Community (EC), and its aim was to relieve the suffering o f the 
displaced population in areas held by the government. CART operated on the 
solidarist principle that aid should be neutral and accounted for; no CART relief was 
to be transported by military convoy.90 Under CART, several NGOs began to assist 
the civilian population in the south of the country, and these included Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA), Oxfam, and World Vision International. But such efforts were 
vulnerable to political pressure. While Sudan government was perhaps less frontal in 
its assault on relief efforts, it used its territorial prerogatives to frustrate CART 
attempts to supply civilians in the south. It maintained that relief could only be 
provided in the areas it controlled, where it supervised relief activities closely, and 
withheld permission for agencies to operate elsewhere. Towards the end of 1987, 
CART was forced to close down as the situation o f the war became more
8 * CART was a consortium o f non-governmental organisations working in areas held by the Sudan 
government. The NGOs involved in this consortium were composed o f secular and ecumenical 
organisations.
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complicated, with each warring party determined to frustrate international relief 
efforts.
The second obstacle was an attempt in 1986 to run a joint UN relief 
programme code-named “Operation Rainbow”. This was a relatively modest attempt 
to provide relief to civilians in the government held towns, particularly Juba, using 
one Hercules aeroplane. Winston Prattley, the UN Resident Representative in 
Sudan, directed it. Prattley estimated that 960,000 people in Southern Sudan faced 
famine. “I think a lot o f people will certainly die”, said Mr. Prattley91, and he 
appealed for food truce to allow relief to reach famine-affected civilians in the 
combat zones. In May that year, reports in the international press told o f 600,000 
people driven from their homes by militia activities in one province alone.9  ^ Mr. 
Prattley was involved in delicate negotiations with both the government and the 
SPLA. His appeal for a food truce was unsuccessful because the government o f the 
Sudan (GOS) was outraged by the very fact that the UN Resident Representative 
was talking to the “terrorists”, a reference to the SPLA. The GOS not only prevented 
Operation Rainbow from proceeding, but it also expelled Prattley himself. Mr. 
Prattley was accused by Khartoum of “political meddling” and was expelled in 
October 1986 93 Under most circumstances the expulsion of the most senior UN 
representative in a country would have elicited some form of reactions from the 
major donor states involved in the Sudan disaster emergencies.
Given the fact that “Operation Rainbow” was set up by the international 
community, why were the strongest members of this community ( the donors) silent 
over the expulsion o f the UN Resident Representative? The international civil 
servants (officials working within the UN system) reacted from a pluralist 
perspective by arguing that the donor community acted responsibly by not publicly 
condemning the sovereign government in Khartoum. According to these officials, 
any condemnation at that time would have made the government more 
uncooperative.94 What was needed in such a delicate situation, they argued, was
90 NGOs, Internal Report on the Situation in Juba, Juba, South Sudan, August 25, 1992, p. 6
91 S. O. Efuk, The Politics o f Famine in Sudan, p.
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behind-the-scene diplomacy. In fact, from this author’s own experience, some o f the 
donors privately welcomed the expulsion, because the UN, the European 
Community (EC) and the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) were all competing for influence and programmes in the Sudan.95 In fact, 
Washington’s dislike of the World Body is well documented.96 According to 
MacKinnon, relations between the US and the UN “had been a steep decline during 
the preceding two and a half decades: as the 1970s and the Carter administration 
gave way to the 1980s and the Reagan administration, the United Nations 
increasingly found itself on the very periphery o f American foreign-policy 
thinking”.97 Even bad news for the Organisation was the strong criticisms o f the UN 
by members of both Republican and Democratic parties in the US Congress. 
Representatives and Senators (both conservatives, and unilateralists) alike eyed the 
UN with a great deal of suspicion, leading them to aim at the Organisation, and its 
programmes.98 In the Sudan, this hostility towards the UN was very much in the air. 
According to one NGO official, the contempt held by USAID for the UN 
programmes was no secret, while the EC sought to exploit any opportunities opened 
by the government."
Whatever the reasons behind the donor states silence, the triumph of the 
government’s hard-line policies over humanitarian needs were achieved because -  
as pluralists rightly claimed - it had exposed the impotence o f the UN and its 
member states in dealing with the sovereignty issue. Some scholars have proved that 
many o f the moral dilemmas with which humanitarians are faced in the international 
arena today arise from uncertainty over the relative value to be attached to 
sovereignty and to human rights, to states and to human beings.100 In international 
relations humanitarian norms often conflict with the principle o f sovereignty. 
Sovereignty in its classical realist interpretation is an expression o f the principle of 
non-intervention and self-determination in the sense that domestic policies are not a
95 Millard J. Burr, Quantifying Genocide in the Southern Sudan, p. 19
96 See, for example, Michael G. MacKinnon, The Evolution o f US Peacekeeping Policy Under 
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concern o f international politics. The most important legal prohibitions against 
intervention are contained in the UN Charter, which states (Article 2.4) that the UN 
members are obligated to “refrain in their international relations from the use of 
force against territorial integrity or political independence o f any other state.” 
Moreover, in 1965, the General Assembly passed Resolution 2131, which states in 
part: “No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason 
whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed 
intervention and all other forms o f interference or attempted threats against the 
personality o f the State or against its political, economic, or cultural elements are 
condemned”.101 Five years later, the General Assembly passed Resolution 2625, 
titled the Declaration on Principles o f International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation Among States, which reiterated the non-intervention 
norm. This means that within this self-governing territory, the sovereign state has 
undivided jurisdiction over all persons and ideas they might hold. Thus, donor 
governments’ muted response to the dismissal o f a top UN official should be seen 
from the way they value the constitutive principles o f the Westphalia state 
sovereignty.
The third obstacle was in June 1986 in which the Sudanese churches and a 
group of aid agencies launched an appeal for relief for the famine-stricken areas, 
thus supporting Mr. Prattley earlier appeal for a food truce, which they saw as an 
essential precondition for a relief operation. Mark Duffield, then Oxfam Field 
Director, said: “Aid agencies decided to bring out the statement because they think it 
is getting near the end of the line in southern Sudan. There’s going to be nothing left 
in the south”.102 Nothing came o f the appeals for a food truce in 1986. In fact, 
towards the end o f that year, the central government embarked upon a more 
comprehensive campaign o f misinformation. In December 1986, relief agencies 
proposed a relief programme for 1987. This proposal had two key elements.103 One 
was an estimate o f need amounting to seventy one thousand tonnes o f relief food for
100 Caroline Thomas & Melvyn Reader, “Human Rights and Intervention: A Case for Caution”, in 
Jan Nederveen Pieterse (ed.), World Orders in the Making: Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond, 
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the first six months o f 1987.104 The agencies wanted the government to forward this 
to the donor countries as an official request. This would obviously have involved the 
government declaring a famine emergency in the south. The second element was 
that the relief should be neutral and should be accounted for. Normal practice was 
for the GOS to endorse the figure, and to use it as the basis o f an appeal to the 
donors for food and resources to transport the food. However, at the two aid co­
ordinating meetings held in December, chaired by Kamal Shwagi, the head o f the 
government-owned Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), the government 
blocked these proposals.105 The Sudanese government refused to endorse the 
agencies’ estimate o f need, though it passed it to the donors and the UN as an 
‘information briefing.106 This intransigent position by a sovereign authority forced 
the donors to rethink their position with regard to the situation. Although there was a 
consensus that something must be done to relieve the suffering o f the civilians 
caught in the war zones, no donor was prepared for a confrontation with the 
Khartoum government. In fact, the expulsion o f Winston Prattley served as a 
warning to those contemplating a confrontation with the sovereign authorities. It was 
not surprising, therefore, that the donor community, and the relief agencies chose to 
placate the government and work for change through cooperation and quiet 
diplomacy. But this policy yielded no fruits.
The fourth obstacle has two stages. The first stage was the decision by the 
GOS to close down the UN Emergency Office for Sudan (UNEOS) itself, on the 
grounds that the famine was over. The famine they referred to was, o f course, the 
1984/5 famine in Western Sudan, rather than the developing famine in South Sudan. 
Again, the UN did not object, and UNEOS was closed down and its assets and 
responsibilities were transferred to the government owned Relief and Rehabilitation 
Commission (RRC). No UN agency even considered providing relief aid to SPLA- 
held areas during 1987 and most o f 1988. A second stage was that UNICEF opened 
a small co-ordinating office in Nairobi to assist NGOs that were beginning small- 
scale operations in non-government held areas.107 But in a meeting on 3ld October 
1988, Dr. Hussein Abu Salih, the Sudanese Foreign Minister, objected to James
104 Alex e Waal, “Starving Out the South”, p. 170
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Grant, then Director o f UNICEF, that this was in violation o f Sudanese 
sovereignty.108 Unhappy about foreign interference in its domestic affairs, the GOS 
insisted on being kept fully in the picture and on playing a major role itself.
This brings us to the fifth obstacle, and that is the failure o f donor policy o f 
appeasement. Before the establishment o f OLS in 1989, donors’ relief agendas had 
three main limitations.109 The first limitation was that donors did not concern 
themselves with tackling the underlying processes o f famine, concentrating instead 
on reacting to the final stage when in the middle o f 1986 half a million Sudanese 
civilians were said to have starved to death.110 One way of addressing underlying 
processes was through political pressure on the Sudanese government. The 
opportunity to exert such pressure -  whether to check raiding and associated human 
rights abuses or to advance peace negotiations -  existed.111 Western donors were 
providing roughly half o f the recurrent government expenditure in Sudan in the 
winter o f 1988-89.112 There were those who argued that withdrawing aid would not 
have changed the views of the GOS towards external intervention. But I argue that 
during 1986-88, the GOS was weakened by domestic factors. The first factor was 
that the coalition government o f Prime Minister Sadig el Mahdi was unstable 
because one o f its partners, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), was in favour of 
ending the war in the south, and had made contacts with the SPLA. Another factor is 
that Sudan was economically drained by the civil war, and the impact was felt in the 
streets o f Khartoum in the form of anti-government demonstrations. For these 
reasons, the GOS was vulnerable both at home and outside. Yet no linkage between 
continued aid and reducing conflict was made, with donors also eschewing public 
criticism of the Sudanese government until March 1989. As late as November 1988, 
the key UN document that purported to address the issue o f the displaced made only
108 See, for example, Minear, L., A Critical Review o f Operation Lifeline Sudan, 1991
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one reference to militias in 164 pages.113 Donors had downplayed the militias’ links 
with the Sudanese government and stressed their defensive role114; the research 
available to donors showed clear links between the Baggara militias and the 
government, and demonstrated the militias’ aggressive role.115 In other words, the 
US and its Western allies were very much aware o f who was most responsible for 
creating such massive displacement of civilian population in the south, but they 
chose to listen to the advice o f the national government.116 The second major 
limitation in donors’ policies was their concern with getting relief to “accessible” 
areas, largely accepting government definitions o f what these were. The 
government’s expulsion o f the UN’s Special Representative Winston Prattley in 
1986, which drew scant protest from the major donors, had put an end to donor 
attempts to reach beyond the government garrison towns. The incident also 
convinced most private relief agencies that channelling relief to rebel-held areas of 
Sudan would not be tolerated by the Sudanese government, nor be supported by 
donors.117 The activities o f various Western governments, among them the US, 
showed how the donor community remained faithful to the principles o f state 
sovereignty. During the years preceding OLS, the US and Britain channelled aid to 
the Sudan largely through their Khartoum ally. As a result, they assisted people in 
government-held areas only.118
For the pluralists and realists, this is inevitable, because, according to the 
Westphalian conception, a government’s claim to be recognised as sovereign was 
not dependent upon how it behaved towards its citizens. Thus, the norm o f non­
intervention is a description o f state sovereignty, for without the former the latter is 
impossible.119 As far as the Sudanese government was concerned, the international 
community was interfering in what was its domestic affairs. The GOS protection o f 
its territorial integrity was justified because during that period, there were no
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Committee on Hunger, House Representatives, serial No. 100-30, Washington D.C., 14 July, 1988
115 See M ahmud U. & Baldo S., A1 D a’eim Massacre: Slavery in the Sudan, Khartoum, 1987
116 The New Yorker, March, 1989, p. 12
117 Keen D., “The Functions of Famine in Southwestern Sudan” , p. 118
118 Ibid., p. 115
119 Mark R. Amstutz, International Ethics, p. 120
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internationally recognised laws to protect the internally displaced, other than 
national laws. In the minds o f the government bureaucrats in Khartoum, Sudanese 
internally displaced population were within the borders o f the Sudan and were 
therefore the responsibility o f the government. The implication o f this line o f 
argument is that the international protection o f internally displaced populations is 
severely limited by the national context. In spite o f the existence o f international 
humanitarian actions to assist the internally displaced Sudanese, there was still a 
lack o f an entitlement to international protection and assistance.120 The donor 
governments’ silence is understandable, because ‘realism’, as practical possibility 
and political necessity is a sufficient explanation. Besides the ritual associated with 
the sanctity o f the state sovereignty, donors’ failure to put pressure on the 
government o f the Sudan can also be described in terms of the Cold War politics 
which was very much in the minds of Western governments. The post-war world 
was one dominated by bipolarity, and the Cold War conflict between the West, led 
by the United States, and the East, controlled by the Soviet Union.
Thus, a concern for stemming the spread of communism was a central Western 
policy to the Third World. During this period, at least in Africa, geopolitical 
considerations were given more attention by states at the expense o f humanitarian 
imperatives. In the Horn of Africa, for instance, frenzied competition between 
communism and anti-communism, promoting political ideology became more 
important than humanitarianism.121 Thus, the attitude o f the donor states was one o f 
disinterest in the famine but diplomatic support to the government, which was 
viewed as friendly and pro-western. This disinterest amounted to censorship, 
comparable to that in Ethiopia during 1982-4. It stood in marked contrast to the huge 
international concern with the perceived impending famine in Ethiopia during 1987- 
89. The donor governments were more concerned with the possible famine in 
Ethiopia than with the exceptionally severe famine already occurring in Southern 
Sudan. According to Larry Minear, predominant geopolitical considerations made
120 In this thesis humanitarian relief assistance is also defined as foreign intervention designed to 
prevent and minimise gross human rights violation and the promotion o f good governance and 
development.
121 Thomas G. Weiss & Larry Minear, Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining Civilians in 
Times o f War, Boulder & London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, p. vii; David Halloran 
Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989, Princeton 
Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 55
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the Sudan the largest recipient o f the US aid in sub-Saharan Africa during the 
eighties.122 In fact, in 1986-88, forceful public US criticism of Khartoum policies 
on humanitarian and human rights for its grounds was muted by US interest in 
continued base rights for its rapid deployment force and access to the Red Sea, 
strategic proximity to Marxist Ethiopia, support for the Sudan’s ally Egypt and for 
the Sudan government itself, which alone among other Arab governments had 
backed the Egypt-Israel Camp David Agreement. It must also be recognised that 
outside o f diplomatic condemnations or using international forums such as the UN 
and the EC to denounce human rights and humanitarian violations, there was no 
effective machinery to directly compel the Sudanese government to change its 
policies. By the time the international community made the decision to threaten the 
use o f sanctions to compel the GOS to comply with the international demands, the 
damage had been done and the GOS had achieved some of its goals.
The sixth obstacle is to do with the impotence of domestic and international 
press throughout the period discussed above. Since the experience o f Ethiopia in 
October 1984, relief agencies regard the press as a natural ally in their struggle to 
attract the attention of the donors to a famine. In the immediate aftermath o f Band 
Aid, the press had played this role across Sahelian Africa, notably in Western Sudan. 
However, the experience o f Southern Sudan throughout 1980s shows that there is a 
limit to which the press can be relied upon to galvanise international community on 
behalf o f relief agencies. Throughout 1986-88, the Sudanese government had 
embarked upon a more comprehensive campaign of the mainstream newspapers 
which catered for a reading public in Khartoum who considered the war and famine, 
at worst, as embarrassing irritation.123 On June 6, 1988, Prime Minister Sadiq el- 
Mahdi spoke against “elements in the Sudanese media, in co-operation with the 
foreign media, who have been attempting to create an impression that there is racial 
and religious conflict in Sudan”.124 The GOS was even more hostile towards the 
Western press. Several constraints were imposed on international press. One 
constraint was restricted access for journalists, who could not obtain permits to 
travel to rural areas o f the South. They mostly travelled with relief workers to
122 Minear., A Critical Review o f Operation Lifeline Sudan, 1991, p. 76
1-3 For a discussion o f the difficulties faced by the press in reporting the humanitarian crisis in the 
Sudan, see S.O. Efuk, The Politics o f  Famine in S udan , p. 10
124 Ibid.
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government held towns and therefore did not visit the areas inaccessible to relief. 
Thus, most press coverage of Southern Sudan during 1986-88 consisted of the story 
“aid is getting through”. While a little aid was getting through to the areas to which 
relief agency personnel had access, this story-line was not true for other areas and 
allowed an unwarranted degree of complacency. A second and related constraint 
was that relief agencies and journalists made repeated claims that several million 
people faced famine and starvation. These claims could not be verified because 
neither the agencies nor journalists had access to the opposition controlled areas in 
the south.125 The Western donors considered these un-verified claims to be 
unreliable and developed a cynicism redolent o f Ethiopia during 1982-4. The 
journalists needed pictures to substantiate the numbers at risk, and these were not 
available. Moreover, following the expulsion o f the UN Resident Representative, 
and four other relief agencies from the country, the humanitarian organisations 
themselves encouraged self-censorship by the journalists for fear that exposure of 
the causes o f famine would lead to them being permanently expelled from Southern 
Sudan.
It is clear from these six obstacles that the GOS had used its sovereignty to 
obstruct the efforts o f humanitarian organisations to engage in in-country activities 
that might have given some effect to international protection and reduced the human 
suffering and material destruction caused by the conflict during that period. The 
triumph o f the government’s hard-line attitude towards humanitarian needs o f its 
population in areas controlled by the rebel movement was achieved because of the 
disarray among Western donors and the obstacles imposed by the norms governing 
the Cold War international system. However, towards the beginning o f 1989, 
humanitarian considerations received higher priority as lessened superpower 
tensions and the Prime Minister Saddig el Mahdi government’s cultivation o f Libya 
altered political calculations. This changed international political climate is the topic 
o f the next section below.
125 S. Efuk, The Politics of Famine in Sudan, p. 12
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1 . 3 . 2 .  THE CHANGED INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
The easing of Cold War tensions from 1989 reduced the perceived benefits of 
shielding a “friendly” Sudanese government from criticism. For the first time 
Western donors took a decisive action at the cost of opposing the policies o f 
Khartoum, and took the initiatives to influence the course o f events.126 Although this 
change o f policy could be said to have emerged as a result o f the relaxation o f the 
East-West tension, the international media could arguably be said to have influenced 
donors’ robust position on relief emergency in the Sudan. While some analysts may 
disagree, the media and public opinion are key factors that pushed the momentum 
for change among the donor governments. Considerable responsibility for conveying 
the challenges o f the Sudan humanitarian predicaments also lay with policymakers 
and international governmental and non-governmental organisations. But even the 
most astute policymakers must rely on the media for information and to 
communicate their views. The CNN and the BBC coverage of the Sudan famine in 
1986-88 had pressured, and shamed Western governments into a confrontation with 
the Khartoum government over its obstruction o f humanitarian relief assistance to 
areas controlled by the SPLA.
Donors who had earlier avoided any confrontation with the Khartoum 
government could no longer have any excuses for inaction. Diplomatic discourse 
during this period concerning the increasing obstruction of relief aid in the Sudan 
communicated the international community’s anxieties over the two problems of 
human rights-humanitarian protection and the delivery of aid to those in need. The 
principal states involved in designing an effective response, including possible 
unspecified punitive measures, to the growing Sudan emergency disaster (the US 
and the EC member states) issued diplomatic statements that defined their position 
with regard to the two problems. Although the United States policies will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 3, the reader should bear in mind that Washington 
played an important role in pushing for the establishment o f OLS. Before the 
launching o f  OLS, two prominent Americans, Julia Taft of the Office for Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and Congressman Mickey Leland, had travelled to 
Sudan and became personally involved in the twin causes o f peace and famine
126 Efuk, The Politics of Famine in Sudan, especially chapter 2
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relief.127 The fact that the politico-military strategy o f both the GOS and the SPLA 
was designed to displace civilian non-combatants as war-security aims, presented 
the US and its Western allies with a set of problems regarding human rights and 
humanitarian relief aid. Unfortunately, however, the US framed the problems 
generated by the escalation in famine by both its failure to undertake early 
preventive action and the flawed assumptions on which its conflict management 
efforts were based. These problems fall into two principal categories -  human rights 
and humanitarian aid assistance. In terms o f human rights and humanitarian 
protection, the Reagan administration response was limited to condemnations. But 
these verbal expressions o f moral condemnation by representatives o f the US 
government did not go far enough in persuading the parties to the conflict to modify 
their relief aid policies. Thus, Washington’s response to the problems of protection 
o f human rights in the context of the war resulted in a substantial failure to engage in 
either a timely fashion appropriate to the risks the conflict posed both to human life 
and to any potential political resolution. It was only after President George Bush 
came to power that humanitarian emergency in Southern Sudan began to be 
seriously taken by the bureaucrats in Washington.
OFDA initiated a review of the US relief policy towards the Sudan, which 
reached fruition at the time of the inauguration o f George Bush as President. In 
January 1989, the incoming US Administration spoke about the possibility o f cross- 
border operations to the SPLA-held areas, made public with a demand by the new 
Secretary o f State James Baker that the GOS should allow relief to go to all needy 
people.128 In regard to human rights and humanitarian protection, James Baker 
declared that the US was not going to “stand by and watch the Sudanese authorities 
deny the people o f Southern Sudan their rights, and that the international community 
does not see the Southern Sudan emergency as an internal problem but as an affront 
to universal standards o f human rights which the donor community pledged to 
uphold”.129 This public demand was backed up by a threat o f economic sanctions,
127 Millard J. Burr, Quantifying Genocide in the Southern Sudan, US Committee for Refugees, p. 21
128 US AID/Bureau for Humanitarian Response/OFDA, Situation Report No. 4: Sudan, Washington, 
D.C., USAID, April 12, 1989, p. 5
129 Africa Watch, “Sudan: A Human Rights Disaster”, An Africa Watch Report, London March
1990, p. 133
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and other unspecified measures.130 Washington’s position was also echoed in other 
European capitals; some countries such as the Netherlands and Norway hinted at 
economic and diplomatic measures if Khartoum did not yield to the international 
pressure for access to the needy population in non-government held areas. As 
mentioned above, the television images o f the Sudanese war-victims touched the 
hearts and minds o f the American public, and it undoubtedly facilitated the vigorous 
US action. Having been enthusiastic supporters of ‘Africa’s newest democracy’ a 
year or so previously, the U.S. now began to hint at its support for a military 
government if the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Sadiq el 
Mahdhi would not allow the UN and NGOs access to areas under the control o f the 
SPLA.131 With the looming military threat from the US and the shaming behaviour 
of the international community, the stage was thus set for Operation Lifeline Sudan 
(OLS).
1 . 3 . 3 .  LAUNCHING OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN
As international pressure increased, the Government o f the Sudan, in June 1988, 
requested UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar to appeal for international 
assistance to prevent starvation in the south and among displaced in Khartoum. 
After receiving the Secretary General’s assessment of the situation, the UN General 
Assembly in October 1988, following a review o f the Secretary General’s 
recommendations, requested him to mobilise and co-ordinate a major relief and 
reconstruction effort.132 The Secretary General then declared an emergency, issued 
an appeal for funds, and instructed the UN staff in Khartoum to step up existing 
relief activities and planning.133 Before ending its 43rd session in mid-December 
1988, the General Assembly approved a resolution that called for an international 
conference to address Sudan’s seemingly intractable problems.134 The Sudanese
130 US Department o f  State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1992, Washington 
D.C., 1993, p. 256
131 Collin Campbell and Deborah Scroggins, ‘Officials: U.S. may W elcome Coup in Sudan; Military 
Rulers Might Improve Famine R elief, Atlanta Journal and Constitution, 27 January 1989
132 Weiss T. & Minear L., “Humanitarian Politics in the Sudan”, p. 202
133 UN, Emergency Assistance to the Sudan: Summary of Urgent Humanitarian Requirements, UN 
General Assembly document A/43/755, Geneva, October 27, 1988, pp. 1-8
Cf. Special Economic and Disaster Assistance: Special Programmes o f Economic Assistance,” 
UN General Assembly document A /43/918/Add. Geneva, 1, December 2, 1988
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government agreed to host such a conference, and on behalf o f the Secretary 
General, the Executive Director of UNICEF, James Grant, led a high level 
delegation to a meeting in March 8, 1989, in Khartoum. The conference was jointly 
convened by the government and the UN, but with joint participation o f the major 
donor governments, the ICRC and other NGOs. The Khartoum Humanitarian Relief 
Conference took place in an atmosphere of widespread scepticism.135 As Minear 
rightly puts it, “the challenge confronting the international community was 
daunting”.136 In spite o f doubts expressed by some relief agencies regarding the 
commitment o f the warring parties, the conference was a success. After two and half 
days o f conference, the UN and the Khartoum government came up with the Plan of 
Action.137
1 . 4 .  UNITED NATIONS PLAN OF ACTION
The decision o f the Sudanese government to allow international community to 
violate its sovereignty on humanitarian grounds was a victory for the solidarists who 
have long been advocating for the rights of war-victims to external relief aid. The 
UN Plan of Action laid down the general principles upon which Operation Lifeline 
Sudan (OLS) was based. The 1989 UN Plan of Action principles, which established 
OLS, as a UN-led humanitarian relief programme, were based on the International 
Committee o f the Red Cross (ICRC) principles. The father o f the ICRC’s 
Fundamental Principles, Jean Pictet, defined each principle as “a rule, based upon 
judgement and experience, which is adopted by a community to guide its 
conduct” .138 The UN and the warring parties, following the establishment o f OLS in 
April 1989, endorsed these principles. Over time, the humanitarian principles were 
distilled into a set o f statements covering independent access, neutrality, and 
transparency. Moreover, in this agreement, the principles included a range o f actions 
to be undertaken by the GOS and the international community within a specific Plan 
o f Action. Regarding access, the Plan of Action established the following points:
135 Weiss & Minear, “Humanitarian Politics in the Sudan, p. 202
136 Minear L., A Critical Review o f Operation Lifeline Sudan, p. 30
137 “Plan o f Action: Sudan Emergency Relief Operations,” mimeographed conference document, 
Geneva, March 14, 1989
l j8  Jean Pictet, “The Fundamental principles o f the Red Cross”, International Review o f  the Red 
Cross, No. 210, May-June, 1979, p. 135
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“the neutrality o f humanitarian relief should be recognised; free access should be 
guaranteed to UN, donor, and NGO personnel participating in relief activities, 
enabling them to reach all civilian non-combatant populations in need of emergency 
relief throughout Sudan; aid convoys will only carry humanitarian assistance”.139 
The UN Plan of Action estimated that it would cost about US$ 133 million to avoid 
a repetition of 1988 disaster, and it also identified the major corridors140 through 
which assistance was to be channelled.141 In the UN Plan o f Action, there were 
many corridors through which supplies were to be delivered: - by rail from central 
Sudan to the South, along the Nile, by road from Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. The 
UN proposal was that the tranquillity could either be a period o f a month or two 
months, or more limited options such as corridors o f tranquillity through which 
supplies could be sent. Although the UN Plan of Action was governmental in nature, 
the opposition movement areas were to be serviced and co-ordinated by UNICEF 
and an agreement was reached regarding the relationship between the SPLM/A and 
the United Nations. Here, the UN agencies were allowed to interact with the leaders 
o f the rebel movement without fear o f any diplomatic fallout with the Khartoum 
government. At a May 1989 press conference in Nairobi, James Grant cited 
agreement between the warring parties as one o f the twin miracles o f the UN, the 
other being the prompt and generous response o f donor governments to the UN 
appeal. Grant said:
I  had the privilege o f  negotiating the SPLA’s adherence to the 
agreement. They agreed it, except that rather than accepting a month o f  
tranquillity, corridors o f  tranquillity were proposed... This is the first 
time in histoty in the midst o f  conflict that both sides in the war agreed 
on a common plan o f  action to reach the people. They made it feasible by 
agreeing that there ought to be some form  o f  tranquillity that would 
allow this to function J  42
Although many UN bureaucrats were optimistic about this political arrangement, 
there was nonetheless an atmosphere o f doubts among many Western diplomats as
139 UN, Plan o f Action: Sudan Emergency Relief Operation, Khartoum, March 14, 1989, pp. 2-4
140 The concept o f corridors o f tranquillity, or zones o f peace, facilitated by short-term cease-fires 
for humanitarian purposes, had been developed earlier by UNICEF to overcome difficulties 
encountered in other civil wars. The concept had been utilised in such settings as Lebanon and 
Kampuchea with success.
141 See Efuk, The Politics o f  Food in Sudan, p. 62
142 Ibid., p. 63
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to whether such a plan of action would be practicable. Mr. Francis Miles, Canadian 
ambassador, stated that the situation o f human devastation was not the result o f any 
natural disaster but the determination o f the warring parties to pursue their military 
and political goals whatever cost to the civilian population. He said: “In the absence 
o f a peace settlement and national reconciliation, we will consider seriously whether 
continuing assistance other than a purely humanitarian nature can be identified”.143 
In fact, throughout the period mentioned in this thesis, international community 
assistance was o f a humanitarian nature. However, the significance o f this 
arrangement is that it provided real attempt to save the lives o f the Sudanese war- 
victims. For the UN Plan of Action to succeed, the Sudanese government was asked 
to fulfil several conditions. These included a streamlined bureaucracy, removal of 
delays and red tape at customs and free access o f personnel to non-combatant 
civilian population in need of relief. Donors also insisted on more favourable 
treatment under the government’s dual exchange rate system - a point the authorities 
accepted.144 The GOS agreed to facilitate assistance efforts in a variety o f ways. 
Among them was a favourable term for exchange rates for all UN and NGOs 
working under Operation Lifeline Sudan. Most important, the government accepted 
an initial month o f tranquillity during which relief efforts could proceed without fear 
o f military action.145 Thus, the conference and its action plan, to which the 
insurgents soon agreed, succeeded in establishing a framework upon which 
humanitarian needs throughout the entire south could be addressed. The Plan Action 
boosted UN diplomatic efforts because for the first time in African history, and 
probably that o f the entire world, the UN elicited the consent o f both protagonists to 
the very principles that each had violated so routinely during the early years o f the 
war. Humanitarian relief was recognised to be neutral in character, with access 
guaranteed to all civilian non-combatant populations in need o f emergency relief 
throughout Sudan.
143 S. Efuk, The Politics o f Famine in Sudan, p. 63
144 UN Plan o f Action: Sudan Emergency Relief Operation, Khartoum 1989, p. 4
145 Ibid.
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1 . 4. 1 . WARRING PARTIES’ DOMESTIC MATERIAL INTERESTS
This author agrees with constructivists argument that the critical interaction between 
politics and relief involved the decisions of the warring parties to allow the 
establishment o f OLS and to participate in it. The common perception was that both 
sides embraced OLS at a time when, for political and military reasons, it was 
advantageous for them to do so. It can therefore be argued that any 
“humanitarianism” by either side was opportunistic. The reasons for the GOS 
acceptance that its territorial integrity be violated for humanitarian purposes were 
pragmatic in nature. By early 1989 the beleaguered Sudan army had suffered a string 
o f major defeats in the south of the country. There was growing unrest in the north 
as well, and the government o f Sadiq el Mahdi was weak and vulnerable. The army 
and all the major political parties, except the National Islamic Front (NIF), pressed 
for an end to the war. According to Minear, OLS provided the reprieve on the 
battlefield and a chance for the regime to regroup politically as well.146
Two motives can be discerned from these interpretations of GOS endorsement 
o f OLS. First, the Government o f the Sudan was facing economic difficulties and 
was interested in the resources o f OLS. Second, which is probably the most 
important reason, Sudan government simply accepted the hard reality that it had 
little authority over areas in Southern Sudan to which relief would now be regularly 
provided. While the GOS accepted OLS out of weakness, the SPLA did so more 
from a position o f military strength. The SPLA had most to gain from the relief 
programme that was to become OLS, because it had its own clear political and 
managerial interests in a UN-led humanitarian operation. At this time, the term 
‘New Sudan” was first used,147 and Dr. John Garang, SPLM/A Chairman, spoke 
about forming an alternative government as soon as the SPLA captured all the 
territory east o f the Nile and south o f Malakal. His agenda was primarily to gain 
wider political recognition and to help set the pace of national political events: he 
intended an alternative national government rather than an alternative local
146 Minear, A Critical Review o f Operation Lifeline Sudan, pp. 205-211
147 “New Sudan” is a vision o f the opposition movement o f a country where all the Sudanese 
regardless o f their race, ethnic backgrounds, religion, and sex will live together in harmony. This 
vision is contained in the SPLM/A Department o f Information, “On the New Sudan’, Nairobi, 
February 1989, pp. 1-3
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administration. Dr. Garang’s new-found enthusiasm for relief in part reflected his 
much enhanced status in the eyes o f the West. Second, apart from these motives148, 
the opposition movement too had reasons for welcoming a reprieve. Rapid military 
successes made it difficult for the SPLA to govern the areas taken. It needed time to 
consolidate its control, provide services to the civilian population, and cultivate 
loyalty. The SPLA forces, like their opposite numbers, also wanted to prepare for 
the next stage in the war. Despite these persuasive military and political calculations, 
humanitarian considerations also played a significant role in each side’s thinking. As 
the cumulative human tragedy o f the years 1985-88 became more widely known, 
international and domestic pressure to deal with the humanitarian emergency grew. 
Censured for retrograde economic and human rights policies, the government saw 
OLS as a way o f reinstating itself with the international community and responding 
to increasingly vocal elements at home. The SPLA, whose attack on relief convoys 
and civilian commercial aircraft during the period described in this thesis drew 
criticisms and censure, also stood to benefit from being seen to be more concerned 
about civilian lives.
Each party could thus gain from accepting help in meeting the needs o f civilian 
populations that they neither, realistically speaking, could address. Providing more 
effectively for civilian populations, whether in the government-held areas or in the 
SPLA controlled areas, would in turn have strategic value. For each side, this benefit 
outweighed the costs o f allowing civilians to be assisted in areas that, in any event, 
were outside GOS control. For each side, the decision to accept and participate in 
OLS thus involved a careful weighing of costs and benefits. In fact, participation 
was part o f a broader set o f calculations using food as a political weapon, though 
each disclaimed such a strategy. The domestic material interests o f the GOS and the 
SPLM/A on OLS have been illuminated in the OLS July 1996 review document..149 
It was clear from OLS review document that both the government and the SPLM/A 
wanted radical changes to the OLS structure. But above all, the GOS and the 
opposition movement were jealously eyeing the resources channelled through OLS 
by the international community.
148 These motives are also discussed in Efuk, The Politics of Famine in Sudan, p. 19
149 DHA, OLS Review, p. 41
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1 . 5 .  CONCLUSION
This chapter has attempted to identify the obstacles to external intervention as 
claimed by the pluralist international society theory. Apart from the demise o f the 
Cold War, this chapter has shown three developments that have enhanced 
international community’s intervention in the Sudan. The first development is the 
need for regional stability and prosperity, which have made mutual involvement of 
the UN and member states in the Sudanese domestic affairs necessary and 
inevitable. The second one is that the fragmentation o f the Sudanese state has called 
into question the ability of the central government to meet its obligations to its 
internally displaced population, and thus to enjoy the full privileges o f sovereignty. 
The third development is to do with the emerging -  although not yet taken seriously 
by the international society in the form of states -  moral and legal recognition of 
common values, such as the protection o f human rights or establishment of 
democratic governance, has created incentives for the UN member states to broaden 
their conception o f geopolitical considerations to accommodate collective efforts to 
address humanitarian emergency in the Sudan.
In other words, the US and its Western allies, while influenced more by the 
Cold War strategic considerations, played an important role in persuading the 
government o f Sudan to soften its hard-line territorial claims in favour of 
humanitarian action by the UN. It was equally clear that the international media, 
particularly television, coverage and the responses, which this evoked in civil 
society, largely constituted the Sudan humanitarian disaster.
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CHAPTER TWO 
OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN PLANS OF ACTION 
2 . 1 .  OVERVIEW
In chapter 1, the problem identified was on how the international community150 
persuaded the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement and Army (SPLM/A) to accept external intervention in the form of 
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS).151
The argument o f this chapter is that the practical way of internalising 
international norms is through communication and dialogue (reasoned consensus) 
with the parties to the conflict. The significance of dialogue in this thesis should be 
seen from the extent to which OLS encouraged some of form of debate on whether 
solidarists and constructivists claim that humanitarian norms have a universalist 
appeal is true or not. Apart from norms, this chapter has also identified two policy 
instruments, which were used by the OLS agencies and donor governments to 
protect the integrity o f humanitarian relief operations in the Sudan: sanctioning and 
shaming.152 Each takes the same basic form: actions by the humanitarian players to 
influence the government o f the Sudan and the opposition movement’s war policies. 
The reader should bear in mind that the effects o f these political devices on the
150 “International community” refers to the donor governments, United Nations and NGOs
151 As discussed in chapter 1, OLS is a joint UN/NGO relief operation for the needy internally 
displaced and war victims in the Sudan, under the UN umbrella. It began its operations in April 1989, 
working on both sides o f the civil war, in government and non-government areas, but only with the 
consent o f the parties. In 1991 Operation Lifeline Sudan became a programme under the UN 
Department o f  Humanitarian Affairs. The OLS Nairobi-based Southern Sector was co-ordinated by 
United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), while the Khartoum-based Northern Sector was managed 
by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
152 Sanctioning is a communication mechanism, which seeks to promote good governance and 
respect for human rights by linking these goals to preferential international economic arrangements. 
Sanctions exploit material power by denying abusing governments access to financial institutions 
such as IMF and W orld Bank. Shaming is also a communication device, which seeks to enforce the 
rights o f  war victims to relief aid and promotion o f  civil governance by creating an international and 
domestic climate o f opinion critical o f national policies. Shaming exploits the symbolic legitimacy of 
foreign pressure and international institutions to unleash domestic moral opprobrium. What differs 
across these two modes is the precise instrument that is employed to shift the domestic incentives 
facing the warring parties. See Andrew Moravcsik, “Explaining International Human Rights 
Regime: Liberal Theory and Western Europe”, European Journal o f  International Relations, Vol. 1, 
No. 2, 1995, pp. 157-189
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behaviour o f the GOS and the SPLM/A will be assessed in chapters 4 and 5. Both 
the GOS and the SPLM/A had jealously guarded their territorial prerogatives. As 
mentioned in chapter 1, both have had problematic human rights practices, although 
GOS human rights record was much more serious during the period 1986-89. But 
the discussion below shows that international community worked intensely on the 
warring parties, contributing to improved practices by the middle o f 1990s. This 
point will be explored through a comparative study o f the impact o f humanitarian 
and rules on the host government and the rebel movement. Accordingly, the aim of 
this chapter is merely to state the OLS plans o f action, and to describe the rhetorical 
devices that were used by humanitarian agencies to implement such action plans in 
an uncertain war environment o f Sudan. Thus, this chapter can be seen as an attempt 
to contribute to the search for a set o f humanitarian principles and rules, acceptable 
to both the warring parties and humanitarian organisations, that can underpin the 
relief efforts in a civil war environment. However, before describing the debate 
among OLS agencies, and between OLS and the warring parties, this chapter will 
begin with an analysis o f the terms o f NGO incorporation into the OLS system. This 
will then be followed by a definition o f the major humanitarian players involve 
directly in the relief operation, and OLS mandate.
2 . 2 .  THE INCLUSION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE OLS SYSTEM
The relevance o f this section should be seen from the context on which the 
institutions of civil society where used as OLS programme implementers. United 
Nations system in the Sudan was aware o f the fact that NGOs are important 
participants in international humanitarian relief system, participating in many 
activities -  human rights advocacy, and implementation.153 Not surprisingly, the 
UN and its member states have incorporated NGOs because their participation 
enhances the ability, both technocratic and political terms, o f states to regulate 
through the treaty process. The terms of that incorporation reflect the resources, 
skills, and domestic influence o f NGOs: NGO participation provides policy advice,
153 For recent work on NGOs, see for example, Mustapha Kamal Pasha & David L. Blaney, 
“Elusive Paradise: The Promise and Peril o f Global Civil Society”, Alternatives, Vol. 23, 1998, pp. 
417-450; Kal Raustiala, “States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions”, International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, 1997, pp. 719-740; Rakiya Omar & Alex de Waal, “Humanitarianism 
Unbound?”
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helps monitor commitments to humanitarian relief assistance. Although the 
constraint o f the issue o f national sovereignty had weakened in many countries to a 
sufficient extent to allow direct donor-NGO relationships, the emphasis in the early 
stages was on the development role o f NGOs and on their work with local 
community groups in terms of service provision and programme implementation. In 
the late 1980s the wider aid policy agenda of “good governance” emerged. This was 
initially championed by the World Bank, around the interlinked concerns o f good 
government, democracy and human rights. The subsequent donor trend o f the 1990s 
can be interpreted as an inevitable coalescence of donor developmental and 
governance agendas. NGOs begin to be highlighted both as service providers and in 
their role in promoting good governance and democratisation.
These roles o f NGOs have been acknowledged by the United Nations system: 
“The activity o f non-State actors has become an essential dimension o f public life in 
all parts o f the world. Reform and restructuring of the United Nations thus coincide 
with the emergence o f a new participatory international system responding to the 
forces o f globalisation sweeping our world. The growing influence and role o f non- 
State actors has been both a hallmark and a cause o f our changing international 
environment. NGOs are the clearest manifestation of what is referred to as civil 
society, that is, the sphere in which social movements organise themselves around 
objectives, constituencies and thematic interests. Other actors, however, have also 
taken on an increasingly important role in shaping national and international 
agendas and policy dialogues. They include local authorities, mass media, business 
and industry leaders and the research community, including academia and think- 
tanks. With lesser bureaucratic and institutional restraints, all have embraced and 
benefited from the profound impact brought about by the information and 
communication revolution. NGOs have been particularly effective in utilising the 
instant access to information made possible by new technologies, and have 
themselves become primary sources and disseminators o f information.”154 Since its 
establishment in 1989, Operation Lifeline Sudan was aware o f  the important and 
constructive role NGOs play in furthering the purposes and principles o f the United
154 Secretary General Report, Arrangements and Practices for the Interaction of non-governmental 
organizations in all Activities of the United Nations System, A/53/170, New York, July 10, 1998, p. 3
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Nations Charter by drawing attention to issues, by suggesting ideas, programmes, 
and solutions to relief problems, and by disseminating information and mobilising 
public opinion about the suffering o f the Sudanese war-victims since 1985.155 In 
fact, before the establishment o f OLS, Non-governmental organisations were 
already involved in relieving the suffering o f the war-victims in areas controlled by 
the parties to the conflict.156 Early on, indigenous Sudanese NGOs, sometimes in 
concert with UN officials, took the lead. For example in 1986, the Sudan Council of 
Churches (SCC), an ecumenical grouping of the country’s Protestant and Catholic 
churches, and Sudanaid, the relief and development arm o f the Sudan Catholic 
Bishops’ Conference, alerted international aid agencies to the war-related hunger in 
the south o f the country, and to the obstructionist policies o f the warring parties.
Despite the uncertainties and the informal nature o f their operations, 
international NGOs joined hands with the local organisations to assist internally 
displaced persons in southern Sudan. The UN agencies and the International 
Committee o f the Red Cross followed them thereafter. Thus, NGO inclusion in the 
OLS humanitarian relief system did not come as a surprise to the observers o f the 
Sudan. It was based on the confluence o f governmental incentives and NGO 
comparative advantages and resources. These incentives and benefits structure, 
across time and functions, the participation that NGOs are granted. The OLS relief 
system in the Sudan recognised this NGO comparative advantage in implementing 
relief programmes. Under OLS agreement the following was established in this 
regard:
“...the UN, jointly with the Government, will provide an operational 
framework for all OLS relief personnel, institutions and NGOs, in all 
areas, including registered NGOs working in areas under the control o f  
the SPLM. To this effect, letters o f association will be signed between all 
NGOs and the UN, listing the principles o f OLS, operational modalities 
and a declaration that all partners agree to work within these principles 
and modalities”.157
155 GOS/INGOs/UN, Agreements Adopted by the Joint GOS/INGOs/UN/US Meeting, Khartoum 
25-28 January, Khartoum: January, 1993; Africa Watch, Denying “The Honor o f Living”: Sudan, A 
Human Rights Disaster, London: An Africa Watch Report, March 1990, p. 88
156 Minear, A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan, p. 6
157 UN, Operation Lifeline Sudan II: Draft Plan of Action, Nairobi, March 28, 1990, p. 28, p. 7
61
This ambiguous statement was interpreted by the UN as meaning that letters o f 
association (now termed Letters o f Understanding) between INGOs and UNICEF 
were sufficient as a means to register INGOs in non-governmental areas o f southern 
Sudan.
2 . 2 . 1 .  HUMANITARIAN PLAYERS IN THE OLS SYSTEM
There are three major humanitarian players involved in the OLS humanitarian 
operation -  the UN agencies, the GOS, the SPLM/A and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). In other words, OLS can be defined as a tripartite co­
ordination arrangement - which involved seven UN agencies, more than 35 NGOs, 
the Government o f the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement 
and Army (SPLM/A) - that consolidated the relief effort to war-affected populations 
living in Southern Sudan, the transitional zone and settlements around Khartoum. 
OLS counterparts were the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) on the 
government side and the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association (SRRA) tor 
the SPLM/A.
The RRC was formed by the government of Sudan to facilitate relief efforts of 
NGOs working among displaced in the government-held towns. The RRC Director 
was appointed by the Ministry o f Services and Welfare, and he was accountable to 
that Ministry. During the 1984/85 famine, the RRC was the national body 
responsible for the co-ordination o f famine relief, and substantial funds were 
invested in the RRC to develop a competent Sudanese relief agency. The RRC was 
the main government partner during the first year o f OLS, and continued in this role 
up to the early 1989. However, the military government, which took over from a 
democratically elected civil government in June 1989, promoted the Department o f 
the Displaced as an alternative government partner for war-displaced populations. 
Unlike the SRRA, the RRC does not have an operational structure o f its own 
because it was directly managed by the Department o f the Displaced. The SRRA 
was formed by the SPLM/A to co-ordinate humanitarian efforts in non-government 
areas. The Executive Director and head of the SRRA in the Nairobi office was 
responsible for directing agencies to Southern Sudan according to needs on the 
ground. The Secretary General, the deputy to the Executive Director, headed the 
field office in Southern Sudan. The role o f field office was to identify needs and to
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help co-ordinate the implementation o f aid, assisted by a group o f co-ordinators. 
Areas secretaries were assisting the Secretary General with the help o f  more than six 
offices. The people were represented by chiefs, elders, and churchmen, who forward 
their needs to the relevant office, which approves proposals. These had found their 
ways to NGOs or donors through the Executive Director. Both RRC and SRRA 
were acting as counterparts to OLS to ensure effective and efficient delivery o f relief 
and other humanitarian assistance to the people living along the corridors mentioned 
in the UN Plan o f Action.
This brings us to the third and most important humanitarian players - the role 
o f the UN agencies. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food 
Programme (WFP) were the most important players in the Sudan disaster relief 
emergency that describing their functions and mandates will describe most if  not all 
the operational work of the UN relief system. The UNDP, the development 
programme of the UN system, did only a limited work with NGOs in emergencies. 
By tradition, as well as by the UN General Assembly guidelines, the UNDP 
Resident Representative in each country normally acts as the UN’s resident co­
ordinator with executive authority to co-ordinate other UN agencies. Not 
surprisingly, UNDP Resident Representative in the Sudan was appointed as the 
overall OLS co-ordinator; this became problematic because of the conflict of 
interest between UNDP and UNICEF. Because it proved impractical for a variety of 
reasons to deliver humanitarian assistance in areas controlled by the opposition 
movement from government held territory, OLS was de facto divided into a 
Northern Sector based in Khartoum, and a Southern Sector with its rear base in the 
northern Kenya border town of Lokichoggio. While UNDP was chosen as Northern 
Sector lead agency because o f its loyalty to state sovereignty, there were reasons as 
to why UNICEF was chosen to co-ordinate humanitarian efforts in the politically 
sensitive and contested region o f South Sudan. An important reason was that 
UNICEF had a good track record in international humanitarian diplomacy.
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With regard to the latter, UNICEF’s earlier association with the pre-OLS cross- 
border operation was important in informing the choice to place UNICEF as the lead 
agency in non-government areas:
In view o f UNICEF’s special mandate, which authorises it to operate as 
a United Nations entity in rebel held areas without implying tacit United 
Nations recognition, it was agreed that UNICEF would act as the UN 
lead agency, opening offices to facilitate the implementation o f the 
programme mainly in the health sector, to monitor distribution and to 
provide an umbrella fo r  NGO activities. WFP, which would bear a major 
responsibility fo r  the transport offood aid and other commodities, would 
also operate in the south
The concept o f corridors, or zones o f peace, facilitated by short-term cease-fires for 
humanitarian purpose, was developed earlier by UNICEF to overcome difficulties 
encountered in other civil wars. The concept was utilised in such settings as 
Lebanon and Kampuchea to facilitate a variety o f humanitarian activities and had 
proved successful in encouraging annual breaks in El Salvador’s civil war to allow 
inoculations o f children throughout the divided nation.159 In each instance, 
UNICEF’s humanitarian mandate allowed it to negotiate arrangements with 
insurgents without conferring recognition upon them or appearing to undermine the 
sovereignty o f the seated government.
2 . 2 . 2 .  THE HUMANITARIAN MANDATE OF OLS
Those familiar with humanitarian politics will undoubtedly agree with this thesis 
that the cornerstone of any UN agency is the mandate o f the operation because it 
provides the legal foundation for international action. Created in April 1989, 
Operation Lifeline Sudan was the first UN humanitarian programme that had the 
mandate to assist internally displaced and war-affected civilians during ongoing 
conflict within a sovereign country, as opposed to refugees beyond its borders. After 
the UN Plan of Action was endorsed by the government o f the Sudan (GOS), and 
later by the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), OLS was then mandated to 
carry out three tasks on behalf o f the international community. First, mobilising
158 Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA., First Draft Report of the Secretary-General on 
Operation Lifeline Sudan, p. 7
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international concern by galvanising world public opinion, spearheading global 
fundraising, and providing international presence. Second, negotiating a framework 
o f action with the political authorities and providing leadership to aid efforts. Third, 
building the capacity o f the Sudanese, particularly that o f the government relief 
wing, RRC, as well as that of the SPLA relief wing, SRRA. The establishment of 
OLS mandate by the international community and the parties in the Sudan conflict 
was unprecedented because o f the nature o f the conflict described in the beginning 
in chapter 1. Its wider implications for future UN humanitarian mandate seem 
obvious. I need to situate this point into a wider perspective. United Nations had 
failed in most o f its humanitarian operations in other parts o f the world for two 
reasons. First, because o f the chaos that often follows the lack o f clear humanitarian 
relief mandate, some scholars have called for an overall strategic direction, for a 
clear division o f labour, or for greater co-ordination between the UN relief 
agencies.160 The experience o f the Somalia intervention shows that one o f the major 
obstacles affecting UN humanitarian co-ordination role in conflict situation is the 
mandate o f its agencies.161 One of the persistent criticisms of the UN agencies in 
Somalia was that they failed to fulfil their responsibilities because o f their 
conflicting mandates.162 To illustrate further the lack of clear mandates among the 
agencies, UNHCR and UNICEF have the same mandates when coming to assist 
refugee children, particularly in the areas o f education and protection. Moreover, 
UNICEF, WHO and UNHCR have expertise in health and sanitation; in regard to 
nutrition FAO also has a stake to claim. W FP’s competence in mobilising and 
delivering food has conflicted at times with UNHCR’s efforts. Furthermore, 
UNICEF’s desire to provide supplementary foods to vulnerable groups sometimes 
has been at odds with a rational division o f labour with WFP.
Second, much of the inter-agency conflict results because of the polycentric 
nature of the United Nations system. Each is eager to demonstrate action when an 
emergency arises, which has frequently led to the issuance o f separate appeals by 
each agency. In 1989, the UN and its member states attempted to address many of
159 Weiss & Minear, “Humanitarian Politics in the Sudan”, p. 203
160 Adam, R., “Humanitarian Action in War”, p. 73
161 For the experience of Rwanda, Somalia and Bosnia, see Rakiya Omaar & Alex de Waal, 
“Humanitarianism Unbound? Current Dilemmas Facing Multi-mandate Relief Operations in Political 
Emergencies”, London, African Rights, Discussion Paper No. 5, November, 1994, pp. 11-39
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these problems. The first o f the tools for improving UN response mechanism in the 
Sudan was the establishment o f the two OLS Sectors, which had offices in 
Khartoum and Nairobi in Kenya. By locating offices in these two capitals, the UN 
removed the conflict o f mandates among its agencies that often frustrate its 
international humanitarian co-ordination efforts. Thus, the establishment o f OLS, 
following the Khartoum conference, which formulated the UN Plan o f Action, 
reflected the desire o f the international community for the effective operational co­
ordination o f the UN agencies’ humanitarian response. It was the result of 
considerable debate, consultation, and as such initially represented a potentially 
significant advance in the development of a global strategy for humanitarian 
relief.163 In fact, the principle o f “negotiated access” was at the centre o f OLS 
arrangements and was identified as a critical factor required in the strengthening of 
the UN’s humanitarian system in the Sudan, and beyond.
The above analysis of humanitarian intervention in the Sudan has shown that 
impetus for the establishment o f the United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan came 
from Western governments, INGOs and others concerned by the inability of the 
international community to establish mechanisms to ensure the operational 
effectiveness o f the UN response to humanitarian emergencies in the Sudan. A 
mandated UN umbrella for humanitarian operations in South Sudan was a major 
innovation. In North Sudan, on the other hand, a more conventional arrangement was 
adopted which reflected the status quo. That is, the UNDP Emergency Unit in 
Khartoum, under a Special Co-ordinator, would continue to organise relief activities 
in government areas in collaboration with the GOS. The structural organisation o f the 
UN system in the Sudan has been extensively discussed elsewhere, and this thesis 
will not be expected to discuss it further.154
162 Omar R. & de Waal A., “Humanitarianism Unbound”, p. 18
163 Under-Secretary-General Jan Eliason, in a UN Department of Public Information, “Enlarging the 
UN’s Humanitarian Mandate,”, Geneva, December, 1992, pp. 1-10
164 See DHA, Operation Lifeline Sudan Review, Nairobi-Geneva, July, 1996
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2 .3  . HUMANITARIAN NORMS DEBATE
In the introduction, it was argued that a norm domestic salience should be 
established by the analysis o f national discourse and state policies. But how are 
international norms introduced and accepted into these features o f the state’s 
domestic politics? This section draws on humanitarian discourse to identify several 
plausible conditions, mechanisms, and the processes that contribute to the domestic 
salience o f international humanitarian norms, rules and principles. The OLS 
humanitarian policy discussed in this section is an elaboration o f the 1989 UN Plan 
of Action that was purely based on the ICRC principles o f neutrality and 
impartiality. These principles were interpreted in terms o f relief aid delivery, and 
thus OLS was not allowed to interfere in the politically sensitive issues o f human 
rights, the rule o f law and democratic governance. However, by 1992, the concepts 
of neutrality and impartiality were seen by many aid agencies in Southern Sudan as 
representing a narrow framework for the UN humanitarian action to which all relief 
agencies could subscribe. The NGOs argument was that humanitarian principles 
contained in the 1989 UN Plan o f Action were inadequate to deal with the security 
prevailing in the early 1990s.
The discussion is structured around three key issues. First, I will examine the 
arguments for and against the inclusion o f human rights into OLS mandate. Second,
I address the mechanisms through which international humanitarian norms can enter 
the domestic arena: national political rhetoric, the material interests o f domestic 
humanitarian actors. The third section describes Islamic discourse on international 
humanitarian norms and national understandings, an issue that conditions the impact 
of these principles once they enter the national arena. I do not address the interesting 
question o f the origins of international humanitarian norms. Many international 
norms, such as those pertaining to human rights and Geneva Conventions, have their 
origins in national discourses. However, the focus o f thesis is limited to conditions 
and mechanisms mediating between the existence of humanitarian norms and their 
impact on the behaviour o f the GOS, the SPLM/A and donor states. All the views 
discussed in this chapter were expressed formally and informally during OLS 
monthly co-ordination meetings as well as during workshops and conferences 
organised by either UNICEF or by NGOs.
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A . OLS PROTECTION POLICY DEBATE
It was clear from a brief theoretical analysis in the introduction that norms, 
principles and rules enjoy moderate salience when they appear in the domestic 
discourse, and when they produce some change in the national agenda and the 
state’s institutions. Both the UN and the ICRC are mandated to work for the faithful 
application o f IHL (International Humanitarian Law) applicable in armed conflict; 
their failure to promote protection issues in the Sudan created the debate between 
traditionalists (realists), who called for a more informed and pragmatic way o f 
introducing human rights/humanitarian norms into the Sudanese internal affairs, and 
political humanitarians (solidarists/constructivists), who want the UN to be more 
robust on the issues o f protection and relief access. Those taking a realist approach 
include UN and ICRC (International Committee o f the Red Cross) officials; the 
solidarists include officials o f NGOs, religious organisations and community groups. 
Solidarists saw UN and the ICRC as focusing narrowly on the relief work, rather 
than as being essential for building a bridge to good governance, human rights and 
development during the relief phase. Throughout 1990-2, there was a general 
recognition among political humanitarians in the Sudan that a free humanitarian 
access would help the famine relief efforts, but the UN saw its job as almost 
exclusively providing material aid and staying out o f politics.165
T raditionalist Views
Traditionalists (a mixture o f realists and pluralists), led by the UNDP representative 
in Khartoum, worked within this framework, and were inevitably against any 
inclusion o f protection issues into OLS relief aid programmes without the consent of 
the government in Khartoum.166 In an interview with this author, Mr. Jaeger 
Christopher, the UNDP Resident Representative, was clear on the difficulties that 
the UN faced when dealing with the sovereign government: “We are not here to 
dictate to the Sudanese authorities on how to manage the problems caused by the 
presence o f the internally displaced people in and around Khartoum. Like any other
165 “Staying out of politics” here means excluding the issues of human rights and good governance 
from OLS programmes.
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government, the Sudanese regime is competent to deal with the humanitarian 
emergencies within its own borders. The UN role here is one o f facilitation; co­
ordinating international humanitarian efforts. In this area, we co-operate and work 
extremely well with the local authorities”.167 This was clearly a pluralist position 
which makes norms o f sovereignty and non-intervention as obstructions to 
humanitarian action in a foreign state. This, too, was the position o f many senior UN 
officials such as Philip O ’Brien, UNICEF/OLS Chief Co-ordinator, who argued that 
any attempt to impose human rights without the consent o f the host government 
would pose a challenge to OLS impartiality and neutrality.168 The UN negotiated 
framework for humanitarian operation was based on 1989 Plan o f Action, which 
was approved by the government o f the Sudan. According to the UN Plan o f Action, 
the guiding principle o f OLS was that o f humanitarian neutrality -  an independent 
status for humanitarian relief work beyond political or military considerations.169 
This was interpreted as meaning that human rights/protection, democratic 
governance and peace issues are beyond the mandate o f OLS, and all the relief 
agencies working within this system are not allowed to act contrary to the UN Plan 
o f Action.
Mr. O ’Brien explained that the UN appeal o f 1989 did not even reflect a 
concern with human rights abuses.170 The argument behind the UN appeal -  which 
the traditionalists used to support their arguments - was that “if relief agencies insist 
on the policies o f protection and accountable relief, at best they will get a worthless 
paper agreement from the government, and at worst they will be expelled. Instead, 
they should find a compromise modus operandi in which they will be able to meet 
some of the government’s requests for development aid in the north, and obtain local 
agreements to do the best they can under adverse circumstances in the south”.171 
This statement clearly shows that during that period neither the UN relief agencies
166 James C. Operation Lifeline Sudan: Workshops on Lessons Learned, Copenhagen, 14-15 
December 1989, Nairobi, UNICEF/OLS, March, 1990
167 Interview with Christopher Jaeger, UNDP Sudan Resident Representative, Nairobi, March 12, 
1996
168 Interview with Philip O’Brien, Chief Co-ordinator, UNICEF/OLS, Lokichoggio, Kenya, 
February 6, 1996
169 United Nations, Plan of Action: Sudan Emergency Relief Operations, Khartoum, 8-9 March 
1989, p. 2
170 Interview with Philip O’Brien, UNICEF/OLS Chief Coordinator, Nairobi, February 6, 1997
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nor the non-governmental organisations had any mandate to deal with human rights, 
particularly in the OLS Northern Sector. Accordingly, the relief programmes that 
sprang from the policy o f politically na'ive humanitarianism would quickly run into 
insurmountable obstacles. So, in the minds o f the UN bureaucrats, any attempt to 
force the application o f such broadly accepted standards o f international behaviour 
would elicit a negative response from the host government. Traditionalists view was 
that humanitarian aid should be given according to the consideration o f human need 
alone. In other words, its granting, or its acceptance must not be made dependent on 
political factors; it must not seek to advance any political agenda.172 This pragmatic 
rather than moralistic political approach does not mean that the UN made no 
advances on behalf o f the Sudanese non-combatant civilian population. On the 
contrary, the UN agencies, more than any other humanitarian player, worked behind 
the scene to reduce such excesses without causing major rift with any o f the parties 
to the conflict.173 In an anarchic civil war environment, such cool heads were 
necessary for the smooth running o f humanitarian operations in the Sudan. It is clear 
from the above that the 1989 UN Plan o f Action did not include ‘protection’, or the 
promotion o f human rights among its priorities.
Indeed, agreement between the Government o f the Sudan and the UN was not 
about human rights but about giving handouts to the internally displaced. Protection 
issues were seen as the prerogatives o f the sovereign authority and not o f foreigners. 
Any deviation from a strict interpretation o f this Agreement, either by the UN 
agencies now waking up to the importance of human rights, or NGOs who also 
worked under the OLS Agreement, was met with fierce resistance from the regime 
in Khartoum. Thus, the failure to situate the humanitarian response to war-displaced 
populations within the broader context o f internal conflict meant that human rights
171 Efuk, The Politics of Food in Sudan, p. 54. See also United Nations, The Emergency Situation in 
Sudan: Urgent Humanitarian Requirements, Geneva: UN, October 1988
172 Interview with Ian Levine, October 13, 1996. See also Carl Tinsman, “Operation Lifeline Sudan: 
United Nations professionals protecting humanitarian workers in war zones”, DHA News, December, 
1997, p. 43
173 The UN has met with the parties to the conflict on several occasions over the issues of access and 
human rights of the internally displaced persons. UNICEF/OLS, Minutes of a Meeting Between Dr. 
John Garang De Mabior and Mr. Michael Priestly, Nairobi, May 19, 1990; UNICEF/OLS, Report on 
SPLM Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance, Nairobi, September, 1995; Traxler V., Summary of 
DHA’ Negotiations with the Government of the Sudan -  From August 1993 to April 1996 -  on the 
Issue of Humanitarian Access in the Area of the Nuba Mountains, Geneva, DHA, May 13 1996
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concerns for these populations was effectively absent from the mandate o f OLS.174 
This also indicates that a feature o f international nonns within the existing 
framework of humanitarian relief system is the pervasive need to find a balance 
between contradictory pressures (found in the UN Charter and humanitarian norms 
and principles) o f state sovereignty, and humanitarianism. Traditionalists saw OLS 
failure to include the protection issue as a pragmatic response to alleviate suffering 
without explicitly tampering in the issues of local politics. This is because, being a 
UN humanitarian programme, for an important part dependent on state co-operation, 
the OLS Northern Sector had responded to existing political restrictions in a realist 
fashion. The view of the traditionalists was that humanitarian nonns and principles, 
on their own, cannot impact on a government which is determined and has the 
resources to cling to its remaining part of the territory. At the OAU Co-ordinating 
Conference on Assistance to the Displaced populations held in Khartoum in 
September 1995, GOS re-asserted its position on the sanctity o f its territorial 
prerogatives, and confirmed that internally displaced populations in the Northern 
Sector could not be subject o f protection interventions by the UN or other bodies, as 
this infringed upon state sovereignty.
For this reason, the GOS rejected moves to extend the mandate of the UN to 
include the internally displaced. A government official, Mustafa Ismael, noted that 
“the internally displaced do not need protection, they only need assistance”.175 
Traditionalists thus saw such statements as supporting their view that concentrating 
too much on human rights would trigger a confrontation between relief agencies and 
the authorities in Khartoum. Traditionalists saw political humanitarians argument for 
assertive human rights policy as extreme and uninformed.
174 GOS/NGOs/UN, Agreements Adopted by the Joint GOS/NGOs/UN Meetings, 25-28 January 
1993, Khartoum, January, 1993 p. 8
175 Calthoff, E. (MSF-Holland), Memorandum, Khartoum, September 20, 1995
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Many UN and ICRC officials interviewed in Nairobi stressed that the UN’s 
acceptance o f the primacy of sovereignty was a pragmatic position which ensured 
continued access in the South.176
Political Humanitarians’ Views
Political humanitarians (solidarists) argued that limiting emergency response to the 
provision o f material aid have draw-backs: it ignored the fact that food shortages 
were frequently politically induced by deliberate prevention o f normal trading 
patterns and by food embargoes imposed by armed factions.177 According to 
political humanitarians, the argument o f the traditionalists that the inclusion of 
human rights into OLS mandate would undermine the credibility o f aid operations 
was based on the fear o f the GOS.178 They accused the UN of hiding its inaction 
“behind the curtains o f neutrality and impartiality”.!79 For those who have 
experienced the dangers o f working in an ongoing civil war environment, the 
outrage o f political humanitarians at the OLS impotence to deal with a sovereign 
government is understandable. The killing o f relief workers by the SPLA soldiers, 
following a factional fight in Torit County in Southern Sudan, caused an 
international outcry, and many aid agencies demanded punitive sanctions against the 
rebel movements.180 This incident led to a major controversy between the UN and 
NGOs over priority given to relief aid at the expense o f humanitarian norms and 
principles. There were criticisms, from the NGOs and the donor community, of
176 In fact it was clear from this author’s conversation with some international civil servents during a 
workshop held by UNICEF in February 1997 that the UN/NGO marriage was more a relationship of 
convenience arranged by the pressures of events and overbearing donor governments than a 
passionate romance. This relational discomfort between the UN agencies and NGOs was based on an 
absence of familiarity with one another; they had good reason to be wary of each other. The two 
systems of humanitarian relief institutions compete for scarce donor government resources, spoke to 
quite different constituencies that were frequently hostile to each other, recruited different kinds of 
people to work for them and moved at distinctly different speeds. UNDP, as OLS lead agency in the 
Northern Sector, measured its success by whether host government was pleased, while NGOs 
measured by whether public and private donors were happy. UNDP was more centralised, while 
NGOs were highly decentralised. In this kind of situation, the UN will have to rethink the way it 
selects its implementing partners.
177 NGOs, Demobilisation and Reintegration: Issues in the Horn of Africa, Nairobi, December, 1994, 
pp. 6-7
178 Ibid., p. 7
179 Ibid.
180 African Rights, Food and power in Sudan: A Critique of Humanitarianism, London , The Africa 
Rights, 1997, p.326
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defects in the OLS system, as well as the capacity o f that system to cope 
successfully with the immense range and scope of difficulties imposed by the 
sovereign government on humanitarian access.181 Political humanitarians based their 
arguments on IHL.182 In fact, the UN to endorse GOS position meant that it was 
difficult for the OLS to maintain impartiality when the system was by nature 
involved in a wide range of political decision-making. At the wider perspective, 
many UN and NGO officials agreed that the UN should confine its role to political 
functions associated with a resolution of disputes, the prevention o f conflict and 
coercive interventions. Frustrated by the inability o f the UN to overcome the 
limitation o f its state-centric mandate in favour of neutral humanitarianism, many 
NGOs began to advocate for a new OLS humanitarian mandate that would 
incorporate human rights issues into its programmes.183 Leading the charge were 
ecumenical organisations such as Sudan Focal Point-Europe; the most visible and 
vocal o f the NGOs, arguing that OLS should employ humanitarian action within a 
political strategy on behalf o f victims.
The argument o f solidarists (political humanitarians) was that these political 
restrictions were not imposed only by the GOS and SPLA, but also by the mandate 
o f OLS, which was based on the principles o f neutrality and impartiality.184 
Solidarists pointed out that even when OLS attempted to be neutral and impartial, its 
lead agencies (UNICEF in the Southern Sector and UNDP in the Northern Sector) 
favoured the national government in Khartoum. This, political humanitarians 
argued, was responsible for the confusion and violence in the field when insurgents 
resorted to looting and intimidation as strategies for extracting concessions from 
OLS. According to Barry Wheeler o f the US Refugee Committee, reaching and 
succouring the victims of conflict and co-ordinating the relief efforts o f the 
international community should not be a United Nations responsibility.185 These 
proposals are unlikely to be implemented because political pressure in the UN
181 African Rights, Food and Power in Sudan, p. 325
182 IHL is part of public international law and is composed of rules intended to alleviate the suffering 
of the victims of armed conflict. These rules restrict the choice of the belligerents with regard to the 
means and methods of combat they use and are, therefore, applicable to military operations as such. 
Most of these rules are contained in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and in the two Additional 
Protocols of 1977, all these texts being international treaties.
183 See also DHA, Operation Lifeline Sudan, pp. 54-55
184 Interview with John Ashworth, Co-ordinator of CEAS, Nairobi, April 17, 1996
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system supports its involvement in this field. Moreover, the UN, as an organisation 
o f states, has more effective policy instruments and resources at its disposal for 
international humanitarian action than any international body. In spite o f the 
political humanitarians’ arguments, the UN system in the Sudan was slow to act 
because the GOS was against any suggestion that would favour the inclusion of 
protection and political issues into OLS humanitarian programmes. Therefore, for 
agencies that found human rights violations intolerable, there were two main 
options. One option was to defect from the OLS system in order to have the space 
for speaking against human rights abuses. Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and the 
American Refugee Committee took up that option and condemned human rights 
abuses committed by government forces, as well as those committed by the 
insurgents. Their defection was tactical because the UN would have expelled them 
anyway for violating OLS Letters of Understanding, which the majority o f  NGOs 
signed as a condition for being incorporated into the OLS relief system. The second 
option was to become political, but without violating the terms (neutrality and 
impartiality) contained in the Letters o f Understanding. Most NGOs took the second 
option because defecting from the OLS system would have seriously disadvantaged 
them logistically. Operation Lifeline Sudan had many resources, including several 
aircrafts that went in and out o f the Sudan with the consent of the Khartoum 
government.
While it was true that some international NGOs had considerable amount of 
resources that would have made them independent of OLS system, the risks of 
hiring planes into the locations that were not in the OLS official list were high for 
many such renegade NGOs. The majority o f NGOs who remained within the OLS 
system were aware that flying into the non-OLS approved locations would risk the 
lives o f their agents. Consequently, many NGOs -  more than 30 in number - chose 
to abide by the rules o f “engagement” imposed by the OLS system, while at the 
same time expressing their concerns over human rights issues during the monthly 
co-ordination meetings organised by the lead agency - UNICEF. During those co­
ordination meetings, the view o f political humanitarians was that the impact and 
value o f humanitarian assistance would remain limited unless human rights and the
185 Interview with Barry Wheeler, Director of American Refugee Committee, Nairobi, July 6th,
1996
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obstacles to peace were tackled.186 Nevertheless, political humanitarians -  as will 
be discussed below -  had put a considerable pressure on the UN system in the Sudan 
to take up the issues o f protection with the Sudanese government. Before examining 
the dialogue between OLS and GOS over humanitarian values in the context o f  the 
war, I will describe first the debate on material motives of the parties to the conflict, 
and how these interests have been accommodated by the OLS agencies and donor 
governments.
B . DEBATE ON MATERIAL INTEREST OF LOCAL ACTORS
This second section focuses on the demands o f the warring parties that OLS move 
from relief to “development”.187 From the realist perspective, it is clear that both the 
GOS and the SPLM/A endorsed OLS legitimate normative position out o f self- 
interest; both wanted to benefit from the international resources channelled to Sudan 
through OLS relief agencies. Not surprisingly, the incorporation o f such long-term 
programmes into OLS traditional mandate was less controversial than the debate on 
protection issues raised above, and this was because both traditionalists and political 
humanitarians agreed on the importance of such long-term programmes. Where 
initially prevention of mass starvation was the main aim of intervention in 1989, by 
1994 the OLS mandate was expanded to include the encouragement o f good 
governance, capacity building and development.188 But there was a minority voice 
who saw such programmes as inappropriate in an uncertain civil war 
environment.189 The opponents o f relief-to-development policy pointed out that 
despite the consensus among humanitarian players, the experiences o f Liberia, 
Somalia and Angola have shown that there remained very practical challenges to 
linking relief and development operations in conflict situations. One of the
186 Christian NGOs, Meeting, Khartoum, 20 April, 1996
187 During one of the workshops organised by UNICEF for the Sudanese NGOs in March 1996 in 
the Kenyan border town of Lokichoggio, “Development” was defined in terms of capacity building, 
protection and good governance.
188 According to the UN document, the concept of “human security” embraces a much broader 
agenda, one that broadens significantly the scope and substance of the word ‘security’, that includes 
issues such as human rights, governance, civil society and internal conflict. See UNDP, Human 
Development Report 1994, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 22
189 These sentiments were aired out in one of the Humanitarian Principles workshops organised by 
UNICEF in Lokichoggio, May 21, 1997
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programmes that was contested was “capacity building”. Some UN officials felt that 
capacity building was inappropriate in an unstable environment, while others saw 
capacity building as "developmental", and hence a deviation from the main priority 
o f emergency relief.190 But the Sudan situation was unique for three reasons. First, 
unlike in the countries mentioned above, Operation Lifeline Sudan was established 
with the consent of the parties to the conflict. Second, both the Sudanese 
government and the opposition movement demanded that OLS should move away 
from its strictly relief aid mandate to more long-term programmes, such as capacity 
building and rehabilitation and development. The GOS position on the need for the 
inclusion o f developmental programmes into OLS mandate was contained in The 
Document o f  the Government o f Sudan on the OLS Review. 19' The main contention 
in this document was that the international community’s failure to support national 
institutions, involve the government in decision making, move from relief to 
development, use cheaper transport, was in violation o f OLS agreements.192 The 
SPLM/A supported this GOS position. Therefore, the expansion of OLS mandate to 
include the developmental aspects o f humanitarianism was indeed in the interest of 
both the GOS and the SPLM.
Third, the UN report gave an explicit directive to OLS that emergency 
assistance should be provided in ways that would support recovery and long-term 
development in the Sudan. The UN report clearly recognised the link between relief 
and development activities within the Operation Lifeline Sudan relief system.193 In 
fact, OLS major donors want their organisation -  the UN -  to move gradually away 
from relief to rehabilitation and development as a way o f strengthening opposition 
movements’ internal democracy, as well as strengthening IGAD peace initiatives.194 
In order to show that they mean business, United States government, through 
USAID, in 1993 made a grant to UNICEF for an institutional capacity building
190 Interview with Elizabeth Phillippo, Oxfam-UK East Africa Director, Nairobi, October 23, 1996
191 GOS, Phase I: The Document of the government of the Sudan on the OLS Review & Par II: 
Replies of the Government of Sudan to Questions posed by the OLS -  Operations Team. Khartoum: 
Government of Sudan, Khartoum, April25, 1996
192 DHA, OLS Review, pp. 36-7
193 UN, Strengthening the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Activities 
of the United Nations, including Special Economic Assistance to Individual Countries or Regions: 
Emergency Assistance to the Sudan:, New York, United Nations Secretary General, September 12, 
1994 UNDP, Towards a Workable Strategy on the Internally Displaced Persons in the Sudan: A 
Proposed Workplan of an Assignment to be submitted to the UNDP, Khartoum, 1996
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project.195 This grant signalled the inclusion of capacity building as part o f OLS 
programme, based on an increasing recognition at all levels o f the humanitarian 
community that capacity building in complex emergencies was a sine qua non for 
moves away from relief to rehabilitation and development. The US position was 
supported by the European Union (EU), which also linked humanitarian relief aid 
and elements o f good governance.196 While donor governments’ political influence 
on OLS plans o f action will be discussed in chapter 3, the reader should bear in 
mind that the EU member governments made it possible for OLS to embark on 
programmes such as capacity building, good governance and grassroots 
peacemaking.197 The support given by the EU to the OLS programmes since 1994 
was reflected in the Commission of the European Communities communication to 
the Council and the European Parliament; the communication acknowledges the link 
between humanitarian assistance and development.198 This policy was further re­
emphasised and strengthened in the Oslo meeting o f the 1GAD Partners’ Forum 
Committee on Sudan, which brought government representatives from Belgium, 
France, German, European Commission, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, 
together with the officials from the UN agencies.
In this meeting, humanitarian situation in the Sudan was reviewed and 
expression o f support for the implementation o f the Rome Agreements o f the 
Technical Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (TCHA) to continue its work was 
reaffirmed.199 The participants recognised the importance o f OLS relief efforts, and 
the commitment o f the warring parties to the cease-fire, and agreed to support the 
promotion o f civil governance and humanitarian principles. Thus, this consensus 
between humanitarian agencies and the warring parties resulted in an OLS 
commitment to focus on strengthening local capacities and coping mechanisms of
194 Donor Group, Aide Memoir, Khartoum, November 17, 1992
195 USAID/OFDA, Situation Report on Sudan, No. 2, Washington D.C., USAID, February 13, 1993, 
p. 12
196 ECHO, ECHO Global Plan I: Global Humanitarian Plan of the Affected Populations of the 
Sudan, Brussels, April, 1994
197 NGO Community, Economic Reform in the Horn of Africa: Demobilisation and Reintegration, 
OLS Documentation Centre, Lokichoggio, December, 1994, p. 11
198 Commission of European Communities, Communications from the Commission to the Council 
and the European Parliament on Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development, Brussels, 30/4/96
199 Fourth Meeting of the Committee on Sudan of the IGAD Partners’ Forum, Oslo, Norway, 10 
March 1999, p. 1
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the internally displaced persons. This model o f intervention, as seen from OLS, 
stated that rather than relying primarily on international organisations, first priority 
should be given to strengthening and working through local institutions. However, 
the incorporation o f the concept o f “capacity building” into OLS jargon was marred 
by a disagreement over its meaning. For example, working out the details o f what 
capacity building would entail, and how to go about it, was greeted with both 
scepticism and lack o f consensus among international agencies in the Southern 
Sector. Capacity building imprecision helps explain the lack of consensus among 
OLS agencies on how it can best be carried out. Within UNICEF, the first serious 
attempt at defining the term was at the Capacity Building Workshop in June 1995, 
which produced what has become known as "The Nairobi Joint Statement II". The 
Statement, produced by representatives of 15 OLS agencies, two donor agencies, 
and non- OLS NGOs, endorsed the definition of capacity building as an explicit 
intervention that aims to improve an organisation's effectiveness and sustainability 
in relation to its mission and context.200 In their document "The Way Forward", the 
SRRA implicitly adopted the Joint Statement definition, and described capacity 
building as human resource development and institutional support201 The document 
then went on to propose the type o f training it would require for development of its 
personnel, and the type of material and financial support it has for capacity building 
project and it was noted that perceptions vary from those who considered the 
support to Sudanese agencies to be in terms of merely improving the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance, to those who saw capacity building interventions to be 
aimed at influencing policy and institutional levels, promoting good governance, and 
community empowerment.202
Despite differences of what capacity building is, and how it should be 
implemented in a war environment, OLS nonetheless adopted capacity building as 
one o f its programmes which includes a spectrum of activities such as training local 
structures for relief management, and the revival o f traditional mechanisms for 
conflict resolution. While the national interests o f the warring parties has been 
endorsed by the OLS agencies and donors, the issues o f human rights and 
democratic governance remained unsolved. It is clear from the above discussion that
200 UNICEF/OLS, Capacity Building Workshop, Lokichoggio, Kenya, June, 15, 1995
201 UNICEF/OLS, Capacity Building Workshop, 1995
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there is a considerable disagreement over the compatibility o f the international 
norms with those of the Islamic government in Khartoum.
2 . 3.1 . GLOBAL CONTEXT OF ISLAMIC DISCOURSE
The aim o f this section is to refine the discussion about Islam in order to include a 
more nuanced appreciation about the Sudanese context. This include about the 
debate about Islam and the Qu'ran (Islamic Holy Book); Islam and Sudan, and 
divisions between Hassan al-Turabi and President Omer el-Beshir. It is important 
remark here that the issues raised by the end of the Cold War were reflected in a 
debate that got underway in Western policy and academic circles, especially in the 
United States (US). The debate was led by Samuel Huntington in an article, ‘The 
Clash o f  Civilizations’, where he argued that civilisations were becoming more 
coherent as actors in the international system.203 Huntington’s civilisational thesis is 
an ambitious attempt to formulate a conceptual framework that can help citizens and 
policy makers o f the post-Cold War world. Instead o f focusing on power and 
ideology -  as it was done during the Cold War - Huntington’s paradigm emphasises 
cultural competition:
The fundamental source o f conflict in this new world will not be 
primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among 
humankind and the dominating source o f  conflict will be cultural. The 
clash o f  civilizations will dominate global politics”.204
For Huntington, Islam seems to represent a particular source o f conflict in the 
contemporary world order. While this author does not agree fully with Huntington’s 
civilisational clash thesis, the starting point for much discussion o f Islam and 
Western concepts o f humanitarian norms/human rights is Sharia (‘Islamic law ’) and 
the argument that it is a sufficient basis for the legal and constitutional framework o f 
Muslim societies. This claim is itself based on the argument that Sharia is a divinely 
given code which is both, “by dint of its sacredness, wholly sufficient for Muslims 
and which brooks no emendation or contradiction by other legal or philosophical
202 Ayers A. Letter to Philip O ’Brien, Nairobi, July 30, 1995, p. 2
203 See Samuel Huntington, “The Clash if Civilizations” Foreign Policy, 1993, pp. 22-49
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considerations”.205 However, the claim that Sharia is such a basis for law is, even in 
the terms in which this claim is made by Islamists and other Muslims, seems 
contestable. According to Fed Halliday, the only parts o f the Islamic traditional texts 
that are sacred are, first, the Qu'ran itself which is said to be the word of Allah (God) 
and, secondly, the hadith or sayings of the Prophet Mohammed, as subsequently 
codified.206 The term Sharia, literally ‘path’ or ‘way’ (the root is the same as for the 
conventional Arabic term for a street, shari) did not initially denote a legal code. 
The interpretation o f this divinely sanctioned material, and its elaboration into a set 
o f comprehensive legal codes, is known as fiq  (literally ‘understanding’, hence 
jurisprudence), and it is this, humanly evolved and variously codified, body o f legal 
material that has become to prevail in Muslim society under the, misapplied, term 
sharia.201 Thus, what is today invoked as an accepted, and sacred, body o f text is, 
even in Islamic terms, seems to be nothing o f the sort. As the Syrian writer Aziz al- 
Azmeh has written: ‘Islamic law is not a code. This is why the frequent call for its 
application is meaningless, most particularly when calls are made for the application 
o f Sharia -  this last term does not designate law, but is a general term designating 
good order, much like nomos or dharma....Calls for the “application of Islamic 
law” have no connection with the Muslim legal tradition built upon multivocality, 
technical competence and the existence o f an executive political authority which 
controls the legal system. It is a political slogan, not a return to a past reality’.208
Azmeh statement shows that there is a tradition within Islamic theory to invest 
moral standing in the umma (people), rather than the fifty-odd Muslim-majority 
states. The Qu'ran 49:9 orders the umma as a whole to enjoin what is right and 
forbid what is wrong, and to uphold justice. This informs an assumption in Islamic 
thought concerning the legitimacy of just intervention, in the notion o f collective 
action. As the analysis above suggests, the debate on human rights in Sudan was one
204 Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs, Summer, 1993, p. 22
205 For a detailed discussion of this subject, see Fred Halliday, “Relativism and Universalism in 
Human Rights: the Case of the Islamic Middle East”, in David Beetham (ed.), Politics and Human 
Rights, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, pp. 151-167
206 Ibid., p. 160
207 See Norman Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World, London, Athlone, 1976, pp. 3-10, 
where Sharia is described as ‘an amorphous volume of partly contradictory doctrine, to which lip- 
service, at least, was invariably given and which came to stand, like a sentinel to bar the path of 
progress’, p. 10
208 Aziz al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernity, London, Verso, 1993, pp. 12-4
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that reflected a range o f political concerns, and ones that were often in rather marked 
conflict with each other. In order to understand the relevance o f Huntington’s 
“civilizational clash” concept to this thesis, it is important to briefly put into 
perspective the threat Islamic values pose to OLS nonnative position. According to 
prevailing interpretations, a fundamental precept o f Islam is that Muslims are 
superior to non-Muslims.209 Islam divides humanity into three classes: (1) Muslims 
(2) dhimmis (Jews and Christians), and (3) non-believers.210 The dhimmis can be 
tolerated, but only as a second-class. The third group cannot be tolerated at all. In 
Sudan, this resulted into a variety o f responses on the possible relationship o f Islam 
as a religion to the issue o f human rights. Indeed, at least three distinct responses or 
themes211 from within an Islamic discourse may be identified as respectively, (i) 
appropriate: the claim that, far from Islam and human rights being incompatible, it 
is only under Islam that they can be fully realised; (ii) confrontation, for example, 
the argument that international norms are to be rejected as part o f some imperialist 
or ethnocentric project, and replaced by Sharia; {Hi) incompatibility, the claim that 
somehow ‘Islam’ itself is ineconcilable with human rights, or democratic principles
-  a theme present within Islamic societies in the plea for particularism, but also 
found as well in non-Muslim world, but outside an Islamic discourse.
However, what is significant is the fact that the duty o f collective intervention 
to redress injustice extends beyond the specific case of disputes involving Muslims 
to all human communities. In the context of this thesis, its legitimacy and scope thus 
derive directly from the obligation to assist the poor, which the Qu'ran asserts to be 
o f  universal applicability. There is evidence to prove that the Islamic ethical 
framework is premised on the universality o f its principles; hence although certain 
verses may address the Muslim umma specifically as mentioned above, general 
humanitarian principles in the Qu’ran are intended for all humanity, which is 
fundamentally united in its common origins and destiny. Throughout the Qu'ran, 
God thus speaks to humanity as a whole, its universalistic ethos subsuming the ever­
present particularism. According to Islam, humans serve God through good works,
209 Bassam Tibi, “The European Tradition of Human Rights and the Culture of Islam”, in Abdullahi 
Ahmed An-Naim & Francis M. Deng (eds.), Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, 
Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1990, p. 110
210 Ibid., “The European Tradition of Human Rights and the Culture of Islam, p. 110
- 11 For a detailed discussion of these themes, see F. Halliday, “Relativism and Universalism in 
Human Rights”, pp. 151-167
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which include almsgiving and generosity towards orphans and the elderly. This is 
the general principle o f statement in the Koran (Muslim holy book or Surat).212 
Zakah, almsgiving (from Zakah, “to be worthy”, “pure”), is one o f the five pillars o f 
Islam.213 It is a form o f self-taxation to help the needy. Zakah is giving alms 
directly, or indirectly through the state. Its purpose is to assist destitute persons and 
to contribute to other benevolent deeds. Both Islam and Christianity have the same 
understanding o f the concept o f human dignity. For example, the Bible says: ‘you 
shall not kill; the Qu'ran 5:32 says: ‘Whoever kills a human being (without any 
reason like manslaughter), or corruption on earth, it is as though he had killed all 
m ankind...And whoever saves a life it is as though he had saved the lives of all 
mankind’.
Based on the above analysis, it is arguable that the Qu'ran is not the main 
reason for the difficulties with human rights in Sudan: in this sense ‘Islam’ is not the 
issue.214 What is far more intractable is the political and social context o f 
interpretation, the manner in which these texts are conventionally interpreted, in the 
contemporary Sudanese social and political conditions mentioned in chapter 1. Since 
President Omer al-Hassan Beshir came to power in a military coup, which was 
backed by the National Islamic Front (NIF), Sudan, at least rhetorically, was 
gradually becoming an Islamic state. The first concrete attempt to bring Sudan 
within the Islamic system was in April 1992 when the GOS brought together Islamic 
groups from 35 countries and three continents to draft a common strategy to 
establish Muslim states in their respective lands.215 The conference, which was 
organised in Khartoum, was hosted by Hassan el-Turabi, then leader o f the NIF and 
the architect o f Sharia law. Throughout the meeting deliberations, anti Western 
values were expressed, and it was not surpassing that the group approved a six-point 
manifesto intended to demonstrate that “whatever the strength o f America and the 
W est.. .God is greater” .216
212 Surat, pp. 23-39. For a discussion of these issues, see Ashoor Y.B., “Islam and International 
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The significance of this Islamic project is that it marked the first serious effort by an 
avowedly Islamic state to define, with other leading figures o f the movement, their 
own vision o f a new world order and strategy for achieving it. The conference also 
made progress toward Turabi’s long-stated goal o f overcoming the historic rift 
between Sunni Muslim states, like Sudan, and the Shiite state, like Iran -  that is 
toward ending the bitter historic enmity that has separated these two wings o f Islam 
since the seventeenth century.217 But increased international pressure in the form of 
economic sanctions, and the costly war in the south, President Beshir became less 
enthusiastic to Turabi’s project. Thus, the ongoing discourse on the connections 
between nationalism, the territorial state, and the role o f Islam was complicated by 
differences between President Beshir and Turabi.218 The conflict between the two 
leaders began in 1991 when President Beshir failed to step down to hand over the 
government to Turabi and his NIF followers.219 Turabi became impatient with the 
military fa?ade, since he wanted to rule directly. When Islamic legal codes were 
promulgated in 1991, NIF leaflets had claimed that “the zero hour is near and the 
Islamic Republic will be declared in Sudan”.220 Turabi’s frustration with the 
Beshir’s failure to surrender power to the NIF resulted, in part, from his own failure 
to push through his Islamist agenda.
The relationship between the two leaders deteriorated further when President 
Beshir sought the support o f the more moderate NIF leaders, and his attenpt to 
reconcile with the exiled leaders o f Umma and DUP. Consequently, the power 
struggle between the two leaders intensified in 1999 over the nature and pace with 
which NIF agenda should be implemented. President Beshir wanted a more 
moderate form of Islamic constitution that would be attractive both nationally and 
internationally, but Turabi wanted a comprehensive imposition o f an Islamic state in 
the Sudan. Moreover, the decision o f President Beshir to embrace economic 
liberalisation, and the removal in 1999 of Hassan al-Turabi from the position of 
Speaker o f the National Assembly precipitated the crisis between the NIF and the
217 Miller, “The Challenge of Radical Islam”, p. 44
218 See Peter Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989; Ann Mosely Lesch, The Sudan -  Contested National 
Identities, Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 1998
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government. Turabi tried to fight back by organising street demonstrations against 
the government but failed because the government used armed police force to 
suppress its opponents. Thus, the struggle between General Beshir and Turabi can be 
seen as a clash over democratic reforms, but would suggest that Turabi was in 
favour o f democracy and Beshir was opposed to it, which is not necessarily the case. 
Turabi, the architect o f Islamic Sharia law, was not a democrat, and he presided over 
a parliament that merely rubber-stamped his or Beshir’s decisions. In these 
circumstances, electoral process has served to legitimate unreconstructed or partly 
transformed authoritarian elites in Khartoum whose overriding purpose is to 
preserve their own interests.
Nonetheless, the sacking o f Turabi has raised fresh questions about the pace o f 
democratic reform in the Sudan. General Beshir’s dissolution o f parliament came 
shortly before it was due to vote on Turabi orchestrated reforms which would have 
reduced Beshir’s powers and increased those o f the Speaker o f the National 
Assembly. In short, the struggle was largely about naked personal ambitions, rather 
than democratic reforms. Given the tyrannical tendencies displayed by both Beshir 
and Turabi, democratic reforms seems unlikely to proceed very far as long as either 
remains in power. However, by the year 2000 Dr. Turabi had lost his position as 
Speaker o f the Sudanese National Assembly, and has altogether left the government. 
In this powerful struggle, it appeared that President Beshir, with the support o f 
moderate Arab states such as Egypt, has won. Relevant to this thesis is however the 
impact o f Islamic discourse to OLS humanitarian context.
2 . 3 . 2 .  HUMANITARIAN NORMS VERSUS GOS POLICIES
The Islamic discourse above has wider implications on how OLS should implement 
its programmes or apply international norms in its operational war environments 
(Northern and Southern Sectors). It is stated in chapter 1 that the crisis o f the 
Sudanese state has provided the grounds for the political revival o f Islamic 
fundamentalism. A constructed divine order is being presented in this section by 
Islamists as the alternative to the Western humanitarian values. This section 
contexualises the Islamic discourse by addressing “cultural match” between 
international humanitarian nonns and domestic Sudanese understandings. Pre­
existing domestic understandings condition the impact o f such norms in policy
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debates. Checkel refers to this condition as “cultural match”.221 Using the term 
“culture” captures why, if  humanitarian norms are to become salient domestically, 
they need to resonate with domestic norms, widely held domestic understandings, 
beliefs, and obligations. The domestic discourse, then, provides the context within 
which humanitarian norms take on meaning and thereby conditions their operations. 
When such a cultural match exists, domestic humanitarian actors are likely to treat 
such political devices as given, instinctly recognising the obligations associated with 
the norms. OLS has attempted to do just that. Even though the mainly Christian 
opposition movement subscribed to humanitarian norms, the Islamic government in 
Khartoum was not happy with the whole idea of inserting political issues into the 
traditional humanitarian relief mandate. Though it is a signatory to the Geneva 
Conventions, the GOS position was that humanitarian norms were a threat to its 
sovereignty not only because the principles were conceived and formulated largely 
by Westerners, but also that they reflected cultural values and mores that were 
hostile to the Sudan Islamic values.222
In this case, the recognition o f international norms o f behaviour has been 
likened to cultural imperialism and cause domestic resistance. Accordingly, political 
elite in Khartoum had viewed adhering to humanitarian norms and principles as 
compromising the state’s sovereignty or their capacity to prosecute the war in 
Southern Sudan. For many government officials, the so-called humanitarian 
principles were nothing other than a cover-up of Western conspiracy against Sudan 
Islamic aspirations.223 Accusations o f the alleged OLS violations o f its own norms 
and principles in South Sudan strengthened GOS perception o f OLS as a foreign 
policy tool o f Western governments, with the US singled out as the “enemy” o f 
Islamic values.224 Given this position, there is some truth in the Huntington’s 
‘civilizational clash’ thesis that the language of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights was derived from Western religious and politico-philosophical
221 Jeffrey Checkel, “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary Europe”, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43, 1999, pp. 31-63
222 The Attorney General and Minister of Justice of Sudan attacked the UN Special Rapporteur, 
calling his human rights report “blasphemous”. The Attorney General told the UN Commission on 
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Priestly, Nairobi, May 19, 1990
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traditions, notably Christianity and the Enlightenment. Both the universality o f 
humanitarian norms and the indivisibility o f civil and political, social and cultural 
rights have been seriously contested in the Sudan. Although many Western 
diplomats I met in Nairobi rejected the clash-of-civilisations hypothesis225, donor 
states post-Cold War policy (this is discussed in detail in chapter 3) appeared to have 
been affected by the fear o f an Islamist threat. It was not surprising, therefore, that 
GOS Islamic values conflicted with humanitarian norms and principles. The 
Sudanese government hostility towards OLS was understandable because the very 
existence of such a major international humanitarian operation was bound to create a 
sense o f national humiliation among the ruling Islamist elite in Khartoum. Much of 
GOS rhetoric was based on anti-Western sentiment and this was interpreted by some 
diplomats in Nairobi as a rejection o f Western humanitarian values.226 This anti- 
Western rhetoric, whether exaggerated or not, has some historical validity. For 
example, in an interview with this author, the Sudanese Minister o f External Affairs, 
Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, described humanitarian principles as Western 
instruments o f destabilisation in the Sudan:
All these talks o f humanitarian principles or Geneva Conventions don 't 
make sense to us. You have to ask yourself in whose interest are these 
principles established? They are not fo r the good o f our people; for us the 
UN is here to serve the interest o f Western powers, whose policy is to 
destabilise and divide the country. We have our own values which are more 
humane than those the UN is preaching, and foreigners who are really 
serious to assist our starving population in the south will have to be guided 
by these values.2- 7
The GOS opposition to the Western liberal values o f humanitarianism was based on 
a historical frame of reference, which I believe was the only one that led OLS to an 
understanding of, and consensus on, human rights in the context o f the war. The 
question is, where does Islam fit into this picture, since the GOS opposition to 
humanitarian norms and principles seemed to have dashed any hope for a consensus 
on protection issues. A clear account o f GOS criticisms o f OLS developed over the 
years, and it was contained in a 1992 Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC)
225 This was a conversation between me and an Italian diplomat who attended a conference on Sudan 
organised by the All Africa Conference of Churches, Nairobi, April 5-8, 1997
226 Interview with a Sudanese embassy official, Nairobi, November 17, 1997
2- 7 Interview with Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Minister of External Affairs, Nairobi, May 15, 1997
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report.228 This report clearly stated that the use o f humanitarian principles in 
disregard o f domestic Sudanese law violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
o f the Sudan, and that the INGOs working within it were in breach of Sudan’s visa 
laws because they refused to be registered in Khartoum. The GOS positions on 
OLS, and the alleged irregularities within it, were made clear to the United Nations 
Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA).229 Given the fact that the GOS 
claimed that 80 percent o f the population in Southern Sudan was non-believers, it is 
then logical to argue that by incorporating protection issues into the traditional relief 
aid operations OLS has indeed violated the GOS policies. In other words, OLS has 
no right to protect the rebellious non-believers in the south of the country, and that is 
precisely the aim of jihad (holy war).230 The military officers and politicians who 
seized power on 30 June 1989 - two months after the establishment o f OLS - held a 
monolithic vision o f the identity of the Sudan. They maintained that Islam, the 
majority religion, and Arabic, the language of the Quran, represented the essential 
bases for the country’s nationalism and should define its political, human rights and 
humanitarian systems.231 In this case, minority (referring to the second and third 
believers above) must either merge into that Islamic culture or be exempt from a few 
religious punishments.232 Christians could practice their faith, but adherents of 
traditional African faiths could be compelled to convert, since they were not 
monotheist “people o f the book”.
228 RRC Report to the UN/OLS, Nairobi, September 17, 1992, pp. 1-4
229 Ministry of Social Planning, Briefing Note, Khartoum, March 31,1996
230 See, for example, Gino Basella & Maguel A. Ayusu, Struggling to Be Heard: The Christian Voice 
in Independent Sudan, London, Paulines Publication, 1998
231 For a discussion of this subject, see Kate Almquist, “Religion and Politics in the Sudan: A 
Humanitarian Agency’s Perspective”, paper presented to the United States Institute of Peace 
Conference ‘Religion, Nationalism and Peace in Sudan’, Washington D.C., September 16, 1997
232 US State Department report on Sudan found evidence of how the Islamist regime in Khartoum 
used religion to undermine the status of non-Muslim population in the country. It talked of the 
relegation of southern Sudanese into second class citizens. See United States Department of State, 
Country Human Rights Reports 1997: Sudan
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The regime in Khartoum sought to compel the public to follow its rigid defined 
social code, cultural norms, and religious forms. President Omer Hassan al-Beshir 
underlined the aim o f creating an Islamic state and emphasised the officers close 
relationship with the NIF (National Islamic Front):
We upheld the Islamic trend from the beginning. An Islamic organisation 
was created in the armed forces when the Communists tried to overthrow 
the Numeiry regime in 1971. When the revolution began [in July 
1989]....the leadership o f the NIF met and decided to....join the 
authorities. We needed a number o f their cadres... We are trying to apply 
the [Islamic] texts gradually and intend to establish an Islamic state in 
Sudan... We have programmes for comprehensive daw'a [c a ll]  .^3
The legal underpinnings for an Islamist humanitarian system were consolidated 
when the National Founding Conference for the Political System adopted a National 
Charter for Political Action which emphasised that “our intellectual, spiritual and 
humanitarian values spring from our subservience to one God and belief that He is 
the sole authority in this world and the world after”.234 Throughout the early 1990s, 
the Islamic orientation o f the Sudan was strictly based on Sharia law, which 
discriminated against non-Muslims.235 This Islamic law was incompatible with 
humanitarian principles, which were based on international standards o f behaviour. 
The Sudanese Muslim society in the north was divided by the pro- and anti­
fundamentalist sentiments that were swirling throughout the Muslim community in 
the country.236 Accordingly, Muslims’ reaction to President Omer el Beshir’s 
opposition to humanitarian norms varied widely. Muslims who supported the 
government politically did not appear troubled by the human rights violations in 
Southern Sudan, but other Muslims found these violations intolerable and a 
perversion o f central Islamic values.237 But the international community -  
represented by the UN -  was united in its affirmation o f the universality of
233 Sawt al-Sha ’ab Newspaper, Amman, 23 February 1993, p. 4
234 GOS, Report of the Founding Conference for the Political System, Khartoum, May, 1991, p. 12
235 See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim, “Islamic Law, International Relations, and Human Rights: 
Challenge and Response”, Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1987, p. 317; and An- 
Naim, Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and International Law, 
Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1990
236 David Little, “Islam and Society: the Sudanese Experiment”, Washington D.C., United States 
Institute of Peace, 1998, p. 5
Ibid., Islamic and Christian Cross-currents in Sudan, lecture notes, Washington D.C., United 
States Foreign Service Institute, April 3, 1997, pp. 1-4
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humanitarian norms. As far as the UN, IGADD (Inter-Governmental Authority on 
Development and Drought) and the civil society were concerned, humanitarian 
principles were fundamentally moral claims, and that there was a well established 
right for the Sudanese war victims to have access to humanitarian assistance, and, 
conversely, for impartial aid organisations to provide this assistance. In January 
1994, the IGADD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development and Drought) 
Committee and the parties to the conflict agreed that the humanitarian and political 
dimensions o f the Sudanese problem should not be treated separately but 
simultaneously.238 The Sudanese government was told during the launching o f the 
IGADD peace initiative -  discussed in chapter 3 -  that for any peaceful settlement to 
prevail in the Sudan it was essential that the humanitarian organisations were 
allowed free access to the needy population in Southern Sudan.239
The argument o f the Chairman of IGADD, President Daniel Arap Moi o f 
Kenya, was that humanitarian actions should themselves be seen as one part o f a 
spectrum o f human rights activities: that assistance and protection were closely 
related activities that could and should be justified in human rights terms.240 Like 
OLS, the Kenyan government was against military-humanitarianism that some 
national NGOs lobbied for. The IGADD member countries re-affirmed their support 
for humanitarian principles and urged the GOS and the SPLA to respect and abide 
by those norms. The importance o f respect for humanitarian principles, including 
unrestricted and secure access to areas in need, the security of humanitarian workers 
and the integrity o f relief distribution, was also strongly emphasised by the 
representatives o f donor countries.241 GOS position tends to inform what Dower 
terms an ‘idealist-dogmatic’242 cosmopolitan approach to international norms o f 
behaviour, which requires that non-Muslim societies accept not only the set o f 
values upheld, but equally the worldview from which they emanate. The problems 
surrounding GOS position in a differentiated and increasingly interconnected global 
society barely require mention: furthermore, it is difficult for it to entertain co­
238 Interview with Bathuel Kiplagat, IGAD Consultant, Nairobi, Kenya: March 12, 1997
239 Ibid.
240 GOK, Relief Supplies and Humanitarian Assistance to the War Affected Areas, Nairobi, 
Government of Kenya, March 23, 1994, pp. 2 - 5
241 DHA, Records of the Donor Consultations on the Sudan, Geneva, May, 1995
242 Nigel Dower, World Ethics: the new agenda, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1998, pp. 
95-6
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operative alliances with other religious traditions, or with non-religious actors such 
as the UN. There is a marked contrast in this respect with the contribution o f 
religious pluralists and liberals, for whom the perspective o f the whole is balanced 
with an appreciation o f diversity and difference. Among them, common involvement 
towards building a consensus of values in solidarity and an active commitment to 
their advance is possible, establishing a platform from which broad appeals can be 
made to those whose humanitarian convictions are not religiously grounded, 
creating alliances of convergence for practical purposes. Prince Hassan o f Jordan, 
for example, has repeatedly urged for the crafting o f a universal ethic as the basis for 
a ‘New International Humanitarian Order’, founded on a recognition o f the 
fundamental worth o f the human person and reflecting global understanding of 
shared nature o f contemporary human obligations.243 The Prince acknowledged that 
the desired ethic, which can provide a focus for consensus by explaining the 
necessary minimum of common values, standards and attitudes which can be 
universally affirmed, implies ‘an almost Copemican change of perspective, from a 
fractured to a holistic view of human welfare which is centred on the commonality 
o f human interests’.244 As early as 1995, OLS had already acknowledged the 
significance o f the commonality o f human interests in its framework for relief 
operation. But it was the acknowledgement o f the diversity o f cultural norms by 
OLS, which prompted UNICEF to establish a fact-finding commission in late 1994 
to look into the relevance o f OLS principles to the Sudanese context.
2 . 3 . 3 .  TOWARDS A DIALOGUE OF VALUES
Pluralists, who, without giving up the distinctiveness o f their own tradition, seek a 
consensus with GOS based on an acknowledgement o f cultural differences, and the 
solidarists who adopt an ecumenical perspective looking to global problems 
generated by a global society in their impact on humanity as a whole. How might 
these opposing articulations (perspectives) be reconciled for the good o f Sudan war- 
victims? UNICEF was aware o f these different cultural relativist arguments, and it 
thus set up a fact-finding commission toward the end o f 1994 to try to settle
243 Prince El Hassan bin Talal, The Universality of Ethical Standards and the Government of Civil 
Society, The Annual Denning Lecture, London, July 28, 1997, 2-4
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differences o f interpretation and operationalisation of humanitarian principles and 
rules. The aim o f the commission was to contribute to the search for a set o f 
humanitarian principles acceptable to the warring parties and donor organisations. 
The commission was given the task o f researching the various Sudanese values, and 
preparing a comprehensive analysis to be presented to OLS for study and 
consideration. The commission made an extensive survey of the various Sudanese 
nonns and customs. The OLS commissioned document was ready by January 1995, 
and it proved that, apart from the relative importance attached to group rights and 
individual rights, both Christian and Islamic cultures share humanitarian values, 
which oblige international community to come to the aid o f those starving.245 The 
document argues that humanitarian norms exist within the Sudanese societies which 
has countered GOS opposition to OLS and offered the moral foundation for the 
rights o f international community to intervene on behave o f Sudan war-victims.246
Much o f the GOS argument above has been countered by the Commission’s 
findings, which illuminated the sources o f humanitarian values that were found in 
the Sudanese cultures. The document gives an elaborate overview o f the origin of 
different elements o f humanitarian norms in indigenous social and popular culture 
particularly in Southern Sudan. There is nothing Western about them, yet they 
resonate with those adopted by OLS. The historical fact that the fonnulation of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) was dominated by the political forces o f the 
day does not exclude humanitarian norms and principles from being rooted in their 
own specific ways in the Sudanese society. The implication o f the Commission’s 
findings is that tribal society is a form of political association whose members 
recognise the collective authority o f the tribe as it is embodied in and expressed by 
rainmakers, elders and wise men. The Sudanese tribal societies are, according to the 
Commission, usually stateless societies in which the enforcement o f the members’ 
rights is a matter o f  self-help o f individuals and families and their friends and allies.
244 Prince Hassan, The Universality of Ethical Standards and the Government of Civil Society, pp. 2- 
4
245 For a comparative analysis of the Western and Sudanese values, see Simon Simonse, Human 
Rights and Cultural Values in Relief Operations in War-torn South Sudan: A Discussion paper 
produced by Larjour Consultancy, Commissioned by Operation Lifeline Sudan, Nairobi, January 2, 
1995, pp. 1-28; For an African perspective, see Abdullahi Ahmed An-Naim and Francis M. Deng 
(eds.), Human Rights in Africa: Cross-Cultural Perspectives, 1990
“46 Simonse S., Human Rights and Cultural Values in Relief Operations in War-torn South Sudan, p.
28
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But I argue that this anarchy is prevented from destroying the social order only by 
powerful cultural pressures that promote adherence to tribal customs and which 
include respect for the guidance and decisions o f the rain-makers and elders. Not 
surprisingly, the document confirmed that both Islam and Christianity enjoy a 
minimum fundamental consensus concerning binding humanitarian values, 
irrevocable standards and basic moral attitudes, which support humanitarian 
principles and rules. In other words, contrary to the Sudanese government position, 
there are no fundamental differences between Islamic concept o f humanitarianism 
and that espoused by Operation Lifeline Sudan. During one of the OLS 1995 
workshops on “Religious Concept o f human rights” - in which this author was one 
o f the facilitators - the views of the Sudanese religious leaders (Christians and 
Muslims alike) were similar to those o f OLS: “that humanitarian values which guide 
relief operations are accepted by both Islam and Christianity, and that the two 
religions do not support discriminatory practices in the distribution of relief aid to 
the war-victims”.247 According to Rev. Haruun Ruun, the Executive Secretary o f the 
New Sudan Council o f Churches, political and military leaders in the Sudan “do a 
definite disservice to the objectives o f their policies if  they create the impression that 
European values are un-Sudanese”.248
The Muslim Council o f the New Sudan view was that humanitarian relief aid 
was sanctioned by Allah (God), and should not be undermined by abstract 
intellectualism.249 The representative o f the Sudan Law Society echoed the religious 
leaders’ position: “The idea that an interest in humanitarian principles and rules is a 
Western import serves the interests o f local violators of human rights. Many o f our 
political and military leaders are not properly educated and have no positive values, 
but exhibit exceptional narrow mindness, brutality and corruption. If there is a single 
rationale underlying humanitarian principles, it is perhaps the need, on the one hand, 
to protect the lives o f the war victims and risks o f operating in a civil war
247 UNICEF/OLS, Report on Workshop on Humanitarian Principles for Sudanese NGOs, Nairobi, 
April 5, 1995
248 Dr. Haruun Ruun made this statement during the workshop on the Religious Concept of Human 
Rights, held in Lokichoggio, Kenya, from 5-7 May, 1995
249 For an analysis of humanitarian values across cultures and religions, see Isaac Ephrain, 
“Humanitarianism Across Religions and Cultures”, in Thomas G. Weiss & Larry Minear (eds.), 
Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining Civilians in Times of War, Boulder and London, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1993, pp. 13-22
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environment” .2 5  ^ Thus, the revelation by the OLS commissioned document that 
Sudanese, in their traditional warfare, do not deprive children, and other vulnerable 
groups o f their rights to relief aid, and that children under eighteen years were not 
traditionally allowed to go to war, exposed Sudan warring parties to shame, though 
it did not end doubts regarding the universality o f humanitarian principles. Both the 
GOS and SPLM/A interpreted the document according to their own interests. As 
SPLM/A representative puts it:
I  have read the document and I  do not think any Sudanese, who is in his 
or her right mind, can deny the fact that humanitarian values existed and 
still exist among our people, despite the breakdown o f society. We have 
nothing to regret much. The SPLM/SPLA allows and encourages 
unrestricted and unconditional access fo r  Operation Lifeline Sudan and 
other relief agencies that are operating in areas under the control o f the 
Movement. Similarly, although the SPLM/A has taken up arms in defence 
o f the rights o f all the Sudanese people, the nature o f the civil war made 
it difficult fo r  us to check the conduct on which the war is being pursued 
by our fighting men and women. In spite o f some human rights violations, 
we are the only party to the conflict that takes prisoners o f  war (POWs) 
and hands them to the care o f the ICRC. This is not the case with the NIF 
regime in Khartoum. In fact, the government o f Sudan even kills those 
who surrender.251
While there were those who saw SPLM/A leadership acceptance of humanitarian 
principles as dictated by political opportunism, OLS, though aware o f such political 
interest, saw it as a new dawn in its relations with the insurgents. The GOS, anxious 
to defuse the opposition movement’s accusation that it was responsible for 
obstructing relief access, also welcomed UNICEF’s findings contained in the OLS 
document. The GOS did not only make a U-turn from its earlier hard-line position, 
but it also made a commitment to the concept and principles o f  Operation Lifeline 
Sudan. Prof. David de Chand, GOS representative to the Great Lakes Regional 
conference on Sudan, stated clearly that the government was serious and concerned 
with the plight o f its people, and would not pursue policies that would violate the 
rights o f the war-victims to receive relief aid.252 But the SPLM/A leader, Dr.
25® Interview with John Luk, Sudan Law Society, Nairobi, November 9, 1996
251 Interview with Dr. Samson Kwaje, SPLM/A Secretary for Information and Culture, Nairobi, 
November 12, 1997
252 Interview with Prof. David de Chand, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nairobi, April 8
1997
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Garang, believes the GOS is the only culprit, having denied the universality o f 
humanitarian norms and principles:
It is Khartoum which has turned this tragedy into a political instrument.
The argument that by sending food, clothing and medicines to the needy 
in SPLA-held areas would morally strengthen the Movement is 
understandable. The SPLA/SPLM does not trade on human misery, 
otherwise it would refuse granting permission to the delivery o f food to 
the starving in the government-held towns. The government is aware o f  
the fact that the policy o f starving the citizens under its controlled towns 
is a wrong weapon. Khartoum’s insistence o f sovereignty is another 
wrong way o f saying talking with the rebels will diminish national 
sovereignty. It is a fallacious argument. It is the very starving people who 
are suffering”.253
Nevertheless, the failings of the government do not justify SPLM/A practice o f 
deliberate looting o f OLS resources, or depriving the starving population o f relief 
food. The reality, however, is that both the GOS and the SPLM/A were shamed into 
accepting the universality o f humanitarian principles and rules. The significance o f 
these findings is that, religious and cultural perspectives do possess the potential to 
provide important resources towards the creation o f a new international 
humanitarian order, the ongoing association of their adherents with division, conflict 
and intolerance notwithstanding. In other words, the fact that legitimating discourses 
are bounded by prevailing domestic understandings should not obscure the dynamic 
nature o f the relationship between domestic and international normative structures. 
In the case o f OLS, both seems to be evolving. This implies that the match between 
the two sets o f normative structures may change over time and that the domestic 
salience o f international nonns will vary accordingly. The cultural match as a 
condition mediating the domestic salience of humanitarian nonns and principles is 
dynamic and malleable. The debate above shows that both Islam and Christianity 
can counsel a more comprehensive, if  not universalist, vision, stressing the need for 
human solidarity and countering divisive attitudes after the like o f Huntington’s ‘the 
West and the rest’.
253 Quoted in Efuk, The Politics of Famine in Sudan, p. 18
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2 . 4 .  CONSTRUCTING NORMS FOR RELIEF AID OPERATION
Now that the GOS and OLS have reached a consensus on their humanitarian 
policies, it was the job o f OLS to construct norms, rules and principles (political or 
rhetorical devices) on which to dialogue meaningfully with all the concerned 
authorities in the Northern and the Southern Sectors. The underlying normative254 
position o f OLS diplomacy was based upon two fundamental assumptions.255 First, 
that the protection o f safety and dignity o f victims of conflict is an integral part o f a 
humanitarian mandate. Second, that access to humanitarian assistance is a 
fundamental right and that the integrity o f humanitarian assistance - ensuring its 
timely arrival to the right people - must be protected. This normative position drew 
upon two principal influences. The first was the Convention on the Rights o f the 
Child (CRC), which entered into force in 1990. The CRC became a principal 
framework for UNICEF in the elaboration o f what it referred to as rights-based 
programming rather than needs-based programming.256 The argument o f the 
UNICEF officials was that “humanitarian action should itself be seen as one part o f 
a spectrum o f humanitarian activities, and that assistance and protection are closely 
related activities that can and should be justified in human rights terms”.257 
Accordingly, humanitarian assistance was described in tenns o f the fulfilment o f 
certain claims that human rights make on us.258
The second influence in the definition o f OLS’s normative position was 
UNICEF’s mandate as co-ordinating humanitarian agency. As in all DHA-led 
programmes, the humanitarian co-ordinators are responsible for advocacy and 
promotion o f DHA’s ‘Respect for Humanitarian mandates in Conflict Situations’.
254 In this thesis, “normative” is defined in terms of humanitarian norms which guide OLS 
humanitarian action. These norms include the Geneva Conventions and human rights law.
255 Interview with Ian Levine, UNICEF/OLS Co-ordinator of Humanitarian Principles: Nairobi, 
October 13, 1996; see also Ian Levine, Humanitarian Principles: the southern Sudan experience, ODI, 
London, May 1997, pp. 1-4
256 Ibid., Humanitarian Principles, London, ODI Publication, 1997, p. 3
257 Ibid., p. 3
258 For further information on the link between human rights and relief, see James Dracey, “Human 
Rights and International Standards: What do Relief Workers need to know?”, Relief and 
Rehabilitation Network, ODI Publication, London, February 1997, pp. 1-34
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This document259 defines the promotion o f humanitarian principles and the 
protection o f civilians as integral to its mandate. In order to promote and protect 
these two normative positions, UNICEF was requested to define the objectives o f 
the humanitarian principles programmes which OLS will use to dialogue with the 
warring parties. These were defined into four policy objectives. First, to define and 
defend OLS humanitarian mandate; to ensure that assistance reaches the neediest 
and that civilians are protected. Second, to increase awareness and observance o f 
humanitarian principles through dissemination and advocacy at all levels o f society. 
Third, to strengthen the commitment of the political authorities to these 
humanitarian principles. Fourth, to monitor and document violations.
The question was how to define the standards that would achieve the 
protection. Though many commentators have written o f the growing 
interdependence o f human rights law and humanitarian law260, in the case o f OLS, it 
was recognised from the outset that political constraints would prevent that. In fact 
at the time when OLS was planning its humanitarian principles programme, Gasper 
Biro, the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights, was made persona non grata by 
the GOS for his critical report on the human rights situation in the country. To have 
brought up human rights in the manner some NGOs wanted OLS to act would have 
attracted an immediate and very negative response from the government. The 
challenge for OLS therefore was to clearly identify the political devices needed for 
promoting the ethical standards required in a civil war environment. Three 
diplomatic tools were identified. The first device was the Geneva Conventions with 
their additional Protocols - which seek to ensure that those fighting conform to basic 
rules with respect to non-combatants, including medical and relief personnel - were 
an obvious choice. Although there are often problems related to the application of 
the Geneva Conventions, particularly in internal conflicts, Article 3 that makes up 
part o f customary international humanitarian law provides most o f the basic 
principles, which guarantee the protection o f the civilian population in the war 
zones.
259 The document states: “Civilians have fundamental right under international humanitarian law to 
be protected from attacks, torture and other forms of attacks on their physical and moral integrity.” It 
also states: “The fundamental human right of all persons to live in safety and dignity should be 
supported through appropriate measures of protection as well as relief.”
26<-* See Darcy, J., Human Rights and International Legal Standards: What Relief Workers Need to 
Know, Relief and Rehabilitation Network Paper 19, London, ODI Publication, 1997, pp. 1-5
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The second device chosen was the Convention on the Rights o f the Child (CRC), 
which is perhaps the most under-rated tool o f humanitarianism, and it is the most 
ratified human rights treaty in the world, with 190 governments behind it. It is also 
the most comprehensive since it deals with political and civil liberties as well as 
social, economic and cultural rights. With, typically, more than 50 per cent o f war 
affected people being children,261 it covers the largest and most vulnerable segment 
o f  the population. The third diplomatic device chosen was the Ground Rules. 
Because the rebel movement is not a signatory to the Geneva Convention, UNICEF 
developed the Ground Rules to dialogue with the rebels. Following the 1992 
incident in which four relief workers were killed by the insurgents, coupled with the 
continuing NGOs hostility towards OLS appeasement policy, UNICEF saw the need 
for a framework on which to work with the SPLA. First, UNICEF put pressure on 
the leaders o f the SPLA factions to sign their acceptance o f a set o f ‘Ground Rules’. 
These Rules were an agreement between UNICEF and the humanitarian wing o f the 
opposition movement, which defined the basic principles upon which OLS 
humanitarian programmes were based. In accepting the Ground Rules, the 
opposition movements recognised their international obligations:
We, the undersigned, enter into this agreement in a spirit o f good faith 
and mutual co-operation in order to improve the delivery o f  
humanitarian assistance to and protection o f civilians in need...In 
signing this agreement, we express support fo r  the following 
international humanitarian conventions and their principles, namely: (i) 
Convention on the Rights o f the Child 1989; (ii) Geneva Conventions o f  
1949 and the 1977protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions.262
The Ground Rules represent the bringing together of humanitarian and human rights 
concerns, and provide a vehicle for OLS agencies to address incidents o f abuse 
against civilians directly with the parties responsible as they have committed 
themselves to abide by those rules.
261 Levine, I., Humanitarian Principles: the southern Sudan experience, p. 4
262 UNICEF/OLS, SPLM/OLS Agreement on Ground Rules, Nairobi, July 20, 1995, p.  1
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2 . 4 . 1 .  DISSEMINATION OF HUMANITARIAN NORMS
With the norms and rules identified and apprehensively endorsed by all the parties to 
the conflict, it was left to UNICEF - as UN lead agency -  to disseminate the 
information widely. Indeed, since 1995 OLS became, through its monthly 
coordination meetings and workshops, a forum within which international 
community and the Sudan warring parties expressed and shared their problems and 
successes. By their nature, humanitarian principles and Rules require considerable 
publicity and education, especially within the opposition movement, for them to be 
accepted and effective. According to UNICEF document on Sudanese values, OLS 
was requested to take steps to revive traditional southern Sudanese norms and values 
through a series o f workshops:
OLS may take the initiative to carry out educational programmes that 
promote adherence o f human rights such as workshops on human rights 
fo r  high ranking political and military personnel, possibly in 
collaboration with ICRC; training programmes on human rights about 
procedures to be followed when human rights are violated fo r  church 
leaders, school teachers, NGO personnel, with the ultimate aim o f  setting 
up human rights groups inside southern Sudan. OLS could show its 
human rights concern by giving increasing attention to victims o f  human 
rights abuses, especially minors, the special mandate o f UNICEF.
Since 1995, great efforts were made to make the principles and rules widely known 
and understood. In doing this, the officer o f the programme was particularly 
concerned to emphasise the links between humanitarian principles, as codified, and 
the traditional values o f Sudanese cultures.264 Making this connection was an 
important part o f the many workshops that were held in order to disseminate the 
rules. The argument was used largely in order to prevent giving the impression that 
foreigners were imposing foreign values. As far as the first task was concerned, that 
is selecting categories o f audiences, UNICEF made a list of eight target groups 
which, in order o f  importance, were: combatants, local and international 
organisations and community leaders -  chiefs, and elders. According to UNICEF, 
there were many good reasons as to why combatants should learn the principles, and
263 Simon Simonse, Human Rights and Cultural Values in Relief Operations in Wartom South 
Sudan, p. 25
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rules o f humanitarian operation and respect them. First, Sudan government and the 
SPLM/A were morally obliged to ensure that combatants learn and respect the rules. 
Second, there were economic as well as technical reasons that justified respect o f 
humanitarian principles and rules. Third, and perhaps most important, there was 
always a political cost attached to each violation o f humanitarian principles and 
rules.265 In the Sudan, UNICEF, in collaboration with the ICRC, was legally 
mandated to disseminate information pertaining to humanitarian law and Geneva 
conventions among the different audiences mentioned in this section. UNICEF 
identified, developed, encouraged and oversaw the dissemination o f both 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and o f the principles.
2 . 4 . 2 .  OLS AD HOC HUMANITARIAN DIPLOMACY
Although the significance o f humanitarian principles and rules as political devices 
for shaming the behaviour o f the GOS and the SPLM/A will be examined in the next 
chapters, it is essential that the meaning o f OLS “Ad hoc diplomacy” is stated in this 
section. Knowing what is entailed in this kind o f diplomacy is important for 
understanding the weaknesses and strengths of OLS humanitarian operation 
discussed in the chapters dealing with the two operational environments o f OLS. 
Before explaining OLS concept o f diplomacy, I would like to define briefly the 
link between “humanitarianism” and “diplomacy” in the context o f OLS. 
“Humanitarianism” is viewed here as encompassing activities covering a full 
spectrum -  from supplemental feeding o f infants during famine to longer-term 
measures such as strengthening of indigenous social and institutional coping 
mechanisms to avoid future emergencies. Similarly, humanitarianism includes a 
spectrum of activities ranging from conflict resolution, diplomatic efforts on behalf 
o f an individual or group to enhancing the safety o f a vulnerable person or persons 
through international presence (e.g. UN agencies, NGOs), and providing a physical 
barrier to deflect a threatened use o f force. This brings us to what “diplomacy” 
means. The structure of the “new diplomacy” remained similar in form to traditional 
diplomacy to the extent that states/governments remained the major actors in this 
diplomatic system. There are two important stages to note, however, which have
264 Interview with Levine, 1996
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implications not only for the structure but also for the processes and issues that 
characterised the new diplomacy.266 First, in terms o f structure, states are no longer 
the only actors involved. Increasingly, they had to share the diplomatic stage with 
other actors like international organisations who are also engaged in diplomacy. 
These organisations were categorised into two types: inter-governmental 
organisation (IGO) and non-governmental organisation (NGO). The changing 
interests o f states as international actors and the growing number o f non-state actors 
involved changed the nature o f the new diplomacy as a process o f negotiation.
Most obviously, it made diplomacy a more complex activity involving 
different actors. States continued to negotiate bilaterally with each other on a state- 
to-state basis, but groups o f states typically negotiated multilaterally through the 
auspices o f the UN and, increasingly with the growing range of NGOs, which 
sought to influence inter-state behaviour to achieve their own objectives. In the 
context o f OLS, this thesis identifies diplomacy as a key process o f communication 
and negotiation in the international system and as an important policy tool or 
instrument used by the humanitarian players in issue-areas such as refugees, 
environment, human rights, and so forth. As discussed above, Operation Lifeline 
Sudan operated within many external constraints, and access was one o f the main 
constraints. OLS gained access to those in need through an agreement negotiated by 
all parties to the conflict.267 That is, OLS ad hoc diplomacy was based on the 
International Committee o f the Red Cross (ICRC) ad hoc humanitarian diplomacy, 
which involved, among other things, representation at meetings; the building o f 
relations with leaders o f open and clandestine political or military parties, and the 
intervention o f the top UN officials with ministers, heads o f state and insurgent 
leaders. While not strictly neutral and impartial like ICRC, with ties with the 
government, OLS was engaged in discreet negotiations with all sides to the Sudan 
conflict. In its attempt to co-ordinate the various actors in the war, OLS was 
involved in a very delicate diplomacy, particularly over the issue o f sovereignty.
265 Interview with Levine
266 For recent discussion on this subject, see Luc Reychler, Beyond Traditional Diplomacy, 
Discussion Paper No. 17, Diplomatic Studies Programme , Leicester, University of Leicester, 1996; 
Paul Sharp, “For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International Relations”, International 
Studies Review, Vol. 1, Issue 1, Spring 1999, pp. 33-57
267 Interview with Hamish Young, OLS Humanitarian Principles Officer, Nairobi, November 20, 
1996
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There was a wide ranging and continued debate around Sudan’s sovereignty in the 
OLS, particularly between traditionalists, led by the UN agencies, and political 
humanitarians, led by NGOs. For many agencies, recognising or ignoring borders is 
a political act and whether to cross them in order to provide humanitarian assistance 
and/or protection certainly has proved the most contentious issue in the debate. For 
many NGO officials, sovereignty should not be afforded to a government which 
allows, even propagates the suffering o f its people, but for the UN bureaucrats, 
sovereignty is a fact o f international law and one o f the few protections for the ever- 
weakened developing nation state and as such must be respected.
The experience o f Sudan is indeed illustrative o f these diverse approaches to 
humanitarian operations, and OLS co-ordination difficulties were exacerbated by the 
diverse approaches o f the actors. UN agencies generally function within the 
prevailing understanding o f national sovereignty. That is, they operate as inter­
governmental bodies comprising member states and representing government 
interests, political as well as humanitarian. Since 1989, when OLS was established, 
supporting displaced and conflict-affected populations within war zones, as opposed 
to refugee populations outside o f war zones, has become a notable trend in relief aid 
policy.268 As a result, the international attitude toward large-scale refugee 
movements has hardened. The aim o f the new approach is to internalise war-induced 
displacement. O f necessity, the new approach is usually implemented in situations 
where governance is contested, and where conflict is unresolved; this, in turn, has 
led to the questioning of sovereignty in relation to humanitarian issues. Concerning 
human rights, this process has potentially contributed to the challenge and gradual 
erosion o f traditional connotations linked up with “state sovereignty” as a more or 
less absolute concept.269 These changes in the world do not make hard political 
choices any easier. If OLS did not balance the concerns o f sovereignty with those o f 
humanitarianism and accept this limitation it would probably have lost all access to 
southern Sudan”.270 This practical approach to OLS/GOS relations was founded 
upon recognition that the humanitarian problems of foreign policy are complex, 
compared with the views (for example, those o f NGOs and religious institutions) 
that they are simple.
268 UNHCR Report, Geneva, 1995, pp. 19-56
269 Interview with John Maurice ,UNICEF/OLS Field Officer, Nairobi, April 20, 1996,
101
2 . 5 .  CONCLUSION
The conclusion from this chapter that will be used in the next chapters concerns the 
universality o f humanitarian norms and principles, and their possible effects on the 
behaviour o f the parties to the Sudan conflict, as well as OLS donor governments. 
International Humanitarian Law on armed conflicts embodies an unprecedented 
aspiration to conceive rights as applicable to all non-combatant war-victims. In this 
sense, humanitarian norms and principles were a global project which recognised the 
rights o f Sudanese war-victims to international assistance and protection. The 
interesting thing with these norms and principles is that they have served to 
stimulate discussion among the international humanitarian community in the Sudan 
on the need for the UN to go beyond the co-ordination of relief operations to more 
long-term issues. The debate in this chapter has shown that people need standards by 
which to quantitatively measure what they do and what other people do to them. 
Specifically, the humanitarian players -  the UN, warring parties, donors and NGOs - 
in the Sudan need structures and a language to relate to each other, to frame 
whatever they want to identify as progress in their operational environments. While 
the debate over the nature and relevance o f the international norms were settled as 
far as the humanitarian players in the Sudan were concerned, implementation of 
such operational guidelines were always difficult in an ongoing civil war. However, 
the advantage of OLS relief aid policy debate was its globalist character and its 
emphasis on victims of war.
But the advantage o f the diplomacy o f OLS was precisely its political content, 
its implications for participation. In so doing, the OLS showed the Sudanese warring 
parties respect, and gave them a motive to comply with the principle o f holding 
cross-cultural dialogue. As will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5, OLS experience 
does indeed add humanitarian principles the notion o f state responsibility for respect 
for human rights in the context o f war through global civil society action. This 
meeting o f minds between OLS and the Sudanese people over the universal nature 
o f the international humanitarian standards o f behaviour could have implications for 
the reconceptualisation o f  future “humanitarian diplomacy”.
270 Interview with Levine, October 13, 1996
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CHAPTER THREE 
NORMS AND DONOR STATES’ MULTIPLE AGENDAS 
3 . 1 .  OVERVIEW
Chapter 2 has attempted to analyse Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) Plans o f Action, 
and how the principles and rules contained in that action plans helped create policy 
debate between humanitarian relief players and the parties to the conflict. There is 
evidence in chapter 2 to prove that different interpretations o f such values of 
international contention as variant adjudication of the tension between humanitarian 
norms and state sovereignty are not a reflection o f different cultural values; they 
reflect different interests, and positions within a world of shared discourse. Thus, the 
lesson from chapter 2 is that humanitarianism is not a determined set o f options, but 
rather a context - historical and global -  within which a set o f options are available, 
around which the main players (states, the UN) can develop practical policies and 
engage with their own operational humanitarian environment.
The aim o f this chapter is to show, through the case study o f donor states’ 
multiple agendas, that the usefulness o f humanitarian norms strengthen the case 
against the Realist denial o f the significance o f norms under conditions o f anarchy, 
and pluralists claim that principles o f sovereignty and non-intervention make 
external intervention in states’ domestic affairs problematic. Although donor states 
had multiple agendas (for example, political, security and humanitarian interests) in 
intervening in the Sudanese internal affairs, I argue from the constructivist 
perspective that international nonns had provided intervening states with a 
legitimate justification to violate Sudan tenitorial sovereignty in order to relieve the 
suffering o f civilians trapped or displaced by the civil war.271 The significance of
271 As one US embassy official told me, the final impediment to the realisation of a humanitarian 
policy consistent with a declared aims of the Western governments is the multiplicity of foreign 
policy objectives -  geopolitical and humanitarian. “Geopolitical objective” is understood here as 
foreign intervention that seeks to advance the national interest of an intervening state. The 
humanitarian objective — saving the lives of starving Sudanese — was basically circumstantial. 
Interview, Nairobi, June 12, 1997
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constructivist approach in this argument is that it attends to the role o f international 
norms can remedy realist claim by allowing us to problematise interests and their 
change over time. In this respect, all the ‘donors’272 mentioned above viewed 
humanitarian disaster relief in Sudan as their foreign policy responsibility for 
containing and resolving the Sudanese conflict, which was seen as posing a threat to 
the stability o f the Horn o f Africa sub-region. Humanitarian norms were used by 
donor states to strengthen principles o f good governance as a guideline for 
international interaction through foreign policy practice and diplomatic dialogue. 
For example, at the higher political level, the US Congress, the European 
Community (EC) and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Development (IGADD) played a leading role in pressuring the hesitant UN to accept 
the inclusion o f human rights norms, democratic governance and development273 
into the OLS programmes. Foremost among major actors was the US, from which 
many other governments and organisations traditionally took their cues in matters 
relating to humanitarian assistance and good governance.
3 . 2 .  UNITED STATES POLITICAL AGENDAS
One o f the most important donors, whose multiple geopolitical interests impacted on 
OLS humanitarian relief programmes, was the United States (US). The 
constructivists can claim that Washington’s intervention in the Sudanese domestic 
affairs supports their position because the US defines its interests in terms o f human 
rights norms, and regulates its own behaviour accordingly.274 This was reflected in 
the US Department o f State report, which underlined the need to use aid embargo as 
a way o f encouraging the military regime in Khartoum to return the country to 
civilian rule.275 However, some scholars have argued rightly that in American 
foreign policy there is often a dialectical tension between two opposing patterns:
272 The IGADD member states can be called donors because, countries such as Uganda, Kenya, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea gave part of their territories to the United Nations for humanitarian purposes. 
The headquarters of Operation Lifeline Sudan is at Lokichoggio, northern Kenya.
273 Breaking the Cycle of Despair: President Clinton’s Initiative on the Horn of Africa, Report of the 
President’s Representative, Washington D.C., June 1994, p. 13
274 Johnathan Clarke, “The Conceptual Poverty of US Foreign Policy”, The Atlantic Monthly, March, 
1993, pp. 54-66
275 US Department of State, Country Human Rights Reports, 1993: Sudan, Washington D.C., Us 
Government Printing Office, 1994, p. 23
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realism -  pragmatism - idealism -  legalism”.276 Or to put it differently, American 
foreign policy has oscillated between realpolitik and humanitarianism. In the eyes o f 
its advocates and practitioners, realism signifies a more orderly, clear-headed and 
ruthless understanding of the formulation of policy based on well-defined national 
interests.277 In contrast, idealism reflects a deeper cultural ethos and its values. 
These values are embedded in the core idea of national greatness, closely coupled 
with the promotion o f individual liberty and democratic capitalism at home and 
abroad. This debate between realists and idealists (solidarist) has its origins in the 
American national style, which is based on its geographic position, historic 
experience, economic system, and political culture and values.278 Although 
Americans associate democracy with peace and authoritarianism with aggression, 
this simple dichotomy fails to account for Washington’s foreign policy.
Historian John Gaddis notes that the United States has traditionally associated 
its security with the balancing of power behind an idealistic fa?ade and has used the 
democratic rhetoric as mere window dressing; democratic ideals were sacrificed at 
the alter o f realpolitik calculations o f self-interest. Intervention policies have also 
been justified in terms o f making the world “safe for democracy”.279 Washington’s 
approach to the Sudan humanitarian crisis is shrouded with the same tensions and 
strains that have marked Washington’s conduct toward other rogue states and 
ideological movements. This is not surprising, because US support for humanitarian 
action in the Sudan was influenced by a combination o f three factors -  the Cold 
War, the resurgence o f Islamic fundamentalism, and humanitarianism. Despite of 
these multiple agendas, the thesis agrees with constructivists argument that political 
and material interests o f state can lead to a successful humanitarian action. There 
were three reasons which encouraged the US to get involved in the Sudan 
humanitarian relief crisis.
276 Fawaz A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 4
277 Glen P. Hastedt (ed.), American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ., 
Prentice-Hall, 1997, pp. 28-34; Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and US Foreign Policy, New Haven, CT., 
Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 1-8
278 Fawaz A.G., America and Political Islam, p. 5
279 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, 
Reconsiderations, Provocations, New York, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 9-11
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A. COLD WAR GEOPOLITICAL AGENDA
First, the Cold War was an important factor, which played a significant role in the 
US approach to the humanitarian relief emergency in Southern Sudan between 1986
- 1989. During this period, the US government decision-makers weighed in favour 
o f geopolitical considerations in intervening in Sudan domestic political situation. 
Interestingly, American ideals of human rights and democratic governance were 
used as legitimation for intervention. Nonetheless, Norman Anderson, then US 
Ambassador in Khartoum, denied that humanitarian interests were driven by the 
Cold War strategic considerations. According to him, US geopolitical interests in the 
Sudan were not substantial and that “Sudan was a very weak reed to rely on. 
Humanitarian considerations were much greater than military ones for the US”.280
But journalists familiar with Ambassador Anderson portrayed him as having 
been all but mute in the face o f Sudan’s humanitarian emergency. According to Ray 
Bonner, who published an extensive article on Sudan, Ambassador Anderson was 
extraordinarily wary o f speaking with journalists because o f his deference toward 
the sovereign authorities in Khartoum.281 While it is true that American ideals 
mentioned above might have contributed to Washington’s involvement in the 
nineties, the Ambassador’s denial is nonetheless questionable when compared to 
Washington’s response during 1986-88, and its robust response toward the end of 
1989, a period that witnessed the dramatic events in Eastern Europe that led 
eventually to the collapsed of communism.282 The post-Cold War rhetorical
280 Minear L., A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan, p. 76. Moreover, when, in the 
company o f the Catholic bishops, I met Ambassador Anderson in February 1989, he was frank about 
Washington’s support for Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi’s government. The ambassador was even 
critical against the violations of human rights by the Marxist SPLA rebels. And to the disappointment 
of the Catholic Bishops, the Ambassador did not directly condemn Sadiq government war policies in 
southern Sudan. He was also uneasy about the Bishops’ request that a US fact-finding committee be 
sent to SPA areas, and the reason is crystal clear: the SPLA was a Marxist organisation that was 
supported by a Soviet satellite in Addis Ababa.
281 Raymond Bonner, “Famine”, The New Yorker, March 13, 1989, p. 87
282 The region was a major super power competition during the Cold War. While superpower 
competition took precedence, little attention was paid to addressing the political and economic 
problems -  all of which have exacerbated the recurring insecurity. Compounded the problem are 
weak governmental systems in the region, few of which are based on democratic practices that would 
enable them to manage societal conflict peacefully.
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statements o f US political leaders on human rights and democratic governance were 
rarely heard, at least publicly during the anticommunist era. With the exception o f a 
serious and comprehensive chapter on Sudan in the State Department’s Country’s 
Reports on Human Rights Practices in 1988 -  which was issued in 1989, I was not 
aware o f any occasion on which the US took Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi’s 
government to task publicly. An explanation as to why Washington ignored 
American ideals (human rights and good governance) during the Cold War, was 
given by the Coalition for Peace in the Horn of Africa283: “The Horn o f Africa has 
long been the site o f interest to both the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Strategically placed at the juncture o f the Middle East and Africa, the Horn o f Africa 
affords access to key shipping lanes as well as to the Persian Gulf. For centuries, the 
Horn o f Africa has been a battle ground for contending regional empires. For 
decades, both the US and the Soviet Union have continued to wage a strategic battle 
for economic gain in the region and, as a consequence, have supported governments 
which fail to represent the majority of their people.. ..The role o f the US for the last 
decade has involved economic and military support to the government o f Sudan. 
Consequently, US policy has been based on a desire to access new markets and the 
shipping lanes o f the Red Sea and to bolster the position o f the United States in the 
Middle East” . 284 Even if Sudan was “a very weak reed” as Ambassador Anderson 
mentioned above, this does not ignore the fact that preventing the spread of 
communism in the Horn of Africa was an important US foreign policy objective.
The statement clearly shows that from 1970s until the m id-1989, Sudan’s 
considerable importance to the US was based on four strategic considerations285: the 
first consideration is that Sudan was a pro-western neighbour of pro-Soviet, Marxist 
Ethiopia, and good relations with the Sudan ensured US access to the strategically 
important Red Sea. The Red Sea port was of military significance to the US attempts 
to contain the threat o f communism to its allies in the Middle East and Egypt. The 
strategic significance o f the Red Sea should be seen by the extent to which the US 
government assistance to the Sudan was dominated by military aid, which totalled
283 The Coalition for Peace in the Horn of Africa, Policy Statement, Washington D.C., November, 
1988, pp. 1-2
284 Ibid., p. 1
285 The US geopolitical interests in the Horn of Africa were discussed in The Indian Ocean 
Diplomatic Newsletter, October 1, 1988, and in Africa Recovery, December, 1988
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US$ 2.2 million286; the second consideration is that Sudan offered investment 
opportunities for the US companies in its ambitious development schemes. 
According to The Economist Intelligence Unit, Chevron, a US oil company, was 
responsible for oil exploration and drilling in the Sudan since the 1970s up to the 
outbreak o f the civil war in 1983287. While statistical evidence are hard to come by, 
Sudan mineral resources (uranium, gold, copper, and oil), and agricultural potentials 
were undoubtedly major attractions to the US multinational companies; the third 
consideration is that Sudan was a consistent ally o f Egypt, being the only state in the 
Arab bloc at that time to support the 1979 Camp David agreement between Egypt 
and Israel; the fourth consideration is that President Jaffer Numeiry was a consistent 
opponent o f Libya, a state considered by Washington as one o f the renegade states 
that should be isolated. These four strategic interests were seen by the Sudan 
observers as reasons for Washington’s reluctance to intervene during 1986 - 88 
when thousands o f Sudanese starved to death in the south of the country.288 The 
reader should, however, bear in mind that Washington’s policy was not to starve the 
civilian population in South Sudan; there were attempts to minimise the suffering by 
Western governments, including United States, but such aid was given in such a way 
as not to support the war-efforts of the Marxist-backed rebels o f the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA), which controlled much o f Southern Sudan. This is what 
makes states intervention problematic; in theory, American political leaders speak 
loudly o f liberal ideas o f human rights and democracy, and in practice they do the 
opposite when it is not in their national interest.
During the Cold War period, United States was a strong supporter o f the 
successive Sudanese governments; it provided US$ 101.7 million in aid between 
1970s and 1980s, and encouraged the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, as well as private donors to support this critically important Cold War ally.28  ^
Despite the United States’ disenchantment with Prime Minister Sadig on 
humanitarian grounds, it does not appear that the leverage of US assistance 
throughout his increasingly repressive conduct o f the war in the south was exercised
286 Dunstan M. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, New York-London, Africana 
Publishing Company, 1981, p. 135
287 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Sudan, London, 3rd quarter, 1983
288 Interview with Prof. Isaac Riak, Chairman, Division of Business School, United States 
International University-Africa, Nairobi, April 12, 1997
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as a means to seek human rights and good governance. In fact, throughout the mid- 
1980s, human rights issues were not important in the US relations with the Sudanese 
government.290 The New York Times reported that until the first cross-border 
shipment o f food to the Sudan from Kenya in early February 1989, “Washington had 
restricted its relief food to government-held towns for fear o f affronting Khartoum, a 
strategic ally” .291 One of the earliest signs of a shift in US policy was contained in a 
statement approved by then Secretary of State James Baker on January 23, 1989.292 
In one o f the George Bush administration’s first foreign policy actions, the US 
announced its intention to provide aid to civilians in SPLA-controlled areas.293 Ihe 
policy o f providing relief aid directly to the SPLA controlled areas in Southern 
Sudan was set in place by the Ronald Reagan administration, although one diplomat 
stressed that the George Bush administration deserved credit for abandoning the 
policy o f deference to Prime Minister Sadig.294
Michael MacKinnon, from a slightly different context, seems to agree with the 
view that it was George Bush who raised hope for a new, more humane international 
order, which led to Washington policy o f assertive humanitarianism in the Sudan: 
“No other world leader did more to spread the belief in this possibility than United 
States President George Bush, during and after the war to evict Iraq from Kuwait. 
Bush’s theme throughout this period was that the world was witnessing the dawning 
o f ‘new world order’, and that the UN held a central position in this vision”.295 
While MacKinnon’s statement above concerns US peacekeeping policy, it is 
nevertheless relevant to this discussion. The assumption o f George Bush to power, 
and its assertive humanitarianism encouraged UN agencies and other international 
bodies to support cross-border operation. The Bush administration assertive 
humanitarianism -  which was also supported by in 1993 by President Bill Clinton
2^9 Dunstan Wai, African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, p. 135
290 Africa Watch, “Denying ‘The Honor of Living’: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster”, p. 133
291 The New York Times, February 17,1989, p. 12
292 Ibid.
293 USAID/OFDA, Sudan Situation Report No. 3, Washington D.C., May 26, 1991, pp. 1-2
294 Interview with a former US diplomat, Nairobi, March 17, 1997
295 Michael G. MacKinnon, The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton: A 
Fairweather, London, Franc Cass, 2000, p. xiv
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administration -  was propelled by domestic public opinion.296 In either case, it is 
clear that extensive Congressional pressure and extensive press coverage o f the 
famine in Sudan played a significant role in helping persuade the executive branch 
to assume a new aid policy.297 This decisive push for OLS came not from high-level 
State Department officials in Khartoum or Washington but from the Office o f 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) within the State Department’s US Agency for 
International Development (USAID).298 However, on June 30, 1989 -  two months 
after OLS was established - Prime Minister Sadig was overthrown in a military coup 
headed General Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Beshir. The new military regime described 
the presence o f the OLS in Southern Sudan as a violation o f the Sudanese 
sovereignty. Apart from expressing regrets at the overthrow o f a democracy and the 
arrest o f elected politicians, the US administration did not rebuke or impose 
economic sanctions against the military regime’s attitude towards humanitarian 
action in the south.299
Moreover, the lack of Washington’s seriousness in humanitarian issues also 
allowed the new regime to prosecute the war vigorously, which obstructed access to 
the needy population in Southern Sudan. Neither Section 513 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act, which prohibits aid to military governments that overthrow elected 
civilian government, was of much use during this period. For example, two months 
after the democratically elected government of Sadig was toppled, the Bush 
administration was consulting with Congress to inquire whether Section 513 might 
be waived to allow the provision o f additional assistance to the Beshir government, 
including improvements in train and barge deliveries o f relief, the demobilisation of 
militias and the release o f some political prisoners. However, due to oppositional 
politics within the Congress, the administration’s request was refused on the grounds
296 For a discussion on the role of public and the media in US domestic and international politics, 
see Ibid., pp. 76-88
297 USAID/OFDA, Sudan Situation Report No. 3, p. 2
298 OFDA, Humanitarian Relief Operations in Sudan, Trip Report, Washington D.C., July, 1993, p. 
2
299 In his February 23, 1989 statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Kenneth Brown complained that, in part because the 
US was so critical of the Sadiq government, US access to the government was increasingly limited. 
Mr. Brown was quoted by Africa Watch as saying: “Our privileged access is beginning to show wear 
as a result of extensive public criticism of Sudan, our declining assistance levels and the repeated 
hard messages we have delivered to Khartoum”. Africa Watch, Sudan: A Human Rights Disaster, 
Washington, March, 1990, p. 134
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that there was little progress on human rights issues, which in any case, was 
outstripped by increasing violations of humanitarian norms and principles. Human 
rights setbacks at the time of the administration’s consultations included the Beshir 
government’s suspension of OLS, and increased support for militias who continued 
to commit violent abuses against civilian non-combatants. By m id-1989, the Bush 
administration abandoned its efforts to waive restrictions on aid to the Sudan 
military regime, and the Khartoum was confronted with a prospect o f  economic 
sanctions. While the US support for OLS might have contained some elements of 
idealism, its major geopolitical agenda nevertheless included the containment of 
communism in the Horn o f Africa. However, after the collapse o f Berlin Wall, 
which symbolised the East-West ideological conflict, the US took a more robust role 
in humanitarian relief aid in areas controlled by the Marxist rebels o f the SPLA.j0° 
This commitment to a more ethical foreign policy was reflected in Chester Crocker 
article:
In the Horn o f Africa, the complex interplay o f regional and internal 
conflicts with economic and humanitarian crises threatens to engulf the 
entire subregion. The challenges facing us are equally complex. Nor are 
they made easier by a simplistic moral posturing -  not to say 
scapegoating — that passes for informed analysis in too much o f  our own 
media coverage. I  refer to the tragedy in Sudan and the echoes of Marie 
Antoinette in policy critiques o f some journalistic commentators ( “let 
them eat words...words o f condemnation from the United States). There 
is a war going on in southern Sudan, an area the size o f France, and it is 
not a new war. No country has done more than ours to push both the 
government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) rebels for  
relief access.301
The overhaul o f the US Cold War strategic interests allowed Washington to 
sanction the behaviour o f the Khartoum government, the result o f which was the 
establishment o f OLS in April 1989. But, the violation by the GOS of humanitarian 
norms, and the lack o f progress in the peace talks, made the US, together with its 
Western allies, suspend all development aid to the Sudan during 1990-2. This robust 
role did not, however, signal the emergence of the significance o f humanitarian 
norms and principles in the minds o f Washington’s policy makers. However,
300 USAID/OFDA, Sudan Situation Report No. 5, Washington D.C., May 26, 1993
301 Chester A. Crocker, “Summing Up...And Looking Ahead”, CSIS Africa Notes, No. 96, March 
16, 1989, p. 4
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apparent in Washington’s statements and speeches during this period was that the 
US used humanitarian norms and principles as its policy instruments for influencing 
the behaviour o f the Islamist military regime in Khartoum.
B. POLITICAL ISLAM AGENDA
The second reason which made Washington to get involved in Sudam domestic 
affairs was the fear o f Islamic terrorism. It is clear in chapter 2 that political Islam302 
has seen a resurgence in the Sudan since the 1990s, and one that explicitly 
articulated a cultural conflict with Western standards o f behaviour. The rise of 
Islamism was identified by Washington’s policymakers as a significant risk to 
Western interest in Sub-Sahara Africa, and the Islamist regime in Sudan itself had 
proclaimed commitment to export Islamic values beyond Sudan borders.303 Thus, 
US political influence on OLS programmes can be viewed as Washington’s crusade 
against the military regime in Khartoum. According to Professor Isaac Riak, former 
Country Director o f World Vision International, the UN was forced by USAID to 
incorporate democratic governance into OLS programmes, and this was seen by 
observers o f  the Sudan as an attempt by Washington to dialogue with the GOS over 
the issues o f democracy, and Islamic terrorism.304
Security and political concerns were o f great, if  not greater, significance 
because they had a direct bearing on American officials’ perceptions o f their 
primary interests. These include Washington strategic calculations in the Horn of 
Africa, and the vulnerability o f Egyptian government to radical Islamic groups. 
Accordingly, the goal o f American foreign policy remains wedded to the 
achievement o f stability, understood as a process o f orderly change.305 This was the 
rationale for America’s clash with Marxist, revolutionary nationalism during the
302 This thesis uses several terms -  political Islam, Islamic fundamentalism, Islamist -  to delineate 
the contemporary Islamist phenomenon. Islamist activists contend that Islam possesses a theory of 
politics and the state and includes prescriptive notions for political and social activism. The various 
terms are always used interchangeably throughout this thesis. See Nazih N. Ayubi, Political Islam: 
Religion and Politics in the Arab world, London, Routledge, 1991, especially chapter 1, for an 
excellent definitional and conceptual application of contemporary political Islam.
303 See John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?, New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1992, pp. 26-31
Interview with Prof. Isaac Riak, April 12, 1997
305 Stanley Hoffman, Dead Ends: American Foreign Policy in the New Cold War, Cambridge 
Ballinger, 1983, pp. 11-12
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Cold War era, and now with its successor -  radical Islamic nationalism. Indeed, 
United States has an important economic and security stake in the Horn o f Africa. 
Recently, reflecting the significance o f this geopolitical interest o f Washington, 
Susan Rice, then Assistant Secretary o f State for African Affairs who visited 
SPLM/A headquarters in Yei, Southern Sudan in November 2000, said US policy 
towards Africa is driven by a number o f transnational concerns arising there, 
including terrorist threats posed by the rogue states such as Sudan and Libya, and 
humanitarian concerns for “the victims of war, famine and disease...”306 Rice 
elaborated further:
All these transnational threats...are most difficult to combat where 
national institutions are weakest, where people are poorest, and conflicts 
most enduring. We need strong, democratic, economically viable 
partners in Africa. Only such partners can be relied upon to invest in 
health care to stem diseases, foster environmentally sustainable 
development, to apprehend terrorists ...and to deny extremist elements 
both material support and a gullible following...For all these reasons 
and others ...the United States is actively working to strengthen 
democracy and promote human rights in Africa and continues to play an 
active role — diplomatically and operationally — to help prevent and 
resolve African conflicts.307
It is evident from this statement that US interest in the Horn of Africa is defending 
national security and protecting Americans in the United States and abroad: “If some 
Americans were doubtful about our significant security interests in Africa, if  their 
eyes were focused elsewhere -  toward the Persian Gulf, the Korean Peninsula, or the 
Balkans — they were sadly refocused last August 7 when bombs destroyed our 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania....”308 In the US eyes, Sudan’s “rogue”309 state 
sponsor terrorism, and also use and abuse the discourse o f Islamist ideology 
(discussed in chapter 2) by providing material assistance to radical Islamic armed 
movements in the Horn of Africa.310 Hence, the American values (ideals) of
306 Susan Rice, “Rice Reviews U.S. Africa Policy at Oxford University, Washington, D.C., United 
States Institute of Peace, 1999, p. 1. For a full speech, see http//www.usip.org
307 Ibid.
308 Ibid. p. 3
309 “Rogue” state is a state that is considered by powerful Western countries undemocratic. Such a 
state is an international pariah, regarded as a potential threat to international order. See William 
Zartman (ed.), Collapsed States: the disintegration and restoration o f legitimate authority, Boulder, 
Lynne Rienner, 1995, p. 11
310 Interview with a US Embassy official, Nairobi, November 6, 1997
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democracy and human rights, which Washington infused into the OLS humanitarian 
relief programmes, can also be seen from neorealist and neoliberalist perspectives -  
that is, stopping the spread of Islamic values and ideology.311 Thus, the collapse o f 
communism in the Horn of Africa, as in other parts o f the world, enabled 
Washington to redefine its strategic interest, which has now come to include anti­
terrorism, good governance and traditional humanitarian relief aid. Despite its 
limited strategic and minimal economic interest in the Sudan, Washington 
recognised the Horn o f Africa’s regional stability, and its humanitarian involvement 
in the Sudan can be seen from that context.312 United States interests in the Horn o f 
Africa fall within the broader vision o f establishing ‘a community o f free, stable, 
and prosperous nations acting together while respecting the dignity and rights o f the 
individual and adhering to the principles o f national sovereignty and international 
law’.313 US goal in the region was therefore part of its world-wide policy objectives. 
This is based on the reality that domestic strength and leadership abroad are 
essential to advancing Washington’s goals and objectives. As MacKinnon stated 
above, the US was committed to establishing an international order which no region 
is dominated by a power hostile to it, and where regions o f vital importance to it are 
stable and at peace.314 Thus, the commitment to fighting Sudan-inspired terrorism in 
the Horn o f Africa.
Accordingly, the US national interests were the greatest influence on the 
choice o f the countries known as the ‘new front-line states’.315 In this case, the 
countries chosen are those that were seen by Washington as the anchors o f stability 
in the region.316 Uganda together with Eritrea and Ethiopia constituted the ‘new- 
front-line states’ against the Islamist regime in Khartoum which was considered by 
the US State Department as a rogue state. Both Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia were 
in increasingly close consultation not only with each other but also with the US 
government over what each of them considered a comprehensive project by the
311 Bernard Lewis, “Islam and Liberal Democracy”, Atlantic Monthly, February, 1993, p. 91
312 Department of Defense, United States Strategy for Sub-Sahara Africa, Washington D.C., 1995, 
pp. 1-3
313 US Department of State, Strategy o f Enlargement and Preparedness, Washington D.C., 1996, p. 
vii
314 US National Security, ‘A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington D.C., May, 
1997, p. 6
315 “Arms Against Sea of Troubles”, Africa Confidential, Vol. 37, No. 23, 1996, p. 1
3 16 “An American in Africa”, East Africa, Nairobi, 14-20 October, 1996, p. 8
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Sudan government to destabilise the region.317 These countries were already 
beneficiaries o f US military aid. For example, in 1996 Washington approved 
military aid worth US$ 20 million to the three countries, all known opponents o f the 
Islamist regime in Sudan.318 Then Secretary o f State Warren Christopher articulated 
these common views on a visit to Addis Ababa: “We stand together with Ethiopia 
and other countries in this region against international terrorism, particularly the 
threat that Sudan poses to its neighbours and the world at large”.319 This message 
was again re-emphasised by former US Secretary o f State Madeline Albright when 
she visited northern Uganda in the m id-1998. Albright told the press conference in 
Kampala, after returning from the Ugandan northern town o f Gulu, that the US 
government would continue to support all the frontline states in their fight against 
terrorism. Christopher and Albright comments reflect US attitudes towards the 
world-wide resurgence o f Islamic fundamentalism.
Although the military threat to the West from the world o f Islam had ceased to 
exist by the end o f the seventeenth century, the religious and intellectual challenge 
o f Islam continues to seize the imagination o f many people in the West.320 Since 
1980s, events in the Muslim world have become traumatic news in the United 
States. A New York Times editor noted that “thanks to current international politics, 
one form of ethnic bigotry retains an aura o f respectability in the United States: 
prejudice against Arabs [Muslims]”.321 Immediately after the Iranian revolution o f 
1979, a poll o f representatives of mainstream America showed that the majority o f 
Americans think o f  Islam as a hostile culture and as synonymous with the spectre of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran’s revolutionary behaviour. According to the poll, the 
American perception Arab/Muslims is that o f threatening people, with almost all 
Muslims being described as “barbaric” and “cruel”.322 This perception also affected 
the decision makers in Washington, and it is the fear o f Islamic terrorism which has
317 Interview with Prof. Isaac Riak, Nairobi, April, 1997
318 “ Arms against sea of troubles”, Africa Confidential, Vol. 37, No. 23, 1996, p. 1
119 Summary o f  World Broadcast, London, 14 October 1996
320 See Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East, 
London, I.B. Tauris, 1995, Richard J. Payne, The Clash with Distant Cultures: Values, Interests, and 
Force in American Foreign Policy, New York, State University of New York Press, 1995
321 “It’s Racist, But Hey, It’s Disney”, New York Times, 14 July, 1993; Michael W. Suleiman, The 
Arabs in the Mind of America, Brattleboro, VT., Amana Books, 1988, p. 147
322 Shelley Slade, “The Image of the Arab in America: Analysis of a Poll on American attitudes”, 
Middle East Journal, V ol. 35, No. 2, Spring, 1981, pp. 144-5, 147, 157.
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emerged as one o f the most important political issues in the United States. More 
than anywhere else in the world, the US Congress plays a determining influence on 
US policy toward Sudan. As will be discussed below, a cursory review o f statements 
by some Congressional men reveals deep concern about security threats associated 
with the rise o f political Islam in the Horn of Africa.323 Worried about Sudan 
regional destabilisation policy, Representative Ileana accused the State Department 
o f underestimating the uniform nature o f Islamic extremism and of stressing instead 
its diffused and eclectic character; in her view, Islamic groups represent a 
monolithic movement “sworn to fight the Great Satan America for the global 
supremacy o f Islam”.324
Hence, the US Congressional leaders contend further that the struggle between 
Islam and the West is not just about material and political interests; it is a clash o f 
cultures and civilisations.325 Accordingly, the US Congressional leaders draw a 
parallel between the Communist threat and Islam’s: like Communism, Islamic 
resurgence is not only a proselytising ideology but also revisionist. Although it is 
clear that Washington’s policy o f assertive humanitarianism (support for democratic 
governance and the rule o f law) was more to do with curtailing the destabilising 
effects o f Khartoum Islamic policies, it is fair to acknowledge here that the US 
concern for the alleged Sudan support for terrorism was also shared by all the 
neighbouring countries, and such a concern was humanitarian.326 In other words, 
humanitarian relief aid served the strategic purposes o f the United States, which 
used such assistance to induce the Sudanese government not to support militant 
Islamic groups. However, the argument of this thesis is that such interplay between 
political interests and humanitarianism were legitimated by US policy makers’ 
commitment to international norms, as well as their support for OLS programmes.
323 According to Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairperson of the Subcommittee on Africa, 
“Islamic militancy has emerged as one of the most serious threats to Western Security”. See “The 
Threat of Islamic Extremism in Africa”, Prepared Testimony of the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, 
Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Federal News Service, 
Washington, DC., 6 April, 1995, p. 1
324 Ibid.
325 Fawaz, America and Political Islam, p. 23
326 The actions of terrorists groups, regardless whether they are Muslims or not, often result into 
humanitarian emergencies. The bombing of US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, in 1998 by the Islamic 
militants allegedly supported by Khartoum, caused the lives of more than 200 Kenyans. The 
humanitarian aftermath of the bombing so substantial that the government of Kenya had to call in 
foreign assistance. This was why this thesis argued that the US geopolitical interest can be beneficial 
to humanitarian operations as well as interplay with them.
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C. HUMANITARIAN AGENDA
The third US agenda was humanitarian relief aid. The above analysis indicate that 
American political leaders faced difficulties between their obligations to their state 
and its citizens, and their obligations to the Sudan war-victims. This dilemma has 
caused aggravation between politics and humanitarianism central to the debate 
discussed in chapter 2. The US citizens were concerned about the suffering o f the 
Sudanese civilian population in Southern Sudan, yet wished to protect their own 
community from communism in the eighties and terrorism in the nineties. This point 
shows that public opinion on rights in US foreign policy is a blend o f liberalism and 
realism -  o f universal concern and narrow self-interest.327 The burden o f the 
decision makers in Washington was to weigh these concerns o f their people, and 
make the difficult decisions. The case o f OLS has shown that whilst leaders have a 
duty to their citizens they must also take the lead in representing the values and 
concerns o f their citizens internationally. This lead is reflected in the rhetorical 
statements o f the US officials:
We have a significant humanitarian stake in Africa and strong cultural 
and historical ties to the African people. Some 12 percent o f  the 
Americans, almost 33 million people, trace their roots to the African 
continent. Many Americans, not just African-Americans, feel a strong 
obligation to better the lives o f  people throughout Africa. They are not 
only about helping to prevent and resolve conflicts but also about 
responding effectively alongside the international community to crises 
and humanitarian disasters. Last year, the United States provided almost 
$700 million in assistance to the victims o f war, famine....from to Sudan 
and other African countries....328
In devising US foreign policy toward the Sudan, administration officials were 
influenced by humanitarian norms and principles in the OLS Plans o f Action,329 but 
only because such standards o f  behaviour were implicit in the US policy objectives. 
In 1990, the American ambassador in Nairobi spoke o f “a strong political 
tide .. .flowing in our US Congress.. .to concentrate our economic assistance on those 
o f the world’s nations that nourish democratic institutions, defend human rights and
327 See David P. Forsythe, “Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: Two Worlds”, in David Beetham 
(ed.), Politics and Human Rights, Oxford, Blackwell, 1995, pp. 111-130
328 Rice, “Rice Reviews US Africa Policy at Oxford University, p. 4
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practice multi-party policies”.330 The ambassador’s comment was not directed to 
Sudan alone but it reflected Washington’s determination to not only contain the 
Islamic values o f the Khartoum regime but also to bring about democracy in the 
Sudan. For instance, the members and staff of the US State Department, who visited 
Sudan and met American Secretary of State Kenneth Baker, played an important 
role in Washington’s new direction.331 The Congressional leaders pressured the 
administration to request the UN Secretary General Perez de Cuelar to appoint a 
special negotiator and humanitarian envoy to the Sudan, along the lines o f the UN 
Envoy to Afghanistan, to address the critical issues of war and famine relief.332 
Even if scholars and public officials were similarly divided over the impact of 
humanitarian principles and rules as shaming devices, it is arguable that the aims o f 
democratic governance and human rights pronouncement often heard from the lips 
and official statements o f the US congressional leaders were morally worthy, and 
they indeed played an important role in influencing the UN to incorporate the liberal 
ideals o f human rights and good governance into OLS relief programmes.333
There are, o f  course, sceptics within the international relief system who would 
raise the issue o f double standard or policy inconstancy in Washington’s 
involvement. I argue, however, that such arguments often ignore the fact that 
complete consistency in international or even national affairs is rarely possible, and 
that the steps taken by Washington in saving the lives o f millions o f Sudanese 
trapped in Southern Sudan war zone should not be undermined by arguments of 
double standard, which have so much littered the literature o f humanitarian 
intervention. After all, the global commitment to humanitarian norms “is difficult to 
separate from the ebb and flow o f great power relations. Human rights, and its war­
like step-child, ‘humanitarian intervention’, are both the core elements o f post-Cold 
War geopolitics” .334 To put it differently, diplomatic practices o f the US, like any
329 Interview with Dr. Gordon Wagner, USIAD official, Nairobi, October 3, 1997
330 Quoted by British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Background Brief’, London, 1991, p. 5
331 OFDA, Sudan-Drought/Civil Strife, Situation Report No. 52, Washington D.C., December 5, 
1991,p. 12
332 Report of the President’s Representatives, Breaking the Cycle of Despair: President Clinton’s 
Initiatives on the Horn of Africa, Washington DC., June, 1994, p. 4
333 House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Africa Sub-Committee, Hearings on Sudan, 102nd 
Congress, 2nd Session, Washington D.C., May, 1992, pp. 15-24
334 Richard Falk, “Sovereignty and Human Rights: The Search for Reconciliation”, US Foreign 
Policy Electronic Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, May, 2000, p. 35
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other industrial democracy, are connected with a humanitarian duty that can be 
described as the moral o f responsibility. This ethic results from the tradition o f the 
constructivism to bridge the realist-idealist gap in international relations theory 
without removing too far from political practice.335 Taking the position between 
these poles, this humanitarian perspective is in contrast to the utopian call for a 
perfect charity because the anarchic character in the international arena is accepted 
by this thesis. It also contrasts with the realist emphasis on political power, because 
it points to the existence o f norms and agreements that can tame geopolitical 
ambitions o f donor states. As such, both projections o f power on behalf o f severe 
human rights abuses and the decision to take action to end humanitarian crisis 
suggest how deeply human rights is embedded in contemporary geopolitics. The 
interplay between political considerations and humanitarian imperatives provided 
the inspiration and motivation for US policy development and implementation in the 
Sudan. For example, in a sharp contrast to its 1986-88 pre-OLS humanitarian 
efforts, the US government decision to support OLS programmes was inspired in 
great measure by the humane concerns o f leaders to alleviate starvation and keep 
millions o f people from dying.336
President Bill Clinton, building on the American ideals, was able to 
demonstrate the significant influence o f a leader’s moral values. As a result o f his 
strong convictions about human rights, his administration pursued a pragmatic 
humanitarian policy, leading the once hard-line realists within the State Department 
to publicly condemn human rights violations and to halt foreign assistance to the 
repressive regime in Khartoum. Clinton’s rhetoric on humanitarianism was squarely 
within the activist tradition o f American society. This optimistic statement, in what 
is arguably an anarchic international system, is bound to raise some eyebrows 
among some scholars and practitioners, but this was the perception o f the majority 
o f the war-victims interviewed in Southern Sudan. This positive Sudanese 
perception o f Washington’s role in the OLS relief system was supported by the 
documentary evidence, which this author got. For example on 18 August 1993, the 
House Concurrent Resolution 131 clearly and forcefully expressed the sense o f US 
Congress regarding the situation in Southern Sudan. The Resolution, which was
335 Martin Wight, International Theory: Three traditions, edited by Gabriele Wight & Brian Porter, 
London, Leicester University Press, 1991
336 US Department of State, Country Human Rights Reports, 1994, p. 22
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sponsored by 40 Senators, called for the UN Security Council to consider the 
establishment o f “safe havens” for the war-victims of Southern Sudan and urged the 
UN to impose an arms embargo on Sudan. Moreover, at the request o f the US 
President, a delegation visited Sudan between May 26 and June 4, 1994. The 
purpose o f the mission was to assess the condition in Sudan, as well as to examine 
US government aid and other programmes designed to address factors that 
contributed to famine and civil unrest, to share information and promote a 
constructive exchange o f ideas designed to enhance co-operation within the Horn o f 
Africa sub- region. In its report, the delegation became convinced that the cycle o f 
despair that affected Sudan would recur unless new measures were made to address 
the root causes o f the country’s problems in the medium to longer-term. One o f their 
findings was that security for donor operations and access to populations in areas o f 
conflict had inhibited relief deliveries and donors’ ability to reach all those in 
need.337 These problems were further compounded by a lack o f agreement, 
commitment and co-ordination regarding an overall strategy for Sudan among 
donors and international agencies.
It was therefore inevitable that the US Congressional delegation made a shuttle 
diplomacy between Rome, and Brussels in order to build greater support and 
awareness among other donors and international organisations concerning the 
magnitude o f the problem, to demonstrate the commitment o f American government 
to a successful resolution o f the emergency, and to stress the need for enhanced 
donor support and co-ordination.338 Their findings persuaded the US House of 
Representatives Sub-Committee on Africa to convene a special hearing on Sudan to 
discuss what could be done on a bilateral basis. After the hearing, the US Congress 
issued a warning to the GOS not to interfere with the humanitarian relief efforts, and 
it also stated that the US administration would ensure by whatever means at its 
disposal that humanitarian aid were delivered to all Sudanese who were in need of 
it.339 In addition to the warning, Congress also resolved that the regime should be 
prohibited from exporting grain, either for foreign exchange or in barter agreements
337 Report of the President’s Representatives, Breaking the Cycle of Despair, p. 5
338 Ibid.
339 Ibid.
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for weaponry, while Sudanese people were dying from starvation.340 This evidence 
support the Sudanese war-victims’ perceptions that humanitarian values that 
characterised OLS operation in the Sudan also influenced US approach to that 
country’s disaster relief. USAID also registered strongly in the policy-making 
process, which ultimately influenced and supported OLS Plans o f Action that 
advocated for both the delivering o f relief assistance, civil governance and capacity 
building, channelling relief funds through NGOs or multilateral organisations, and, 
importantly, serving people in both government and SPLA-held areas. By early 
1995, NGOs such as Catholic Relief Service (CRS), a relief wing o f US Catholic 
Bishops’ Conference and Oxfam, were deliberately used to build the capacity o f the 
opposition movement as well as establish structures that would sustain peace and 
stability in non-government areas. Washington’s use o f NGOs did not come as 
surprise to many observers o f Sudan. Even before OLS was established, there was 
growing evidence that unofficial humanitarian players, including NGO community, 
played important role in the development and implementation of the US government 
relief policies.
One o f the veteran humanitarian practitioners, John Prendergast argues that 
buttressing democratic institution building in Sudan is an important element in a 
broader conflict resolution strategy, including support for responsive social 
administration, civil society and democratic processes: “A key element o f the 
external pressure needed to encourage the regime to negotiate must be the provision 
o f material support such as food and medicine directly to the Sudanese opposition. 
Such support would also enhance the capacity o f the people o f the south, the Nuba 
Mountains and other besieged areas to withstand attacks against their livelihood 
bases” .341 This means that development aid, trade and investment promotion, and 
economic reform advocacy could be integrated much more consciously into 
strategies that build for a more peaceful future in the Horn of Africa, a sub-region in 
which the GOS attempted to destabilise through its support for Islamic groups. 
According to Prendergast, the US can play a major role in moving the process of 
peace forward, particular if  it can harmonise its important efforts at countering the
340 Sudan Democratic Gazette, ‘Is the International Community Finally Prepared to Act?, No. 35, 
April 1993, p. 2
341 John Prendergast, Building for Peace in the Horn of Africa: Special Report, Washington, D.C., 
United States Institute of Peace 3 November, 2000, p. 10. See http://www.usip.org
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Khartoum government regime’s support for terrorism and human rights violations 
with its increased vigour of peace efforts.342 Prendergast arguments illustrate the role 
o f NGOs in US foreign policy towards the humanitarian crisis in Sudan. Partnership 
between NGOs and Washington enabled both groups to be more powerful and 
effective in achieving their missions in Sudan. Among officials o f State Department 
interviewed by this author, there is a clear acknowledgement o f the importance of 
voluntary organisations in US foreign policy:
There is no doubt that NGOs have become increasingly important in the 
region and in serving as both implementers o f and commentators upon 
our humanitarian policy. For example, humanitarian NGOs have an 
impact on Sudan in terms o f  their sustainable relief policies and getting 
the warring parties committed to the OLS principles. As we enter the next 
millennium, it appears that unofficial humanitarian actors will continue 
to play an important role in foreign policy development and 
implementation. In the years to come I  foresee an increasing role o f  
NGOs in humanitarian relief and in conflict resolution. NGOs have had 
an intense interest in the Sudan, and I  don 7 see that lessening over the 
medium termJ^J
The case o f OLS has demonstrated that official US foreign policy efforts and the 
grassroots work o f NGOs can work together to support the unique goals o f each 
party to the partnership. Since 1994, USAID has used NGOs such as CRS to manage 
a grant-making programme in the OLS approved areas o f southern Sudan. 
According to CRS officials interviewed in Nairobi, the USAID grant-making 
programme included direct grants to local NGOs as well as an institutional 
strengthening programme that supported the development o f the NGO sector in he 
Sudan. CRS received more than US$ 4 million annually from USAID for capacity 
building in the SPLA controlled areas. The CRS Country Representative told this 
author that US government humanitarian assistance to Sudan was not based on any 
egoistic motives but rather on humanitarian grounds: “This programme will 
contribute to the achievement o f USAID’s objectives o f increased participatory 
democracy and good governance in opposition held areas o f Sudan and reduction of 
heavy reliance on relief by strengthening local capacities. I will equally contribute to 
the good o f CRS-Sudan’s 1997-2000 strategic programme plan, which is to increase
342 Prendergast, Building for Peace in the Horn of Africa, p. 11
343 Interview with Paul Trivelli, US State Department official, Washington D.C., July 18, 1997
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the food and health security o f target population in a just, participatory, and 
pluralistic civil society”.344 The relief-recovery-development continuum expressed 
in the CRS statement above was a concept that informed the US administration’s 
thinking during the early 1990s and this was clearly reflected in the views o f official 
and non-governmental leaders in South Sudan as well as other NGOs. The strategic 
framework required OLS/NGOs in southern Sudan to shift from a traditional 
approach that was largely reactive (e.g. responding to recurrent disasters as a relief 
problem only) to one which was more pro-active (e.g. looking at location o f each 
relief dollar in terms of long term impact and effectiveness in addressing root causes 
o f the crises). Building on a long-standing government partnership with private 
groups, the Clinton administration significantly increased the NGO’s share o f a 
relatively stable bilateral AID development pie in 1997. Although many agencies 
were unwilling to give the author exact figures, a relief aid official told me however 
that the funds NGOs received at that time included substantial resources provided 
within a more explicitly political context.345 As explained elsewhere in this chapter, 
Washington’s support for the OLS programmes shows also that geopolitical 
considerations can be strengthened by mixing them with a commitment to 
humanitarian relief aid.
During my writing-up period, in June 1999, the Congress passed a resolution 
condemning Sudan’s human rights record, and calling on the President and the UN 
Security Council to impose punitive arms embargo on the Government o f Sudan.346 
The Concurrent Resolution called for the intensification and expansion o f the United 
States diplomatic and economic pressures on GOS by maintaining the current 
unilateral sanctions regime and by increasing efforts for multilateral sanctions. 
“Congress calls on the President to substantially increase development funds for 
capacity building, democracy promotion, civil administration, judiciary and 
infrastructure support in opposition-controlled areas, and to report on a quarterly 
basis to the Congress on the progress made under this sub-paragraph”.347 The 
Concurrent Resolution also urged President Clinton to increase by 100 percent the 
allocation o f funds that were made available through the Sudanese Transition
344 Interview with Dr. Jim O’Connel, CRS Country Representative, Nairobi, August 14, 1997
345 Ibid.
346 106th Congress: Concurrent Resolution 75, Washington DC., June 15, 1999, p. 5
347 Ibid.
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Assistance for Rehabilitation Program (commonly referred to as the ‘STAR 
Program’) for the promotion of the rule o f law to advance democracy, civil 
administration and judiciary, and enhancement o f infrastructure, in the areas in 
Sudan that were controlled by the opposition to the National Islamic Front. The US 
government has already contributed substantial funds to OLS, including grants to 
enable UNICEF and WFP to hire additional staff on the scene. At the same time, the 
US increased its support o f NGOs such as CRS, ICRC and the League o f Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies. Washington also provided resources to strengthen 
SRRA, SPLM/A humanitarian wing. Even if  US intervention can be viewed as an 
undesirable but nonetheless necessary, many scholars, particularly from the pluralist 
family, saw such an intervention as morally problematic because it violated Sudan 
sovereignty. However, the circumstances o f the Sudan in the mid-1980s, where 
millions o f lives were threatened by the obstructionist policies o f the government, 
and the press coverage of that suffering, led the US and its Western allies to 
intervene in favour of humanitarian imperatives. The US government’s decision to 
permit and then support humanitarian relief illustrates rule-based ethical analysis as 
the dominant motive in undertaking relief mission in response to humanitarian needs 
regardless o f how such aid might impact the political system. As one US senior 
diplomat puts it:
Throughout 1990s, US policy objectives in the Sudan have been 
consistent and clear. First, we are determined to convince the Sudanese 
government that there is no place fo r  terrorism in a civilised society o f  
states. Second, we seek peace, prosperity, democracy and respect for  
fundamental human rights. We have encouraged the establishment o f an 
inclusive political transition that would end the conflict; build respect fo r  
the rule o f law and human rights, and create the conditions fo r  lasting 
development and reconstruction in southern Sudan. As a consequence, 
we have been committed to a policy o f engagement in support o f the 
Sudanese people who suffered so much from the war.348
The sacrifice o f the principle o f non-intervention in the affairs o f a sovereign state to 
the principle that human rights should, if  necessary, be enforced against a state that 
denies them has been defended on principled grounds. In other words, W ashington’s 
decision to impose economic sanctions against GOS to force compliance over access
348 Interview with Harris Johnson, US Envoy to the Sudan, Nairobi, May 12, 1997
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was not purely about national interest or geopolitical considerations as some 
scholars and practitioners put it, but also about relieving the suffering of civilians 
caught in the war zone.349 It is arguable that American government made the 
commitment to humanitarian relief rather than to purely realpolitik because it 
recognised that international morality “obliges nations with food surpluses to aid 
famine-stricken countries regardless o f their political regime”.350 Thus, whatever 
Washington’s critics say, and according to one US diplomat, the American 
government has applied its economic and political influence in support o f  the United 
Nations attempt to alleviate the suffering of the Sudanese people.351 At any rate, the 
liberal approach to international relations rests very heavily upon the ability o f 
international institutions to promote co-operation and collectively manage conflicts 
and their humanitarian consequences; given Washington’s central role in 
international economy and its undoubted military predominance, international 
organisations such as the UN are unlikely to work effectively unless it is US policy 
that they do so.
Similarly, if  the promotion o f liberal values in the world, the protection of 
human rights is part o f the liberal approach to international relations, then, in the last 
resort, this will only happen if  the US is prepared to make it happen as it did with 
OLS in 1989; “economic and diplomatic pressures only work when the world’s 
largest economy is behind them, and only the US possesses the logistical and 
military capacities to engage in humanitarian interventions on any serious scale” .352 
That was the view o f many scholars and diplomats I met during my fieldwork in 
East Africa, US and Europe.353 This view supported the perceptions o f the Sudanese 
political and military leaders discussed in the next chapters, which is that without the 
sanctioning behaviour o f the American government, the situation in Southern Sudan 
would have developed into a situation of warlordism that characterised humanitarian
349 Interview with USAID official, Nairobi, July 12, 1997
350 Robert W. McElroy, Morality and American Foreign Policy, Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1992, p. 86
351 Interview with Dr. Lucion Vandenbroucke, US Embassy Political Adviser on Great Lakes 
Region, Nairobi, July 14, 1997
j52 Chris Brown, “History ends, Worlds Collide”, Review o f International Studies, Vol. 25, Special 
Issue, December, 1999, p. 48
353 Such statements often emerge during conferences, and farewell parties organised by NGOs or 
some embassies, and in which this author was often invited in his capacity as NSCC Coordinator for
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operation in Somalia.354 All in all, it is clear from the above discussion that the US 
has set the following goals in its attempt to strengthen its interests in the Horn o f 
Africa: conflict prevention, management, and resolution; humanitarian assistance; 
promotion o f democratic governance and respect for human rights, and the 
promotion o f sustained equitable development through market-based reforms.355 
Economic growth and development, the promotion o f democracy and human rights, 
and the prevention, management and resolution o f conflict, together with 
humanitarian assistance, are the imperatives for meeting the first overall objectives, 
o f Sudan integration into the global capitalist economy. Clearly, these are also the 
objectives o f the European states and of the so-called Washington’s new front-line 
states. Both the US, Western states and the IGAD member states share the same fear 
o f the resurgence o f Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan.
All Western states display active policies on humanitarian intervention and 
assistance. Like the US, they take various initiatives on humanitarian crises abroad. 
However, the EC member states’ approach to the common issues o f terrorism and 
democratic governance can be described as moderate when compared to the US 
government heavy-handedness on the sovereign government in Khartoum. The next 
section will explore the sanctioning policy taken by the European Community (EC) 
to leverage improvements in respect of human rights and good governance as 
contained in the OLS Plans o f Action. The Netherlands and Britain are singled out 
as the most active humanitarian actors within the EC because o f their right-based 
approach. The impact o f the EC sanctioning policy should be seen in the context to 
which a sovereign government and the parties to the conflict allowed Operation 
Lifeline Sudan to deliver relief assistance to its two sectors - Northern and Southern 
operational environments discussed in chapters 4 and 5.
Human Rights Advocacy and Peace. One such farewell party was in May 1997, and was organised by 
the Japanese Embassy.
354 These views were expressed to me by members of the SPLM/A National Liberation Council, as 
well as by leaders of grassroots communities in the Southern Sector during my fieldwork in 1996-7. 
Given the sensitive o f the issues that I raised, none of the officials interviewed wanted to be identified 
by name. These views on the humanitarian role of the US can be seen from the extent to which 
Washington channelled only its aid to the rebel-held areas of southern Sudan. In fact much of the 
USAID funding for capacity building and civil governance went to the SPLM/A areas. At the time of 
writing this thesis (1999), The US Congress was discussing the possibility of send relief food directly 
to the SPLA forces.
355 Ibid.
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3 . 3 .  EC AND MEMBER STATES’ POLITICAL AGENDAS
Despite having multiple agendas, the argument o f this section is that Western states’ 
support for OLS humanitarian relief operation owed much to their acceptance o f 
international norms rather than to their national interests only as realists would like 
us to believe. Although the resurgence o f Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan and 
other regional considerations influenced donor governments’ involvement in the 
Sudanese internal affairs, the major inspiration and motivation was their compassion 
for the starving civilians in Southern Sudan. There is no doubt that the EC/EU 
(European Community/European Union) and member states influenced not only the 
manner with which the OLS action plans were crafted, but also the way it was 
implemented in the Northern and Southern Sectors. Unlike the US, however, EC/EU 
and member states’ approach to political Islam was less robust, and the overall 
policy direction, particularly during 1986-89, incoherent. But like US, the European 
policy toward Sudan was characterised by confusion from the start. The sum of 
EC/EU public pronouncements on Islamist regime in Khartoum points to a 
conscious attempt to accommodate and reach out to moderate GOS radical Islamic 
orientation. A closer and more critical reading of the various EC/EU’s 
pronouncements, however reveals some inconsistencies and strains.
First, member states, particularly, Germany and France, were reluctant to take 
a strong, and decisive position on the Sudanese government. Thus, opinion among 
EC/EU member states was divided between the pragmatic French/German position, 
on the one hand, and the more rights based Dutch/British approach, on the other 
hand. While the Dutch and the British wanted a more assertive approach to human 
rights violations in Sudan, the French and the Germans called for caution because 
such issues require dialogue with a sovereign authority in Khartoum. These 
divisions were embarrassing as Britain held the presidency o f the EC, and 
contributed to a number of complaints from the Netherlands and Belgium, 
concerning the lack o f a clear policy and directives. The positions of the successive 
UK governments toward the regime in Khartoum were reflective o f domestic 
political exigencies. But it was France, more than any other member state which 
undermined EC/EU policy toward the crisis in the Sudan. France has always been at 
odds with other EU governments on humanitarian issues, and according to one 
scholar, the problem with Paris was how to maintain and assert French
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independence in a collaborative endeavour clearly led by the United States.356 In 
order to attain the objective o f co-operation without identification France supported 
UN programmes in opposition controlled areas largely through its NGOs and ECHO 
(European Community Humanitarian Office). The real issue regarding France was 
the continuing suspicion on the part o f Britain and USA that French government 
appeasement policy towards Khartoum was an attempt to expand its sphere o f 
influence beyond Francophone Africa.357
The second o f the obvious reasons for the division among the EU member 
states was due to the fact that they were unsure o f whether the hard-line position of 
Washington would force the Islamist regime in Khartoum to modify its anti-western 
rhetoric. Britain, the former colonial power, was cautious and wanted to retain its 
freedom of manoeuvre while smaller countries like the Netherlands wanted a clear 
and consistent EU response to the ‘rogue’ Islamist regime in Sudan.358 Thus, the 
complex web o f competencies, the diverging interests, and the complex institutional 
framework within EC/EU also contribute to explain the incoherent humanitarian 
policy initiatives o f the EC/EU in the Sudan. Throughout the nineties, the EC/EU 
had difficulties in defining common interests and precise goals for its common 
foreign policy towards the Islamic regime in Khartoum, a fact which is clearly 
reflected by the lack o f clear goals o f the Common Foreign and Security Policy.359 
This point needs to be put briefly into a wider a context o f EC/EU policy. This 
somewhat complicated situation of the EC/EU and the lack o f a common 
understanding of the appropriate role o f Europe in international politics to a large 
extent explains why the EC/EU was generally conceived as in inefficient and 
inconsistent player in international relief system in the Sudan during the eighties and 
early nineties.
356 Interview with Dr. Christian Mailhes, Department of Law, Toulouse University, Paris, December 
8,1997
357 Ibid.
358 Ibid.
359 Schirm S.A., “Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy”, p. 7
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The constitutional explanation to this is simply that both before and after the 
ratification o f the Maastritch treaty360, most foreign and security policy was and still 
inter-governmental, which opens the way for separate actions from the individual 
EC/EU member states parallel to the common policies361. The final push towards 
establishing a ‘European’ foreign policy or giving an international role to the 
Community came with the ending of the Cold War which, in 1991, led to a number 
o f initiatives with special reference to establishing a common European foreign and 
security policy (CFSP). The principles o f the CFSP were entered into the European 
Union Treaty, the Maastrictch Treaty o f 1997.362 It was stated in chapter 1 that the 
ending o f the Cold War changed the security framework in fundamental ways, as 
new and ‘softer’ security issues such as those discussed in chapter 2 moved to the 
top of foreign and security policy agenda of the Community instead o f the former 
military threats.363 According to Michael Smith, ‘the new security situation 
fundamentally changed the traditional foreign policy thinking in Western Europe.
Inter-linking economic, political and security issues became the order o f the 
day which created a pressure to find new roles and responsibilities for the 
Community in ways that ‘approximated to “real” foreign policy’.364 The new 
security situation stressed the need for a new European security policy which, with 
civilian means, could take into account the non-military threats and challenges 
which characterised the post-Cold War situation in Europe.365 This intertwining
360 One of the many conferences I attended was that of European conference on conflict prevention 
held in the Netherlands from 27-28 February 1997. In this conference 1 provided an overview of the 
conflict system in the Great Lakes Region. Organised by the Dutch umbrella-NGO ‘National 
Committee for International Co-operations and Sustainable Development, the conference fitted into a 
longer series of advocacy and public awareness-raising events to promote conflict prevention in 
European foreign policy. The aim was to make conflict prevention the key of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) -  one of the principal pillars of the Maastricht Treaty that was then being 
reviewed by the EU Inter-governmental Conference.
361 For a recent discussion of this subject, see Gorm Rye Olsen, “Promotion of Democracy as a 
Foreign Policy Instrument of ‘Europe’: Limits to International Idealism”, Democratisation, Vol. 7, 
No. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 142-167
362 Alan Cafruny & Patrict Peters, “EU Foreign Policy: From Maastricht to Amsterdam”, in Cafruny 
A. and Peters P. (eds.), The Union and the World: Economy o f a Common European Foreign Policy, 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 7
363 Kjell A. Eliassen, “Introduction: The New European Foreign and Security Policy Agenda”, in 
Eliassen K.A. (ed.), Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union, London, Sage Publications,
1998, pp. 1-8
364 Michael Smith, “The EU as an International Actor”, in Richardson J. (ed.), European Union: 
Power and Policy-Making, London & New York, Routledge, 1996, pp. 250-51
365 Stefan A. Schirm, “Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy: The Politics of Necessity, 
Validity, and adequacy”, in Rhodes C. (ed.), The European Union in the World Community, 
Boulder, CO., Lynne Rienner, 1998, p. 76
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between the old civilian agenda o f the Community and the new high politics o f 
peace and security was particularly outspoken in Europe in the 1990s.366 The 
transformed international situation brought new topics on the international agenda. 
As discussed generally in the previous chapters, one o f the prominent themes o f the 
early 1990s was the value of democracy and human rights combined with a general 
belief that Western values were on the rise.367 Accordingly, the influence o f the EC 
political interests, as an organisation o f governments, can be seen from the fact that 
a striking departure in the early 1990s in the foreign aid policies o f Western 
governments was the linking of official development assistance to good 
governance.368 I want to digress here to provide a brief perspective to this point, 
which is important to understanding the sanctioning behaviour o f European 
Community and its member states in the Sudan. Democratisation has been the most 
significant political development in the Third World in the 1980s and 1990s. It is 
dealt extensively elsewhere369, but one aspect of democratisation, the emergence o f 
political conditionality, is particularly relevant to the understanding o f the behaviour 
o f donor community in the Sudan between 1989 and 1996.
Political conditionality refers to “the linking o f development aid to demands 
concerning human rights and (liberal) democracy in recipient countries”.370 The 
debt crisis made economic conditionality central to the provision o f some forms of 
multilateral aid in the 1980s, and at first political conditionality was simply an 
extension o f this process. In response to difficulties o f implementing structural 
adjustment in Africa, the World Bank produced a report in 1989, entitled Sub- 
Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable development, which stressed the 
importance o f ‘good governance’ as a precondition for successful development.371
366 Smith, “The EU as an International Actor”, p. 253
367 Pinar G. Tank, “Security Issues Emanating from the Mediterranean Basin”, in Eliassen, op.cit., p. 
179; Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation, Baltimore, MD., John 
Hopkins University, 1999, p. 24.
368 Gordon Crawford, “Foreign Aid and Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency”, 
Democratization, Vol. 4, No. 3, Autumn 1997, p. 69
369 Colin Parkins, “North-South Relations and Globalization after the Cold War”, in Charlotte 
Bretherton & Geoffrey Ponton (eds.), Global Politics: An Introduction, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers,
1996, pp. 3-73
j7 ° Sorensen G., “Political Conditionality”, The European Journal o f Development Research, Vol. 5, 
No. 1, Special Edition, 1993, p. 1
371 See Moore M. (ed.), “Good Government?”, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1993
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The role o f “political conditionality”372 in the tide o f democratisation that swept 
through Africa in the early 1990s is important for what it represents: “a potentially 
dramatic change o f basic principles o f the international system: putting human rights 
first means that respect for individuals and individual rights acquires priority over 
respect for the sovereignty o f states”.373 Not surprisingly, the end of the Cold War 
witnessed numerous declarations and public statements not least from European and 
United States political leaders on the precedence o f democratic governance. This has 
implications on EC and its member states policies towards the humanitarian relief 
disaster in the Sudan. Throughout the period described in this thesis, two agendas, 
among others, influenced EC/EU and member states involvement in the Sudan 
humanitarian emergency -  democratic governance ( in the OLS jargon, this was 
defined in terms o f relief access, capacity building, good governance and human 
rights) and supporting regional (IGADD) conflict resolution efforts.
A. DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AGENDA
Humanitarian norms and principles have provided EU and member states the basis 
for conditioning development aid on the Khartoum government’s willingness to 
embrace the call for democratic governance. Given the prevailing debate o f the time, 
good governance was an obvious topic to choose for Sudan, if  the aim was to give 
Western Europe a new and special regional profile in the Horn o f Africa. Regardless 
o f their different national interests, all the EU member states basically acted 
multilaterally adhering apprehensively to the humanitarian policies constructed by 
OLS. In this case, OLS served as the principal source o f legitimation for all EU 
member states, though preserving a good bilateral relationship to the US was more 
important to Britain.
372 In the context of this thesis, “Political conditionality” refers to an instrument -  the withhodling of 
development assistance -  that states employ for governments to modify their behaviour. Political 
conditionality can also be more broadly defined as a set of specific state behaviours -  respecting 
human rights, working in a good governance mood -  that are internationally upheld as conducive to 
development and whose realisation is promoted, inter alia, through that leverage instrument. For a 
detail analysis of this subject, see Peter Uvin & Isabelle Biagiotti, “Global Governance and ‘New’ 
Political Conditionality”, Global Governance, Vol. 1, 1996, pp. 377-400
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Consequently, the EU was generally consistent in calling for the return of 
democracy and the rule of law in the Sudan. One senior ECHO official explained:
We have no specific interest in the Sudan, and our relief assistance has 
no political motives. We are supporting OLS programmes because, as 
members o f the international society, we have an international obligation 
to those suffering as a result o f internal conflict. Our support to the OLS 
should be seen from the regional perspective; the EU is concerned about 
the implications o f such emergencies on regional stability. The Horn o f  
Africa cannot be stable unless conflicts such as those in the Sudan are 
resolved, and we believe one way o f doing that is to condition our 
development aid to good governance. In the case o f the Sudan, our policy 
is working because Khartoum is beginning to constructively dialogue 
with the opposition movements.374
While it is true that the EC/EU and member states had idealistic concerns in 
supporting humanitarian programmes in the Sudan, it is equally true that throughout 
the eighties, the Western industrial democracies were more interested in containing 
the spread o f communism in the Horn of Africa, rather than tackling the 
humanitarian emergencies that engulfed the sub-region during 1985 (Ethiopian 
famine) and 1986 (Sudanese famine). But in 1990, European attention was directed 
to threats posed by the emergence o f Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan, which 
induced OLS major donors to give priority to democratic governance throughout the 
Horn o f Africa. In this case, power, in the traditional realist sense o f the term, 
matters as well; it is usually the conceptions o f legitimacy and sovereignty of the 
existing powerful states in international relations that become the international 
norm.375 There is no doubt in this chapter that powerful states are sometimes in a 
position to impose their ideas o f legitimacy on the less powerful, and, therefore, it is 
the ideas o f most powerful states that matter most. The perception of Western states 
o f Sudan as a haven for Islamic terrorists has been accepted world-wide. Because o f 
the threat the regime posed to regional stability and peace, it is not surprising that 
European donors paid increased attention to the fundamental role o f governance and
373 Sorensen, “Political Conditionality”, p. 1
374 Interview with a senior official working with the European Community Humanitarian Office, 
Nairobi, September 23, 1997
375 For an analytical discussion, see, for example, David Lumsdaine, Moral Vision in International 
Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993; Samuel J. 
Barkin, “The Evolution of the Constitution of Sovereignty and the Emergence of Human Rights”, 
Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, 1998, pp. 229-252
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human rights in the maintenance o f national as well as regional stability. In fact, the 
European Community’s humanitarian relief aid to the Sudan was seen by 
practitioners and scholars as one o f the few forms of engagement, which its member 
governments were willing to undertake in situation of internal conflict, and this was 
because the word “humanitarian” shielded them off from accusations o f imperialistic 
designs in Africa by their detractors.376 Mark Duffield argues that in the post Cold 
W ar development and security concerns have been increasingly difficult to separate, 
and that development policy o f western governments is now concerned with 
transforming the domestic relations within a given country in pursuit o f economic 
and political stability. Some development scholars have interpreted this approach as 
one o f saving lives, preventing dependency, and where possible, supporting 
livelihoods.377 This policy was expounded in several position statements drafted at 
the end of 1995 and the early part of 1996.378 This policy document supports 
Duffield’s argument that achieving structural stability through a comprehensive 
policy is as much a political project as it is a development goal:
“The idea o f structural stability is a good illustration o f how the politics 
o f aid has changed since the Cold War period. During the Cold War, 
development assistance often found itself politicised by superpower 
rivalry and the desire to construct alliances and political blocks in the 
South. The fact that a given regime took a pro-western stance very often 
served not only as qualification for development assistance but also as an 
acceptable excuse fo r  all manner o f internal sins. The politics of 
development has now changed, as it is less dependent on forming 
alliances with southern rulers. O f increasing importance is a more 
radical and in some ways more intrusive agenda o f  encouraging 
domestic social, political and economic reform ”.379
376 Interview with Prof. Macharia Munene, Dean of Division of Arts and Social Sciences, United 
States International University-Africa, Nairobi, May 8, 1997
377 For a recent comprehensive review of the effects of EU humanitarian assistance in the Sudan, see 
Mark Duffield, “Sudan: Unintended Consequences of Humanitarian Assistance: Field Evaluation, 
Dublin, A Report to the European Community Humanitarian Office, The University of Dublin, 
Trinity College, November, 1999
378 These include the Council conclusions on Preventive Diplomacy and Peacekeeping in Africa, 
December, 1995; the Commission communications on The European Union and the Issue o f  Conflict 
in Africa: Conflict Prevention and Beyond, March, 1996, and Linking Relief Rehabilitation and 
Development, April, 1996. There is a strong intellectual coherence linking the policy architecture that 
is outlined in these documents and the tools for its implementation.
379 Duffield M., “Sudan: Unintended Consequences of Humanitarian Assistance, p. 19
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Humanitarian principles, the EC has a number o f policy instruments (rhetorical 
devices) at its disposal. That is, international legal obligations regarding democracy 
are found only in Europe’s regional institutions. The statutes o f both the Council of 
Europe, created in 1949, and the European Economic Community (EEC), in 1957, 
oppose membership of nondemocratic countries. Today, the EC can restrict foreign 
development assistance and trade preferences under its Lome Convention 
arrangements with former African and Caribbean colonies. According to Duffield, 
“compliance with the economic and political norms of self-orchestration and self- 
help free elections, (the markets and so on) forms the basis o f partnership and 
acceptance within the system of global liberal governance. Depending on the 
severity o f transgressions, non-compliance can lead to exclusion. The concern is 
that, due to the fungibility o f development assistance, some countries may be using 
it to help them wage war, both internally and against neighbouring countries. In such 
cases, development assistance would be undermining the principles o f solidarity and 
peaceful co-operation enshrined in the Lome Convention. Depending on 
circumstances, counter-measures include the closure o f some programmes, including 
extreme sanction o f the formal suspension of all EU development assistance. It is 
argued that such measures “ ...can be instrumental in encouraging a cessation of 
hostilities and political dialogue”.380
In the case o f the Sudan, EC and member states did this relatively well. Most 
EC countries suspended their aid and Denmark, in fact, broke off its diplomatic 
relations with the regime in Khartoum. EU development assistance under the Lome 
Convention was formally suspended in 1990.381 The remaining financial and 
technical co-operation between Sudan and the EC has mainly comprised of 
emergency aid and food aid via European Community Humanitarian Office 
(ECHO), Stabex scheme and implementation o f NIP funded by Lome III. 
Emergency food aid was given as so-called ‘indirect food’, through free distribution 
via NGOs and multilateral organisations. Although geopolitical considerations were 
much more important to the Western political leaders, the decision by the EC 
member states to support the inclusion o f political conditionality-related 
programmes into the OLS Plans o f Action, and by implication violated Sudan
TOA
Duffield, Sudan: Unintended Consequences of Humanitarian Assistance, p. 20
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territorial integrity, could be seen as justified by the need to intervene on behave of 
starving population caught up in the war zone.382 Among all the EU member states 
involved in OLS, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were the most visible. 
These two countries played an important role in framing EC policy in the Sudan. As 
mentioned above, the European Community’s response to the Sudan humanitarian 
emergency was couched in terms o f human rights, democratic governance and 
security interests.383
The Netherlands took a more active part in translating humanitarian norms and 
principles into action by funding relief programmes such as capacity building and 
good governance in the OLS Southern Sector. The Dutch government policy 
towards the Sudan reflected three elements central to EU foreign policy384 -  a 
priority to provide humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts, a concern for 
protecting human rights, and support for the work o f NGOs.385 According to Jan 
Gruiters, Dutch Human Rights Researcher, two policy objectives have held central 
position in the Netherlands response to the humanitarian emergency in the Sudan: 
the promotion and protection o f human rights on the one hand, and the giving of 
financial support to OLS in the form of humanitarian assistance on the other. Within 
the overall foreign policy in the Horn of Africa, various aspects o f Dutch interest 
compete for preference -  interest o f trade, economics, human rights and 
humanitarian relief assistance.386 Hence human rights occupies a central role 
because the moulders of the Dutch foreign policy, like those in EU member states 
such as Germany, were persuaded that a focus on human rights and democratic
3 81 Incidentally, contrary to the above expectations, this suspension did not have much influence on 
the conduct o f the war in Sudan.
382 ECHO, ECHO Global Plan VI: ECHO Global Plan for Sudan, April 1997 -  March 1998, 
Brussels, February 27, 1997, p. 5. This Sixth Plan was the first to highlight the importance of human 
rights issues and their being closely linked to the causes of the humanitarian need and the provision 
of humanitarian aid and to attempt to analyse the situation of displaced southern Sudanese in the 
GOS areas.
383 Ibid., ECHO Global Plan VI, p. 5
384 Ibid., ECHO Global Plan II: Second Global Package of Humanitarian Aid to the Sudan and the 
Sudanese Refugees, Brussels, December, 1994
385 Interview with Jan Gruiters, Secretary General for African Affairs, Pax Christi-Holland, 
Amsterdam, December 11, 1996
386 A number of factors draw governments. There will always be innumerable special interests 
which enmesh particular states, sometimes to do with historical links, sometimes with perceived 
threats to valued assets. Beyond this there is the complex concerns. Summed up in the phrase ‘threat 
to regional stability, including economic dislocation, links to terrorism, as well as ‘spill-over into 
regional politics.
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governance goals advance that country’s international image. The government o f the 
Netherlands, o f all states supporting UN programmes in the Sudan, has always 
considered these policy objectives to be in line with each other.387 This is not 
surprising because The Netherlands likes to picture itself as highly international and 
cosmopolitan.388 It was the home o f Grotius, the father o f international law, and now 
it prides itself as a country highly active on democratic governance and human 
rights. This last orientation is affected both by its Protestant missionary tradition, 
and in some circles by a certain guilt about its colonial record and especially its 
handling of claims to independence by Indonesia in the 1940s.389 Both historical 
elements push the Dutch into activism on human rights and democratic governance. 
The Dutch political leaders see themselves as making a special contribution towards 
solving the crisis in the Sudan through their humanitarian aid to OLS agencies. From 
the constructivist perspective, the Dutch government adherence to these 
international standards of behaviour shows that humanitarian norms and principles 
do matter and that norms that are accepted do not merely reflect the interests o f the 
materially powerful. In this view, what states aim to do is an endogenous variable, 
not an exogenous given as neorealist and neoliberalist argued, and norms shape both 
goals o f  states -  their perceptions of their interests -  and the means they use to 
achieve those goals.
While neorealism and neoliberalism see norms as reflections o f the fixed 
preferences o f the most powerful states, this thesis believes that one o f the roles 
norms and principles play is to help determine those preferences. Because the ability 
o f states to make correct choices o f strategy is constrained both by limited 
rationality and by great uncertainty, the behavioural guidance provided by 
international norms is crucial as “a cognitive energy-saver and as a clue to 
successful strategies”.390 In this case, the government o f the Netherlands, like all EU 
member states, was guided in its approach to the humanitarian crisis in the Sudan by
387 Interview with Jan Gruiters, December, 1996
388 See David Gillies, Between Principle and Practice: Human Rights in North-South Relations, 
Montreal, MxGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996; Peter R. Baehr, “The Netherlands and the United 
Nations: The Future lies in the Past”, in Chadwick F. Alger, Gene M. Lyons and John E. Trent (eds.), 
The United Nations System: The policies of Member States, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 
1995, pp. 271-328
389 See, for example, Peter R. Baeher, “Problems of Aid Conditionality: The Netherlands and 
Indonesia”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1997, pp. 363-376
390 Ann Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms”, p. 366
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the international humanitarian norms and principles. This was clear from two major 
policy papers written by the Minister for Development Co-operation, Mr. Jan Pronk: 
A World o f Difference and A World in Dispute.391 Mr. Pronk, who was Minister for 
Development Co-operation from 1973 until 1977 and again from 1989 until the 
present (1996), was one o f the main architects of EU policy implementation in the 
Sudan. According to a Dutch Foreign Ministry official I met in The Hague, the 
Dutch government believes, like all other Western industrial democracies, that 
humanitarian norms play an essential element as guiding principles and moral 
foundation for democratisation processes.392 It can be argued thus, that humanitarian 
principles had provided the Dutch policy makers with an inspiration and motivation 
for policy development and implementation. For example, since the establishment o f 
the OLS in 1989, the Netherlands government directed its humanitarian aid policy to 
the promotion of human rights and good governance in SPLA controlled areas. A 
greater portion o f Dutch assistance to both sides was channelled multilaterally as 
well as bilaterally through ECHO, the UN and the international non-governmental 
organisations. Aid was “part o f our dialogue with the Sudan government,” says a 
Foreign Minister official in The Hague. While such assistance “can’t turn around the 
whole atmosphere,” he concludes, it has proved a useful way of keeping 
communications open and conveying concerns.393 From the idealist perspective, the 
Dutch policy was humanitarian in its goals and methods394 and it strengthened EU 
policy in the Sudan. But from the realist perspective, the keeping o f communication 
open between Amsterdam and Khartoum was in the national interest of the Dutch 
government because this was the best option of influencing the behaviour of the 
Islamist Sudanese regime. Like all Western governments, there was a concern by the 
Dutch government about contagion by example if  unacceptable behaviour o f the 
GOS was not dealt with effectively.
391 Second Chamber: 1990-91 Session, 21 813, nos. 1-2: hereafter quoted as A World o f  Difference; 
A World o f Dispute, The Hague, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993
392 Interview with a Dutch Foreign Ministry official, The Hague, August 8, 1998
393 Ibid.
394 According to Amstutz, there are three methods by which international norms influence 
international relations. First, the conscience of decision makers. Second, the influence of domestic 
public opinion, and third, the influence of international reputation. See Armstutz M. R. , International 
Ethics, 1999, p. 13
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The United Kingdom government also played a leadership role among 
representatives o f donor governments based in Khartoum, pressing the authorities 
particularly energetically to reinvigorate OLS. The British government took a right- 
based approach to the Sudan humanitarian crisis. British history, too, affects 
London’s modem orientation to human rights and democratic governance.395 All 
political parties (for example, the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat) 
strongly identify with civil and political rights and are proud o f such early 
documents as the Magna Carta, and the English Bill o f Rights of 1689, and so forth. 
Like the USA and The Netherlands, the UK prides itself on a strong legal culture 
emphasising constitutionalism. Not surprisingly, various British governments, unlike 
the USA, have not only accepted the full International Bill of Rights, along with 
European legal instruments, but also have undertaken concrete policies for specific 
situations -  engaging in quiet diplomacy, and suspending foreign assistance to the 
Khartoum government for its failure to return to democracy and the rule o f law to 
the Sudan. Even before the establishment o f OLS in 1989, the British government 
was in the forefront in the race to save the lives o f starving people o f Southern 
Sudan. Between February and May 1988, the House o f Commons Foreign Affairs 
Committee held a series o f hearings on famine in the Horn of Africa.396 Although 
Ethiopia featured in the debate much more than Southern Sudan, these series of 
hearings helped educate the British politicians, who were more interested in trying 
to undermine the Marxist government in Addis Ababa397, were now beginning to 
learn about the suffering o f the Sudanese war-victims. For example, the case o f the 
Nuba Hills was instructive in this respect, and was raised in the British House of 
Commons by Baroness Chalker:
I  am extremely sad over a year since the problems o f Sudan were last 
debated in the House the situation is grim as ever and, in a number o f  
areas like the Nuba Mountains, is even worst than it was a year ago... We 
are deeply concerned about the Government o f  Sudan’s lack o f  
commitment to the international efforts which is designed to provide 
153,000 tonnes o f sorghum fo r the relief effort. International NGOs face
395 For further discussion of this subject, see Human Rights in Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy 
Document No. 268, London, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, July, 1996; Foreign Policy and 
Human Rights, Vol. 1, House of Commons Sessions 1998-9, Foreign Affairs Committee, London, 
The Stationary Office, December, 1998
396 Foreign Affairs Committee, London, 1988, p. 40
397 Ibid., p. 90
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problems obtaining visas and permits to work in Sudan. The Churches 
and NGOs have great difficulty in gaining access to areas in severe need 
i f  the Government o f  Sudan decides to interveneJ98
Due, in part, to domestic criticism , the British government supported much o f OLS 
programmes, funding NGO activities such as Oxfam-UK as well as the work o f UN 
agencies. Such generosity can, however, be seen as a mixture o f humanitarianism 
and political opportunism, though it was very much inspired by the Prime Minister 
Tony Blair’s “ethical foreign policy”, which was contained in the mission statement 
promulgated by the Foreign Office on 12 May 1997. This policy set out the new 
government’s understanding of Britain’s foreign policy objectives. The document, 
titled Mutual Respect, explains: “We shall work through our international forums 
and bilateral relationships to spread the values of human rights, civil liberties and 
democracy which we demand for ourselves”.399 This is the ‘ethical dimension’ of 
Britain’s foreign policy. Mr. Robin Cook fleshed out what is involved in a speech o f 
17 July 1997, entitled Human Rights into a New Century. After presenting a list o f 
rights, he added: “These are rights which we claim for ourselves and which we 
therefore have right to demand for those who do not yet enjoy them...The right to 
enjoy our freedom comes with the obligation to support the human rights o f 
others” .400
Mr. Cook’s statement reflects the current international humanitarian disaster 
situation and the principles and rules that govern it are a product o f a history in 
which their most fundamental beliefs have had to be subverted and subordinated to 
Western liberal beliefs for the sake of continued existence or economic survival. 
Moreover, the British Foreign Secretary’s statement above clearly shows that 
humanitarian norms often have to take their course through a filter o f various 
domestic structures to become accepted by states as guiding political principles. The 
British state, like other members o f the international society, has accepted 
humanitarian norms for three reasons. First, it has been forced to through domestic 
political pressure as neorealists claim; second, because it is in its self-interest as
398 House of Lords Debate on Sudan, HANSARD, Vol. 551, No. 25, London, 19 January 1994, p. 
596
399 Mission Statement for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, May 12, 1997 
(http:fco.gov.uk/aboutfco/mission).
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neoliberalists maintain; or, third, because the British state perceived principles and 
norms as legitimate. These domestic and foreign factors interact to produce a foreign 
policy on rights somewhat similar to those o f other EU member states -  increasingly 
active and complicated, but inconsistent due to its variety o f interests in international 
relations. However, the point to keep in mind - which is relevant to this thesis - 
relates to the significance o f the consensus on the principles and rules o f 
humanitarian intervention and action. The British ‘ethical foreign policy’ is more 
important for considering norms settled than acting purely upon those principles and 
rules. Accordingly, the British Foreign Secretary’s statement above provides a 
classic example o f the interplay between geopolitical considerations and 
humanitarian impulse. This fitted well into the principal argument o f this thesis, 
which is that there is no conflict between humanitarianism and geopolitical interest, 
because the social practice we are engaged in necessarily includes both the two 
human natures o f charity and egoism. Therefore, the decision o f the UK government 
to give substantial amount o f money to the UN-led Operation Lifeline Sudan and to 
its UK-based NGOs, can arguably be said to be humanitarian.
However, it has been stated above that the so-called ethical foreign policy 
emerged mainly as a result o f domestic pressure from concerned politicians and 
from civil society. Much o f this pressure came from the lobbying efforts - 
sometimes through their members of parliament - of non-governmental 
organisations.401 Humanitarian agencies, with the support o f the media, have a 
relatively strong position in the United Kingdom.402 They repeatedly pointed to the 
deficiencies in the humanitarian relief disaster in the Sudan, and Christian Aid, 
Oxfam, Save the Children and other interest groups led this criticism. In terms of 
positive impacts, civil society influenced government policy through advocacy 
activities. An ethical foreign policy depends, in part, on an informed public opinion, 
and civic associations in Britain has been able to raise public awareness and
400 ‘Human Rights into the New Century’, Foreign Secretary’s keynote Speech, London, July 17, 
1997
401 Interview with Robert Rees, Project Officer, Catholic Fund for Overseas Development 
(CAFOD), London, December 15, 1996
402 The politics of an individual country cannot be understood without knowing what groups lobby 
the government and what debate there has been in the media. Similarly, international diplomacy does 
not operate on some separate planet, cut off from global civil society. Analysts of British politics use 
two terms: interest group conveys a bias towards a group, such as a company or trade union seeking
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understandings o f the war in Southern Sudan and its impact on the civilian 
population. NGO such as Christian Aid and World Vision-UK prepare newsletters, 
information kits, produce audio-visual presentations, organise talks, supply 
information to and attract the attention o f the mass media, maintain websites on the 
internet, and develop materials for schools. Since 1995 Britain donated more than 
£200 million to the OLS agencies. As one ODA official said: “Since 1989 the 
British Government has contributed a substantial sums o f money to the relief efforts 
in the Sudan. We made clear that we stood ready to provide further assistance as 
necessary. Thus, when the initial pledge was fully committed, we allocated a further 
6.23 million pounds in May and another £15 million in June. We are supporting 
international charities working in the area, and the work o f the United Nations 
Humanitarian Co-ordination Unit based in Khartoum, UNICEF and the World Food 
Programme”.403 Clare Short, British Secretary o f State for International 
Development, wrote letters to her EU colleagues, urging their governments to 
increase their contribution to the relief effort in Sudan. Such bilateral efforts o f the 
British and the Dutch governments clearly show that despite EU member states 
inconsistent humanitarian agendas, and the internal difficulties in formulating a 
common policy towards Sudan, EU aid co-operation remained frozen until there is 
‘concrete” evidence o f a return o f democracy.404
The Dutch and the UK have shown above that EU governments are no doubt 
also motivated by humanitarian concerns, prompted by the sincere efforts o f 
individual minister (s) or under compulsion from outraged public opinion. For 
example, the former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said:
Situations are developing in Europe, in the Middle East, in 
Africa....which don’t immediately threaten Western Europe or British 
national security but which are themselves as a situation unacceptable.
They are unacceptable because o f the amount o f death and suffering 
which they caused and because they could spread outwards...Some 
scholars have in recent months made an intellectual distinction: they 
have divided the kind o f actions we might have to think about into two 
broad categories: wars o f interest and wars o f  conscience, but I am not
to influence economic policy; while pressure groups invokes a wider range o f groups promoting their 
values.
403 Interview with Allan Zachariades, Co-ordinator, Greater Horn of Africa, Department of 
International Development, London, August 21,1997
404 Interview with Paul Filler, ECHO Representative, Nairobi, May 24, 1996
141
sure that these distinctions are absolute. I think that it is too simple a 
division...If we really want a world that is truly more secure, more 
prosperous and more stable, then humanitarian problems may from time 
to time be seen not only as a moral issue but as a potential security threat 
as well. We help people because they are hungry and because i f  they are 
not fed  they will die, but it is also true that countries which are racked by 
famine or civil war will be unsafe neighbours in the world village.4®5
This statement reflects a mixture o f realism and idealism in the Western 
humanitarian policy. Realists, for example, argue that such intervention can be 
understood in terms of the power and interests of nation-states, in particular great 
powers such as Britain, acting collectively through the European Union. In this case, 
states such, as the United Kingdom and The Netherlands, tend to cloak their 
interests in the language of humanitarianism, and may claim to be acting in the name 
o f the international community. Thus, Mr. Hurd’s statement above may not 
represent a meaningful departure from the Cold War political interests. Arguing, 
however, from a constructivist perspective, great powers often articulate their 
particular interests in the language o f universal principles in an effort to persuade 
others to accept them. However, to realists within the states establishment, the key 
point is that what might appear to be the action o f an international community is in 
fact a reflection o f dominant Western states. While it is true that there is much o f 
self-interested public relations (PR) exercise in the donor governments humanitarian 
involvement, it is equally true that the EC/EU and member states have a genuine 
commitment to the images o f suffering civilian population everywhere.
B. CONFLICT RESOLUTION AGENDA
The second agenda which attempted to address the Sudanese crisis was the use o f 
humanitarianism as a strategy for conflict reduction, and possibly for confrontation 
with the warring parties. However, as stated above, consideration was given to the 
long history o f EU member states’ interest in the Horn o f Africa. At the junction o f 
Asia and Africa, and commanding the Suez shipping route through which oil and 
other raw materials are imported by Western Europe, the East African coast
Douglas Hurd, Speech at Royal United Services Institute, 13 October, 1992, Arms Control and 
Disarmament Quarterly Review, Vol. 27, 1992, pp. 34-5
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commands a highly strategic position.406 It also, even in the best o f times, one o f the 
most politically, ethnically, and climatically unstable regions o f the world.407 While 
the Cold War witnessed extensive American and Soviet engagement in the Horn, the 
European Union member states also have a long history of external bilateral interest 
in the region. Italy, the United Kingdom and France have held colonies within the 
Horn o f Africa and many EU member states have invested heavily in the region. 
However, there are still a number o f outstanding claims for self-determination 
among groups which lie both within and between IGAD member states.408 Thus, 
continuing inter-state tensions have led to support for transnational militia 
movements, fuelling regional instability. Cross-border linkages include a history of 
assassination attempts, armed incursions and direct military support to rebel groups. 
Indeed, some states in the region have adopted a directly interventionist approach in 
their search for a better internal security environment. However, the 1990s show 
several major changes in conflicts and peace in the Greater Horn o f Africa, after 
decades o f destruction and massive human suffering because o f long and interrelated 
wars.
Some are still persisting, while changing shape. But the wars in Eritrea, 
Ethiopia and Djibouti have been terminated and major demobilisations have taken 
place. Major efforts are made in these countries to support reintegration o f ex­
combatants and other war-affected groups and facilitate a broader process of peace­
building. Despite some significant progress in parts o f this subregion region, Sudan 
Islamist regime remains a major obstacle, at least from the Western states’ eyes, to 
peace and stability. Thus, one of EC/EU geopolitical considerations was the 
resolution o f the Sudanese conflict as an essential condition for political stability in 
the Horn o f Africa. Although the subject of peace per se is beyond the scope o f this 
thesis, the reader should bear in mind that European Union’s policy also influenced 
the types o f programmes OLS co-ordinated, which included grassroots peacemaking
406 See for example, Emma Visman and Emery Brusset, Prevention of Violent Conflict and the 
Coherence of EU Policies towards the Horn of Africa, Channel Research LTD: London, April 1998, 
p. 4; James Fairhead, Conflict Over Water Resources: Complex Emergencies, Environment and a 
Critique of Greenwar in Africa, a paper presented for the UNU/WIDER and Queen Elizabeth House 
meeting on The political Economy of humanitarian Emergencies, July 1997
407 USAID, Breaking the Cycle of Despair: President Clinton’s Initiative on the Horn of Africa, 
Report of the President’s Representative, June 1994, p. 6
408 The 1994 IGAD Declaration of Principles accords recognition of the right to self-determination 
of the peoples in South Sudan.
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and regional peace initiatives. The motive for supporting humanitarian programmes 
in the Sudan was tied to the ambitions o f the EU to become an important global 
player, for example, to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security policy o f 
Europe.409 Furthermore, the heightened concern with the Horn o f Africa stability is 
reflected in EU statement410, which took note of Islamic threat, and formulated a 
common position concerning conflict prevention in the region. These efforts fit well 
with the English School definition o f diplomacy as an expression o f the concept o f a 
morale. According to this school o f thought, the main function o f diplomacy is to 
contain conflicts, resulting from different value-conceptions or interests, to promote 
co-operation and communication and mutual trust between the negotiation parties, 
and to collect knowledge about the others’ identity and culture.411 As Bull has noted: 
“Diplomacy...in its essence is common sense and charity applied to International 
Relations; [it is the] application of intelligence and tact to relations between 
governments...The foundation o f good diplomacy is the same as the foundation of 
good business -  namely, credit, confidence, consideration and compromise”.412 This 
interpretation o f diplomacy presupposes that states, although lacking a common 
executive and judiciary in international sphere, have a commitment to international 
peace and security as contained in the UN Charter. This form of diplomacy was 
beneficial not only to the Sudanese war-victims but has also the potential o f 
defusing sources o f instability in the Horn of Africa sub-region.
In the minds o f the Western political leaders was the war in the Sudan, and its 
regional implications discussed later on in this chapter. Establishing a connection 
between relief and development also complemented the increasing importance of 
conflict prevention and resolution. Insofar as humanitarian strengthened local 
capacities as discussed in the next chapters, it was also seen by EC as contributing to 
conflict mitigation. Thus, in addition to promoting self-sufficiency, humanitarian 
programmes were seen as a way of addressing Sudan social and political dimensions 
o f instability discussed in chapter 1. This focus has moved EC external aid policy
409 The Council of the European Union, Common Position Concerning Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution in Africa, Brussels, 2 June 1997 (97/356/CFSP)
410 Ibid.
411 Bull, The Anarchical Society, pp. 162-171
412 Harold Nicolson, quoted in Martin Wight, International Theory, p. 180
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into the area o f conflict prevention and resolution but mainly through IGAD.413 EC 
Development instruments have taken account of: . .their potential for balancing the 
interests and opportunities o f different identity groups within a state, for 
encouraging democratic government (s) that enjoy widespread legitimacy among the 
population, for fostering consensus on key national issue...and for building 
mechanisms for peaceful conciliation o f group interests”.414 Apart from the 
Netherlands and Norway, Britain played a crucial role during its Presidency o f the 
EU to voice European concerns on the situation in Sudan and their likely spill-over 
into the neighbouring states. The British government had long regarded the peace 
process pursued by IGAD as the best chance to bring an end to the fighting through 
a negotiated settlement. According to one Overseas Development Agency (ODA) 
official, Britain’s attempt to bring about a peaceful end to the Sudan conflict was 
motivated, in part, by the need to end the suffering o f the Sudanese people. The UK 
government also pursued behind the scene diplomacy with Khartoum on the issues 
o f democracy and human rights, but leaving ODA and NGOs such as Christian Aid, 
Oxfam and Save the Children Fund to deal with humanitarian consequences o f the 
war in Sudan.415
A government official was clear about London commitment to a peaceful end 
to the Sudan conflict: “Our interest in Sudan since 1983, when the war broke out in 
the south o f the country, is peace. We pressed for an early meeting o f the IGAD 
Partners Forum, which consists o f the IGAD members and a number o f EU donor 
countries. This was hosted by the Netherlands on 17/18 June 1998 in the Hague”.416 
Throughout the period discussed in this thesis, the EU policy objectives in the Sudan 
were fairly consistent and clear: they sought peace, respect for humanitarian norms 
and good governance. From the start of IGAD peace initiative, the donor 
governments such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands were pursuing an 
active diplomatic strategy in support of EU objectives. The EU and member states 
reaffirmed their support for the Sudan peace process within IGAD framework, on 
the basis o f the Declaration o f Principles (DoP) and in accordance with the IGAD
413 IGADD was revitalised in 1996, and it is now called Inter-Governmental Agency for 
Development (IGAD). This thesis will use abbreviation IGAD rather than IGADD.
414 European Commission, The Issue of Conflict in Africa, March, 1996, p. iii
415 Interview with Daniel Collison, Sudan Project Officer, Christian Aid, London, October 9, 1996
416 Interview with an ODA official, London, November 13, 1998
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and the OAU principles and objectives embodied in its Charter: “In order to ensure 
swift progress towards a general and comprehensive cease-fire and medium and 
long-term improvement o f the humanitarian situation, the urgent enhancement o f the 
IGAD peace process on Sudan, in accordance with the DoP, it was recognised as 
essential... The participants encouraged Kenya, as IGAD Chairman for the Sudan 
peace process, to appoint a Special Envoy to mount a concentrated and continuous 
media effort” .417 Consequently, IGAD received support from EU member states for 
institution building and sub-regional projects, including support for the 
organisation’s initiatives in conflict prevention, resolution and management. The EC 
provided technical assistance to the IGAD secretariat and specific IGAD projects, 
while Italy and the Netherlands provided capacity building support. Even though an 
analysis o f the IGAD peace process is beyond the scope o f this thesis, it is important 
to point out here that among the EU member states, Belgium, Germany and Sweden 
provided support for the peace process for Sudan 418
3 . 4 .  IGAD AND MEMBER STATES’ POLITICAL AGENDAS
This section will also shows that geopolitical motivations operate within sub­
regional settings in a manner that often impose heavy additional pressure on the 
United Nations co-ordination o f humanitarian assistance. Nonetheless, this thesis 
argues that IGAD (Inter-Governmental Agency on Development), as an organisation 
o f states, did not intervene in the Sudan on purely humanitarian grounds, but that it 
used principles and rules as a legitimation for involvement in the Sudanese internal 
crisis. The conception o f IGAD followed the United Nations General Assembly 
resolution 35/90 of 5th December 1980 and 38/216 of 20lh December 1983, 
recommending that countries in the Eastern African sub-Saharan sub-region 
established organisation to co-ordinate their efforts in the area o f drought and 
development.419 However with the simmering conflict in the Horn sub-region, the 
IGAD brief was expanded to include political, humanitarian, and peacemaking roles. 
The justification o f this could not be questioned: the tasks o f security and post­
417 Fourth Meeting of the Committee on Sudan of the IGAD Partners’ Forum, p. 2
418 Kees Kingma & Kiflemariam Grebbrewold, “Militarisation, Reintegration and Conflict 
Prevention in the Horn of Africa”, Bonn International Center for Conversion, July 1998, p. 30
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emergency recovery could not be tackled without the prerequisite o f a sustainable 
peace.420 It is clear from this point that IGAD was motivated by two main agendas
-  humanitarian agenda and security agenda.
A. HUMANITARIAN AGENDA
The interplay between relief and peace is perhaps the most intriguing and complex 
aspect o f the entire IGAD initiative. It can be argued that the ethical factor in the 
Sudan conflict was a humanitarian one, employed by the IGAD and member 
states.421 The terms o f the public debate about the merits and demerits o f regional 
involvement were set by international norms. These norms are contained in the 
Geneva Conventions and agreements (or treaties) and have informed the vocabulary 
o f regional debate. To the extent that member states see themselves as beneficiaries 
o f these norms, then they supported them. With the establishment of the Operation 
o f Lifeline Sudan (OLS) as a UN humanitarian relief programme, the IGAD 
member states used their political leverage to put pressure on the Sudanese 
government not to use its territorial integrity to obstruct international efforts to relief 
the suffering o f the southern Sudanese people. During 1992 and also when IGAD 
was revitalised in 1996, pressure, mainly from OLS agencies and donors, grew for 
the organisation to get actively involved in the UN humanitarian operations in the 
Sudan.
IGAD was directly asked by its major Western European partners to also take 
a pro-active role in the traditional humanitarian operations through its newly 
established Department for Humanitarian Affairs. This new mandate recognised the 
link between humanitarian emergency and conflict resolution. In order to handle the 
new mandate o f humanitarian diplomacy (conflict prevention and peace promotion 
and relief assistance), IGAD set up a division o f political and humanitarian affairs, 
and in April 1996 a Secretariat to handle Sudan peace process was inaugurated in
419 IGADD Secretariat, Executive Brief on Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and 
Development, Djibouti: Unpublished Report, January 1996
420 ‘It is impossible to talk o f development and the environment in an area where there is no peace 
and stability’, was how President Museveni of Uganda put at the September 1993 IGADD Summit, 
HAB, Vol. 5, 1993; see also Lionel Cliffe, “Regional dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa”, 
1999, p. 96
421 IGADD Secretariat, Executive Brief, pp. 2-3
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Nairobi, under the auspices o f the Kenya Ministry o f Foreign Affairs. But the 
decision to establish the Department o f Political and Humanitarian Affairs (DPHA) 
stems from a declaration passed at the Horn of Africa Summit on Humanitarian 
Affairs issues held in Addis Ababa in 1992. The declaration o f governments and 
political leaders states the following:
We have come together- because we believe that humanitarian problems 
facing our people, which have accumulated and worsened over the 
years, require our fu ll and immediate attention. We also believe that 
because o f  their regional dimension, they call fo r  concerted regional 
solution. Finally, we recognise that unless we address them on an urgent 
basis, we can not hope to make progress in solving other equally critical 
problems that also require action 422
The seriousness o f member states to tackle the humanitarian relief disaster in the 
Sudan meant that the main aim o f the Department o f Political and Humanitarian 
Affairs was, therefore, to enhance IGAD’s ability to mitigate humanitarian relief 
disaster through improvement of disaster management and promote the voluntary 
repatriation and integration o f refugees in the sub-region, among other activities. 
The Department has already conducted research on the link between 
humanitarianism and conflict management, and develop an effective conflict early 
warning system within the IGAD Secretariat. As to underline the importance of the 
OLS in the IGAD peace initiatives, the Kenyan Foreign Minister said: “We have 
keenly followed the work o f Operation Lifeline Sudan since it was established. Its 
importance in humanitarian activities remains central to survival o f the many people 
in the area...”423 Dr. Godana, who was also in charge o f IGAD peace initiative, 
made a spirited diplomatic offensive that took him to Sudan, and to the neighbouring 
countries in order to put further pressure on the warring parties to respect 
international humanitarian norms and rules and allow unimpeded access to the 
needy population. The new department for humanitarian affairs was expected to 
work together with that o f political affairs to formulate policies that would ease 
tensions among IGAD member states in order to direct their efforts towards the 
peace process and regional stability. This humanitarian agenda was strengthened by 
member states’ security interests discussed below.
422 IGAD, IGAD Forges Regional Cooperation, Nairobi, 1996, p. 10
423 Interview with Dr. Bonaya Godana, Kenya Foreign Affairs Minister, Nairobi, August 10, 1997
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B. SECURITY AGENDA
As stated above, the changed security climate also witnessed a convergence of 
Western geopolitical considerations and the IGAD member states’ national interests. 
One of the reasons that propelled the IGAD member states to expand the mandate of 
the organisation to encompass the field o f conflict management and resolution was 
the realistic fear that the humanitarian emergency in the Sudan could affect peace 
and stability in the Horn o f Africa. But it was OLS, through its offices in Khartoum 
and Nairobi, which played an important role in persuading frontline states to initiate 
a peace process on Sudan.424 Although OLS did not end the war, it used 
humanitarian norms to encouraged dialogue and provided a point o f agreement 
when division prevailed virtually everywhere in the Sudan. In fact, the IGAD peace 
initiative on Sudan would hardly have taken-off without the regional diplomatic 
efforts o f UNDP and UNICEF, agencies that were responsible for co-ordinating 
OLS humanitarian operation in both Northern and Southern Sectors.425 Along side 
relief assistance, the international community used humanitarianism as a strategy for 
conflict reduction in Southern Sudan.
But by 1994 this strategy was undermined by the security interests of the 
IGAD member states 426 One way o f characterising the overall regional pattern that 
has subsequently emerged would be in terms o f a basic polarisation between Sudan 
on the one hand, and Ethiopia and Uganda, now supporting Eritrea, on the other, 
with the two sides each having their foes and allies internally, in the region and 
internationally.427 One critical incident in triggering off these reversals o f detente 
occurred in December 1993 when an armed column purportedly of the Eritrean 
Jihad Movement infiltrated across the border from Sudan to be accosted and wiped 
out by the Eritrean army 428 The Eritrean government launched an official complaint 
with the UN Security Council. The government o f the Sudan denied any
424 Interview with Dr. Godana, Kenya Foreign Minister
425 Interview with Christopher Jaeger, UNDP Resident Representative, Nairobi, March 12, 1996
426 At the time of writing-up this thesis, the Islamist regime in Khartoum had improved diplomatic 
relations with Ethiopia, and Eritrea was in the process of restoring its diplomatic office in Khartoum. 
The war between Eritrea and Ethiopia benefited Sudan diplomatically after many years of isolation.
427 See John Prendergast, Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia, London, 
Pluto Press, 1997, pp. 64-65
428 Lionel Cliffe, “Regional dimensions of Conflict in the Horn o f Africa”, Third World Quarterly, 
Vol. 20, No. 1, 1999, p. 96
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involvement, though it claimed that the rebellion was internal to Eritrea. 
Nevertheless, this incident proved a watershed that marked the deterioration o f 
Eritrea-Sudan relations, despite some conciliatory diplomatic moves during 1994, 
and the reversion to mutual antagonisms affecting the region as whole. During 1994 
efforts were made to resolve tensions by negotiation. One eventual response was for 
Eritrea to host a conference of all group opposing the military, ‘Islamist’ regime in 
Sudan, including both factions of the SPLA, plus many civilian and exile groups 
from northern Sudan, many under the umbrella o f the Nation Democratic Alliance 
(NDA). The Asmara Conference was hosted by the ruling Eritrean party, and was 
supported by finance from Egypt and the USA.429 The newly independent state o f 
Eritrea too did not have any warm relations with the government in Khartoum. So 
strained were their relations that Eritrea actually handed over the Sudanese embassy 
building in Asmara to leaders o f the opposition to the Khartoum government.430
Sudan too had bad relations with its other neighbour -  Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s 
concerns about Sudan’s role in the region dated back in early 1994. In January it 
warned Sudan against ‘exporting ideology and creating trouble’,431 but the two 
countries continued a diplomatic dialogue to ease tensions. Even in m id-1995 the 
Ethiopian President, while still complaining about interference, stated that ‘it has not 
reached the stage where we need to take action...has not necessitated a widespread 
deterioration in relations.. .and would be dealt with through the diplomatic 
channels’.432 However throughout that year, Ethiopia continued to accuse Sudan o f 
army incursions and other interference, but relations became more fraught after the 
attempt to assassinate President Mubarak of Egypt at an OAU meeting in Addis 
Ababa in June 1995 which was attributed to a group of terrorists, three o f whom 
were thought to have escaped to Sudan, Tensions between the two countries 
continued through 1996. In January 1997 Sudan further claimed that Ethiopian 
forces had attacked border towns of Kurmuk and Qassein in this same area.
Paralleling these developments, there was a marked deterioration in Sudan’s 
relations with its southern neighbour, Uganda. The relations between Sudan and 
Uganda were often characterised by accusations and counter accusations about who
429 Cliffe, Regional dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa, p. 97
430 See International Security Digest, Vol. 3, No. 5, February 1996
431 HAB, No. 1, 1994
432 Lionel, “Regional dimensions of conflict in the Horn o f Africa”, p. 98
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should or should not be blamed for the incursions of insurgents against each other’s 
territory. The latter maintained since the mid-1980s that it was not providing bases 
nor support SPLA, and as one example o f what was possible under earlier 
agreements about mutual non-interference, the Sudanese were allowed to provide 
military monitoring teams to operate on the other side o f the border. Reciprocal 
arrangements allowed Ugandan teams to operate on the other side o f the border. But 
Uganda began to feel there were attempts to export a politicised Islamic agenda, and 
adherents of Sudan’s NIF were deported in July 1990. For example, the alleged 
support o f the Lord’s Resistance Army -  a fundamentalist Christian movement -  by 
the GOS, and o f SPLA by the Uganda government led the two IGAD member states 
to conclude that they could not continue having normal relations, and hence the 
break o f diplomatic relations between them.433
It is clear from above that IGAD support for OLS relief operation was 
influenced more by the security concerns o f member states than humanitarian 
imperatives. Nonetheless, a major change IGAD’s expansion introduced was 
humanitarian relief as an additional priority area, and this was interpreted by the 
regional observers as an incorporation o f the humanitarian issues into the regional 
security agenda. Massive displaced o f people across the borders, if  they were not 
tackled at the political level, would have led to regional instability.
433 See Makumi Mwangiru, “Towards an Architecture of Peace in the Horn of Africa Conflict
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3 . 5 .  CONCLUSION
The conclusion from this chapter is that humanitarian norms and principles can be 
used by states as policy instruments o f foreign policy. Nonetheless, it is evident that 
political as well as humanitarian concerns also played a role in the involvement o f 
many governments in relief activities in the Sudan. OLS experience has shown that 
the two human natures -  egoism and generosity -  can work together to the benefit o f 
the starving war-victims. In addition to the UN’s own interest in making its mark, it 
offered a convenient vehicle for governments, themselves largely excluded from 
assisting in the south, to become involved without accepting the diplomatic 
consequences for their intervention. Most prominent in pressing for the creation of 
OLS were donor governments. Foremost among them was the US, and its Western 
allies. For the state, the issue of humanitarianism is articulated differently than for 
the humanitarian NGOs and the ICRC. Governments that were themselves having 
great difficulty getting the attention o f the Khartoum government were willing to see 
OLS shoulder the lead responsibility. The EC and the IGAD member governments 
were themselves comfortable with OLS playing that role as well.
The nature o f OLS as an intergovernmental programme influenced its 
involvement in relief. Constituted of member states, the UN-led OLS represented 
the interests, political and humanitarian alike, o f governments. Because most 
political conduct typically involves multiple policy objectives, it is arguable that 
humanitarian action will inevitably involve trade-offs among relevant competing 
nonns. Indeed, as Realism correctly claimed, self-interest undoubtedly plays a 
commanding role in the donor states policies towards Sudan. It is only natural that 
states individually and jointly seek to advance their interests, because, as 
Morgenthau and his followers argue, we (humans) are self-centred, and our egoism 
affects almost all we do, often corrupting even our genuine love for family and 
friends. The attraction o f wealth and pleasure, security and prestige, are obvious and 
powerful But for the solidarists and constructivists, humanitarian duplicity and 
hypocrisy do not justify the removal o f humanitarian values from international 
politics.
System”, Nairobi, Nairobi University, 1996, p. 11
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE EFFECTS OF HUMANITARIAN NORMS ON SPLM/A 
4 . 1 .  OVERVIEW
Chapter 3 has discussed the humanitarian role of the donor governments in the 
Sudan, and it was clear that humanitarian norms and principles became policy 
instruments o f donor states’ political agendas, but that their role in saving the lives 
o f starving non-combatant Sudanese civilian population was not circumstantial.
The aim o f this chapter is also to prove that the usefulness o f international 
norms in a civil war operational environment strengthens the case against the realist 
denial o f norms effectiveness under conditions o f anarchy, and pluralists claim that 
principles o f sovereignty and non-intervention make humanitarian action in state’s 
domestic affairs difficult. The neorealists and neoliberals would argue that the 
SPLM/A acceptance o f humanitarian norms and rules as the basis for humanitarian 
operation in the Southern Sector was driven by short-term calculations o f interest 
and that the rebel movement’s actions were constrained only by the sanctioning 
behaviour o f donor governments; its actual behaviour was driven by a logic o f 
consequences that was detached from these broadly accepted norms o f international 
behaviour.434 While a valid argument, I argue that humanitarian norms and rules 
have constituted an important development in the relationship between international 
community (the UN, donors and NGOs) with the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement and Army (SPLM/A). From a constructivist perspective, both self- 
interest and altruism enabled OLS to extract some concessions from the SPLM/A in 
terms o f access, for the development and implementation o f effective codes. The 
reader should, however, bear in mind that the effects of these political devices on
434 From a classical sociological perspective, behaviour is seen as embedded in normative structures 
that include both values (desired objectives and norms, the way the objectives are pursued). The 
central question for individual is not whether a rule is instrumentally useful but rather what is the 
right normative principle in a given environment. For the parties to the Sudanese conflict (GOS and 
SPLM/A), legitimacy derived from conforming with moral precepts. Conformity arose out of a sense 
of an obligation to adhere to local Sudanese humanitarian norms, which were incorporated into the 
OLS Ground Rules.
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the behaviour o f the Khartoum government itself will be discussed in chapter 5. In 
this chapter, the effects o f these rhetorical devices on the behaviour o f  the rebel 
movement will be gauged from the extent to which OLS action plans discussed in 
chapter 2 were implemented and accomplished. A set o f issues to show whether the 
Southern Sector performance was successful or not are examined: reforms within 
the political institutions o f the Movement itself; and the impact o f capacity building 
policy on local structures, and access to SPLA-held areas. This chapter will also 
consider the role o f civil society in a civil war setting. In the areas controlled by the 
opposition movement, development and human rights advocacy was seen by civil 
society as the most constructive way to address some of the deeper issues o f Sudan 
conflict.435
4 . 2 .  THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
In defining the context o f human rights violations in the rebel movement’s 
controlled areas, I will not repeat in detail what has already been mentioned in 
chapter 1. The major feature o f OLS operational environment was the war itself, and 
this affected humanitarian action in Southern Sudan. An important impact o f war is 
the break down of social norms and values; SPLM/A’s policy towards its own 
population was just as cruel as that o f the Sudan government.436 Before the war 
broke out in 1983, inter-group disputes were settled at periodic tribal conferences, 
which could assess compensation and reach a compromise. Customary southern 
Sudanese law,437 varying from tribe to tribe - though the basic principle o f 
correcting the wrongs o f the community are the same -  is applied by chiefs in tribal 
courts in much the same way as it was under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium
435 Thus, the development of the advocacy component of the strategy was informed by a growing 
recognition of the need for positive action by the NGO community at the political level, in addition to 
actions to minimise any negative effects of aid. Some of these issues are contained in European 
Working Group on the Horn of Africa, Minutes of the 15th Meeting of EWOHA, Copenhagen, March 
11, 1994, p. 5
436 International Non-Governmental Organisations, Aide Memoire to Jan Eliason, Khartoum -  
Nairobi, September, 1992, p. 2
437 Early British officials sometimes wrote about a “tribal code” or “tribal law” but in general they 
adopted the legal category of “customary law” to cover all such codes, and to distinguish it from the 
written codes o f civil, criminal and Sharia law. I refer to it as customary southern Sudanese law to 
distinguish it from other areas of the country.
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government (1899-1956), run by the British.438 Disputes among the southern 
Sudanese tribes were settled by negotiations between ad hoc groups o f  mediators 
drawn from the heads o f opposing social family units. In feuds, where strong feeling 
inhibited groups from meeting together, a neutral arbitrator who could impose 
additional sanctions, usually the land priest or the rain-maker, was brought in. He or 
she was able to persuade groups to meet and to agree on a settlement. And where a 
local compromise cannot be reached, it was often left to the relevant government 
agencies to deal with it accordingly. However, modem weaponry overwhelmed this 
system. The war exacerbated tribal tensions, promoted conflict between groups and 
polarised ethnic differences in Southern Sudan.439 Between 1983-92, SPLA adopted 
a policy that was hostile towards traditional structures. As Wal Duany puts it:
The SPLA has attained... adequate means o f coercion and has terrorised 
the southern population into passive compliance. The predominant 
instruments o f  the movement since 1983 have been and still are coercion 
and corruption. It has not managed to integrate society around any 
positive political values. The movement has been able to persist only as it 
successfully coerces and demoralises social groups in the region. 
Because the co-operation o f the civil population is needed, at times, in 
order to canyout the liberation, coercion has not been a successful 
strategy>. Corniption, in various doses, might have worked for sometime, 
but it demoralises both the commanders and the 
people...Institutionalisation o f the top-down arrangements by the 
socialist group who initially established the SPLM/A has led to a 
permanent oppression o f those persons in the area under the control o f  
the movement, that is, most o f  rural Southern Sudan.44(>
Perhaps one o f the most telling signs o f SPLA treatment o f civilians came from 
1996 International Refugee Day exercise that asked children in UNHCR camps in 
northern Uganda to draw pictures depicting refugee camp life.441 What surprised
438 See Douglas H. Johnson, “Judicial Regulation and Administrative Control: Customary Law and 
the Nuer, 1895-1954”, Journal o f  African History, No. 27, 1986, p. 62
439 Biro Gasper, Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan, New York/Geneva: UNESC Commission 
on Human Rights, February 1, 1994, p. 9
440 Wal Duany, “What Can Be Done to Move Peace Negotiations Forward in Sudan”, Washington 
D.C., Presentation to USIP Conference, April 1994, p. 4
441 This was an attempt by the United Nations at trauma counselling, and my role there as OLS 
Communications director was to video the activities, which was then distributed to the entire refugee 
and displaced camps as an example of how children affected by war can be reintegrated into society. 
In most parts of the OLS Southern Sector, this kind of exercise helped traumatised children recover 
from their ordeal.
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this author was that most children drew harrowing pre-rape scenes, killings and 
looting -  and captioned many of them “SPLA”. Much of the above reflects a more 
general operational environment, and such a situation has been acknowledged by 
some leaders o f the rebel movement. For example, Dr. Samson Kwaje, SPLM/A 
Secretary for Education and Culture, agreed that the lack o f accountable political 
institutions within the Movement resulted in gross human rights violations, which 
affected the moral o f the soldiers:
Its political sensitisation work among the people, as well as within its 
own membership and forces, was weak. This led to many mistakes being 
committed and, the SPLM/A, between 1991 and 1994, suffered heavily in 
terms o f  disunity. But since 1994, the SPLM/A embarked on a process o f  
reforms aimed at addressing the mistakes made and consolidating the 
success. This has included the process o f democratisation in the realms 
o f both society and the state, and the development o f  civil and political 
structures".442
The largely -  though by no means exclusively -  internal quality o f war, its 
embeddedness in the civilian population, the difficulties o f discriminating between 
military and civilian personnel, the breakdown of law and order, weak lines of 
authority and the economic agendas of some combatants, all reflect and contribute to 
the chaotic quality o f the Southern Sector’s operational environment during 1989 to 
1992.443 The chaos inherent in this war environment encouraged international 
community to seek some protection and good governance. As discussed in chapter 2, 
OLS lead agency -  UNICEF -  was under pressure by the donor governments and 
NGOs to initiate dialogue with the rebel movement over relief access and human 
rights.444 Thus, the mechanisms used by OLS may be categorised narrowly as
442 Interview with Dr. Samson Kwaje, SPLM/A Secretary for Education and Culture, November 12, 
1997
443 US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Africa Subcommittee, Hearing on Sudan, 102nd 
Congress Session, May 1992, p. 21
444 See, for example, Africa Rights, Food and Power in Sudan: A Critique of Humanitarianism, 
London, Africa Rights, 1997, pp. 279-80
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institutional.445 OLS institutional development extended well beyond an 
organisation, and it sought to change norms and values in its wider environment or 
more generally in society. This distinction matches the definition in social sciences 
o f institutions as norms, rules of the game, behavioural patterns,446 which are 
distinguished from the organisations that uphold them. In the Southern Sector, the 
Ground Rules sought to define the minimum acceptable standards o f conduct for 
the activities o f the OLS Southern Sector’s agencies.447 They also sought to define 
the minimum acceptable standards o f conduct for the activities o f the opposition 
movement’s relief wing in areas controlled by the SPLA. It was these Rules of 
which the international community used to shame and sometimes sanction the 
behaviour o f the opposition movement.
4 . 2 . 1 .  THE PROCESS OF SHAMING SPLM/A
The evidence in this section show that OLS agencies mobilised international 
norms to name and shame the SPLA commanders involved in obstructing relief 
access, as well as violation of human rights. There was a genuine attempt by 
the international community to reduce excesses o f the rebel movement’s 
violation o f humanitarian norms and rules.448 For instance, OLS role was to 
encourage and support the Movement and civil society to be able to make a 
reality o f the Ground Rules. Indeed, by May 1994, Dr. John Garang, the leader 
o f the SPLM/A, signed an agreement with OLS, which led to the incorporation 
o f humanitarian principles into the Ground Rules. By endorsing and agreeing 
to respect these international norms o f behaviour, the rebel leader has exposed 
his movement to national and international scrutiny, particularly on the issues 
o f human rights and democratic governance. In fact since the inclusion of the 
Grounds Rules into humanitarian principles, there was a serious attempt by the
445 It is clear from chapter 2 that institutional mechanisms refer to a set of rules and relationships 
which OLS used as means of defining the contractual framework o f the Southern Sector, and of 
gaining some degree of regulatory control over NGOs and movement counterparts. Institutional 
mechanisms include Letters of Understanding (LOUs), which UNICEF signs with NGOs, and 
Ground Rules, which the humanitarian wing of the opposition movement were expected to adhere to.
446 Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables,” in Friedrich Kratochwil and Edward Mansfield (eds.), International Organization: A 
Reader, HarperCollins College Publishers 1994, p. 97
447 Ibid.
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rebel movement to convince international community that it was committed to 
the liberal principles o f democratic governance.449 Thus, the effects o f these 
rhetorical devices on the rebel movement cannot be underestimated. One 
positive effect o f the Ground Rules on the behaviour o f the SPLM/A occurred 
in 1994 when the rebel movement formulated its own civil governance450 
policy with local structures in the opposition movement’s controlled areas. 
During 1994-5, a series o f conferences followed, including an Officers 
Conference and a conference on humanitarian principles and rules.451 In all 
these conferences OLS representatives were present, in most cases as 
facilitators. One o f the most important conferences that opened the floodgate o f 
demands for the restructuring o f the SPLM/A political and military structures 
was the 1995 Chukudum humanitarian conference.
The Chukudum conference set a pace for political restructuring within 
SPLM/A movement. For example, working groups in the conference studied 
the relationships between the SPLA and communities, the SPLA and NGOs, 
and the SPLA and SRRA 452 The aim o f the democratisation process was to 
develop a national consciousness and common purpose in the New Sudan 
around the fundamental principle o f putting the individual in the centre stage o f 
decision-making and development. The success o f this conference was also 
acknowledged by the OLS Review Team. According to the Review Team, the 
eventual signing o f the new Ground Rules by the SPLM/A in July 1995 can be
448 These efforts are also contained in DHA, Operation Lifeline Sudan Review, July, 1996
449 Marion Muor Muor, SRRA Position Paper on Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) Southern Sector, 
Nairobi, November 27, 1995, pp. 2-5
450 The choice of the terminology of “governance” rather than “government” is also important for 
several reasons. First, governance calls attention to various forms of institutional and collective 
efforts to organise human affairs on an international scale, intending to move from the global 
institutions of the UN system through the various UN agencies and down to transnational and local 
grassroots initiatives. Second, the idea of governance is intended to be flexible and analytical, 
avoiding the anti-sovereignty connotations of “global” or “world” government. For a helpful 
explanation of global governance, see The Commission on Global Governance, Our Neighbourhood, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995
451 SPLM/A, SPLM/A First National Convention: A Major Watershed -  Resolutions, Appointments 
and Protocol, Chukudum, New Sudan, March 12, 1994; SPLM/A, Conference on Humanitarian 
Assistance to the New Sudan: A Partnership for the New Sudan -  Facilitated by the Sudan Relief and 
Rehabilitation Association (SRRA), Chukudum, September 21, 1995. Since then both UNICEF and 
SRRA have been organising a number of workshops/conferences for local people as part of the OLS 
capacity building policy.
452 Ibid., Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to the New Sudan, ‘A Partnership for New 
Sudan,’ Chukudum, 21-23 September 1995, draft report, Item III/(I)
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seen within the context of an overall “attempt at institutional deepening, as 
well as opening the movement to local and international scrutiny.453 Even 
before 1994, there was already some serious discussion within the opposition 
movement and among its supporters about the need to set up civil and political 
institutions, and provide a home for skilled civilians who were not ready to join 
the army.454 Another evidence of the significance o f international norms was in 
September 1995, when Dr. Garang, the SPLM/A leader, invited his field 
commanders for a workshop on Ground Rules in the presence o f the 
international aid agencies and “to communicate to the commanders that 
observation o f them is not optional”.455 This was a departure from previous 
hostile attitude towards humanitarian norms such as codes o f conduct and the 
Ground Rules. Humanitarian norms and rules governing the conduct o f 
combatants towards civilians and neutral personnel, developed into a relatively 
effective net o f constraints on the SPLA behaviour. Although it was the case 
that violations o f these norms and principles routinely occurred in most OLS 
designated locations, these violations, when reported, usually resulted in some 
reimposition o f discipline and change in procedure by the SPLA. As one SPLA 
senior officer told this author:
We are tired o f these kinds o f  accusations that our soldiers are violating 
OLS Ground Rules. Compare the time when these rules were not yet 
developed and today, you will find  that we have protected aid agencies 
and ensured that relief food reaches its destination. The Islamic regime is 
continuously bombing relief centres, and yet the UN is not doing 
anything to stop it. D on’t get me wrong here; we do not endorse any 
violation o f OLS rules just because the government does it. It is in the 
interest o f the Movement that our people don’t die from hunger, and we 
are committed to see that those who violate OLS Grounds Rules are 
punished. I am not saying there will not be such violations, but those 
caught will be disciplined accordingly.456
For the realists, such statements can be seen as reflecting opportunism, rather than a 
substantial change of behaviour on the part o f the opposition movement.
453 DHA, OLS Review, p. 54
454 Interview with Dr. Samson Kwaje
455 w orld Vision, Sudan: The Cost of Continuing Conflict, London, World Vision Policy Report
1997, p. 16
456 Interview with Commander Pierre Ohure, Military Administrative Officer, Nairobi, March 6
1996
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Accordingly, the SPLM/A change o f behaviour was not so much because it valued 
the principles and rules that guided humanitarian operation; thus, the neorealists and 
neoliberals can claim that it was rather a manipulative way o f attracting donor 
community’s resources that the movement so desperately needed for rehabilitating 
its controlled areas.457 But from a constructivist perspective, such self-interested 
humanitarianism is also an essential condition for a successful humanitarian 
operation In other words, there is nothing wrong here because that is what human 
nature is all about -  seeking one’s material interest. In this respect, the society’s 
legitimating discourse can evolve due to considerations o f material interest as 
espoused by the rebel movement. This device (material interest) has produced a 
congruence between domestic and international humanitarian norms in the rebel 
movement’s territory. This was reflected in the SPLM/A leader appeal to the 
international community:
I  take this opportunity to appeal to Europe and the international 
community to assist the New Sudan (that is, the areas o f Southern Sudan, 
Southern Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile that are under the 
administration o f the SPLM), to achieve and nurture through 
development, irrespective o f whether there is a peace agreement... 
Indeed, assisting the New Sudan with development can lead to peace by 
using development as a commodity for peace making and peace building, 
the establishment o f a Civil Authority for the New Sudan, and promotion 
o f  transparent and good governance, as these measures will provide a 
conducive environment for economic, freedom and peace.458
The wider implication o f this statement is that humanitarian norms and rules are 
more likely to become salient if  they are perceived to support important domestic 
material interests, whether economic, or security. This point was supported by some 
Sudan observers. As John Prendergast puts it in relation to the potential impact o f 
material interest in changing the behaviour o f the rebel movement: “In the Sudan, if  
the SPLM is to engage effectively in peace efforts and to be prepared to implement a 
peace agreement, its civilian leadership capacity must be greatly enhanced. Concepts 
o f citizen participation, rule o f law, sustainability, and reciprocity between
457 SPLM/A, First National Convention, Chukudum, 1994, p. 4
458 Dr. John Garang, Address to the United Nations Human Rights Commission, Geneva, March 24
1999, p. 3
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governing and governed must achieve wider circulation and commitment” .459 To 
some extent, these concepts have achieved wider circulation and commitment within 
the rebel movement.460 However, some among the rebel movement leadership 
frowned upon the very idea that the movement was pushed into reforming itself by 
domestic and external factors:
“We are not restructuring our Movement because o f  international 
pressure; we are doing it because in these areas we are the government o f  
the day. As a government, we have a responsibility towards the welfare o f  
our people. Foreigners cannot dictate their agendas to us, and you must 
understand that we have the means to make things difficult fo r the UN in 
the areas controlled by us and those held by National Islamic government.
We will not do this because it is in our interest not to do so ” 461
In politics, such denials are inevitable, because hardly any political leader want to 
be seen to be making policies on the basis o f external or domestic pressure. There is 
no doubt that the opposition movement had an enormous firepower at its disposal to 
frustrate humanitarian relief efforts in areas it effectively controlled. But as one 
commander told this author, “the slogans o f our liberation struggle have always 
been to restore a sense o f justice and dignity among our people. To oppose those 
principles would have defeated the very purpose of our liberation struggle”.462 
Many of the insurgents I met shared this view; they all agreed that some o f the 
abuses committed by their soldiers indeed tarnished the image o f their movement 
both inside and outside the Sudan 463 Even one o f the top political advisers told this 
author off record that OLS gave them the opportunity to rebuild the image o f their 
movement.464 Respect for humanitarian principles, including the right of the 
child465, the rule o f law, good governance, the right to offer and receive 
humanitarian assistance, and the need to facilitate access to populations in need,
459 John Prendergast, Building for Peace in the Horns of Africa: Beyond Diplomacy, Washington, 
D.C., United States Institution of Peace Special Report, 3 November, 2000, p. 13. See also 
http://www.usip.org.
460 John Okwahi, Deputy gGvemor, Yambio, august 26, 1997
461 Interview with Commander Abu-John, Governor of Equatoria Region, Yambio, New Sudan, 
June 19, 1996
462 Interview with Commander Deng Oyai, SPLA Commander of the First Sector, New Cuss, New 
Sudan, August 13, 1997
463 I interviewed five officers during a workshop on Humanitarian Principles, New Cus, August 15,
1997
464 Ibid.
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formed the aspects o f the Ground Rules. As stated above, the Ground Rules relate 
to mutual obligations of the parties to the agreement, and to how relief properties 
and supplies should be used. They were meant to regulate opposition counterpart 
agencies and their relationship with the OLS agencies.466 In addition to these 
rhetorical devices, the domestic pressure for changing the political character o f the 
movement also came from the growing presence o f southern Sudanese in East 
Africa who wanted to see SPLM/A leaders end human rights abuses in areas they 
control. However, some SPLA soldiers complained o f being misunderstood and 
misjudged by aid staff. One senior SPLA officer was quoted as saying:
“Aid agencies have to realise that we, the soldiers care about our people 
very much because we are in the bush fo r  them, and without them we 
would not make a dent on the northern government. The problem with 
some aid workers is that they come here with a notion that we the 
military are the enemy o f the people. It is time they change their 
perceptions about us. We are both trying to make a difference in the lives 
o f  our people. I f  the Movement as a whole is being criticised at the 
leadership level up there, what has that to do with us as individual 
soldiers here at the bottom? Among us here, just like it is among aid 
workers, there are some who are bad as there are others who are 
excellent”.467
Such feelings played a significant role in pushing the SPLM/A leadership to 
overhaul its political and military structures so much blamed for the prevalence o f 
human rights abuses and diversion of relief aid. Some of the SPLA who were critical 
o f the movement handling of the situation contended that if  the SPLM/A wanted to 
show to the world that the people o f South Sudan were its primary concern, it should 
encourage the establishment o f civil governance and the rule o f law.468 These kinds 
o f sentiments were seen by the UN officials as clear success of political devices in 
the form of the Ground Rules.469 Thus, the impact of humanitarian norms can be 
divided into four sections -  the first section deals with the process o f internal 
democratisation, the second section discusses the establishment o f civil
465 In March 1999, in Maputo, Mozambique, SPLM/A signed a protocol on the rights of the child.
466 Ian Levine, Memo to Philip O’Brien: Definition of Counterparts: Some Preliminary thoughts, 
Nairobi, November 24, 1994, p. 3
467 Interview with an SPLA officer, New Cuss, New Sudan, February 14, 1996
468 I had a confidential conversation with three SPLA soldiers during my trip to Akot on 6 October, 
1996
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administration, the third section examines the establishment o f the SPLM/A legal 
system, and the fourth section describes the emergence o f  some form o f civil society 
in the context o f a civil war environment.
4 . 2 . 2 .  ATTEMPTS AT CIVIL GOVERNANCE
The first effect o f humanitarian norms on the behaviour o f the SPLM/A should be 
seen from the extent to which international agencies were placed in direct contact 
with sections o f the opposition movement, and the degree to which this contact 
informed a process o f institutional reform within the rebel movement. This section 
considers the evolution and implications of this contact. Seeing from the past history 
o f  the movement, -  which was hostile towards local structures - these were 
remarkable changes worthy o f emulation by similar situation o f conflicts.470 A 
combination of pressure from within and outside the opposition movement, forced 
the SPLM/A leadership to convene a meeting in Torit, eastern Equatoria region o f 
Southern Sudan, in early September 1991 to reassess the structures and goals o f the 
movement for the first time since its formation in 1983.471 The High Command set 
up committees to review issues o f control and accountability and to initiate civilian 
administration. The significance o f the meeting to the role o f international norms 
was that the SPLA High Command issued the ‘Torit Declaration’ which declared, 
among other things, “that a system of civil administration will be established, and 
that military training would no longer be compulsory for members o f the 
Movement”.472 This as an attempt to build civil governance in the opposition
469 Interview with Hamish Young, Humanitarian Principles Deputy Officer, Nairobi, November 20, 
1996
470 UNICEF/OLS, Report on SPLM Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance, Nairobi, September 1995, 
pp. 1-4
471 SPLM/SPLA, Torit Resolution, 1991 of the SPLM Political Military Command, Nairobi, 
September 12, 1991
472 The SPLM/A convened its first national Convention in the period between 2-12 April with the 
objective of debating all issues of concern to the movement and its future direction, specially in the 
aftermath of the split. There were more than twenty items on the agenda of the convention. Some of 
the most important issues that were discussed include: reviewing the movement’s manifesto, 
democratisation and restructuring of the political and military institutions of the movement, and the 
movement’s policies and strategies for a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Sudan. The 
SPLM/SPLA Torit Resolution, 1991 of the SPLM Political Military High Command, Nairobi, 
September 12, 1991, p. 3
163
movement-held areas. Since the establishment of Ground Rules, following the 
killing o f four relief officers in 1992, SPLM/A encouraged moves toward some form 
of civil governance in its controlled areas.473 For example, the political wing o f the 
SPLA, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), took its first steps toward 
democratisation and improved governance by convening a National Convention, 
which mandated the separation o f the military and civil authorities.474 The 
establishment o f administrative structures, separate from those o f the military, was 
welcomed by relief agencies. One Italian NGO official, who worked in Southern 
Sudan for more than five years, was impressed by the dramatic changes within the 
opposition movement:
In all my ten years work in many parts o f the world, I have never seen 
anything like what is going on in southern Sudan. It has never happened 
anywhere that a rebel movement can humble itself to the demands o f the 
international community. Today in Southern Sudan, it is possible fo r  a 
relief agency to walk into a commander’s compound and tell him that 
some o f his soldiers are misbehaving without fear o f any victimisation. I 
worked in Cambodia, Liberia, Bosnia, and Somalia, and the kind o f  
consultations and discussions that I witnessed between the UN and the 
rebel movement was nowhere near seen in these countries. My view is 
that this is a good precedence fo r  future humanitarian action.475
Such comments were common among aid agencies. The pressure for changes in the 
movement from non-governmental organisations working under the auspices o f the 
OLS Southern Sector led to a conference in September 1995, which brought 
together SRRA and NGO officials to discuss the issue o f democratic governance, 
among others.476 The fact that much o f the pressure for an establishment of civil 
structures and the rule of law came from NGOs and concerned leaders in areas 
controlled by the insurgents, which formerly exhibited intolerance towards those 
who had called for respect for human rights, was seen as an evidence o f the effects 
o f the Ground Rules on the behaviour o f the SPLM/A’s leadership.477 Indeed, 
during 1994-6, the human rights situation in the Southern Sector improved, and
473 Ian Levine, Capacity Building: OLS Presentation [Notes], Nairobi, April 1996
474 Interview with Martin Okeruk, General Secretary, SPLM/A National Executive Council, Nairobi, 
July 19, 1997
475 Interview with Antonio Luciano, Caritas-Italy, Lokichoggio, June 7, 1996
476 SPLM/A, Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to the New Sudan, September 21, 1995, p. 3
477 This emerged from group discussions during the SPLM/A-Church Consultative Dialogue held in 
Yei, central Equatoria region, July 7-10, 1997
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many communities were relating somewhat normally to the traditional structures o f 
authority in Southern Sudan: chiefs and elders. The civil society conferences, which 
were funded by USAID and facilitated by OLS, were important in changing the 
attitudes o f the opposition movement’s leadership. This is a prove that the work of 
international regimes has helped link international institutions and governance by 
establishing that governance (and order) is more than organisational structures; it 
must encompass sets o f rules governing behaviour, the principles and norms 
underlying those rules, the practices o f actors that signal the convergence o f their 
expectations, their acceptance with rules, as well as any formal structures.478 
SPLM/A position paper to the Great Lakes Region Consultation Conference on 
Sudan stressed the importance of these principles and rules: “We have to take them 
(Ground Rules) seriously because they are all aimed at dialogue between the 
Movement and various constituencies o f our country and people for the purpose o f 
achieving greater understanding, reconciliation, and peace and unity among our 
people so that we can resolve the enormous challenges facing us now during the 
war and after.. ,”479 The mutual obligations established within the Ground Rules 
played an important role in shaping the development o f social welfare structures in 
opposition movement areas. In this regard, there was a symbiotic relation between 
the two processes. This can be seen most readily in relation to the programme o f 
capacity building and institutional support that OLS developed for the humanitarian 
wing o f the opposition movements”.480
Although such behavioural changes can be credited to their human rights 
advocacy, many within the rebel movement did not want to hear even the very idea 
that the movement was forced by a combination of domestic and external pressures 
to reform itself. According to Dr. Samson Kwaje, SPLM/A Secretary for Education 
and Culture, the impulse for democratic reforms within the movement was not a 
consequence o f humanitarian principles and rules, but rather the result emanating 
directly from the SPLM/A liberation struggle aims and objectives: “Since 1983, the 
vision, objectives and programme of the SPLM are based on the fundamental 
principle and goal o f the Movement, which is the liberation o f the individual from
478 Margaret P. Kams, “The Changing Architecture of World Politics: Multilateralism, Cooperation, 
and Global Governance”, in Kenneth W. Thompson (ed.), Community, Diversity, And a New World 
Order: Essays in Honor of Inis L. Claude, Jr., Boston, University Press of America, 1994, p. 274
479 Dr. Kwaje, Vision, Perspective, and Position of the SPLM, p. 22
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all forms o f political, economic, social and natural constraints to freedom and the 
pursuit o f happiness and self-fulfilment, and that is for this purpose that society and 
the state are organised to promote and harmonise this goal among its citizens, so 
that there is peace, security and stability necessary for sustained individual and 
societal development” .481 Despite such protestations from political leaders, I argue 
that humanitarian norms have had effects on the behaviour o f the rebel movement. 
Part o f the effort o f OLS was to articulate the notion of humanitarian norms by 
reference to good governance, examining the positive and negative trends along a 
few axes o f normative concern: respect for the rule o f law, the social aspects o f 
human rights and democratisation in the context o f the ongoing civil war. In the 
OLS jargon, good governance was also conceived in relation to the otherness o f 
inhumane governance, a reference to how the opposition movement treats its 
populations, violation o f international norms and the silencing o f the voices o f civil 
society. It is not surprising therefore that some observers considered the creation o f 
OLS as an impulse towards liberalisation in the rebel-held areas o f Southern 
Sudan.482
4 . 3 .  ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
The second example o f the effects o f humanitarian norms on the behaviour o f the 
rebel movement was the attempt to establish civil administration. As explained 
below, international community’s shaming behaviour became hard to ignore, and on 
20 February 1993, the SPLM/A issued a press release announcing preparations to 
convene a National Convention as part of a process of democracy and 
restructuring.483 As mentioned above, the success o f this convention in separating 
the military from civilian structures, and the Movement’s stated commitment to 
human rights, can arguably be described as a landmark in the history o f the civil 
war. The “New Sudan”484 was proclaimed, and the basis for a decentralised
480 Kwaje, Vision, Perspective and Position of the SPLM, p. 22
481 Interview with Dr. Samson Kwaje, Nairobi, 1996
482 Interview with Michael Lang, US Embassy official, Nairobi, August 15, 1997
483 SPLM/SPLA Press Release, Kampala, 20 February 1993
484 New Sudan refers to the areas of the Sudan, which are controlled by the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement and Army. The differences between the so-called Old Sudan, areas under the 
national government and New Sudan is based on the contradictory visions of what Sudan should be. 
The Old Sudan vision is one of an Islamic state, where all the institutions of government will be
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government within a new regional structure established.485 A blueprint for a 
radically reformed SPLA was adopted and the first steps were formally taken to set 
up SPLM as a political party. A National Liberation Council (NLC) was set up as 
the legislative organ of the Movement, with smaller liberation councils for each 
region and smaller administrative division. Pre 1976 provinces were formally 
designated as regions and former districts (called provinces in GOS federal 
nomenclature) became counties, which were then further subdivided into “payams” 
(rural councils). Governors were appointed to administer the regions, and 
Commissioners to run the counties.486 The payams were the responsibility o f the 
Payam Civil Administrators (PCAs), and Executive Chiefs administered villages. 
Many o f the new PCAs were formerly civil military administrators (CMAs), 
although many also were in civil administration before the war. In this case, the 
SPLM administration is therefore characterised by decentralisation, popular 
participation, transparency, accountability, responsiveness, consensus orientation, 
fairness, effectiveness and the rule o f law, so that the people o f New Sudan are 
provided with the necessary conducive environment for accelerated socio-economic 
development and increased happiness. According to the opposition movement, the 
decentralised system o f governance through the Liberation Councils is designed and 
aimed at achieving the following:487
a) Ensuring that the system of decentralisation is based on democratically elected 
Liberation Councils (LCs) on the basis o f universal adult suffrage in accordance 
with the articles o f the SPLM Constitution, and that functions, powers and 
responsibilities are devolved and transferred from the centre to the local 
administrative/political units;
b) ensuring the full realisation o f democratic governance through popular 
participation and democratic control in decision making through empowering 
local units to plan, initiate and execute policies in respect of all matters affecting 
the people within their jurisdiction;
inspired by Sharia law. The New Sudan vision is that of Sudan, where religion and state are separated 
(secularism), and where all ethnic, and religious groups live in harmony with one another.
485 SPLM/A, SPLM/A First National Convention: A Major Watershed -  Resolutions Appointments 
and Protocol. Chukudum, New Sudan: SPLM/A, March 12, 1994
486 See Africa Rights, Food and Power in Sudan,
487 SPLM, Vision and Programme of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, p. 13
167
c) empowering the local units/LCs to oversee the performance o f persons deployed 
or employed to provide services in their area and to monitor the provision of 
services, including security and maintenance o f law and order, and oversee as 
well as participate in the implementation o f projects in their areas so that they 
achieve the best standards possible;
d) ensuring that political, social and economic priorities are based on broad based 
consensus in the society, where voices o f the poorest and vulnerable groups, 
including the disabled, women and children, are heard in decision making over 
allocation of development resources and other matters affecting their lives.
It can be argued that increased participation and inclusivity will strengthen the 
SPLM/A, prepare the south for its future, and reduce warlordship and 
authoritarianism. One of the ways for these objectives to be reached was through the 
development o f the SPLM/A’ civil administration. As explained in chapter 3, the US 
government’s Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) programme, 
designed to support democratic institution building in the opposition-held areas of 
Sudan, has, by and large, engendered the development o f a responsive 
administration in the OLS Southern Sector. For instance, the establishment o f a civil 
administration in the opposition movement’s controlled areas also triggered a chain 
o f changes which were seen by many humanitarians and observers as a further 
evidence o f the effects o f humanitarian norms on the policies of the opposition 
movement.488 While it is true that the establishment of civil administration in the 
SPLM/A held areas did not resolve all the difficulties that OLS agencies faced in the 
Southern Sector, I argue that at least in the war zone o f Southern Sudan relief 
agencies knew who to approach when confronted with problems o f a political 
nature. Throughout the middle o f 1990s, as a consequence o f donor and the UN 
sanctioning and shaming behaviour respectively, the process o f internal 
democratisation with the opposition movement appeared unstoppable. Consistent 
with the Movement's policy on human rights, the SPLM believes that the 
“Movement shall adhere to and respect internationally accepted norms and standards 
o f human rights and shall protect and respect the rights and civil liberties o f all 
persons resident in the New Sudan without prejudice based on race, tribe, religion or
488 Interview with Dr. Mohammed Hasouni, lecturer, Institute of International Studies and 
Diplomacy, Nairobi University, March 25, 1997
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gender” .489 The significance of this transformation is that the SPLM has accepted to 
guarantee and respect the independence o f genuine human rights non-governmental 
organisations, which protect and promote human rights, and the Movement also 
agreed to establish an autonomous New Sudan Human Rights Commission (NS- 
HRC).490 Its recent vision statement on democracy, good governance and human 
rights explains that:
The SPLM affirms that fundamental rights and freedoms o f the individual 
are inherent and inalienable, and not granted by the Movement. The 
rights and freedoms o f the individual, and o f social or cultural groups, 
shall be respected, upheld and promoted by all organs, agencies and 
officials o f the Movement. Every person has an inalienable right to life, 
and no person has the right to terminate the life o f a person or o f  an 
unborn child except as may be authorised by law. Every person has a 
right to own property, either individually or in association with others, 
and no person shall be deprived o f  property or any interest in or right 
over property o f any description except where authorised by law. All 
persons are equal before or under the law in the spheres o f political, 
economic, social and cultural life, and in every other respect, and shall 
enjoy equal protection o f  the law. A person shall therefore not be 
discriminated against on the ground o f gender, race, colour, ethnic 
origin, tribe, birth, creed or religion, or socio-economic position, 
political opinion, or disability.491
The fact that this process of democratisation in the movement followed the signing 
o f the tripartite OLS agreement in May 1994, which led to humanitarian norms and 
rules being fully incorporated within the Ground Rule framework,492 meant that 
OLS played an important role in reducing the kind of humanitarian chaos that the 
international community experienced in parts of the world. Since 1995, “living in 
the SPLA controlled areas became more secure than living in Nairobi or New 
York” 493 For the SPLM/A political and military leaders, the decision to embrace 
democratisation process in the midst o f the liberation struggle was a political gamble 
that paid-off in terms o f the movement’s domestic and international reputation. 
Some SPLM/A political and military leaders acknowledged that such a restoration
489 SPLM, Vision and Programme of the SPLM, p. 22
490 Ibid.
491 Ibid.
492 UNICEF/OLS, SPLM/OLS Agreement on Ground Rules. Nairobi, June 1994, pp. 2-4
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of discipline improved the image and credibility o f the Movement among the local 
population, which suffered from cattle raiding, pillaging and looting practices o f 
their forces.494 The need to win the minds and hearts o f the civilian population 
ensured that the Movement’s political leadership continues with the process o f good 
governance. In one o f its recent document on democracy, it is clear that:
In running its affairs, the SPLM shall establish and base itself on the 
democratic path o f development, which empowers and encourages active 
participation o f all citizens at all levels in their own liberation and in 
their own governance, and where the people in positions o f authority or 
decision-making are mandated periodically by the people. All the people 
o f the New Sudan shall have access to leadership positions at all levels o f  
the Movement, and the running o f the affairs o f New Sudan shall be 
guided by a system o f decentralisation and devolution o f functions and 
powers to the people at various levels, so that the people are empowered 
to manage and direct themselves. The SPLM Movement system o f  
democracy shall be broad based, inclusive and non-partisan, non-tribal, 
non-sectarian and shall conform to the principles o f  participatory, 
popular and grass-roots democracy, and subjected to accountability, 
transparency, accessibility to all positions o f leadership by all citizens, 
and individual merit shall be the basis fo r election to political office.495
In an attempt to get rid o f corrupt practices that could undermine this process within 
the Movement, the SPLM has begun to set-up and establish good governance, where 
the exercise o f political, economic and administrative authority in the management 
o f the country's affairs at all levels will be people-based, so that individuals and 
groups have an effective say in the allocation and management o f resources and in 
decisions that affect their lives. The SPLM was based on a system o f Liberation 
Councils (LCs), as mechanisms, processes and democratic institutions through 
which citizens and social groups articulate and mediate their differences and 
exercise their rights, freedoms and obligations. The Boma became the basic political 
and administrative unit and the cornerstone of SPLM administration. Several Bomas 
have formed a Payam, several Payams a County, and several Counties a Region, and 
the five Regions have constitute the New Sudan, and the Liberation Councils has
493 Interview with Rev. Mark Nickol, an American missionary working in southern Sudan, Nairobi, 
January 18, 1996. See also DHA, OLS Review, pp. 81-88
494 Interview with (Rt.) General John Okwahi, Deputy Governor of Equatoria Region, Yambio, 
August 26, 1997
4 SPLM, Vision and Programme of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Nairobi, March, 1998, p. 
13
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been established at all these levels. This democratisation process has put the 
movement in a much more favourable position in terms of external resources needed 
for rehabilitation and development. In this respect, the development o f the Ground 
Rules was seen in relation to the SPLM/A’s attempts to develop the basis o f a civil 
administration in South Sudan.496 Thus, the democratisation process embraced by 
the movement also included the establishment o f the legal system.
4 . 3 . 1 .  ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM
The third impact o f humanitarian norms and rules on the behaviour o f the opposition 
movement is to do with the establishment o f some form of a legal system. Rule of 
law is also important in conflict prevention and management. The events described 
early in this chapter have shown that unfair judicial system can support the arbitrary 
use o f power. This was the case in 1980s and early 1990s when many SPLA 
commanders were engaged in serious human rights violations in Southern Sudan. By 
the middle o f 1990s the donor states’ capacity building programme, especially the 
US STAR programme, helped build the foundation for the rule o f law in the 
opposition movement controlled areas o f the south. This material aid had positive 
impact because it enabled the SPLM/A to develop its own penal code to govern the 
conduct o f its armed forces, as well as those o f its non-combatant civilian 
population. A British relief worker in Southern Sudan was asked by a member of 
one of the drafting groups to provide a copy of the British Constitution so that it 
could be studied along with the American model.497 The SPLA Code defined the 
new political system and its various organs as well as the rights o f the people within 
the system.
Corruption threatens everything and everybody. It is a major obstacle to 
economic development, and even before we reach that stage, corruption 
can seriously jeopardise and even destroy the liberation movement. The 
SPLM will therefore vigorously combat corruption at all levels o f the 
Movement, so that it is completely eliminated. To this end, combating 
and elimination o f  corruption, the SPLM shall establish an Anti­
corruption unit, a sort o f Ombudsman, to fight corruption, as an 
independent organ. Laws governing it shall be enacted. Corruption must 
be ruthlessly combated at all levels, so that good governance becomes a
496 DHA, OLS Review, pp. 54, 66
497 Interview with an Oxfam-UK official, Yambio, South Sudan, September 15, 1996
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basic character o f the New Sudan. Public property in the form o f  
immovable and movable assets, cash, title deeds, etc, belong to the 
Movement and no single person, be he/she a civilian or soldier, is 
allowed to use it fo r private ends, and in the interests o f accountability 
and transparency, public property must always be disbursed by a three 
man committee. The SPLM shall establish at each level, from the Boma 
to the national level, a sound financial system that is based on the 
committee system and periodic auditing to ensure transparency and 
accountability, and thereby combat and eliminate corruption. The 
severest o f punishments, as prescribed by law, shall be meted out to 
corrupt officials in all departments and branches o f the SPLM, so that 
corruption is completely eliminated, and a healthy environment created 
fo r  rapid socio-economic development o f the New Sudan.
The SPLA Code is basically secular. It listed substantive offences that were military 
in nature: mutiny, disobedience o f lawful orders, drunkenness on duty, desertion and 
theft o f firearms.498 It also established economic, cultural, social and foreign policy 
guidelines. The Code, however, also attempted far-reaching regulation o f civilian 
life, criminalising for civilians the following actions: posing as soldier, robbery, 
theft, criminal breach of trust, forgery, rape, traffic in kidnapping of minors. These 
acts are crimes for the military also. The Code also punishes failure to produce food, 
to observe sanitation and dress standards, and indolence, and provides for game 
preservation.499 In a more serious class than any o f these offences, however, 
forbidden to civilians and military alike, is that o f being an “enemy o f the people” . 
The offence, which reflects the Soviet/Cold War origins o f the 1983 SPLA Code, 
provides the greatest opportunity for abuse since its provisions are vague and overly 
broad. An enemy o f the people includes “members of the SPLM that may break 
away from the principles o f the people’s socialist movement” and “individuals or 
groups o f people who propagate or advocate ideas, [ideologies], or philosophies, or 
organise societies and organisations that tend to uphold or perpetuate the oppression 
o f the people or their exploitation by the Khartoum or similar bourgeois system”.500 
Accordingly, customary southern Sudanese law still applies to civilians.501 
According to Ambrose Ring Thik, SPLM/A Chief Justice, a number o f  laws were
498 SPLA, The SPLA Penal Code, New Sudan, 1995, sections. 26-34
499 Ibid., Penal Code, sections. 35-50
500 Ibid., Penal Code, sections 10, 10 (c), 10 (f)
501 Under the SPLA Code, similar to the British system, the customary courts do not have the power 
to sentence defendants to death nor long-term imprisonment.
172
enacted during 1995 to protect civil rights.502 Since the establishment o f  the legal 
system in the Sudan in 1995, unnecessary misconduct by soldiers has been reduced 
drastically, except in some areas of Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal regions which 
experienced tribal violence. The provisional Constitution was significant because it 
defined responsibilities and procedures; what constitute a crime, who can carryout 
an arrest, under what circumstances, the length o f detention, and through what 
procedures. It defined the penalties for those who abused their authority by false 
arrest or detention, illegal search, as well as for use o f torture during 
interrogation.503 But an unpredictable civil war environment has shown that a law in 
itself is no guarantee o f protection o f rights or justice. Accordingly, the actual extent 
and rigour o f the application of the SPLA Code is hard to determine. Chief Justice 
Ring Thik admitted that there were still many problems to overcome in the 
application o f the law: “There are still abuses and errors made because some 
representatives o f the civil and military authorities do not yet fully understand the 
laws and have been under-trained. Not all judicial personnel have backgrounds in 
law and there are not enough lawyers in the New Sudan. It takes time to educate the 
public and train legal staff, and many laws have only recently been approved while 
others are still under study”.504
It is not just the lack of trained judicial personnel which was a threat to the 
opposition movement’s legal system, but the ignorance o f the many commanders 
about the existence o f such Code also contributed to the continued violation o f 
human rights. According to one senior commander, the code was given to each 
commander, who was expected to explain the law to his soldiers as part o f his 
responsibility to lead and control his troops.505 However, a copy of the code was 
extremely hard, if  not impossible, to come by in the field. Many told this author that 
commanders deliberately ignored; it obviously was not followed if  it was not 
available to those who should be administering it. It is difficult to know how the 
rudimentary judicial system functioned in all parts o f Southern Sudan under the 
control o f the SPLM/A. However, a major defect in the SPLA Code was its lack o f 
procedural guarantees or any procedural guidelines. For instance, there was no limit
502 Interview with Ambrose Ring Thik, SPLM/A Chief Justice, Nairobi, September 10, 1997
503 SPLA Penal Code, sections 35-50
504 Interview with Ambrose Ring Thik
505 Interview with a senior SPLA Commander, Akot, New Sudan, August 23, 1996
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on the time any accused persons could be held for investigation and no requirement 
to bring him to trial within a certain time period.506 Prolonged arbitrary detention -  
for years -  o f dozens of political prisoners was the result. Nor is there any rule o f 
law available to guarantee a fair trial. The lack o f procedural guidelines gave 
absolute discretion to military officers and others unrestrained in the law. It is not 
surprising that by 1996, there was pressure from local and international non­
governmental organisations for a revision o f the SPLA Code. According to Chief 
Justice Ring Thik, the SPLM/A leader Dr. Garang has asked those Sudanese with 
legal expertise to read and review the code. It was also clear from the Chief Justice 
that the draft of the penal code will be put to a referendum before it is formally 
signed by the leader o f the movement. However, the significance o f the legal system 
should be seen from the extent to which it allowed some form of civil society to 
emerge in an environment o f ongoing civil war.
4 . 3 . 2 .  THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE OLS SYSTEM
The fourth issue that these political changes within the opposition movement 
triggered was the emergence o f some form of civil society. Given the lack o f good 
governance discussed above and the inadequacy of the rebel movement’s 
mechanisms to resolve them, it is understandable that increasing numbers o f citizens 
have considered civil society as a way to enhance public participation, consultation, 
transparency and accountability in the rebel movement. Throughout the OLS period 
mentioned in this thesis, international community had laboured to couple top-down 
democratic reform with substantial support to grassroots civic initiatives that can 
provide ways o f getting around the stultifying ethnopolitical divisions, even though 
they did not fully meet the numerous demands of physical and social 
reconstruction.507 Their capacity building efforts enabled civil society (NGOs, 
religious organisations, and so forth) to become a key in managing and moderating 
the effects o f the war on civilians by broadening participation, engendering debate, 
enhancing accountability, and providing war-victims in the OLS Southern Sector 
with a political voice. Though much o f this activity has emerged in Equatoria
506 SPLA Code, sections 10, 10( c ) ,  1 0 ( f )
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region, it has been stunted in Upper Nile and Bahr el-Ghazal. This is because 
historical ethnic animosities and political inertia and the utter absence o f a civic 
culture, as well as the deep unhealed wounds and suspicions left behind by the split 
o f  the SPLA into Dinka versus Nuer, have made it difficult for those within these 
critical communities to translate into action even the most sincere wishes to restore 
fragile social bonds. Broadly speaking, however, civil society in the OLS Southern 
Sector was associated with the establishment o f a set o f social and political virtues 
described as “civility”508: respect for rule o f law and common standards o f 
international behaviour. Monitoring and reporting o f human rights had helped 
ensure that the SPLA soldiers do not violate, with impunity, the rights o f the civilian 
population. The significance o f this point can be gauged from the fact that the 
absence o f a strong civil society during the period 1986-89, and the consequent 
weakness o f civic virtues became tumbling blocks to the establishment o f the rule o f 
law in SPLM/A controlled areas.509 But with the establishment o f OLS in 1989 as a 
solution, and the subsequent acceptance o f the rebel movement to reform itself, 
some form o f civil society emerged in the Southern Sector. The southern Sudanese 
academics, lawyers, journalists, teachers, religious and women associations, which 
played a significant role in the SPLM/A democratisation process, constituted a civil 
society.
During the past eight years, this civil society was not only part o f the solution 
to the humanitarian emergency, but it also articulated normative values and 
democratic sensibilities. In other words, the language of civil society was an 
expression o f the values o f globalism, and it identified with the human suffering in 
southern Sudan. This “self-organising” or “autonomous” quality o f civil society 
allowed associational life to act as both a staging ground for opposition to the war 
policies o f the SPLM/A and the basis for mobilising plural, popular agencies as an 
alternative site o f politics in an evolving form of democratic governance in non­
government areas o f Southern Sudan. These non-governmental humanitarian players
507 Much funding for civil society came from the European Community. See ECHO, Global Plan II. 
Second Global Package of Humanitarian Aid to the Sudan and Sudanese Refugees, Brussels, 
European Commission Humanitarian Office, April 1994
508 In the context of this thesis, “civility” is principally conceived in relation to the preservation and 
management of humanitarian operation. The norms of behaviour demands that warring parties 
respect the impartiality and neutrality of relief aid.
509 Charles Lamuniere, Mission to Sudan and Kenya: 28 to 30 November and 4 to 6 December 1992, 
Geneva, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, December, 1992, pp. 4-10
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- New Sudan Council o f Churches, Sudan Law Society and Sudanese Women Voice 
for Peace (SWVP) - became fora where citizens, regardless o f their political, ethnic, 
or religious affiliation, can assemble and freely express their views and address 
community needs in an environment o f co-operation. It is arguable that humanitarian 
norms offered opportunities for the various sectors o f society to help articulate 
national goals and projects and to join debates about the future shape o f New 
Sudan.510 For this participation and debate to be effective, many different 
humanitarian players must be mobilised, especially activists who can represent the 
war-victims. This process o f mobilisation began in April 1994, when the SPLM/A 
leader, Dr. Garang charged military, politicians, local professionals and OLS 
agencies to draft a document identifying the institutions o f civil governance. The 
humanitarian conference proposed measures to strengthen the judicial system and 
ensure law and order. Important as this initiative may be for good governance and 
procedures, however, the real key to the successful democratisation o f opposition 
movement was mobilisation at the grassroots level -  the community, payams and 
counties — around the search for solutions to the problems o f war.
The Sudan Law Society (SLS) work challenges much o f the conventional 
thinking on the role o f civil society in democratisation not only in the OLS Southern 
Sector but more generally. It is often assumed that civic institutions act as a natural 
counterweight to the powers o f the state and have vested interests in democratic 
developments because that is how their autonomy is secured. In the same manner it 
is assumed that civil society will almost naturally evolve as a force for 
democratisation when human rights are abused or undermined. From the start of the 
formal process o f the 1983 o f the SPLM/A provisional Constitution in late 1995, 
the SLS has sought to set the parameters o f the constitutional discussion and suggest 
signposts for public discussions on the review o f the constitution and engage civic 
institutions in that process. In such a complex situation o f the ongoing civil war 
active steps were required to reverse a tide of ethnic animosities and violence which 
required the mobilisation of the civic rather than the state sector institutions. 
However, since 1991 split o f the rebel movement into hostile ethnic armed factions,
5 1 0  It c a n  b e  a rg u e d  th a t th e  G ro u n d  R u le s  r e la tiv e  su c c e s s  in  e n c o u ra g in g  d e m o c ra t ic  g o v e rn a n c e  
a ls o  e n c o u ra g e d  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  c iv il  so c ie ty . In  th e  S o u th e rn  S e c to r  c o n te x t ,  d e v e lo p m e n t  w a s  
d e f in e d  in  te rm s  o f  th e  a c t iv e  p ro m o tio n  o f  c iv i l  so c ie ty , d e m o c ra t ic  g o v e rn a n c e  a n d  l ib e ra l  e c o n o m ic  
p o l ic ie s ,  a n d  s tru c tu re s  th a t  p ro te c t  h u m a n  r ig h ts .
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civic institutions have generally tended to reflect the same divisions that have come 
to characterise the liberation struggle in Southern Sudan. So, for example, there 
were many religious and grassroots leaders who supported the opposition movement 
even if  there were serious human rights violations. There were groups within civil 
society that in a patterned manner fell on one or the other main sides in the aftermath 
of the split. At the same time it is far too simplistic to say that there were only two 
sides. To straightjacket all shades o f opinion into two blocs is to deny that 
differentiation exist in Southern Sudan as indeed in all other societies. Besides the 
overwhelming identification with tribe, people have numerous other basis for their 
political and social associations. These include gender, and religious affiliations. 
Even within the Dinka and Nuer tribes categories there are diverse groups. At the 
other end, the southern Sudanese community comprises a number o f linguistic and 
traditional groups with widespread social and cultural differentiation. By locking 
them all into two main ethno-political ideologies (e.g. Dinka versus Nuer), 
incalculable harm is done to the nature of the democratisation process going on in 
non-government areas o f the Sudan. The quality o f human rights debates in recent 
times amply demonstrates the consequences o f the liberation struggle ethnic 
preoccupation.
In such debates important national policy considerations are reduced to some 
form or the other o f tribal bargaining. This distorts the capability o f national 
institutions to deal with what clearly are national, rather than ethnic issues. In this 
regard the SWVP and the NSCC have created an alternative and people-based space 
where Southern Sudan diverse civic institutions can participate in discussions about 
problems that it faced and explore ways of dealing with them. Such a space also 
facilitated a modest level o f direct interaction between civic institutions and the 
ethnic-based armed factions so that the diversity o f opinions and interests are given 
expression. More important, however, such a space also provided citizens with an 
opportunity to discuss political issues without the overbearing influence o f ethnic- 
centred political movements enabling consequently a slight erosion o f the monopoly 
of political groups over the political and constitutional discourse. Being an open 
forum rather than a structured organisation has enabled the two institutions to 
continue to project a national agenda and a national point o f view in relation to 
critical constitutional and political issues. In ethnically tom societies forums that are 
open to all communities and where informed debate and discussion can take place
177
on even the most sacred o f political issues are exceptions rather than the norm. 
Clearly, the NSCC and SWVP have had no parallel since the opposition movement 
cave in to international pressure for democratic reform. Both the NSCC and SWVP 
can best be conceived as a people-based space that existed in a violent and uncertain 
war environment. They also provided a vehicle for building consensus progressively 
without subjecting individuals to defending what are widely regarded as entrenched 
ethnic positions. The SWVP and NSCC approach seeks to anchor democratic 
change directly amongst the people rather than solely amongst armed factions and 
political leaders. This can happen if governance discussions largely take place in the 
public fora. So that civil society is not disadvantaged when dealing with complex 
political issues such as alternative self-determination contained in the IGAD 
Declaration o f Principles, civic forums like the SWVP needs to enhance the 
capability o f civic institutions and ordinary citizens to deal with them through 
education campaigns. Quite appropriately, this was a high priority on the SWVP and 
NSCC agendas. Given their contribution to the process of democratisation in the 
OLS Southern Sector, it can be argued that the civil society in Sudan has represented 
that space occupied by associations which, although working in collaboration with 
the opposition movement and international non-governmental organisations 
(INGOs), were officially independent and ultimately only accountable to their 
international membership. As discussed above, INGOs were fundamentally pressure 
groups that did not contest the overall legitimacy of a specific warring party, but 
merely sought to alter the military policies and strategies of the parties to the Sudan 
conflict. While the factors in the rebel controlled areas were an obvious and vital 
aspect o f explanation as to why the opposition movement changed its violent 
policies into political reforms, they were also seen in terms o f their relationship to 
the humanitarian imperatives.
4 . 3 . 3 .  FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO NORM EFFECTIVENESS
The argument o f this section is that humanitarian norms and rules alone would not 
have had much impact without the role played by other actors. Although it is true 
that the democratisation process that took place within the opposition movement in 
the mid-1990s was a result o f the effects o f the Ground Rules on the behaviour of 
the SPLM/A, I argue nevertheless that such shaming devices would not have had
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any impact on their own if  the UN and its donor states did not condition resources to 
an improvement in human rights in the Southern Sector.511 This argument is fully in 
line with the constructivists position regarding conditions (material interest norm 
salience) on which humanitarian action can be successful. In this case, the rebel 
movement was confronted by four major enormous pressures to continue with 
democratic reforms.
The first pressure, which contributed to the rebel movement change o f 
behaviour, was the collapse o f the Mengistu Haile Mariam Marxist regime in 
Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in 1991. The fall of Mengistu regime was significant 
because it caused the SPLM/A to lose its political and military sanctuary in 
Ethiopia. The relevance of this events to this thesis is that for the first time in the 
history o f  the rebel movement, Dr. John Garang leadership was challenged over 
human rights issues, among other demands which are beyond the scope of this 
study. On 28 August 1991 three top commanders of the SPLM/A, Dr. Riek Macar, 
Dr. Lam Akol, and Gordon Kong Chuol, declared that they had removed Dr. 
Garang in order to end his human rights violations.512 The coup leaders accused 
Dr. Garang o f ruling the movement autocratically, jailing officers who challenged 
him, and forcibly recruiting teenagers into the SPLA.513 The issue o f human rights 
was well received by the people of Southern Sudan and relief agencies who had 
suffered greatly as a result of the SPLA war strategies. This led to the need by the 
rebel movement leadership to rethink their attitude towards the civilian population, 
as well as to those who assisted the war-victims. According to Dr. Samson Kwaje, 
SPLM/A Secretary for Education and Culture, the weakness of the Movement was 
that it did not succeed in developing itself into a mass-based political movement or 
in building a viable alternative civil administration in the areas it liberated. Even 
though it is true that internal schism within the rebel movement was responsible for 
the changes that took place during 1992-96, it has to be noted here that the split
511 It s e e m s  th a t  th e  d e c o u p lin g  b e tw e e n  n o rm s  a n d  b e h a v io u r  m a y  b e  a  c o m m o n  s ta te  o f  a f fa irs  
b e c a u s e  to  s e c u re  r e s o u rc e s  f ro m  th e  e x te rn a l  e n v iro n m e n t  o rg a n is a t io n s ,  a n y  o r g a n is a t io n  m u s t  
h o n o u r  e x te rn a l ly  le g i t im a te d  n o rm s  a n d  a t  th e  s a m e  t im e  e f f ic ie n tly  p ro v id e  te c h n ic a l  a n d  m a te r ia l  
r e s o u rc e s  to  i ts  c o n s t itu e n ts .  S e e  B ru n s s o n  N ., T h e  O rg a n iz a tio n  o f  H y p o c r isy :  T a lk ,  D e c is io n s  a n d  
A c t io n s  in  O rg a n iz a tio n s ,  C h ic h e s te r ,  J o h n  W il le y  &  S o n s , 19 8 9 , p . 7 , 168
5 1 2  S P L M -U n ite d ,  P re s s  C o n fe re n c e ,  L o n d o n , A u g u s t  2 1 , 1991 . T h e  re a d e r  s h o u ld  b e a r  in  m in d  th a t  
o th e r  s m a lle r  S P L M /A  fa c t io n s  a re  b e y o n d  th e  s c o p e  o f  th is  th e s is .
5 1 3  Ib id .,  1991
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alone, without international pressure in the form of UN and member states, would 
not have led to the type of democratic governance that the SPLM/A embraced.
The second pressure was from the United States in the form of Ambassador 
Donald Petterson, who visited SPLM/A leader Dr. John Garang in February 1993. 
His dialogue with the opposition movement leadership pushed the momentum for 
the development of an open civil society.514 The intervention o f the US did not 
come as a surprise to the Sudan observers. For the US, relief aid was a conscious 
element o f winning the hearts and minds o f the civilian population o f South Sudan 
in its war o f words with the Islamist government in Khartoum. As discussed in 
chapter 3, the point was to use assistance to affect the outcome o f the war in the 
pursuit o f Washington’s interest in the Horn of Africa. In fact, in his talks with the 
political leaders o f the opposition movement, Ambassador Peterson raised two 
issues in support o f his demand for good governance. The first one was that OLS 
programmes -  which the movement so desperately wanted - would not be 
effectively implemented unless there was some form o f civil administrative 
machinery to work alongside OLS. The second issue was that the US Ambassador 
encouraged the SPLA leadership to adopt definite measures o f liberalisation.515 
Given the US significance as an important ally to the rebel movement, the SPLM/A 
leadership was left with no illusion of Washington’s commitment to good 
governance. The US government has undertaken a number o f related tasks in 
support of a more stable environment in the opposition controlled areas.516 Much 
o f the work focused on establishing sound institutions in support o f the rule o f law 
and effective democratic mechanisms for encouraging wider participation and
5 1 4  I n te rv ie w  w ith  a  s e n io r  U S  E m b a ss y  o f f ic ia l ,  N a iro b i,  O c to b e r , 2 1 , 1996
5 1 5  T h e  h id d e n  h a n d  o f  A d a m  S m ith  f re e -m a rk e t  p o lic ie s  w e re  v e ry  m u c h  in  th e  m in d s  o f  
W a s h in g to n ’s d e c is io n -m a k e rs .  T h e  d e m a n d  fo r  l ib e ra l is a tio n  in  a  w a r -e n v iro n m e n t  h a s  i l lu m in a te d  
th e  fa c t  th a t  p o l i t ic a l  le a d e rs  in  W a s h in g to n  h a v e  fo u n d  th a t  th e  in te re s t  o f  th e  U S  a re  b e t te r  s e rv e d  b y  
re c o g n is in g  a  re b e l  m o v e m e n t th a t o c c u p ie s  a n  e c o n o m ic a lly  s ig n if ic a n t  te r r i to ry ,  b u t  w h ic h  la c k s  
ju r id ic a l  in d e p e n d e n c e .
5 1 6  T h e  U S  g o v e rn m e n t h a s  su p p lie d  h u m a n ita r ia n  a s s is ta n c e  to  th e  S u d a n , a n d  m o s t ly  to  th e  
S P L M /A  c o n tro l le d  a re a s  o f  s o u th e rn  S u d a n , in  th e  a m o u n ts  U S $  6 0 .2  m il l io n  in  f is c a l  1 9 9 2 , $ 9 9 .6  
m il l io n  in  f is c a l  1 9 9 3 , a n d  $ 7 0 .8  m ill io n  in  f is c a l  1 9 9 4  (O c to b e r  1993 th ro u g h  M a y  1 9 9 4 , e ig h t  
m o n th s ) .  T h e s e  in fo rm a tio n  w a s  c o n ta in e d  in  th e  U S A ID /B u re a u  fo r  H u m a n ita r ia n  R e s p o n s e /O F D A , 
S itu a t io n  R e p o r t  N o . 11, W a s h in g to n  D .C ., U S A ID , M a y  2 4 , 1 9 9 4 , p . 4 . C h a p te r  3 o f  th is  th e s is  h a s  
a ls o  s h o w n  th a t  b y  th e  e n d  o f  1 9 9 6 , th is  a m o u n t w a s  in c re a s e d  s u b s ta n tia l ly .
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accountability in the political process.517 Working in conjunction with NGOs, 
Washington also supported activities designed to develop civil society 
organisations and to encourage reconciliation and peaceful methods o f conflict 
resolution (these issues are discussed below). Washington also supported 
programmes designed to alleviate poverty and foster economic development in the 
SPLM/A areas o f Southern Sudan.518 Political and material support for OLS 
Southern Sector operation had to be cobbled together through a time-consuming 
diplomatic process. OLS operation in the opposition territories was sustained 
largely because o f Washington’s willingness to absorb many of the financial costs 
o f its own contribution to the operation.
The third pressure was from the European Union, or EU. While the EU 
development aid to Sudan remained suspended because o f the GOS radical Islamic 
orientation and abuse o f human rights in Southern Sudan, EU took up strengthening 
of civil society as a specific aid objective.519 In the decision authorising linkages 
between the EU and the opposition movement, it was viewed by the Commission as 
an ‘essential condition for building the rule o f law in non-government areas.520 
Because o f the importance of democratic principles and human rights in the relations 
between EU and SPLM, ‘democratic governance was given special attention in the 
opposition movement areas. Since 1995 the EU has supported OLS projects 
promoting a democratic society, practices o f good governance, respect for human 
rights and respect for the rule o f law’.521 Although earlier EU Sudan Global Plans 
emphasised short-term emergency interventions, later Plans reflected a longer-term 
planning horizon. Another component was EU’s indirect financial support to local 
administration and the establishment of local councils in opposition movements’ 
controlled areas. The transfer of democratic practices to the SPLM apparatuses was 
considered part o f the strategy to implement elements o f good governance in the 
opposition government controlled areas.522 There were a number o f advantages tied
5 1 7  U S A ID /O F D A , S itu a t io n  R e p o r t  N o . 11, p . 6
5 1 8  Ib id .,  p . 10
5 1 9  E C H O , E C H O  G lo b a l  P la n  III: F u n d in g  P ro p o s it io n  fo r  a  G lo b a l  H u m a n ita r ia n  A id  P la n  in  
F a v o u r  o f  th e  A ffe c te d  P o p u la tio n s  o f  S u d a n  B o th  W ith in  S u d a n  a n d  in  U g a n d a , B ru s s e ls ,  D e c e m b e r ,
1995
5 2 0  in te rv ie w  w ith  H e a th e r  E lk in s , D e le g a tio n  o f  th e  C o m m is s io n  o f  th e  E C , N a iro b i ,  M a y  15, 1997
521 Ib id .
522 E u ro p e a n  C o m m is s io n  H u m a n ita r ia n  O ff ic e , E C H O  G lo b a l  P la n  II: S e c o n d  G lo b a l  P a c k a g e  o f  
H u m a n ita r ia n  A id  to  th e  S u d a n  a n d  th e  S u d a n e se  R e fu g e e s ,  N a iro b i-B ru s s e ls ,  D e c e m b e r .  1 9 9 4 , p. 5
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to the idea o f promoting democratic governance as a foreign policy issue in the Horn 
of Africa. First, ‘democracy’ and humanitarian aid were probably the most effective 
civilian non-military means that the EC/EU had at its disposal to promote regional 
stability and thereby enhance European security. As Stefan Schirm explains: 
“Because the EU’s international ‘power’ is of an economic nature, and because the 
EU members do not agree on a common military security policy, a socio-economic 
approach to CFSP is the more appropriate option. Europe can focus on its specific 
strength as a civil power in order to promote ‘stability transfer’ as a preventive 
security policy”.523 Second, the positive attitudes towards good governance and 
human rights in Western Europe could contribute to create and strengthen popular 
support to the ambitious goal o f having a Common Foreign and Security Policy, if  
promotion of such values were conspicuous and integrated elements o f the CFSP.524 
So, the promotion o f democratic governance as a prominent theme in the foreign 
policy o f the EC/EU could contribute to the existing good image o f donor states in 
the Horn of Africa, particularly in the Sudan.
From the constructivists perspective, these two motives show that EC/EU 
support for OLS was guided by both self-interest and a relative commitment to 
Western humanitarian values. Although -  as seen in chapter 3 -  humanitarian norms 
reflected the policies o f donor governments, they enabled donor states and their 
development agencies to dialogue with the opposition movement.525 They were to 
one extent or another the result o f donor sanctioning behaviour.526 Accordingly, 
they were the result o f self-interested voluntary choices. Motivated, it seems, by a 
concern for human rights and a sense o f urgency in the face o f the scope of 
humanitarian disaster in the Sudan, the United States and other Western
523 S c h irm  S ., “ E u r o p e ’s C o m m o n  F o re ig n  a n d  S e c u r ity  P o l ic y ” , p . 7 6
524 Ib id .,  p p . 7 0 , 78
5 2 5  In  fa c t, O L S  su rv iv a l  in  a n  u n p re d ic ta b le  w a r  e n v iro n m e n t h a s  d e p e n d e d  m u c h  o n  i ts  d o n o r  
g o v e r n m e n ts ’ c o m m itm e n t  to  m a in ta in  p o lit ic a l  p re s s u re  o n  th e  G o v e rn m e n t o f  th e  S u d a n  (G O S ) , 
a n d  th e  S u d a n  P e o p le ’s L ib e ra t io n  M o v e m e n t a n d  A rm y  (S P L M /A ). M o re o v e r ,  th e  a b il i ty  o f  
S P L M /A  to  re s p o n d  to  p o l it ic a l  a s  w e ll a s  to  e c o n o m ic  c o n d it io n a l i t ie s  d is c u s s e d  in  c h a p te r  3 , w a s  
e x tr e m e ly  l im ite d ;  th e  m o v e m e n t  w a s  h e a v ily  re ly in g  o n  O L S  to  fe e d  its  p o p u la t io n .
5 2 6  T h e  in c lu s io n  o f  su c h  p ro g ra m m e s  in to  th e  O L S  P la n s  o f  A c t io n  w a s  d o n e  b y  d o n o r  
g o v e rn m e n ts ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  E u ro p e a n  C o m m u n ity  H u m a n ita r ia n  O ff ic e  (E C H O ). T h e s e  p ro g ra m m e s  
a re  c o n ta in e d  in  E C H O  G lo b a l P la n  I: G lo b a l  H u m a n ita r ia n  p j a n  jn  F a v o u r  0 f  tjje  A f fe c te d  
P o p u la t io n s  o f  th e  S u d a n , B ru s s e ls , A p r il  19 9 4 ; E C H O  G lo b a l  P la n  II I : S e c o n d  G lo b a l  P a c k a g e  o f  
H u m a n ita r ia n  A id  P la n  in  F a v o u r  o f  th e  A ffe c te d  p o p u la t io n s  o f  S u d a n  B o th  W ith in  S u d a n  a n d  in  
U g a n d a , B ru s s e ls ,  D e c e m b e r ,  1995
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governments intervened in the affairs of the Sudan in the hope o f contributing to 
peace in that country and beyond.
The fourth pressure emanated from the advocacy efforts o f civil society. As 
discussed later on in this chapter, NGOs were also involved in human rights 
advocacy and development initiatives in order to attain some order in an ongoing 
war situation. Some humanitarian NGOs such as church groups were themselves 
federations representing their members in a centrally organised process in which co­
ordination functions were already in-built. Through such initiatives, the community 
was educated on their role in promoting human rights as well as a solution to the 
conflict. The work o f the Sudanese Women’s Voice for Peace was one such effort. 
Other groups such as Sudan Working Group, People for Peace in Africa and the 
Horn of Africa local groups in Europe and North America were pivotal in keeping 
Sudan conflict on the regional and international agenda. They also engaged in 
promoting dialogue and negotiation among Sudan’s warring parties. Their 
contribution to the development o f democratic governance in the rebel held areas o f 
Southern Sudan was acknowledged by the SPLM/A leader Dr. Garang: “ ...It is not 
only the gun that we need here, we are opening up everything. So, those who want 
to go into the army, will go into the army, but we have other fields. Those o f you 
who are agriculturists, for instance, will be engaged in the agricultural field, those 
who are teachers will be absorbed in teaching. We are opening all fields and 
institutions; those o f health, development, education, administration, so that the New 
Sudan actually grow s...”527 More generally, co-operation and co-ordination 
between NGOs themselves, and between NGOs and other organisations and actors 
involved in peace building in Southern Sudan was a positive one.
Such co-operation and co-ordination was based on a long tradition o f shared 
experiences; it was an essential feature o f everyday working activities, and it 
included not only planning, but also operational aspects o f humanitarian action. 
However, NGO efforts would not have paid-off if  it had not been because o f the 
sanctioning behaviour o f donor community; there is enough evidence in this thesis 
to prove that donor motivations for democratic governance, expressed in terms of 
political aid, were based on providing an arena for the development o f other
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dimensions o f political culture: promotion of pluralism, supplementing the role o f 
political movement in stimulating political participation, and respect for human 
rights. In order to secure external resources and diplomatic recognition, the 
opposition movement agreed to honour, in most cases in talks, international 
humanitarian norms and rules but at that same time acted in ways that often violated 
these norms. The realists see such a behaviour as a consequence o f anarchy in which 
each actor is expected to guard its interest above all other things. I argue, however, 
that both egoism and altruism have contributed to saving millions o f lives that would 
have perished if  the donor states had not intervened. Within this context the practice 
o f  good governance emerged as a central part o f what the UN and member states 
have to offer to the war-torn Southern Sudan. Thus, a combination o f the donor 
states’ sanctioning behaviour and international norms ensured that some form of 
democratic structures were established in the opposition movement’s controlled 
territory.
4 . 4 .  IMPACT OF CAPACITY BUILDING
As stated in chapter 2, the primary focus o f OLS was to save lives, but by 1993 its 
action plans included the responsibility to foster national or local capacities to cope 
with long-term needs. This has already been sufficiently discussed in the OLS own 
review document528, and I will not be expected to rehearse those arguments here in 
detail. The shift in OLS programmes in the Southern Sector was from pure, relief- 
oriented interventions, to programmes aimed to rehabilitate rural production systems 
and social services in the context o f protracted warfare.529 With the reduction o f 
conflict and the need to strengthen civil society, the United Nations included 
capacity building into its programmes. The language and images used when talking 
about capacity building were clarified, and I will only discuss here those capacity 
building elements relevant to the OLS Southern Sector. In the field of humanitarian
5 2 7  F o r  re c e n t  sp e e c h e s  o f  th e  S P L M /A  le a d e r  J o h n  G a ra n g , se e  E lw a th ig  K a m e r  (e d .) ,  T h e  V is io n  
o f  th e  N e w  S u d a n : Q u e s t io n s  o f  U n i ty  a n d  Id e n tity , C o n s o r t iu m  fo r  P o l ic y  A n a ly s is  a n d  
D e v e lo p m e n t  S tra te g ie s , C a iro , E g y p t, 1997 , p . 71
528 S e e  D H A , O p e ra t io n  L ife l in e  S u d a n  R e v ie w , N a iro b i-G e n e v a , Ju ly , 1 9 9 6 , p p . 1 8 0 -4
5 2 9  B la k e w a y  S ., E v a lu a tio n  o f  th e  U N IC E F  O p e ra t io n  L ife l in e  S u d a n  S o u th e rn  S e c to r  , N a iro b i,  
A p r i l  1995
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politics, many people have relied heavily on the word capacity building530 to refer 
to events and activities in which people are taught specific ways o f responding to 
humanitarian emergencies. The emergence of capacity building as a distinct OLS 
project was initiated in June 1993, and “it was a genuine attempt by UNICEF to 
empower the Sudanese”.531 UNICEF’s rationale was that capacity building can 
defuse potential hostilities, and assist societies in transition from violent conflict 
towards more normal political conditions and processes. This can occur at the 
micro-level, through aid to rebuild links between communities and to restore 
authority structures and local decision-making capacities. This solidarist view o f 
capacitation was done through a series o f workshops, as well as short-term courses. 
Whatever the weaknesses o f the institutional capacity building policy, it is obvious 
from the rebel movement’s internal reforms discussed above that capacity building 
made significant contributions in the opposition movement areas. In a situation of 
ongoing civil war, any little progress should be acknowledged, particularly when 
compared to the past UN experiences in Somalia and Liberia, where even the little 
done was looted or destroyed.532 There were, therefore, two important contributions 
directly related to capacity building -  traditional grassroots peacemaking, and local 
structures for relief management,
4 . 4 . 1 .  THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN PEACEMAKING
The argument o f this section is that the use o f humanitarian norms and rules as 
rhetorical devices for shaming allowed civil society to revive (through workshops, 
etc.) southern Sudanese traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution and 
management.533 Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) at best embody values of 
liberalism and democracy, unsullied by more Machiavellian (realist) considerations
5 3 0  A s  L e d e ra c h  p u ts  it: “ C a p a c ity  b u ild in g  im p lie s  th a t  w e  a re  o r ie n te d  to w a rd  e x p a n d in g  o n  w h a t  
is  a lr e a d y  in  p la c e  a n d  a v a ila b le . I t  re f le c ts  a n  e m p h a s is  o n  th e  in tr in s ic  v a lu e  o f  p e o p le ’s a b il i t ie s  a n d  
k n o w le d g e , a n d , a t th e  sa m e  tim e , a  r e c o g n i tio n  th a t in c re a s e d  in s ig h t,  le a rn in g , a n d  g ro w th  is 
n e c e s s a ry  a n d  p o s s ib le .  A t th e  d e e p e r  lev e l, th e  ro o ts  o f  th e  w o rd  ‘c a p a c i ty ’ p ro v id e s  u s  w ith  a n  
im p o r ta n t  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  o r ie n ta t io n . I t  is b u ilt  f ro m  “ c a p a b le ”  -  to  b e  a b le ,  o r  to  h a v e  th e  p o w e r  to  
e f fe c t  s o m e th in g .”  J o h n  P a u l L e d e ra c h , B u ild in g  P e a c e : S u s ta in a b le  R e c o n c il ia t io n  in  D iv id e d  
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to which governments and the UN are prone, which are indispensable ingredients o f 
a civil society.534 Although UN agencies were wary of getting directly involved in 
the issue o f peacemaking because the concept o f peace has a political connotation, 
OLS commissioned document on humanitarian values -  discussed in chapter 2 - 
supported and encouraged the revival of traditional Sudanese mechanisms for 
conflict resolution. The document acknowledges that:
Peacemakers played an important role in limiting actions o f reprisal and 
in stopping cycles o f revenge. In Eastern Equatoria this peacemaking 
role was played by Rainmakers and other incumbents o f sacred power. 
Persons seeking a non-violent settlement o f a conflict could seek 
sanctuary at the Rainmaker. With his or her power over the elements, the 
Rainmaker could coerce parties in conflict to accept the terms o f  an 
agreement ...Inside the community the Rainmaker was supposed to 
transcend factional and clan divisions, and propose solutions to conflict 
that put the interests o f the community above that o f the conflicting 
parties. In other Nilotic groups it might be played by prophets, so called 
spear-makers. Outside the community, women and blacksmiths acted as 
mediators. They moved freely between enemy lines. ^ 5
OLS support for this kind o f politically sensitive programme was usually through 
providing the necessary logistics, and some times funding, to NGOs involved in 
organising them. Since the mid-1990s, donor governments and NGOs have adopted 
an even more comprehensive view of the Sudan civil war and identified the need for 
a multifaceted approach that supported a sustainable grassroots peace in Southern 
Sudan. Accordingly, grassroots peacemaking or bottom-up approach was an attempt 
by relief agencies to transform hostile and violent operational war environment into 
an environment where normality can prevail. In the broad view, this conceptual 
framework responds to the set o f needs and challenges confronted by war-victims. It 
is meant to address the social dynamics o f building relationships, and the 
development o f supportive structures and institutions. Some relief officials 
interviewed by this author acknowledged that the most desirable solution was to 
prevent the recurrence o f conflict through policies aimed at the reconciliation o f
534 F o r  a  g e n e ra l  d is c u s s io n  o f  th e  ro le  o f  N G O s  in  c o n f lic t  r e s o lu tio n , se e  F e a rg a l  C o c h ra n e , 
“ B e y o n d  th e  P o li t ic a l  E lite s :  A  C o m p a ra t iv e  A n a ly s is  o f  th e  R o le s  a n d  Im p a c ts  o f  C o m m u n ity -B a s e d  
N G O s  in  C o n f l ic t  R e so lu tio n  A c t iv i ty ” , Civil Wars, V o l. 3 , N o . 2 , S u m m e r  2 0 0 0 , p p . 1-22
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divided communities.536 From this perspective, grassroots peacemaking became an 
instrument for constructing a more stable humanitarian environment. The bottom-up 
approach was rooted in an assessment o f two important features o f the situation in 
Southern Sudan. First, since the outbreak of the war in 1983, the formal, political 
infrastructure of the region had disintegrated. Second, southern Sudanese have a rich 
history o f traditional mechanisms for dealing with disputes. Given this background, 
efforts to identify national leaders or convene peace conferences relying on common 
diplomatic devices, such as bringing together warring parties, would create a 
superficial structure unable to sustain itself. Instead, the most promising approach 
would be to develop a process that builds on the traditions o f the Sudanese people. 
Indeed, consistent with OLS policy of capacity building and support for a peace 
constituency in Southern Sudan was the need to build on the cultural and contextual 
resources for peace and conflict resolution present within the war setting. Apart 
from delivering relief food, there were also innumerable NGO supporting initiatives 
designed to help the churches play a peace-making role.537
OLS played an important role in this situation by providing logistics to 
grassroots peace workshops and short-term training courses on peacemaking and 
monitoring. These workshops complemented humanitarian norms and principles and 
the policy o f constructive engagement at the local and national levels because they 
were meant to change attitudes, and attitudinal change in the service of 
reconciliation objectives. A major initiative by UNICEF was to train community 
leaders from all walks o f life. The initial workshop began with a regional seminar in 
March 1995 that brought together church representatives from all the areas 
controlled by the SPLM/A; these representatives were given the responsibility for 
implementing workshops at the grassroots level. In most o f the areas where these 
kinds o f workshops took place, positive steps to maintain the peace were 
implemented. A variety o f experiments were tried with local peace monitoring and 
peace commissions. In 1996, for instance, the New Sudan Council o f Churches
5 3 6  A  m o re  c r it ic a l  v ie w  h a s  b e e n  o ffe re d  b y  R o la n d  P a r is  w h o  a rg u e s  th a t: ‘A  s in g le -p a ra d ig m  -  
l ib e ra l  in te rn a t io n a l is m  -  a p p e a rs  t g u id e  th e  w o rk  o f  m o s t  in te rn a tio n a l  a g e n c ie s  e n g a g e d  in  p e a c e ­
b u i ld in g . T h e  c e n tra l  te n e t  o f  th is  p a ra d ig m  is th e  a s su m p tio n  th a t  th e  s u re s t  f o u n d a tio n  fo r  p e a c e ,  
b o th  w ith in  a n d  b e tw e e n  s ta te s , is  m a rk e t  d e m o c ra c y , th a t is , a  l ib e ra l  d e m o c ra t ic  p o l i ty  a n d  a  m a rk e t  
e c o n o m y .’ E rn ie  R e g e h r , “ T h e  C h a lle n g e  o f  p e a c e -b u i ld in g ” , Ploughshares Monitor, N o . 16, 
D e c e m b e r ,  1 9 9 5 , p . 3
c ' i n
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trained local peace monitors in Kenya in interpositioning to strengthen cease-fires 
and peace agreements, and ultimately to develop institutional capabilities to 
peacefully transform local conflicts.538 That is what one senior relief aid official 
dubbed as “Field Diplomacy”,539 which means sending non-governmental teams to 
areas o f  conflict on a long-term basis to stimulate and support local conflict 
prevention initiatives. In the OLS context, the primary aim of field diplomacy was 
the creation o f a network of people based on trust. Such a bond of trust was 
necessary for the observation of the dynamics of conflict, for timely taking o f 
measures, such as keeping open the channels o f communication between the parties 
in conflict, the creation o f a favourable climate for exploring solutions, the 
development o f a constructive culture o f conflict, giving advice and evaluating 
governmental peace proposals or deals.540 A number o f other important 
programmatic efforts aimed at promoting field diplomacy at the grassroots level 
suggest a broader scope of possibilities. Three examples o f peace-building efforts 
targeted at the grassroots level took place in the Southern Sector, where initiatives 
emerged from both the churches and UNICEF.
The first initiative was that o f 1995 Ikotos conference, which attracted more 
than 200 people from different villages o f Torit county. Church-initiated Ikotos 
conference was conceived as a way to open up and deal with conflict and peace 
issues in the Southern Sudan setting, with a specific focus on the county (district) 
and payam (sub-district) levels. The Ikotos conference brought together political, 
military and church representatives from Torit county; these representatives were 
then given the responsibility for implementing workshops at local levels. An 
integrated approach was taken to the content o f the workshop discussions, which 
ranged from topics such as religious perspectives on war and peace, to family and 
the Church involvement in conflict resolution, to issues of human rights and good 
governance. The aim of such peace workshops was to deal creatively with the 
conflict, violence and militarisation that confronted local communities, especially 
their jobless youth. The Ikotos conference not only captivated audiences but also
5 3 8  N S C C , R e p o r t  o n  In te rp o s it io n in g  W o rk s h o p , M a rc h  15, 1996 , p . 3
5 3 9  D r. R e g in a ld  M o re e ls ,  “ Id e a s  o n  H u m a n ita r ia n  A id , In te rv e n tio n s  a n d  F ie ld  D ip lo m a c y ” , 
L o n d o n : A  p a p e r  p re s e n te d  to  th e  In te rn a tio n a l  A le r t  C o n fe re n c e  o n  C o n f l ic t  P re v e n tio n  a n d  
R e s o lu tio n , N o v e m b e r  15 , 1 9 9 7 , p . 8
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served as a way to publicly grieve over the loses the communities had suffered, but 
also address concerns o f the people, and to set the stage for changes and movement 
toward peace in the county. Following the Ikotos Conference (a peace initiative that 
addressed intercommunal violence in Equatoria region o f southern Sudan), Bishop 
Paride Taban o f the Catholic Church o f Torit formed an association o f peace scouts 
to act as a peace monitoring mechanism in support o f the Ikotos agreement. Sixty 
monitors -  trained by this author -  were selected from numerous village. The scouts 
were charged with reporting violations o f the Ikotos agreement to the elders o f  the 
village.541
The second example from the Southern Sector was the effort o f UNICEF, 
which integrated conflict reduction approaches within broader community and 
public health programmes that dealt with trauma. Conflict resolution components 
included training in dealing with community conflict and violence, and reducing 
prejudice and enhancing community decision making. The workshops were 
conducted in OLS approved locations as part of the health-delivery system, and 
drew on resource teams made o f up of conflict resolution trainers, public health 
officials and counsellors. In most part o f Southern Sudan, this author facilitated 
more than twenty workshops which integrated health care with conflict resolution 
and community reconciliation. The project showed concern, namely the restoration 
o f public health, as vehicle to convene, engage, and train health Church 
professionals in conflict management and community reconciliation techniques. My 
main task during 1995-97 was to train grassroots peacemakers. The purpose of 
peace workshops was to empower religious communities to take the initiative in 
pursuing a variety of peace building activities, including, but not limited to 
negotiation and mediation. I was inspired by the believe that developing a critical 
mass o f support for such activities among grassroots Christian communities is 
essential to overcoming the stranglehold of ethnic division on both individual and 
collective spirit.
A third example from the OLS Southern Sector was a Church-UNICEF 
collaborative effort to bring peace among two Nuer clans in Upper Nile region. This 
peace effort was successful because mobile peace committees were formed that
541 In te r -C h u rc h  C o m m itte e ,  In te r -V il la g e  P e a c e  M e e tin g , D io c e s e  o f  T o r i t ,  s o u th e rn  S u d a n , 
N o v e m b e r  11 , 1999
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included community and church leaders, who were tasked with travelling to fishing 
holes and cattle camps to explain, monitor, and promote the peace agreement. The 
agreement was commemorated in various locations by re-enacting the covenant’s 
sealing and sacrificing animals. Since the conference, small peace meetings were 
held throughout the Upper Nile region, during which traditional methods o f conflict 
resolution were discussed.542 In Nuer areas o f Upper Nile, especially since the 
Akobo Peace Conference, the chiefs reasserted their authority in the area o f 
customary law, with the support of military commanders. In these areas, the concept 
o f cieng naath -  or covenanting -  was a key mechanism for solving conflict in the 
family, as well as between larger social groups (indeed, it was used in the Akobo 
Conference.543 In Otuho areas in Eastern Equatoria, community leaders were 
updating, monitoring, and enforcing customary law in the context o f the locally 
initiated process o f emwara (reconciliation). In Xande areas in Western Equatoria, a 
museum of culture was established and interest in local laws increased.544 The 
importance o f these grassroots efforts cannot be underestimated. Local dispute 
resolution mechanisms were yet another indigenous, grassroots-level effort to 
manage conflict and build peace. Traditional courts at the local level had stabilising 
influences within and between communities. In some parts o f southern and central 
Sudan, communities were reviving their culture by solidifying and updating 
traditional law -  their reason for doing so was to combat the breakdown o f order and 
values accompanied the endless civil war and was intensified by the inter-communal 
and inter-factional fighting that plagued the region during 1991-3.545
What stands out in all three of these examples is the effort to provide an 
opportunity for grassroots leaders and OLS agencies to work at the community level 
on issues o f peace and conflict resolution. In all these grassroots peacemaking 
endeavours, the Church role was singled out as an important step towards a 
comprehensive reconciliation among the Sudan ethno-religious society. “We are 
grateful for the assistance the Church has provided from relief and rehabilitation to 
development, education and some aspects of governance...W e take note o f the
5 4 2  J u l ia  A k e r  D u a n y , “ M a k in g  P e a ce : A  R e p o r t  o n  G ra s s ro o ts  P e a c e  E f fo r ts ” , U n io n  In s t i tu te ,  
O c to b e r  1 9 9 5 , u n p u b l is h e d  m im e o g ra p h
5 4 3  W il l ia m  L o w re y , “ T h e  R o le  o f  R e lig io n  in  P e a c e m a k in g  a n d  R e c o n c il ia t io n :  A  C a se  S tu d y  
a m o n g  th e  N u e r  in  S u d a n ” , U n io n  In s t i tu te ,  19 9 4 , u n p u b lis h e d  m im e o g ra p h
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Churches’ concerns toward peace process, especially that the IGAD Declaration o f 
Principles (DoP) should be the foundation o f negotiations. We urge you to continue 
with the participatory grassroots peace keeping models”.546 The peace keeping role 
mentioned in the Kenya Foreign Minister’s statement refers to the peace monitors 
mentioned above. Programmes such as these frequently work through existing 
networks, such as churches or health associations. These grassroots-level 
programmes were also characterised by their attempts to deal with the enormous 
trauma that the war produced, especially among the youth. However, we should 
avoid the tendency to romanticise local and indigenous capacities for peacebuilding. 
While they are vitally important, it is often overlooked that traditional capacities for 
conflict management have failed (for a myriad o f reasons) to manage or contain the 
conflict from becoming violent in the first place. Some traditional approaches to 
conflict management reinforce undemocratic patron-client relationships, and may 
have contributed to the conflict.
Indigenous capacities are often unable to mitigate the wrecking effects of 
regional and international influences. These may be political and military 
interventions, or regional and global trade which underpins the economic interests of 
armed groups. Indigenous or traditional capacities for dispute resolution or conflict 
handling are not always commensurate with the demands o f contemporary conflicts. 
Consequently, there is a legitimate role for INGOs in supporting - but not 
supplanting - local organisations in peacebuilding. The Sudanese Women Voice for 
Peace (SWVP), a civil society initiative, has worked as both a facilitator and an 
advocate o f democratic social change. The SWVP has sought to create a space for 
dialogue on a number o f contentious national issues which simply would not 
otherwise have been addressed. Its work challenges much o f the conventional 
thinking on the role o f civil society in conflict prevention and democratisation 
within the opposition controlled areas. This is one important success o f OLS 
capacity building. Indeed, OLS Southern Sector has shown that the process o f 
advancing political negotiation at important cities, while very difficult and complex 
in its own right, is both a more formal and a more superficial process than the 
experience o f reconciliation in which former enemies are brought together at the
5 4 5  N S C C , T h e  I s s u e s  in  th e  S u d a n  C o n f l ic t ,  a n d  th e  P ro s p e c t  fo r  P e a c e ,  N a iro b i ,  19 9 6 , p . 18
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village level. Apart from the grassroots peacemaking described above, the Sudanese 
churches also contributed to the national debate on what kind o f political system (s) 
would be appropriate for the multinational state like Sudan. The Sudanese churches 
were active not only at the grassroots level through humanitarian relief assistance 
and peace building initiatives, but also at the national level. The document, Here We 
Stand United in Action fo r  Peace547, which this author helped prepare, explained the 
Church position on the conflict. The Church role in building a foundation for 
reconciliation arose precisely because o f the link between national and religious 
identity and the respect and influence that some religious leaders enjoy. They are 
based on an assumption that reconciliation after the past 14 years o f bloodletting 
will require more than restoring tolerance, law and justice as important as these 
are.548 While popular and civil participation in peace and conflict prevention 
processes does offer some hope o f transforming conflict situations, they require 
international support. The case o f OLS Southern Sector has shown that civil groups 
operate from a position o f extreme vulnerability when they challenge the activities 
and interests o f armed groups.
Thus, in the case o f the Church, the formation of the Sudan Working Group 
(SWG) strengthened the Sudanese churches’ efforts549, and it allowed many church 
agencies with active interests in the Sudanese peacemaking to collaborate at the 
regional level. Over the years, churches and their organisations were involved in 
peace and reconciliation initiatives at the local and national levels. The SWG 
comprised representatives from the New Sudan Council o f Churches, the National 
Christian Council o f Kenya, the All Africa Conference of Churches, Norwegian 
Church Aid, Nairobi Peace Initiative, and People for Peace. All o f these groups had 
considerable experience in conflict mediation in Sudan. They were important not 
only because they supported IGAD in the quest for a GOS/SPLA peace agreement, 
but they also supported local reconciliation efforts in southern Sudan, where 
destructive inter-communal tensions flared. Material and financial support, as well
5 4 7  N S C C , H e re  W e  S ta n d  U n ite d  in  A c tio n  fo r  P e a c e , N a iro b i,  19 9 6 , p. 5
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as trained personnel helped local NGOs and communities develop grassroots 
conflict resolution and peacemaking programmes in the OLS Southern Sector. These 
programmes designed not only to address pressing disputes among communities and 
ethnic groups but also to impart enduring conflict resolution and peacemaking skills 
based on traditional social structures.550 It is also important to bear in mind that it is 
difficult to build an effective and sustainable framework for preserving peace and 
security without some kind o f normative underpinning. This means that the task o f 
constructing appropriate peace-and-security mechanisms needs to be related to the 
challenge o f building a community values at various levels o f the country. In the 
case o f the OLS Southern Sector, UNICEF was instrumental in the development and 
dissemination o f a core o f normative standards covering such areas as human rights, 
humanitarian principles and child rights.
4 . 4 . 2 .  LOCAL STRUCTURES FOR RELIEF MANAGEMENT
The second impact o f capacity building was the skilling o f local structures for relief 
management. Resources for capacity building, which UNICEF and other NGOS 
gave in the context o f acceptance o f the Ground Rules provided a degree o f leverage 
over the humanitarian wing of the rebel movement. The project promoted more 
effective relief, rehabilitation and development programmes through strengthening 
the capacity o f  indigenous organisations and communities to plan and manage 
community level relief and rehabilitation programmes.551 In most parts o f southern 
Sudan visited by this author, health services improved, and local professionals ran 
most o f these health centres, a situation that was different from the early stages of 
OLS when foreign professionals effectively controlled such programmes. UNICEF 
and INGOs supported primary health care initiatives across southern Sudan. 
Coterminous with this extension of access was a phenomenal increase in the number 
o f INGOs and the Sudanese NGOs (SINGOs) operating, or seeking to operate, under 
OLS. According to DHA review document, the growth in numbers o f SINGOs was 
particularly noticeable following the 1992 agreement.552 For example, while there 
were only two SINGOs (CRS & SMC) in mid - 1993, by early 1996 the number of
5 5 0  In te rv ie w  w ith  J e ro m e  Z u ru ru , N a iro b i,  N C A  S o u th e rn  S u d a n  C o -o rd in a to r ,  Ju n e  2 3 , 19 9 6
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those seeking to register with OLS had reached nearly 30, out which six signed 
Letters o f Understanding with UNICEF.553 Another achievement o f capacity 
building contained in the OLS review document was the encouragement of 
Sudanese professionals to work among aid agencies. In 1996, there were over 200 
southern Sudanese working for international aid agencies.554 But the most 
significant achievement was to get the movements to discuss humanitarian 
principles. Given that OLS operated in an ongoing conflict situation, without any 
protection force, getting the warring parties to agree on Ground Rules was a key 
achievement o f capacity building project. Capacity building support was also widely 
believed to have pressed SRRA to make significant organisational improvements 
over the several years.
4 . 4 . 3 .  THE DANGERS OF CIVIL SOCIETY
One of the issues arising from the influence of the liberal political science debate on 
the international donor establishment is its particular normative approach to non­
governmental organisations. The upsurge in enthusiasm among the donor 
establishment for supporting NGOs in war-affected countries has occurred 
simultaneously with renewed commitments to programmes aimed at the elimination 
o f poverty. In current donor documentation, both aims are usually linked: support 
for civil society is not only about the promotion of democratic governance as an end 
in itself, but is also seen as instrumental in the removal o f poverty. This section, 
however, argues that instead of empowering the poor, NGOs have become self- 
perpetuating, and opportunistic. It was stated above that the war had a devastating 
effect on agriculture and the rural economy and that aiding the people o f a war-torn 
nation by rehabilitating and reconstructing their society became a delicate political 
process that required substantial financial commitment and programmatic coherence 
from the donor community and NGOs. It required a multi-faceted, co-ordinated 
effort to rebuild not only economic but also, and perhaps more important, social and 
political institutions devastated by war and violence, tasks for which the OLS 
system was ill prepared. The challenge was especially daunting because o f factional 
fights and government obstruction, which resulted in the deaths o f half a million
5 5 3 D H A , O L S  R e v ie w , p . 183
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people and the subsequent internal displacement over two million. But during 1993- 
6 when the GOS and the SPLM/A demanded that OLS move away from relief to 
development, the operational roles o f NGOs as OLS implementers, grew 
tremendously during that period.555 While NGOs were praised for their human 
rights advocacy, they, however, faced a tremendous challenge in creating productive 
and accountable relationships and building democratic components into their role in 
the international relief system in the Sudan. Even though NGOs have been 
commended for human rights advocacy, their role as OLS implementing partners 
has raised doubts about their commitment to community-based development. The 
recent donor emphasis on NGOs assumes that such support will benefit the war- 
victims. It therefore presumes to be readily connected to the international agency 
goal o f poverty eradication. Unfortunately, in the Southern Sector, there is evidence 
that a considerable part o f NGO activity did not necessarily lead to a reduction of 
poverty among internally displaced communities in southern Sudan.556 I argue that 
casual linkages between NGO activity and democratic governance, and democratic 
governance and poverty reduction, are assumed without being critically examined in 
local contexts. Although NGOs were relatively successful in their human rights and 
protection advocacy, they were unsuccessful in implementing OLS Southern 
Sector’s development objectives.557 It was not difficult to find examples where 
NGO contributions appeared doubtful. This section examines some downsides of 
civil society involvement in humanitarian relief charity in the OLS Southern Sector
-  four weaknesses have been identified accordingly.
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a n d  p re s s u re  o n  th e  w a r -d is p la c e d  to  b e c o m e  p a r t  o f  a  la rg e , a g r ic u ltu ra l  la b o u r  r e se rv e .  In  th e  
S o u th e rn  S e c to r , p ro g ra m m e s  a im e d  a t r e in fo rc e m e n t  o f  ru ra l  s u b s is te n c e  e c o n o m ie s ,  a n d  
" d e v e lo p m e n t"  w a s  d e f in e d  in  te rm s  o f  re h a b ili ta t io n . T h e re  w a s  a  m o re  s u s ta in e d  a t te m p t  b y  
U N IC E F , W F P  a n d  a  n u m b e r  o f  IN G O s  to  fo c u s  su p p o r t  o n  fo o d  p ro d u c tio n . T h e re  w a s  a lso  a n  
a tte m p t  to  re f in e  u n d e rs ta n d in g s  o f  fo o d  s e c u ri ty  a n d  th e  fo o d  e c o n o m y . In  g e n e ra l,  O L S  
p ro g ra m m in g  m o v e d  a w a y  f ro m  a  c o n c e rn  e x c lu s iv e ly  w ith  r e l i e f  a id , a n d  to w a rd  ta c k l in g  th e  
p ro b le m  o f  lo c a l m a n p o w e r  tra in in g  o r  c a p a c i ty  b u ild in g .
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The first weakness o f NGOs development efforts is to do with their attempt to create 
income-generating projects for the internally displaced population in southern 
Sudan. Both the beneficiaries and OLS officials accepted that the rehabilitation and 
development performance of NGOs fell short of reasonable expectations and that 
none o f the players was immune of criticism. Critical issues such as women’s 
workload and accessibility to information, resources and opportunities were missed. 
Instead, many NGOs, particularly the traditional ones such as Oxfam and World 
Vision International, focused their efforts in income generation through promotion 
o f activities such as tailoring, needlework, food services and sale o f crafts. What 
difficult to understand is the naivete o f these agencies to encourage such skills as 
tailoring and dressmaking in the Southern Sector’s areas where the second hand 
industries virtually killed textile and dressing making business. In addition, profits 
from these businesses were so slow that women and other vulnerable groups who 
were taught these skills did not make enough income to support their families.558 
Even among relief officials there is no disagreement over the failure o f NGO 
community in the Southern Sector. One senior NGO official was even 
uncompromising in his attack on the behaviour o f some relief agencies:
A lot o f the money earmarked for development and rehabilitation goes to 
the unnecessary allowances given to most expatriates working in 
southern Sudan. In Torit County both Norwegian Church Aid and CRS 
are supposed to run health centres, and yet fo r more than seven years 
one can hardly see a functioning medical centre. People have travelled 
all the way to either Uganda or Kenya in search o f medical services. One 
wonders where have all the money raised in the name o f the war-victims 
gone”. 559 It is not surprising that NGOs with many years o f experience 
in practical development work in the Southern Sector were said by their 
detractors to have betrayed a rudimentary grasp o f the concept o f  
development advocacy.560
Take for example, some NGOs such as World Vision and Oxfam were involved in 
seeds and tools programmes among internally displaced communities for more than 
six years. On average, a hoe provided to a household, lasts for at least two 
production seasons. During this period, assuming rainfall is good, the household
5 5 8  I n te rv ie w  w ith  A s u n ta  Ig w a n a , W o m e n  A s so c ia t io n  S e c re ta ry , H iy a la  P a y a m , N e w  S u d a n , 
J a n u a ry ,  8 , 199 6
5 5 9  I n te rv ie w  w ith  R e v . O h im a , A f r ic a n  I n la n d  C h u rc h , N a iro b i,  M a rc h  16, 1996
196
should attain reasonable food security and at least replaced the tools and seeds from 
their own production. This never happened, at least in areas o f  Upper Nile and 
Equatoria regions where there was a high concentration o f NGO activities. The 
reason can obviously be found in the statement above. As one senior Norwegian 
relief officer told me:
There are some NGOs who have no right to be involved in the delivery o f  
humanitarian assistance or development, or rather i f  I  had the money for  
such purpose or have authority o f approval, I  will seriously question 
their credibility. Aid agencies falling under this category are amorally 
wasteful and extravagant with funds, providing luxurious housing, office, 
and benefits fo r  their expatriate staff that do not match the benefits o f  the 
target population. While other NGOs specialise in writing beautiful 
proposals to donors for programmes which may be more in the interest 
o f donors rather than recipients o f humanitarian assistance ”.561
It was also clear from my field observation that many aid workers were after 
securing themselves employment. At least to some extent this appears to be the case, 
given the number o f inappropriate humanitarian assistance programmes 
implemented, particularly in areas, which experienced emergencies, such as Bahr el 
Ghazal and parts of Upper Nile.
Figure 1
Region Number o f NGOs
Bahr el Ghazal 4
Eastern Equatoria 11
Jonglei 8
Lakes 13
Upper Nile 15
Western Equatoria 11
NOTE: Based on the list of NGOs and t leir activities provided by OLS July
1996 Review document, Nairobi.
560 Interview with MSF-Holland official, Nairobi, March 12, 1997
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The second endemic weakness o f NGOs was their reluctance to cede managerial or 
programme autonomy towards the goal of greater strategic coherence or managerial 
efficiency.562 Most lacked either the will or the self-discipline to surrender 
autonomy and integrate their work with other players. Their focus on the village and 
neighbourhood was at the expense o f dealing with national problems of governance, 
planning and policy. Closely linked to this policy implementation failure, OLS 
Review Team saw a noticeable difference in the type o f programmes being 
implemented in various regions o f the South, and in the extent to which 
implementing agencies were attempting to apply a shift away from relief toward 
rehabilitation. In general, more rehabilitation-oriented programming gravitated 
towards the more stable regions in the south o f South Sudan, and away from Bahr 
el-Ghazal and other insecure regions in the Transitional Zone. OLS agencies 
undertook a variety of community-based rehabilitation programmes, most notable of 
which were the provision o f seeds and tools to farm households.563 But as figure 1 
above shows, the growth of OLS programmes, however, guaranteed no equitable 
distribution o f humanitarian services to all populations in need in the South.564
Despite the dearth o f data, there was some evidence o f concentration of 
humanitarian services in some regions at the expense o f others. Only MSF- 
Belgium’s interventions in the Ajiep area provided employment for the local 
population. For example, many people attained experience and skills through their 
involvement in feeding programmes. The income from such employment sometimes 
yielded benefits. The salaries received from MSF helped local people establish small 
business. But the overall development record o f NGOs is very poor. In terms of the 
potential o f aid for reducing dependency, a number o f  sectors required more 
attention. Local people wanted more support for education, trade and agriculture, 
infrastructure (including water and sanitation), health services, and for fostering 
local institutions, including community self-help organisations. Because o f the 
short-term emergency approach to this long-term conflict, a rather minimal
561 In te rv ie w  w ith  a n  o f f ic ia l  o f  th e  N o rw e g ia n  C h u rc h  A id , Ik o to s , S o u th e rn  S u d a n , M a y  18, 19 9 6
5 6 2  T h e  im p a c t  o f  O L S  h u m a n i ta r ia n  p ro g ra m m e s  a re  e x te n s iv e  d is c u s s e d  in  D H A , O L S  R e v ie w ,
199 6
5 6 3  U N /O L S , O L S  S o u th e rn  S e c to r  N e e d s  A s se ssm e n t:  F in a l D ra f t ,  N a iro b i,  N o v e m b e r ,  1 9 9 5 , p . 4
5 6 4  W F P , W o rk sh o p s  fo r  F o o d  M o n ito rs ,  L o k ic h o g g io ,  K e n y a , A p ril  9 , 1996
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contribution was made to development, including the provision o f services such as 
health and education. There were requests for more support for education. In 
particular, educated southerners realised how important the educational 
opportunities they had between the two civil wars (the first civil began in 1955 and 
ended in 1972; the second was in 1983, and continued at the time of this research) 
were in creating a body of people who could communicate with the outside world. 
O f course, there was support for primary education since 1992, but all these schools 
lacked basic educational materials, and trained teachers.
The third failure o f NGO development efforts concerns the insensitivity to 
local traditions and cultures. According to Inga Bjork, humanitarian assistance 
should be given a clear development perspective with the aim o f supporting 
recovery and making it easier for capacity available locally to contribute to the 
organisation and implementation o f the assistance.565 While the OLS action plans 
discussed in chapter 2 were clear on this subject matter, NGOs, as OLS programmes 
implementers, approached development with closed minds and with attitude o f “we 
know what they need”. This arrogant attitude prevented NGOs from getting a good 
understanding of complexities o f the Sudan emergency situation, and develop 
programmes that would have effectively addressed local relief/rehabilitation agenda 
as contained in the OLS action plans. For instance, in a peaceful environment, there 
is a mechanism to ensure that the most vulnerable in the society (women, children, 
orphans, widows and disabled) are protected through kinship support and extended 
family support and extended family system reinforced by the traditional value 
system. Anyone found neglecting his/her responsibilities is punishable by the 
traditional court law. The same value system makes it shameful for a man to be 
unable to provide for his family -  for a mother to have nothing to give to her dying 
child and for a community to have nothing to offer to the vulnerable. O f course, it 
can be argued that in the Sudan war environment, such traditional support and value 
systems were vulnerable to attacks. But OLS, through its humanitarian principles 
programme, managed during 1994, to revive them, and in many parts o f the 
Southern Sector they worked well. The mistake was that most NGOs responded to 
the lack o f systems by creating artificial structures or systems to deal with problems
5 6 5  In te rv ie w  w ith  In g a  B jo rk -K le v b y , S w e d is h  H u m a n ita r ia n  E n v o y  to  E a s t  A f r ic a ,  N a iro b i,  
N o v e m b e r ,  13, 1998
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of delivery and targeting assistance. Unfortunately, unlike traditional systems, these 
imposed structures were insensitive to traditional support and value systems of the 
Sudanese communities. They became very powerful as they were being used as 
vehicles for the distribution of valuable resources; they undermined or weakened the 
traditional ones further. It was not surprising that in most parts o f Bahr el Ghazal 
and Upper Nile regions o f southern Sudan most chiefs and community elders 
neglected their responsibilities towards the vulnerable members o f the community.
The fourth failure o f NGO development efforts, which is little understood but 
which had tremendous effect on chiefs and community leaders ability to serve their 
communities, was the power shift that resulted from the inability o f local leaders to 
provide relief to their suffering people. Consequently, respect and power were 
accorded to NGOs instead o f local authorities and leaders, and this was very much 
resented by local leaders.566 Some NGOs argued that it was difficult to trust local 
leaders because most o f them were in fact SPLA officers masquerading as 
community leaders. There are evidence to support this NGO view. In areas of Upper 
Nile and Behr el Ghazal regions visited by this author, matters were made worst by 
the intermingling o f combatant and non-combatant populations. What this means is 
that it is difficult to escape the conclusion that humanitarian action contributed 
greatly to the consolidation of the rebel movement. Although there is a reason to 
accept the proposition that diversion of relief aid fuels conflict, there are numerous 
plausible counter-arguments in this chapter. For example, OLS Southern Sector has 
proved above that such material incentives can speed the process o f orderly return 
and normalisation in combat zones. The channel o f delivery, in other words, may be 
unconventional, but the result is nonetheless positive from the perspective o f the 
victim. More basically, while humanitarian assistance might have enhanced the 
capacity o f the SPLM/A to sustain war, that does not necessarily mean that their 
absence (or more effective efforts to reduce leakage) would have the opposite effect 
o f bringing people to the table. As one UNICEF official told this author: “SPLM/A 
took 90 per cent o f southern Sudan from the Khartoum government even before
5 6 6  W h e n  I v is i te d  A k o t, in  B a h r  e l G h a z a l  r e g io n  in  O c to b e r  1 9 9 6 ,1 w a s  s u rp r is e d  b y  th e  d e g re e  o f  
lo c a l  h o s t i l i ty  to w a rd s  O x fa m -U K . In  fa c t, so m e  o f  its  fo re ig n  r e l i e f  w o rk e r s  w e re  a r re s te d  fo r  
a l le g e d ly  so w in g  se e d s  o f  d is c o n te n t  a m o n g  in te rn a lly  d is p la c e d  c o m m u n ity  a g a in s t  lo c a l a u th o r i t ie s . 
I t  w a s , h o w e v e r ,  c le a r  f ro m  m y  re lia b le  so u rc e  th a t  th e  c o n f l ic t  b e tw e e n  O x fa m  o ff ic ia ls  a n d  th e  lo c a l 
a u th o r i t ie s  w a s  th e  re fu s a l  o f  th a t  a g e n c y  to  d e a l  d i r e c t ly  w i th  th e  c o n c e rn e d  a u th o r i t ie s  in  th e  a rea .
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OLS was established. They will continue to fight even without outside relief aid”.567 
This view was supported by many SPLM/A political and military leaders 
interviewed in East Africa.565 Humanitarian action had only a marginal effect on the 
calculations o f the rebel movement regarding both conflict and political settlement. 
Thus, although it is sensible for programming decisions to take the potential impact 
o f humanitarian action into account in a contextually sensitive way, there is no 
justification for general policy decisions to be made on the basis o f the role of 
humanitarian action in fuelling conflict. Thus, the failure o f the NGO community to 
make use o f local relief management structures in some areas in the Southern Sector 
was responsible for the tension between OLS and the authorities o f those areas. The 
fundamental point in the dimensions o f relationship between humanitarian action 
and conflict lies in the fact that humanitarian (and development) assistance brings 
additional scarce resources into societies.
Local parties seek to influence the distribution o f these resources to strengthen 
their position and, in relative terms, to weaken that o f their potential or actual 
adversaries. Consequently, the activities of humanitarian players -  while perhaps 
sound from a strict humanitarian (that is, mitigation o f suffering) or 
developmentalist (that is, meeting basic needs and encouraging sustainable growth) 
point o f view -  may inadvertently exacerbate tensions between communities. In the 
case o f the OLS Southern Sector, this resulted in friction between community 
leaders and NGO workers, and the victims were the community. It was evident from 
this author’s fieldwork that most NGOs interpreted the lack of co-operation and 
diversion o f resources by local leaders as inability to manage the operations rather 
than anything to do with shift o f power and deterioration o f social structure, value 
and support systems. Diversion o f relief in the Southern Sector was seen by NGOs 
as a manifestation o f corruption or malevolence. Outsiders’ emphasis on soldiers 
taking relief from intended beneficiaries seemed to have encouraged soldiers to 
cover up their activities -  rather than perhaps explaining why they think they are and 
should be included in relief allocation.
567 Interview with a UNICEF/OLS official, Nairobi, August 14, 1996
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4 . 5 .  CONCLUSION
In spite o f the failure o f development efforts, it was clear from this chapter that the 
success o f the OLS Southern Sector was based on its pragmatic us o f humanitarian 
norms and consensual approach to its war environment. In order to overcome such 
operational obstacles, Operation Lifeline Sudan worked agreements with the 
government o f the Sudan and the opposition movement, which ensured that relief 
aid reached those in need. Serious and sensitive political issues were often taken into 
account in mounting relief operations. Such issues involved securing the co­
operation o f both GOS and opposition forces in the conduct o f relief operations. The 
fact that by 1993 OLS negotiated framework established access to almost all parts of 
southern Sudan, meant that humanitarian principles were asserted as the foundation 
o f  international agencies’ involvement in Southern Sector.
The importance o f these principles is that they enabled OLS to dialogue with 
the opposition movement over relief access. The fact that they shared a core 
common conception enhanced their legitimacy in the Southern Sector. UNICEF and 
other agencies devoted considerable efforts to publicising these standards. Not 
surprisingly, these principles became matters o f public record in southern Sudan, 
increasingly available to individuals, particularly among the insurgents. The 
pervasive knowledge o f humanitarian standards and their widespread legitimacy 
made it increasingly difficult for the opposition movement to openly argue that these 
norms were not applicable to its actions in the territories it controlled. Whether this 
represents a genuine commitment or merely rhetorical acceptance makes a 
difference, but I argue that even rhetorical acceptance created a momentum toward 
genuine adherence to democratic governance in the rebel movement territory. 
Whatever violations there existed in the context o f the civil society, there is no doubt 
that by defining and publicising humanitarian principles and rules Operation Lifeline 
Sudan impacted on the progress that was made toward democratic governance in the 
opposition movements’ controlled areas o f southern Sudan.
568 interview with a senior SPLA officer, Nairobi, September 12, 1996
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EFFECTS OF HUMANITARIAN NORMS ON GOS 
5 . 1 .  OVERVIEW
Chapter 4 has examined the effects o f humanitarian norms on the behaviour o f  the 
rebel movement. It was found that these rhetorical devices were asserted as the 
cornerstone o f relief agencies’ involvement, even though their acceptance was - as 
neorealists and neoliberals rightly argued - partly due to the economic and 
diplomatic incentives that the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army 
(SPLM/A) received from the donor governments and international non­
governmental organisations (INGOs).
The argument of this chapter is that humanitarian norms and principles569 as 
technique for communication and dialogue, though considered inconsequential in an 
anarchic international system, do have some weight that solidarists and social 
constructivists have attributed to them.570 In assessing the relative effectiveness of 
these rhetorical devices on the Khartoum government, the reader should bear in 
mind that there is a difference between success in imposing economic hardship that 
is not within the scope o f this study, and the success in achieving behavioural
5 6 9  T h e  o n to lo g ic a l  g iv e n  fo r  in te rn a tio n a l  so c ie ty  p e rs p e c t iv e  is  th e  u n d e r ly in g  in s t i tu t io n a l  
s tru c tu re ,  a  s tru c tu re  th a t is  d e f in e d  b y  a  se t o f  m u tu a l ly  sh a re d  n o rm s  a n d  e x p e c ta t io n s .  T h is  
s tru c tu re  c a n n o t  b e  d ir e c tly  o b se rv e d . R a th e r , it is  r e f le c te d  in  th e  b e h a v io u r  a n d  e x p la n a t io n s  o f fe re d  
b y  in d iv id u a ls  in  th e ir  c a p a c ity  a s  r e p re s e n ta t iv e s  o f  s ta te s .
In  c h a p te r  2 , p o l it ic a l  h u m a n ita r ia n s  m a in ta in e d  th a t  h u m a n i ta r ia n  n o rm s  a n d  p r in c ip le s  w e re  
n e c e s s a ry  to  fo rc e  th e  G O S  a n d  th e  S P L M /A  to  re s p e c t  h u m a n  r ig h ts , a n d  a l lo w  f re e  a c c e s s  to  th e  
n e e d y  a re a s . A lth o u g h  a  s y s te m  b a s e d  o n  th e  fo rm a l o r  c o n s t itu t io n a l  a u to n o m y  o f  s ta te s  ( th e  
e x c lu s io n  o f  e x te rn a l  in te rv e n tio n )  d o e s  n o t  p re c lu d e  th e  d e  fa c to  in f lu e n c e  o f  e x te rn a l  h u m a n i ta r ia n  
p la y e rs ,  th e  c a s e  o f  th e  O L S  N o r th e rn  S e c to r  sh o w s  th e  v u ln e ra b il i ty  o f  h u m a n i ta r ia n  n o rm s  a n d  
p r in c ip le s  to  S u d a n e s e  so v e re ig n ty .
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reform.571 In spite o f their vulnerability to political and sovereign prerogatives, 
humanitarian/human rights nonns have been useful in communicating572 
international community’s concerns to the Sudanese government. In measuring the 
behavioural changes o f the host government, this chapter will use Sikkink’s 
approach mentioned in the introduction. According to Sikkink, it is enough to say 
norms are effective if the target state denies any wrong doing (e.g. human rights 
violations) or use those norms to justify its actions. OLS is an important case to 
explore the changing conception o f sovereignty, since, as stated in the introduction, 
the GOS has a diplomatic tradition o f anti-Western rhetorics and of intransigent 
defence o f the doctrine o f sovereignty and non-interference. Changes in the 
understandings o f these two stages with regard to humanitarian norms pressure serve 
as an indication o f how sovereignty is being reconceptualised in Sudan.573
5 . 2 .  THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
The Sudanese government role in obstructing relief operation has been generally 
discussed in chapter 1, and in more detail in OLS review document574, and this 
chapter will only state them here briefly. According to Mark Duffield, successive 
Khartoum governments “have sought to promote displacement by sponsoring and 
tolerating raiding and promoting scarcity and famine in the south”.575 The realists 
can rightly argue that armed conflict and deliberate government strategies were 
largely responsible for the long history of famines in the Sudan; famine can be 
regarded as an outcome of political process o f impoverishment resulting from a 
deliberate disruption o f agricultural activities by the parties to the conflict. Three
571 “ B e h a v io u ra l  r e fo rm ” h e re  re fe rs  to  th e  s itu a t io n  in  w h ic h  th e  h o s t g o v e rn m e n t  h a s  b e e n  
p re s s u re d  to  m o d ify  its  h u m a n i ta r ia n  p o lic ie s ,  a n d  its  w il l in g n e s s  to  u se  h u m a n i ta r ia n  n o rm s  a n d  
p r in c ip le s  to  d e n y  o r  j u s t i f y  i ts  a c tio n s .
572 T h e  m a in  a d v a n ta g e  o f  th e  lo g ic  o f  a rg u in g  (c o m m u n ic a tio n )  in  c o n tra s t  to  e c o n o m ic  s a n c tio n s  is  
th e ir  a b il i ty  to  e x p la in  n o t  o n ly  th e  tra n s fo rm a tio n  o f  b e h a v io u r  a n d  in te re s ts ,  b u t  a ls o  th e  
tr a n s fo rm a tio n  o f  id e n ti tie s  a n d  n o rm a tiv e  fra m e w o rk s . T h u s , th e  in te rn a lis a tio n  o f  O L S  p r in c ip le s  
a n d  n o rm s  in  th e  S u d a n  a n d  th e ir  v a lid i ty  w ith in  th e  O L S  N o r th e rn  S e c to r  o p e ra t io n a l  e n v iro n m e n t  
c a n  o n ly  b e  m e d ia te d  b y  th e  p ro c e s s  o f  a rg u in g .
5 7 3  S o m e  h u m a n i ta r ia n  o b se rv e rs  h a v e  e m p h a s is e d  th e  c o n te s te d  n a tu re  o f  h u m a n i ta r ia n  p r in c ip le s  
b u t ,  in  c o n tra s t  w i th  th is  s tu d y , th e y  h a v e  th o u g h t to  e x p la in  v a r ia tio n s  in  te rm s  o f  in te r s u b je c t iv i ty  
s h a re d  id e a s  r a th e r  th a n  th e  c a lc u la tio n s  o f  ru le rs  w h o  a re  fre e  to  c h o o se  a m o n g  m a te r ia l  a n d  
id e o lo g ic a l  r e so u rc e s .
574 S e e  D H A , O L S  R e v ie w , Ju ly , 1996
575 M a rk  D u f f ie ld ,  S u d a n : U n in te n d e d  C o n se q u e n c e s  o f  H u m a n ita r ia n  A s s is ta n c e ,  N o v e m b e r ,  1 9 9 9 , 
p . 56
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specific groups were chiefly responsible for the 1986-88 famine that had taken so 
many lives; three of these groups were vehicles for state policies and were utilised as 
proxies by the government to attack the SPLA and its supporters at a relatively low 
cost to the government. First o f the groups were government-aligned militias and 
others. Their task was to attack and plunder other civilians and take their reward in 
the form o f looted cattle. They also harassed and looted famine migrants. Second 
was the army, which supported militias, isolated some garrison towns from the 
surrounding areas by forcibly preventing civilians from fleeing besieged towns, 
created and maintained artificial scarcities of food in these towns, and actively 
obstructed relief efforts. The third group that contributed to famine in the eighties, 
and much o f early nineties were traders connected with the military. Because the 
army had sole control over the movement o f commodities in garrison towns, some 
officers used this control as an opportunity to extract maximum profits in times of 
scarcities they helped to create.
This GOS counterinsurgency strategy had serious humanitarian consequences 
for the civilian population in the south o f the country. By 1986, an estimated two 
million people were displaced throughout Sudan. While the war was prosecuted in 
Southern Sudan, its consequences in the form of the internally displaced persons 
was felt in Northern Sudan. With the influx of thousands of displaced persons to the 
northern towns in 1990-2, the central government became so concerned that internal 
displacement became an issue at the policy level for the national authorities. 
Accordingly, the Khartoum government saw the implications of such massive 
migration o f the war-victims as posing a potentially veritable threat to the stability 
o f Northern Sudan, especially the capital, Khartoum, where more than fifty thousand 
displaced persons were said by the aid agencies to have congregated.576 However, a 
combination o f domestic and international pressure in the form of shaming and 
sanctioning - which was triggered by television images o f starving Sudanese - forced 
GOS to issue its general draft policy towards the displaced, and to reaffirm the rights 
o f displaced citizens as well as emphasis government efforts to provide relief aid.577
5 7 6  D H A ., O L S  R e v ie w , 1 9 9 6 , 190
5 7 7  G o v e rn m e n t  o f  S u d a n  (G O S ) , A  D ra f t  P ro v id e d  b y  th e  M in is t ry  o f  S o c ia l  W e lfa re ,  Z a k a t  a n d  th e  
D is p la c e d  re g a rd in g  T h e  g o v e r n m e n t’s G e n e ra l  P o lic y  to w a rd s  th e  D isp la c e d :  K h a r to u m : G O S , 
S e p te m b e r  2 2 , 1 9 8 8 , p . 12
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5 . 2 . 1 .  SHAMING AND SANCTIONING GOS BEHAVIOUR
The GOS decision to agree in 1989 that OLS solve the consequences o f its political 
actions in Southern Sudan was due to the shaming behaviour of OLS agencies as 
well as the sanctioning policy of donor governments. Therefore, one o f the lessons 
from chapter 2 is the importance o f setting minimum demands based on 
humanitarian norms and adhering to them regardless o f their perceived weakness in 
an anarchic international system. Even before OLS was established in April 1989, 
international community had already mobilised humanitarian norms to shame, and 
sometimes, to sanction the behaviour of the Sudanese government. In response to 
increasing dissemination o f information on the GOS conduct o f the war in Southern 
Sudan, Western governments578, led by the United States o f America, condemned 
the Khartoum government disregard of the human rights o f its war-affected 
populations. Donor states’ condemnation was followed by the imposition of 
development aid embargo in 1990.
Even though the GOS claimed that such statements constituted unacceptable 
intrusion in its domestic affairs and a violation o f the Sudanese territorial integrity, 
the actions o f the donor states, particularly towards the end o f Communism, indicate 
that they did not accept the GOS claims. As seen in chapter 3, international norms 
provided intervening states with a legitimation to violate Sudan sovereignty on 
humanitarian grounds. The primary witnesses providing human rights data and 
information pertaining to the situation of the displaced population in the Northern 
Sector were the representatives o f humanitarian NGOs. During the period described 
in this thesis, the US State Department had maintained close contacts with and 
sought out the information of NGOs. In fact, early US action on Sudan (discussed in 
chapter 3) was based primarily on the human rights documentation provided by 
American-based agencies such as Catholic Relief Service, US Committee on 
Refugee, Amnesty International, and so forth. In the European countries, points o f 
influence within the state centred on Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Overseas
5 7 8  S ta te s  h a v e  u s e d  a  v a r ie ty  o f  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  in s tru m e n ts  to  in f lu e n c e  th e  b e h a v io u r  o f  fo re ig n  
c o u n tr ie s . T h e s e  in c lu d e , fo r  e x a m p le , fo rc in g  w e a k e r  s ta te s  to  a lte r  th e ir  b e h a v io u r  in  c o n fo rm ity  
w ith  th e  s a n c tio n in g  s ta te ’s p re fe re n c e s ,  a n d  d is s u a d in g  a  ta rg e t  s ta te  f ro m  c a r ry in g  o u t  u n a c c e p ta b le  
b e h a v io u r .  S e e  J a m e s  M . L in d s a y , “ T ra d e  S a n c tio n s  a s  P o lic y  In s tru m e n ts :  A  R e -E x a m in a tio n ” , 
International Studies Quarterly, N o . 30 , Ju n e , 19 8 6 , p p . 1 5 5 -5 6 ; M a rg a re t  P . D o x e y , In te rn a tio n a l  
S a n c tio n s  in  C o n te m p o ra ry  P e rs p e c t iv e ,  N e w  Y o rk , S t. M a r t in ’s P re s s , 198 7
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Development Agency. In the UK and the Netherlands, NGOs such as Oxfam, 
Amnesty International and Pax Christi International provided data and information 
to their respective governments. Indeed, throughout 1989 and mid-1990s NGOs 
attempted to deal with such priorities, and their lobbying effort was accompanied by 
an increasing commitment within donor communities to tackling the realities o f the 
war.579 For example in August 1995, Sudan Focal Point persuaded OLS donor 
governments to pressure the IMF (International Monetary Fund) not to give new 
loans to the Government of the Sudan. According to the Sudan Focal Point 
background policy paper, the IMF policy was part of the strategy to address the 
problem of Sudan’s overdue financial obligations:
“The growing financial co-operation between IMF and Sudan is 
contradictory to the political isolation following gross violations o f  
human rights and international law in Sudan. While the United Nations 
Special rapporteur on Sudan is not allowed by the Government o f  Sudan 
(GOS) to review the human rights performance, the same government 
hails IMF missions to review its economic performance. Even though 
most bilateral and multilateral aid to Sudan is frozen, the ban on IMF 
assistance is lifted. While democratic rights are violated on a large scale,
IMF is reportedly considering the implementation o f a Rights 
Accumulation Program ”.580
The renewed IMF interest was vital to Sudan, as it was attempting to break its 
international financial isolation. This financial isolation severely affected the 
country, particularly when most Gulf States withheld their financial backing after 
Sudan sided with Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991. The success o f transnational 
network advocacy policy led some Western political leaders to link the gradual 
normalisation of the relationship between IMF and Sudan with improvements in the 
human rights and political situation. In early 1993, the Minister o f Foreign Affairs in 
the Netherlands stated, in reply to questions raised by the Pax Christi organisation 
for peace and human rights, that the Dutch Government would not support a 
resumption o f the relations between GOS and the IMF and the World Bank as long 
as political and human rights situation in Sudan has not improved. The success o f 
Pax Christi in persuading the Dutch government to take a tougher line on the
5 7 9  IN G O s , A id e  M e m o ir  to  J a n  E lia so n , K h a r to u m , S e p te m b e r  5, 1992
5 8 0  R e n e  B ro o k le t ,  F ro m  a  C o o p e ra t iv e  T o w a rd s  a  C o n d itio n a l  S tra te g y : B a c k g ro u n d  P a p e r  o n  IM F  
P o l ic y  R e g a rd in g  S u d a n , S u d a n  F o c a l  P o in t -  E u ro p e , C o p e n h a g e n , D e n m a rk , A u g u s t  4 , 1 9 9 5 , p . 1
207
government o f Sudan can be seen as evidence that most substantial contributions to 
the cause o f human rights in the Sudan were contingent on domestic and 
international developments. In April 1994, the Danish government, in co-operation 
with Scandinavian countries, also worked from within the IMF decision-making 
framework to freeze the relationship between the IMF and Sudan until the human 
rights situation improved. As discussed in the previous chapters, the reports and 
counterreports attracted press coverage on the plight o f Sudan war-victims. All these 
examples indicate that state/civil society collaboration on human rights and good 
governance issues will continue to increase. It is worth mentioning here that the 
success o f NGOs’ advocacy in Europe and America would not have been possible 
without the support o f local institutions, in particular the role o f civil society. Local 
Sudanese human rights organisations, such as churches and their humanitarian and 
development wings, in turn, learnt that they could directly or indirectly pressure the 
GOS to change practices by providing information on human rights abuses to human 
rights networks in Africa, US and Europe for inclusion in their advocacy policies. It 
is evident in chapter 4 that by 1989-96, Sudanese NGOs, inside and outside the 
country, began to form and develop significant external contacts. Members o f the 
Sudan Council of Churches, and Sudanese Women Voice for Peace travelled 
frequently to Europe and the United States, where they met with their counterparts, 
talked to the press, and met with the political leaders o f those countries.
These groups sought external contacts to publicise the human rights situation 
of the displaced population in Sudan, to fund their humanitarian activities, and to 
help protect themselves against government repression. In particular, the Church 
organisations were a vital link in providing documentation and information to spur 
the interests and concern o f the donor states policymakers. Much o f the funding for 
domestic humanitarian Church organisations came from European and US-based 
NGOs such as Christian Aid, Norwegian Church Aid, Oxfam, World Vision 
International, and many others. While the effects o f these pressures are examined in 
the next pages o f this chapter, the reader should bear in mind that donor 
governments’ support strengthened humanitarian norms and principles in the 
government controlled areas. It can also be argued from the realist perspective that 
donor states’ willingness to sanction the behaviour o f the sovereignty authority in 
Khartoum was partly influenced by the perceived threat posed by the emergence o f 
Islamic fundamentalism in the Sudan. The decision of donor governments to impose
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development aid embargo against the Islamist regime in Khartoum was motivated 
by concerns among Western governments about Sudan alleged support for the 
Middle Eastern terrorist groups. Giving other Islamist movements access to Sudan, 
and promoting the Islamist movements internationally, were prominent features of 
the post-1989 regime’s policies through the first half o f the 1990s.581 Evidence of 
its complaisance towards, if  not support for, the use o f violence by non­
governmental bodies, was provided by the shelter and protection which it gave to the 
non-Islamic guerrilla Carlos, who resided in Sudan between 1992 and 1994 -  before 
his whereabouts became known to external bodies, and a Sudanese-French deal was 
struck for his kidnapping and transfer to France.582 The regime’s self-perception as 
the co-ordinating point for the international Islamist movement was given 
institutional expression by the Popular Arab and Islamic Conferences (PAIC), of 
which three were held between 1991 and 1995. An official Sudanese government 
publication described the first conference as “the most significant event since the 
collapse o f the Caliphate”, noting that it was the “first occasion where 
representatives from mass movements from all over the Muslim world came 
together in one place”.583
Hassan al-Turabi, then leader o f NIF, saw the PAIC as a vehicle for re­
structuring the world order, replacing the Western-dominated UN structure by a new 
system “comprising free platforms, egalitarian procedures and global 
representation”.584 The radical line espoused by the Sudanese regime ensured that by 
the mid-1990s Sudan had been denied development aid by the United States and its 
Western allies. It must however be stressed here that such geopolitical interests 
played a significant role in ensuring that the Sudanese military regime abides by its 
international obligations, which in this case means respect for humanitarian norms.
581 T im  N ib lo c k , “ S a n c tio n s  a n d  P a r ia h h o o d : T h e  C a se  o f  S u d a n ” , P a p e r  p re s e n te d  to  th e  C o n fe re n c e  
o f  th e  S u d a n  S tu d ie s  S o c ie ty  o f  th e  U n ite d  K in g d o m , h e ld  a t th e  U n iv e r s i ty  o f  D u rh a m  (U K ) , 3 0  
A u g u s t  to  1 S e p te m b e r  2 0 0 0 , p . 3
582 A c c o rd in g  to  N ib lo c k , th is  h a s  b e e n  le f t d e lib e ra te ly  v a g u e  in  so  fa r  a s  th e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  u n d e r  
w h ic h  C a r lo s ’ c a p tu re  a n d  tr a n s fe r  to  F ra n c e  o c c u r re d  re m a in  u n c e r ta in . T h e re  is n o  d o u b t, h o w e v e r ,  
th a t  h is  p re s e n c e  in  S u d a n  h a d  b e e n  a r ra n g e d  b y  th e  S u d a n e se  a u th o r i t ie s ,  a n d  th a t  h e  h a d  c o n ta c ts  
w i th  s e n io r  f ig u re s  in  th e  r e g im e  d u r in g  h is  tim e  in  th e  c o u n try . T h e re  a re  r e lia b le  r e p o r ts  th a t  C a r lo s ’ 
p re s e n c e  in  S u d a n  w a s  le a k e d  to  th e  F re n c h  g o v e rn m e n t  b y  e le m e n ts  in  th e  S u d a n e s e  o p p o s it io n .  S e e  
N ib lo c k , “ S a n c tio n s  a n d  P a r ia h h o o d ” , p . 4 ; Observer, L o n d o n , 14 D e c e m b e r  19 9 7
583 Q u o te d  in  K o b a y a s h i ,  T h e  I s la m is t  M o v e m e n t  in  S u d a n , p p . 2 2 1 -2
584 Q u o te d  in  N ib lo c k , “ S a n c tio n s  a n d  P a r ia h h o d ” , p . 4
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5 . 2 . 2 .  HUMANITARIAN NORMS VERSUS STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Despite Pluralists position on the Westphalian constitutive principles o f sovereignty 
and non-intervention, I argue that the meaning of the Sudanese sovereignty has 
generally changed since the establishment o f OLS in April 1989. As a constitutive 
norm o f international society, sovereignty is the right o f cultural self-determination 
and independence. According to pluralists, states’ decisions are only subject to their 
own will. The right to sovereignty should protect the Sudanese state against 
infringement and secure its rights to independence, autonomy and development. But 
the solidarists are right to argue that the legitimacy and the right to sovereignty of 
states is increasingly measured on the governmental practices o f states against their 
own citizens. In R. J. Vincent’s words, the way a government treats its people 
exposes the “internal regimes o f all members o f international society to the 
legitimate appraisal o f their peers”.585 Thus, the emergence o f a serious human 
rights process in the Sudan operational civil war environment would seem to be the 
most impressive ethical achievement o f the United Nations-led OLS. The 
fundamental idea that the Sudanese government must act within certain prescribed 
limits -  that even political and military leaders might be held accountable for their 
actions if  they amount to severe human rights abuses in the context o f intrastate 
conflict -  represents an important development in international relief system.
As will be seen below, the GOS adopted a series o f varying responses to 
international pressures, each roughly corresponding to a different stage on the 
Sikkink continuum o f the erosion o f sovereignty. The GOS first tried to deny the 
legitimacy o f the humanitarian norms and international concern over human rights 
in the Northern Sector, to discredit United States and foreign NGOs by suggesting 
that its members were part o f a conspiracy of the Islamic regime in Khartoum, who 
are in the country merely to mobilise southern Sudanese nationalist public opinion 
against what it defined as interference in internal affairs. When OLS proved that 
humanitarian nonns and values were similar to those o f the Sudanese people, the 
GOS tried to placate international and domestic opposition by co-operating with the 
UN agencies co-ordinating humanitarian effort in the Northern Sector, while at the 
same time continuing to obstruct access to the displaced camps. By 1995, the GOS
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moved along the continuum from initial rejection o f OLS normative position to 
cosmetic co-operation with the UN, and eventually to some concrete improvements 
in its human rights practices in response to domestic and international pressures.586 
Most importantly for this thesis, the government’s sensitivity to issues o f protection 
and democratic governance was usefully exploited by solidarists. The debate over 
human rights and democracy and concern for international reputation had created an 
opening for the growing number of NGOs and other pro-human rights actors to 
pressure the Islamist regime in Khartoum. I need to put the issue o f reputation into a 
wider perspective. For social learning the actor’s reputation plays a significant 
role.587 Reputation is expressed by the practices o f actors in connection with its 
rhetoric. The actor’s behaviour is judged by others against the normative standard 
that determines the social background for interactions.
The principle o f ‘mirroring’ or ‘appraisal’, which argues “that actors come to 
see themselves as a reflection o f how they think Others see or ‘appraise’ them, in the 
‘mirror’ o f Others’ representations o f the S e lf’ constraints the actor’s behaviour and 
fixes the redefined identities.588 For the sake o f this chapter, the notion o f reputation 
has two dimensions: the first one can be described by ‘standing’ and the other by 
‘prestige’. The concept o f reputation in the form of good standing is an expression 
o f economic and political pressure. In the case of the Sudanese government, it can 
be argued that a mixture o f fear concerning international sanctions and the wish to 
become accepted within international politics led the GOS to adopt humanitarian 
norms and principles. Since compliance with norms is one sign o f integration into 
international society, the Sudanese government was moved to take action on norms 
that it had previously rejected (see chapter 2), and this has led directly to changes in
585 Q u o te d  in  N ic h o la s  W h e e le r  &  T im o th y  D u n n e  (e d s .) ,  H u m a n  R ig h ts  in  G lo b a l  P o li t ic s ,  
C a m b r id g e , C a m b r id g e  U n iv e rs i ty  P re s s , 1 9 9 9 , p . 2
586 S o m e  o f  th e s e  c o n c re te  e x a m p le s  o f  im p ro v e m e n t in  G O S  b e h a v io u r  a re  a ls o  c o n ta in e d  in  th e  
D H A , O L S  R e v ie w , Ju ly , 1996
587 p o r  a n  a n a ly s is  o f  th is  su b je c t  se e  A u d ie  K lo tz ,  N o rm s  in  I n te rn a tio n a l  R e la t io n s :  T h e  S tru g g le  
a g a in s t  A p a r th e id ,  I th a c a /L o n d o n , C o rn e ll  U n iv e rs i ty  P re s s , 1 9 9 5 , p p . 2 9 -3 1 ;  A le x a n d e r  W e n d t,  
S o c ia l  T h e o ry  o f  In te rn a tio n a l  P o li tic s , C a m b r id g e , C a m b r id g e  U n iv e r s i ty  P re s s ,  1 9 9 9 , p p . 3 2 7 -3 3 6
588 W e n d t,  S o c ia l  T h e o ry  o f  In te rn a tio n a l  P o li tic s , p . 3 2 7
211
polices toward protection and access issues. The softening of GOS attitude towards 
OLS and its agencies is contained in the OLS own review document o f July 1996:
This position is well represented in the GOS submission to the Review 
Team, which lists the government’s record o f support fo r  OLS and its 
activities. The thrust o f the argument is that Sudan is unique; a 
government has voluntarily relinquished part o f its sovereignty fo r  
humanitarian purposes. This gesture, however, is being abused by OLS 
in the operation's failure to honour its commitments, and its bias toward 
the rebels. Moreover, donor governments and aid agencies continually 
fa il to acknowledge what the government has done. It is worth noting that 
some donors and aid officials in Khartoum agree with the substance, i f  
not the detail, o f these attitudes from the GOS.589
The Khartoum government’s verbal support for the broadly accepted norms of 
international behaviour and its acceptance o f the UN role in co-ordinating 
international humanitarian efforts in the north were coupled with a failure to address 
the security problems of the displaced persons.590 Nonetheless, the GOS adopted 
international norms, but it did so not because it saw those norms as relating to 
domestic politics or as a natural extension of the Sudanese Islamic norms. Rather, 
adoption o f humanitarian norms was seen as the necessary price o f existence in the 
international society. When those norms were said to have clashed with domestic 
norms -  as discussed in chapter 2 - the Sudanese government was often reluctant to 
respect them. The limitation o f OLS mandate forced the UN to strike a balance 
between GOS political concerns and humanitarian imperatives, and that this 
balancing game shows the practical sophistication of OLS humanitarian diplomacy. 
But many Sudanese, particularly church organisations whose schools and churches 
were closed or confiscated by the central government, accused UN officials of 
conniving with the Sudanese government. One of the Khartoum University lecturers 
I met in Nairobi summarised the general perceptions o f the ordinary people about 
the extent to which UN humanitarian role was undermined by GOS use of its 
sovereignty:
I  have met and spoken with some senior UN officials about the plight o f  
southern Sudanese internally displaced persons in and around Khartoum. I  
can tell you that I  am aware o f the political pressure that UN agencies such
589 D H A , O L S  R e v ie w , p . 43
590 Ib id . p p . 1 8 5 -1 9 2
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as UNDP are experiencing in Khartoum. I understand that their mandates 
makes them work hand in hand with the government. But what I  do not 
understand is why the UN, a body that represents the conscience o f  
international community, should keep silent even in a situation where there 
is a clear evidence that the government was denying access to those who 
want to help our people. Why is the UN here i f  it cannot intervene in matters 
o f serious human rights violations by one o f its member state? From my 
understanding, I  think we have a UN Resident Representative in Khartoum 
who is pro-government, and what he is doing is what I would call 
appeasement policy.591
While such accusations were justified on the grounds that the UN was biased in 
favour o f the Khartoum government, I argue that, given the contradictory nature o f 
the UN Charter, there was not much agencies such as UNDP could do without the 
support o f member states. Those practitioners and scholars who criticised the UN for 
failing to apply fully humanitarian norms in areas under government have ignored 
the fact that OLS was the result o f self-interested humanitarianism o f the Sudanese 
government and the donor states. These mix o f motives and views led to a number 
o f critical limitations for the OLS Northern Sector humanitarian relief mandate. 
First, the framework592 set out by the UN Plan o f Action in March 1989 did not 
include human rights or protection issues for people moving into the Transitional 
Zone, or to government controlled towns. But as discussed in chapter 2, the 
sophisticated nature o f OLS humanitarian diplomacy was not without controversy, a 
controversy which this thesis sees as merely a consequence of the anarchic 
operational war environment. The controversy was, o f course, between realists -  led 
by the UNDP Resident Representative -  and solidarists led by international NGOs 
and Sudanese churches.
For solidarists, the UN failure to effectively apply humanitarian principles in 
the Northern Sector illustrate the problem o f “mission cringe”. According to 
Michael Pugh, the term “Cringe” is a short-hand for a group o f perceived 
inadequacies and appeasing bullies.593 While Pugh’s concept o f “Cringe” refers 
originally to the UN aspect o f peacekeeping -  a subject that is beyond the scope o f
591 In te rv ie w  w ith  N e re o  L o p e , M e m b e r  o f  th e  N a tio n a l  A s se m b ly , N a iro b i ,  J a n u a ry  2 5 , 1996
5 9 2  O L S  f ra m e w o rk , as c o n ta in e d  in  th e  1989  U N  P la n  o f  A c tio n , is  n e g o tia t in g  a c c e s s  fo r  d is a s te r  
r e l i e f  a s s is ta n c e  to  th e  w a r -a f fe c te d  p o p u la t io n . S e e  U N , P la n  o f  A c tio n : S u d a n  E m e rg e n c y  R e l i e f  
O p e ra t io n s ,  K h a r to u m , M a rc h  4 , 19 8 9 , p . 2
5 9 3  M ic h a e l  P u g h , “ F ro m  M is s io n  C r in g e  to  M is s io n  C re e p ?  Im p lic a t io n s  o f  n e w  p e a c e  su p p o r t  
o p e ra t io n s  d o c tr in e ” , O s lo , In s t i tu t t  fo r  F o rs v a rs s tu d ie r ,  1 9 9 7 , p . 7
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this thesis -  it can also be useful in describing the relationship between OLS 
(regarded by solidarists as having appeasement policies) and the GOS ( considered 
by many humanitarian players as a bully). Thus, “mission Cringe” is defined in 
terms o f the problem at the level o f OLS mandate as well as the lack o f political will 
from the UN and member states. The prevalence of mission cringe can be seen from 
the extent to which questions o f humanitarian norms and principles have become 
secondary to political and sovereign prerogatives. Even the OLS own 1996 review 
document acknowledged the existence of mission creep when it argued that “the 
omission o f such crucial considerations (protection issues) was especially 
noteworthy given the widespread public knowledge of, for example, the massacre o f 
Dinka in Ed D a’eim and Wau in 1987 and 1988, which left several hundred people 
dead”.594 The concept of “mission cringe” is also useful in describing donor states 
in action to deal with such tragic human rights violations. The failure o f powerful 
states to translate their support for humanitarian principles into practice can be seen 
from the way GOS exercised significant control over the choice o f UN 
implementing partners through regulatory mechanisms that restricted the OLS 
Northern Sector operationality.
Because the GOS was a party to the conflict, some NGO officials argued that 
the principle o f neutrality was frequently violated both by the government’s 
insistence on ownership o f OLS operation, and by the fact that this ownership was 
not sufficiently challenged by the UN.595 Officials of NGOs wanted the OLS 
Northern Sector to take a more proactive human rights position, meaning in practice 
confrontation with the Sudanese government.596 That is, the UN failure to 
effectively apply humanitarian principles in the Northern Sector shows the 
prevalence o f mission cringe because it reflected inadequacies in OLS mandate and 
the lack o f political will from the more powerful members o f the UN. Those who 
favoured a more assertive humanitarianism (e.g. the inclusion o f human rights 
issues) in the Northern Sector argued that the 1994 genocide in Rwanda would have 
been prevented if  the international community undertook a more assertive
5 9 4  D H A , O L S  R e v ie w , p . 187
595 In te rv ie w  w ith  I a n  L e v in e , 1996
596 In te rv ie w  w ith  N il  C a rs te n s e n , S u d a n  F o c a l P o in t  -  E u ro p e  C o o rd in a to r ,  R io  d e  J a n e iro ,  A u g u s t  
7 , 199 6
214
intervention.597 Solidarists saw Rwanda genocide as a consequence o f the post-Cold 
War appeasement policy o f the UN and member states.598 In theory, this view can be 
supported on the grounds that the World Body has all the necessary policy 
instruments to effect some changes in the way governments deny the rights o f their 
own population to external humanitarian assistance. In practice, however, this kind 
o f idealism which seeks to resolve such sensitive political issues through 
confrontation with a host government has ignored the realist view that the UN, 
working through the Security Council, operates on the basis o f political choices 
made by its member governments, and is subject to the ideological interests of the 
powerful states. Mark Duffield and John Predergast rightly argued in the Middle 
East Report that during the Cold War the UN donor states were inclined to disregard 
evidence o f human rights abuses on the part o f allies and potential client states while 
highlighting those o f adversaries.599 Even if the Cold War has gone, these political 
interests have not changed much, though they have been redefined as discussed in 
chapter 3. Even after OLS was established in April 1989, following the reduction in 
East-West ideological conflict, the UN has not only subjugated its normative 
position to the geopolitical considerations o f its more powerful members, but also to 
the prerogatives of sovereign state for smaller powers or states. As one Dutch citizen 
o f Sudanese origin explains:
Sometimes people go through their own emotions, and many o f them say 
things which they know are impracticable in a situation such as ours 
where the UN was allowed to intervene under certain agreed conditions 
with the host government. Given the trauma o f the war, I  understand why 
many NGOs in the Northern Sector are criticising us (UNDP) fo r  not 
applying humanitarian principles in the same way they have been 
implemented in the Southern Sector. They, (NGOs) have deliberately 
failed to see the different circumstances o f the two OLS operational 
environments. In the Southern Sector, it has been possible to use these 
principles to dialogue with the rebel movements because both rebel 
factions agreed to abide by them. This is not the case in the Northern 
Sector, where the central government is still in control. The March 1989 
Plan o f  Action gives the Government o f Sudan the responsibility to deal 
with relief aid and protection issues. The UN role in this sector is one o f  
facilitation, which includes building the capacity o f  government
5 9 7  U N IC E F /O L S , R e p o r t  o n  W o rk s h o p s  o n  H u m a n ita r ia n  P r in c ip le s  fo r  S u d a n e se  N G O s , N a iro b i ,  
A p r i l  5, 1 9 9 5 , p . 6
598 In te r v ie w  w ith  C a rs te n s e n
5 9 9  M a rk  D u f f ie ld  &  J o h n  P re n d e rg a s t ,  “ S o v e re ig n ty  a n d  In te rv e n tio n  a f te r  th e  C o ld  W a r:  L e s so n s  
f ro m  th e  E m e rg e n c y  D e s k ” , Middle East Report, M a rc h -J u n e , 19 9 4
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structures dealing with internally displaced population. I f  there are some 
violations o f human rights, we normally report them to the concerned 
authorities. We do not often go public on these kind o f sensitive issues; 
we only go public i f  all avenues have failed. Our policy o f working with 
government officials has helped reduce abuses against displaced
population.600
This has been the view of ICRC officials I met in Lokichoggio, and it underlines the 
importance realists attach to state sovereignty.601 It is important to bear in mind that 
the UN Charter recognises the importance o f domestic jurisdiction in Article 2 (7), 
which prohibits UN interfering with the domestic affairs o f its member states. This 
means that domestic jurisdiction is protected by the non-intervention principle. This 
norm has played a useful role in international affairs, not least in affording Sudan 
some protection against international community attempt to apply humanitarian 
norms and principles. While it is true that OLS was established with the consent o f 
the Sudan government, this was not done without such a programme benefiting the 
sovereign authority in Khartoum. In fact, the March 1989 UN Plan o f Action did 
not give the international community a blank cheque to operate without some 
constraints imposed by the Westphalian constitutive principles. In supporting GOS 
policy for the internally displaced, the UN has recognised that sovereign authorities, 
where they have not collapsed as in the OLS Northern Sector, should take 
responsibility for the needs o f their war-victims. Although solidarists saw GOS 
control o f the Northern Sector programmes as a clear breach of humanitarian 
principles, the UNDP officials, on the other hand, took the realist position by 
arguing that GOS ownership o f the Northern Sector operation was merely exercise 
o f  its political and sovereign prerogatives. The UNDP Resident Representative to 
the Sudan, Mr. Christopher Jaeger, views reflected the principles o f the UN Charter, 
which gave prominence to the constitutive principles o f sovereignty and non­
intervention:
The UNDP prefers to work with the host government, because this is the 
only realistic and practicable way o f raising the issues o f protection and 
access in the Northern Sector. I  have no doubt that our approach to the 
protection issues o f internally displaced persons has worked well 
because the Government o f the Sudan, which was previously suspicious
6 0 0  I n te rv ie w  w ith  B o r te l  C o n , U N D P  o ff ic ia l ,  G e n e v a , M a rc h  15, 199 6
601 In te rv ie w  w ith  a n  IC R C  o ff ic ia l ,  L o k ic h o g g io ,  J u ly  13, 1997
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o f UN role in the north, has now come around to appreciate our work in 
the Northern Sector. Local authorities in Khartoum and in other northern 
towns, where displaced people are camped, have been very co-operative 
in this venture. Our strategy is not to impose certain values or 
regulations from outside, but rather to use those that are already 
available within the country; that is, we work within the framework o f  
domestic norms and regulations.602 
This statement shows that the deference accorded sovereignty by the UN meant that
the OLS Northern Sector had to balance the need to assist the displaced population
with the needs o f the political authorities. As one international civil servant told this
author during one o f the UNICEF’s workshops in Lokichoggio, “This is a take and
give situation; the GOS gave OLS a high degree o f freedom in the Southern Sector,
and the UN gave back some o f the GOS lost credibility in the south by
pragmatically accommodating Khartoum’s interest in the Northern Sector”.603 It can
thus be argued from the constructivist position that NGO concept o f human rights,
no matter how conceived, seems distant from the realities o f international society.
One UNDP official, who had worked in the Northern Sector for many years,
stressed the importance of striking a balance between host government’s political
concerns and humanitarian imperatives:
I  support the so-called UN appeasement policy because, despite the 
frustrations relief workers like myself encounter in the field, it 
encouraged local authorities in many towns to co-operate with us. As a 
southern Sudanese, I  would have like this government to be totally 
isolated internationally fo r  what it is doing to our people. But my 
experience o f working in this kind ofpolitically sensitive environment has 
convinced me that working within the system is better than confrontation 
with the authorities. These NGOs who are now calling for a 
confrontation between international community and the government have 
forgotten that it was they who partly created the tragedy of 1986 in which 
thousands o f southern Sudanese lives were lost. During that time very 
few  o f  them even were willing to mention the word 'human rights What 
is going on here is politics, and through UNDP, we have been able to 
find  a way around it. What I  want to tell you here is that we have found a 
way o f feeding the displaced population in the north. It is not perfect, but 
that is how it is.604
The way to minimise political pressure is, o f course, through pragmatic and 
consensual approach to protection and access issues. Many NGOs, particularly the
6 0 2  In te rv ie w  w ith  C h r is to p h e r  Ja e g e r , ,  M a y  12, 1996
603 Ib id .
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ecumenical organisations, failed to grasp the fact that international society, in which 
the Sudan government is a member, is generally negative about the humanitarian 
role o f international institutions, who seem to pursue humanitarian diplomacy by 
way o f countervailing power, and disregard human rights altogether except when 
humanitarian challenges induce philanthropic responses.605 It is clear from chapter 
3 that governments are dominated by self-help modes o f thinking, and this 
orientation is transferred to most of the personnel working on behalf o f United 
Nations agencies. Any debate examining the prospects for international 
humanitarian norms is treated by most realists as a waste of energy -  or worse, a 
diverting manifestation of naive or utopian thinking. In the case o f the OLS 
Northern Sector, solidarists had failed to accept the fact that the pursuit o f human 
rights was hampered by the strength of Islamic realism, which was represented in 
the ideological orientation o f policymaking elite in Khartoum. For example, one 
senior Sudanese diplomat was very clear of what the GOS expect from humanitarian 
organisations operating within the territory under its effective control:
We are not against anybody who want to help our war-victims, otherwise 
we would not have allowed OLS to operate in any part o f the Sudan.
What we are opposed to is the attempt by some foreign relief agencies to 
bypass national structures. The Government will accept external 
assistance fo r  its internally displaced population on condition that such 
aid is in our national interest. Like any other sovereign authorities in the 
West, the Government o f the Sudan will not tolerate any relief 
organisation, including UN agencies, which directly or indirectly try to 
violate Sudanese sovereignty in the name o f the so-called humanitarian 
aid. It is better fo r  our people to suffer rather than to accept national 
humiliation by outsiders.606
The diplomat’s statement reflects GOS determination to own and control OLS 
programmes in the Northern Sector. Thus, for OLS to function within the territory 
controlled by the government in Khartoum, the UN had to strike a balance between
6 0 5  T h e re  a re , h o w e v e r ,  r e a l is t  a rg u m e n ts  fo r  th e  in s tru m e n ta l  u se  o f  in te rn a tio n a l  in s t i tu t io n s  in 
r e la t io n  to  th e  fo re ig n  p o l ic y  g o a ls  o f  U N  m e m b e r  s ta te s . F o r  e x a m p le , s e e  T h o m a s  M . F ra n c k , 
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the prerogatives o f sovereignty and humanitarian imperatives.607 In fact, the OLS 
Northern Sector thrived on that balance in what is arguably a suspicious and hostile 
operational environment. Not surprisingly, the pragmatists within OLS were able to 
accommodate the political realities to a larger extent, even in the face o f human 
suffering. This means that the stressing o f the independent humanitarian nature o f 
OLS was crucially important for its credibility and acceptance in the host country, as 
well as for security reasons. This accommodation was an inevitable part o f the OLS 
Northern Sector operational landscape, and the Sudanese government, within the 
constraints o f its sovereignty, worked together with the UN Country Representative. 
This is bad, but what is the alternative to this approach? Aware o f the negative 
implication o f any confrontation with the national authorities, UN responded to GOS 
control o f OLS Northern Sector’s programmes with a high degree o f realism and 
pragmatism. As one UN official explains: “Throughout 1992-5, we have tried to 
convince the authorities that it is in the national interest o f the Sudan that 
government relief structures should be seen to be working well. I remember telling 
the RRC Commissioner that there is too much bureaucracy and corruption among its 
officials, and this is bad for the image of not only the country but also that o f the 
government. The interesting thing I heard from him was that ‘there is not much my 
office can do because this layer o f bureaucracy is from the top-down. If I make any 
movement that would signal to my boss that I am trying to clean up my department I 
will be sacked’. You see, these are the types of obstacles we often encounter when 
trying to assist the people of Sudan. It is not just the RRC Commissioner who is 
fearing to lose his job; even those o f us who are working for UNDP are afraid of 
losing our jobs. The UNDP country-Representative has a very close link with the 
government, and he does not want to hear anything that would put him into 
confrontation with the authorities in Khartoum. Those o f us who want to assist the 
internally displaced southern Sudanese will have to work within these kinds of 
constraints. This is the best way because we don’t lose our jobs, and the people we 
are helping will also continue to get the little help and protection that our presence 
afford to them”.608 In spite of such constraints, the UN agencies continued to
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dialogue with the central government on the best ways o f channelling relief aid to 
those in need in the Northern Sector. The UN decision not to apply these norms and 
principles in the same manner it did in the Southern Sector was based on a 
pragmatic understanding o f the obstacles of reconciling the principles o f  state 
sovereignty enshrined in the UN Charter with those o f humanitarianism contained in 
the Geneva Conventions. The contradictions -  intervention to restore international 
peace and security and the principles o f sovereignty and non-intervention - which 
are contained in the UN Charter regarding external humanitarian intervention in 
member states, ensured that the UN agencies know how to balance the humanitarian 
needs o f the displaced population with the interests of the host government. This is 
not an easy balancing act because in a war environment such realism is bound to be 
misunderstood by one party or a group of relief agencies. In Khartoum, where there 
were many southern Sudanese politicians and intellectuals, UN pragmatic approach 
was described as “appeasement”. But as discussed below, it was GOS interpretation 
o f the role o f humanitarian norms which presented OLS with a serious challenge to 
its local normative legitimacy.
5 . 3 .  CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF NORMS
The difficulties o f applying international norms in an environment where a 
sovereign authority has not collapsed are reflected in the contradictory 
interpretations o f what humanitarian norms and principles should mean in practice. 
There were two conflicting interpretations o f what role humanitarian norms and 
principles should play in the OLS Northern Sector. First, for the Sudanese 
government, humanitarian principles were seen as merely devices for implementing 
the long-term needs o f the displaced population in government areas. Accordingly, 
humanitarian principles meant the rights o f displaced people to self-reliance. GOS 
interpretation of humanitarian norms and principles can be seen from the Islamic 
perspective. The concepts o f tawhid (which implies God’s ultimate ownership of 
wealth) and Khilafa (which stands at the heart o f the relationship between God and 
man, carries with it ethical responsibility) underpin a vision that translates into 
systems for ordering human affairs centring on the achievement o f universal justice 
by striking a balance between the legitimate needs and aspirations of individuals and
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communities on the one hand and their responsibilities towards each other, the 
created realm and the creator on the other in a holistic, eqalitarian framework.609 
According to this concept, which has its central aim the achievement o f equity based 
on a conviction that all members o f the human family have an equal right to the 
basic essential for a decent life, humanitarian norms can only be applied if  they are 
not harmful to what they are intended to help. For the GOS, international 
community’s obsession with human rights was harmful to the long-term 
development needs o f the displaced population: it is from this perspective that GOS 
interpretation o f OLS principles should be understood. The Islamic vision insists on 
a balance between the material and spiritual aspects o f life, upholding a concept o f 
development as the realisation o f human dignity, including the spiritual dimensions. 
This Islamic understanding o f how humanitarian norms and principles should be 
applied in practice needs to be seen from the wider perspective. As discussed in 
chapter 2, the Islamic concept of humanitarian norms is not different from that 
enshrined in the Charter o f the UN. The Declaration on the Right to Development, 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1986, explicitly affirmed the existence of 
the human rights to development, thus formally recognising a principle that was at 
the core o f the post-Cold War II human rights movement. That principle was 
explained by President Roosevelt in his State o f the Union Address o f 1944: ‘True 
individual freedom cannot exist without economic security and independence. 
Necessitous men are not free m en’.610
In the same 1944 address, President Roosevelt elaborated on a list o f economic 
rights, such as to food, clothing, housing, health, education and employment, that 
according to him comprised economic security.611 These items were incorporated 
into the UN Charter in October 1945. Moreover, the Vienna Declaration o f 1993 
obliges donor states to balance their human rights approach with the right o f the 
war-victims to development. Accordingly, the recognition o f the right to
609 S e e , fo r  e x a m p le , F a z lu r  R a h m a n , “ L a w  a n d  e th ic s  in  I s la m ” , in  R ic h a rd  G . H o v a n n is ia n ,  E th ic s  
in  I s la m , M a lib u  C A ., U n d e n a  P u b lic a t io n , 1983 , p . 12. S e e  a lso , S e y y e d  H .,  T ra d i t io n a l  I s la m  in  th e  
M o d e m  W o r ld ,  1975
610 E le v e n th  A n n u a l  M e ss a g e  to  C o n g re s s  o f  th e  P re s id e n t,  11 J a n u a ry  1 9 4 4 , c ite d  in  Is re a l i ,  F .L . 
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development as an inalienable human rights confers on its implementation a claim 
on OLS resources, and obliges donor states to support that right in the Northern 
Sector. Although it is true that there has been considerable debate between industrial 
democracies and Third World countries around the question o f whether the right to 
development can be regarded as a human right, the GOS position is clear -  it is a 
human right. GOS interpretation o f humanitarian principles is not surprising, and 
OLS Review document, which analysed in detail the social impact o f humanitarian 
assistance in the Sudan, provides a number o f reasons as to why GOS was desperate 
for OLS resources:612 First, there was considerable pressure for humanitarian aid to 
become more developmental, in order to bridge the growing gap in investment 
finance since the early 1990s; second, in the absence of development assistance and 
adequate public welfare financing, there was increasing encroachment by other 
groups into humanitarian resources targeted at the war-displaced. In areas, where 
there were no public services in the displaced camps, international agencies 
substituted for government services; third, the absence o f recurrent government 
finance begs the question as to whether or not developmental relief interventions can 
be sustainable. According to OLS Northern Sector Co-ordinator, Christopher Jaeger, 
humanitarianism should lead eventually to self-reliance:
We often define humanitarianism as putting bread in the mouth o f a 
starving person, but it is not humanitarian to let him get into that 
situation. We should replace free food deliveries and make people repay 
what they have received; this is what we are doing in Wau...People 
should repay this humanitarian loan not to us but to their community. We 
are taking them o f  the beggar mentality. People are proud to pay for  
themselves ...this is part o f  society building, enabling people to feel more 
consciously self-reliant. It is linked to democracy building because 
people have to elect a management committee.6,3
Therefore, the relationship between the UN and the local authorities can be seen 
from the acknowledgement o f both sides that a switch from relief to development 
would remove the trauma o f charity and restore the dignity of the displaced persons 
in the Northern Sector. By working closely with the sovereign authorities, the OLS 
Northern Sector did not absolve itself from its protection mandate as solidarists have 
asserted above. On the contrary, OLS has discharged its international obligations in
612 F o r  d e ta i l  a n a ly s is  o f  th e se  th re e  im p lic a t io n s , se e  D H A , O L S  R e v ie w , J u ly ,  1996
613 Q u o te d  in  O L S  R e v ie w , 19 9 6 , p. 100
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a manner compatible to its negotiated framework that relied on consensual 
agreements with the national government in Khartoum. As the UN Resident 
Representative puts it: “Some relief agencies do not understand that despite our 
attempt to implement GOS internally displaced policy, our behind-the-scene 
diplomacy has been useful in encouraging local authorities to respect human rights 
and grant more access for OLS implementing partners. There are those who are 
impatient with our approach, but there is not much we can do under the current 
circumstances. In fact without our quiet diplomacy, many international NGOs would 
have been expelled from the country long time ago. Our negotiated framework, 
which takes into consideration political and security concerns, is the most realistic in 
any war environment. The UN is not here to impose certain standards o f behaviour 
on the host government. It is here to assist those uprooted from their homes by war, 
and it does this through engagement with the authorities concerned”.614 This 
statement supports constructivists argument that the two natures represented by 
realism in the form of political concerns and idealism in the form of humanitarian 
imperatives were necessary for the survival of UN operations in Sudan. Given that 
the Northern Sector did not experience the destabilising effects of the war, this 
author argues that for the internally displaced persons to overcome the trauma of 
charity, relief-to-development approach is the best option in such a peaceful 
environment.
Indeed, the success o f  humanitarian principles should be seen from the extent 
to which they encouraged self-reliance among the internally displaced people in the 
Northern Sector. In this scenario, talks o f human rights will fall in the sand unless 
those norms and principles address the underlying problems o f poverty. The issue of 
transition from relief to development is not unique to Sudan. As mentioned in the 
previous chapters - within the donor humanitarian community - the concept o f a 
relief-to-development continuum has gained popularity in recent years. The 
proponents o f these ideas define complex humanitarian emergencies as situations in 
which people cannot sustain life by their own efforts.615 Therefore, the use of 
humanitarian principles as devices for shaming also fitted well with the GOS
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understandings: that they are developmental policy instruments. According to OLS 
Review document, in affirming the need to incorporate displaced southerners into 
the economy of the north, the UN had effectively supported GOS development 
policy: “The original framework of OLS, which defined the operation as a 
government programme, focused on achieving and reinforcing government 
objectives with regard, among other things, to its agenda for development. This 
development agenda -  for example, the attempt to establish self-reliance among 
internally displaced populations through settlement schemes -  establish self-reliance 
among internally displaced populations through settlement schemes -  fitted well 
with the UN’s own adoption of a relief-to-development continuum approach. It thus 
provided a means for the UN to continue working within the highly constrained and 
politicised context o f North Sudan. In this regard, the Review Team feels that it is 
not entirely correct to say that the UN has been hostage to the demands o f 
sovereignty in the Northern Sector. Rather, there has been a convergence o f interests 
between UN and GOS -  and indeed donor community -  objectives with regard to 
developmental programmes”.616 While the Review Team took a more sceptical 
position with regard to the UN handling of humanitarian principles in the north617, 
this author argues that the marriage o f convenience between the UN and the host 
government was a pragmatic understanding of what the role o f these international 
norms should be in an environment where the population is struggling to make ends 
meet.
The second interpretation o f the role o f norms was adavanced by donor states 
and NGOs. For these humanitarian players, there is no doubt that humanitarian 
norms and principles were constructed in order to dialogue with the host government 
over the issues o f human rights and democratic governance. Unlike the old order of 
the Cold War where instrumental authoritarianism can be tolerated as long as the 
government in power is an ally against the spread o f Communism, the end o f the 
bipolar international system has meant that powerful states have had to redefine their 
strategic relationship with their former satellites in the Third World. Donor 
governments used to commit funds for an emergency intervention in one country on
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the basis o f where it stands in relation to communism and capitalism. As discussed 
in chapter 1, the United States and its Western European allies consciously 
influenced the delivery o f humanitarian action to enhance the prospects o f the 
Khartoum government. While the emphasis on political ideology is much reduced, 
international politics as well as donor countries’ foreign policies continue to 
influence donor’s decision-making. By 1990 the government o f Sudan (GOS) was 
marked for human rights abuse and blacklisted for supporting terrorism. 
Consequently, it was banned from receiving development assistance from the United 
States and Western Europe.618 This had negative impact on the Sudanese economy. 
While a detailed analysis o f the economic situation in the country is beyond the 
scope o f this thesis, the reader should bear in mind that economic sanctions have had 
negative effects on the Sudanese economy generally.619 With the national economy 
in doldrums, the GOS was desperate for OLS resources. From the early 1990s Sudan 
was plagued by strongly fluctuating growth rates, high inflation, and severe balance 
o f payments support problems. Consequently, the economy turned inward, with the 
share o f  exports to GDP at less than 8%, one o f the lowest among developing 
countries in the world. By the end of 1993, Sudan’s external debt stood at US$ 18 
billion, the equivalent o f US$ 800 per capita.620 Attempts to reform the economy 
through enhanced agricultural production, liberal marketing arrangements, and 
greater privatisation, were unsuccessful due to development aid embargo imposed 
by the donors.
International community decision to punish the regime in Khartoum was 
justified on the basis of international norms in which the GOS was accused o f 
violating. Nonetheless, the use o f development aid embargo as a device for 
communicating international community’s indignation with the way the sovereign 
authority in Khartoum treats its war-victims was just as divisive as the debate in
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chapter 2. The section below explores these differences o f opinions over sanctions 
regime.
5 .3  .1  . DEBATING THE LOGIC OF SANCTIONS
This section illuminates the problem of using economic penalties to encourage 
policy changes in the areas controlled by a sovereign authority that is determined to 
hold part o f its population hostage to its political agenda. While the realists can 
claim that the effectiveness o f humanitarian principles were undermined by the 
different motives and views among humanitarian players in the Northern Sector, I 
argue that the usefulness o f these rhetorical devices can be seen from the extent to 
which they have provided a framework for communication and dialogue between 
the international community and the Sudanese authorities. This form o f interaction is 
based on Habermas’ theory o f communicative621 action in which actors 
communicate with the aim o f reaching a mutual understanding not through acts o f 
egoistic calculations but based on a reasoned consensus.622 Risse and Sikkink point 
to two situations in international politics within which argumentative behaviour and 
therefore social learning occurs; diplomatic negotiations and public debates. Public 
debates differ from diplomatic negotiations because they are usually not confined to 
state actors.
As seen in chapter 2, NGOs or human rights advocacy networks participate 
regularly in international public debates about human rights and increasingly 
participate in decision-making about the reputation and legitimacy o f states. These 
advocacy networks provide a ‘common lifeworld’, which is seen as a precondition 
for reaching a reasoned consensus. They involved a widely shared common 
language, an inclusive moral vocabulary concerning human rights and a well- 
developed normative structure evolved in practice.In the case o f this study, evidence
621 T h o m a s  R is s e -K a p p e n  &  K a th ry n  S ik k in k , “T h e  P o w e r  o f  P r in c ip le s :  T h e  S o c ia l iz a t io n  o f  
H u m a n  R ig h ts  N o rm s  a n d  D o m e s tic  C h a n g e ” , in  T h o m a s  R is se ,  S te p h e n  R o p p  &  K a th ry n  S ik k in k  
( e d s .) ,  T h e  p o w e r  o f  P r in c ip le s :  In te rn a tio n a l  H u m a n  R ig h ts  N o rm s  a n d  D o m e s tic  C h a n g e , 
C a m b r id g e , C a m b r id g e  U n iv e rs i ty  P re ss , 1 9 9 9 , p . 13
622 R e a s o n e d  c o n s e n s u s  is  n e c e s sa ry  fo r  re a c h in g  a  c o m m o n  d e f in i t io n  o f  th e  s i tu a t io n  a n d  o n  th e  
u n d e r ly in g  n o rm a tiv e  f ra m e w o rk . T h e re fo re ,  c o m m u n ic a tio n  in  th e  fo rm  o f  a rg u in g  (a s  i t  is  in  
c h a p te r  2 )  is  a  p ro c e s s  o f  so c ia l  le a rn in g  in  w h ic h  in te re s ts  a n d  id e n ti t ie s  c a n  c h a n g e . W ith in  th is  
p ro c e s s  n o rm s  a n d  a rg u in g  a re  m u tu a lly  c o n s t itu t iv e ,  a n d  th e re fo re  th e  re a s o n a b le n e s s  o f  th e  n o rm  
i t s e l f  is  s te a d i ly  d is c u s se d , so  th a t  th e ir  m e a n in g  c a n  b e  c h a n g e d  a s  w e ll.
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show that both NGOs and the donor states used humanitarian principles to 
communicate and dialogue with the Islamist regime in Khartoum. For example, 
when donor states imposed development aid embargo on Sudan in the early 1990s, 
they did so to communicate their opposition to the GOS human rights record in the 
context o f the civil war. Regardless o f whether one accepts the optimistic or 
pessimistic measures o f sanctions success, it is clear that application o f development 
aid embargo on Sudan had generally resulted in desired humanitarian outcomes -  
that is, respect for human rights and allowing free relief aid access to those in need. 
The relative ineffectiveness of economic sanctions as instruments o f communication 
or dialogue are not unique to Sudan; the international relations literature is littered 
with such failures. One o f the most widely accepted ideas about international 
statecraft is that economic sanctions are an ineffective instrument o f foreign policy. 
Economist Charles Kindleberger argues that “most sanctions are not effective”623, 
while Margaret Doxey concludes her analysis o f sanctions by noting that “in none of 
the cases analyzed...have economic sanctions succeeded in producing the desired 
political result”.624 The general scepticism in the international relations literature 
about the overall effectiveness o f sanctions does not derive from the inability to 
impose hardship on the target state, but from the assumption that punishment 
encourages the desired political goals are achieved. In the case of the OLS Northern 
Sector, however, the use o f sanctions to encouraged the desired political goals has 
become morally problematic. It has polarised the opinion of international 
community in Sudan: realists - those who support the “logic o f positive sanctions” - 
includes the UN and GOS officials, and the proponents o f negative sanctions -  
solidarists. The author will attempt to examine these two opposing views within the 
context o f the OLS Northern Sector.
A. THE LOGIC OF POSITIVE SANCTIONS
The first view is that o f those who supported the “logic o f positive sanctions” 
approach or realists. Strictly speaking, economic sanctions can involve positive 
incentives (“carrots”) designed to punish undesirable behaviour, and to compel
6 2 3  C h a r le s  K in d le b e rg e r ,  P o w e r  a n d  M o n e y : T h e  E c o n o m ic s  o f  In te rn a tio n a l  P o li t ic s  a n d  th e  
P o l i t ic s  o f  In te rn a tio n a l  E c o n o m ic s ,  N e w  Y o rk , B a s ic  B o o k s ,  1 9 7 0 , p . 9 7
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desired political change. According to the “logic of positive sanctions” an effective 
way to influence the behaviour o f the GOS is to provide economic rewards, such as 
increasing development aid. Thus, GOS acceptance o f humanitarian principles to 
guide its conduct was based on its understanding that the international community 
would strike a balance between human rights and development. As stated above, the 
GOS argued that its policies were the best ways of removing the stigma o f charity 
from its displaced population because they would promote self-sufficiency among 
the war-displaced, as well as encouraging a policy o f “peace from within”. Thus, the 
GOS understanding o f humanitarian principles as meaning self-reliance for the 
displaced population reflected a convergence o f thinking between the UN and the 
host government regarding the need for a transition from relief to development.625 
Some NGO officials subscribed to the logic of positive sanctions that favour the idea 
o f supporting government policies during the emergency phase: “Embargoes and 
other limitations even provoke negative solidarity among the population affected. 
Usually it even helps the most extremist and nationalistic leaders to strengthen their 
position. The shift o f governmental and inter-governmental aid has taken place 
through civilian society or through political leaders who want to give their country a 
certain stability. This is not a naive view, but the only way to provide support also to 
a new generation o f politicians in poorer countries and to prevent resorting again to 
corruption or clan solidarity”.626
Although this is a minority view among NGO officials, the statement does 
illustrate the importance o f giving aid to the dictatorial government in Khartoum as 
away o f changing its undemocratic policies and methods. Even if  sanctions can 
encourage capitulation, the case o f  the GOS has shown that it can also increase 
resolve and determination, especially if  the target state (in this case Sudan) considers 
the issues o f vital national interest. Not surprisingly, the proponents o f the logic o f 
positive sanctions argued that sanctions can be politically ineffective because 
economic harm often weighs disproportionately on the poor population while only
6 2 4  M a rg a re t  D o x e y , E c o n o m ic  S a n c tio n s  a n d  In te rn a tio n a l  E n fo rc e m e n t ,  N e w  Y o rk , O x fo rd  
U n iv e r s i ty  P re s s ,  19 7 1 , p . 139
6 2 5  T a h a , H ., R e p o r t  o n  O L S  E x e c u te d  P ro je c t:  S U D /8 8 /0 3 2  E m e rg e n c y  A s s is ta n c e  to  D is p la c e d  
P e r s o n s ,  in  p re p a ra t io n  fo r  te rm in a l  e v a lu a t io n , P P E R  a n d  a u d it, N e w  Y o rk , U N D P , 1995
6 2 6  D r. R e g in a l  M o re e ls ,  Id e a s  o n  H u m a n ita r ia n  A id , In te rv e n tio n s  a n d  F ie ld  D ip lo m a c y :  T h e  
C h a lle n g e  to  P e a c e m a k in g  in  A fr ic a , L o n d o n , a  c o n fe re n c e  p a p e r ,  In te rn a tio n a l  A le r t,  A u g u s t  2 3 , 
1 9 9 4 , p . 6
228
marginally affecting a regime’s political and military leadership. For example, when 
the US and its Western allies imposed development embargo against the Islamist 
regime in Khartoum in the early 1990s, it was the ordinary Sudanese civilians who 
suffered from unemployment and lack o f basic services, but had limited impact on 
government and military officials. As mentioned above, some UN officials in the 
north share the strategy that notwithstanding human rights violations, donor states 
should have maintained and increase economic contact, using international 
economic relations to foster GOS behavioural change. Even if  maintaining 
economic contact might not have led to human rights improvement, the analysis of 
this chapter has cast doubt on the effectiveness o f humanitarian principles as 
rhetorical devices for sanctioning GOS behaviour. Indeed, the Sudanese Minister for 
External Affairs, Dr. Mustafa Osman, was very frank o f what the government saw as 
the role o f humanitarian principles:
These people (donors) tell us to respect humanitarian law, but they are 
the first to disrespect them. By allowing the UN to operate and even at 
times challenge government policies, we have fulfilled our obligations as 
required by the international humanitarian law. Unfortunately, however, 
donor community has decided to victimise our country fo r  this. By 
imposing development embargo on our country, these donors have in fact 
imposed severe poverty on the Sudanese population. How can you expect 
our government to respect humanitarian principles which are used by 
anti-Islamic forces in the West to perpetuate not only the suffering o f our 
people but also to divide the country? What kind o f logic is this which 
talks o f human rights, but, at the same time, denies the very people it is 
trying to protect their rights to development? I think there is a more 
sinister motive beyond this talk o f humanitarian aid, and humanitarian 
principles. We have made it clear in 1994 to the UN General Assembly 
that we will not tolerate the use o f humanitarian aid to undermine the 
sanctity o f  our sovereignty. I f  the donor governments really want to assist 
the displaced population they should cease their political activities.627
Hence, GOS violation o f humanitarian principles should be seen from the context to 
which these principles were unable to meet the domestic material interest o f the host 
government. It is obvious from the Minister’s statement above that the GOS saw 
sanctions not just a violation o f its sovereignty, but also as a violation o f 
humanitarian norms and principles. Broadly speaking, at least from the GOS 
understanding, the donor states’ position is incompatible to the 1993 Vienna
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Declaration, and the UN Charter discussed above, which recognised the right to 
development as a universal and inalienable right. After these two international 
instruments (the UN Charter and Vienna Declaration), it is clear that many Sudanese 
leaders such as the Foreign Minister quoted above argued that it was no longer 
acceptable to promote one set o f rights as against another, or to put forward some 
rights, such as economic and social, to be fulfilled prior to or violation of other 
rights, such as the right to relief aid, civil and political rights, and vice versa. In this 
respect, all rights are to be fulfilled, and the violation o f any one is as offensive as 
that o f any other. For this reason, the analysis above clearly shows the extent to 
which the host government felt cheated by the donor community. It was not only the 
Islamist politicians who saw sanctions as violating humanitarian principles, but even 
the Christians within the establishment believed that the international community, in 
imposing economic sanctions against the Khartoum government, has undermined 
the neutrality and impartiality o f OLS normative position. According to the 
Assistant Minister o f  Foreign Affairs, Anglican Bishop Gabriel Roric:
“The decision by the international community to deny the Sudanese the 
right to self-reliance violated OLS humanitarian principles, and thus 
rendered humanitarianism meaningless in the eyes o f  the impoverished 
Sudanese population. From the Christian perspective, humanitarian 
principles, in their concrete meaning, means human dignity. Human 
dignity, in turn, means raising the standards o f living o f the impoverished 
popidation, particularly those displaced by the war in southern Sudan. 
Without development aid, there will never be any peace in Sudan. There 
are some people who think that by imposing economic sanctions against 
the country they are punishing the incumbent government. They are 
wrong because the sanctions are not harming those o f  us in government, 
but the very people that the international community is trying to help.
When relief agencies talk o f humanitarian principles while the same time 
supporting development aid embargo against the country, they do not 
seem to understand what these principles stand fo r ”.628
Indeed, development aid embargo imposed in 1990 by international community has 
raised questions regarding the morality o f economic sanctions. Taking into the 
consideration the fact that the war in Sudan is a resource conflict, the Bishop is
6 2 7  In te rv ie w  w ith  D r. M u s ta fa  O s m a n  Ism a il ,  S u d a n e se  M in is te r  o f  E x te rn a l  A ffa irs , N a iro b i ,  M a y  
15 199 7
6 2 8  In te rv ie w  w ith  B ish o p  G a b r ie l  R o r ic , A s s is ta n t  M in is te r  o f  F o re ig n  A ffa ir s ,  G e n e v a , M a y
1 3 ,1 9 9 6
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correct in stating that without development aid, peace will inevitably be difficult to 
achieve. The causes o f the humanitarian emergencies in the Sudan were discussed in 
chapter 1, and can be summarised here into two essential categories: economic and 
political. In the view o f many government officials, such as that o f the Assistant 
Minister above, impoverishment and conflict are the basic economic and political 
forces that underlie the suffering in Sudan to which humanitarian assistance 
responds. Although economic embargo remains a popular tool o f statecraft because 
it provides an alternative to military humanitarianism -  that is the use o f armed 
intervention to assist non-combatant civilian population trapped in war zones -  
economic embargo is also a morally problematic instrument because they cannot 
discriminate between civilians and government officials. After all, as the Assistant 
Minister puts it correctly above, it is not those o f them who were harmed by 
sanctions, but the internally displaced persons, and the impoverished local 
population in the north. As one GOS official told this author, “humanitarianism for 
us is prerequisite for development; only when the UN meets that condition, will the 
government take humanitarian principles seriously”.629
Some scholars share this GOS view, and they argue that the failure by the 
donor community to address the realities o f the OLS Northern Sector is that there is 
no collective policy in relation to political Islam.630 The humanitarians who 
supported the logic o f positive sanctions believe that the absence o f a common 
position on political Islam reflected another reality that aid policy was unable to 
address, and led to a number o f important differences between policy in the GOS 
areas and areas controlled by the rebel movement.631 This has affected the national 
economy, and created important differences in terms o f access and protection issues. 
But the argument o f  those supporting the logic o f positive sanctions was not shared 
by many humanitarian players such as donor governments and NGOs. This brings us 
to the question as to whether donors, in imposing development aid against the 
Khartoum government, had violated OLS humanitarian norms and principles.
6 2 9  In te rv ie w  w ith  Ib ra h im  T a y ib , O ff ic ia l  in  th e  D e p a r tm e n t  fo r  D is p la c e d  P e rso n s ,  G e n e v a , M a rc h
5 ,1 9 9 6
630 S e e , fo r  e x a m p le , D u f f ie ld ,  M ., “ S u d a n : U n in te n d e d  C o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  H u m a n ita r ia n  A s s is ta n c e ” , 
N o v e m b e r ,  1999
631 In te rv ie w  w ith  J a n  G ru ite rs
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B. THE LOGIC OF NEGATIVE SANCTIONS
The second view is that o f the supporters o f the “logic o f negative sanctions” or 
solidarists. The “logic o f negative sanctions” advocated by some Western 
policymakers and NGOs assumes that the most effective way to deter Sudan not 
only from obstructing relief access, but also from supporting terrorist groups and 
Islamic extremists is through the imposition of sanctions. Numerous scholars have 
pointed to internal reconstruction as a method o f socialising rogue states to a 
particular international order. Those working in the realist tradition have found the 
internal reconstruction of weaker states by more powerful states to be a common 
feature o f international relations.632 As discussed in chapter 3, the principal 
justification offered by Western policymakers for the imposition of embargo on 
development aid against Sudan was the believe that support for Islamic terrorist 
groups is not in the geopolitical interests o f the donor states and needs to be 
abolished. Sanctions advocates, particularly NGOs and other interest groups, argued 
that economic penalties should be imposed on the Islamist regime in Khartoum in 
order to compel the government to alter its policies.
As stated in the beginning of this chapter, the bedrock o f NGO activity is the 
collection o f accurate information and its timely dissemination. On the basis of their 
analysis and dissemination, NGOs try to persuade public authorities to respect the 
rule o f law.633 One way o f doing that was to pressure donor states to sanction the 
behaviour o f the host government. For example, some Church leaders, such as 
Archbishop Paolino Lukudu o f the Catholic Church, and Bishop Joseph Marona of 
the Anglican Church, pointed out that economic embargo against the Khartoum 
government was necessary to convey a moral message, that is, to express outrage at 
the human rights violations in the context o f the civil war.634 However, from this 
author’s experience, donor governments, and NGO community advocated sanctions 
for strategic reasons, basing their argument on consequentialist logic: economic
632 S e e  J o h n  Ik e n b e r ry  a n d  C h a r le s  K u p c h a n , “ S o c ia l iz a tio n  a n d  H e g e m o n ic  P o w e r” , International 
Organization, V o l. 4 7 , N o . 4 , 19 9 3 , p p . 2 9 2 -3 1 4
6 3 3  S e e  th e  d e b a te  in  Foreign Policy, V o l. 105 , W in te r , 1 9 9 6 -1 9 9 7 , p p . 9 1 -1 0 6 , b e tw e e n  A ry e  N e i te r  
w h o  s tre s s e s  th e  im p o r ta n c e  o f  m o ra l  c o n s is te n c y  o f  N G O s  (“ T h e  N e w  D o u b le  S ta n d a rd ” ), a n d  
J e f f r e y  G a r te n  w h o  s tre s se s  th e  m a n y  ro a d s  to  p ro g re s s  a n d  th e  n e c e s s i ty  fo r  f le x ib le  ju d g e m e n t  in  
c o n te x t  -  a n d  b y  im p lic a t io n  th e  to le ra n c e  o f  in c o n s is te n c y  ( “ C o m m e n t:  T h e  N e e d  fo r  P ra g m a tis m ” ).
634 I in te rv ie w e d  th e  tw o  c h u rc h  le a d e rs  d u r in g  a n  e c u m e n ic a l  c o n fe re n c e  h e ld  in  N a iro b i  o n  7 M a y ,
19 9 7
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hardship and international isolation, they believed, would compel the Sudanese 
authorities to respect human rights and allow access to those in need o f relief 
assistance. As one humanitarian practitioner puts it:
The pursuit o f peace should not diminish human rights considerations. 
Protecting human rights is key to the process o f  creating conditions for  
peace. Calls fo r  an easing o f U.S. isolation o f Sudan as an incentive fo r  
peace before the regime changes the way it treats its own citizens are 
misplaced and would make it even more difficult to induce compromise 
from Khartoum...Perceived short-term strategic imperatives should not 
diminish U.S. advocacy fo r  democratisation.635
Because force is considered the most extreme and least desirable foreign policy 
instrument, development aid embargo offers a useful instrument short o f military 
intervention. Perhaps one o f the reasons that sanctions have generally been 
considered ineffective tools is that they have been judged successful only when the 
desired political goals are achieved. But, if  success o f sanctions is determined not 
only by the political and government changes achieved but also as part o f a state’s 
overall repertoire for exercising influence and communicating intentions in world 
affairs, sanctions can be considered far more effective. Solidarists believe that it is 
wrong to dismiss sanctions as ineffective because in the case of Sudan they have 
served as important, though not very effective, symbols of communication between 
the UN, donor states, and the Sudanese government.636 This is true because, like all 
weak states, the Sudanese government knew that expelling the UN or shutting down 
OLS would have been more costly in terms of the degree of suffering and the 
subsequent instability such a decision would bring to the country. In fact, privately, 
many within the government acknowledged that without OLS humanitarian 
programmes that have assisted not only the displaced but also local communities in 
terms o f health services and long-term community-based projects, it would have 
been difficult for the local authorities to maintain law and order among displaced 
persons.637 In this case sanctions were useful in moderating the behaviour o f the 
Sudanese government, and in forcing it to make even cosmetic changes.
635 P re n d e rg a s t ,  B u i ld in g  fo r  P e a c e  in  th e  H o rn  o f  A fr ic a , p . 15
636 Ib id .
637 In te rv ie w  w ith  B ish o p  R o r ic ,  A s s is ta n t  M in is te r  o f  F o re ig n  A ffa irs
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5. 3 . 2 . GOS ISLAMIC VERSION OF DEMOCRACY
It is evident from the previous chapters that one of the reasons for sanctioning GOS 
behaviour was to encourage the Sudanese government to move towards returning 
the country to the liberal form of democratic governance. Thus, the use o f 
humanitarian principles for sanctioning and cajoling have been an effective way of 
demonstrating international community’s resolve to make the central government in 
Khartoum aware o f its national and international obligations. Although it is true that 
humanitarian access to the people in need was restricted, and that some aid agencies 
were thrown out o f the country by the local authorities, I argue that economic 
sanctions imposed by the donor community had softened GOS exercise o f its 
sovereignty. Attempts by the central government in Khartoum to allow some 
semblance o f democracy can be seen as evidence that international norms have had 
some effect on GOS behaviour. These political devices impacted on the behaviour 
o f the national authorities in Khartoum in two ways -  Elections, the emergence o f 
division between President Beshir and Hassan el-Turabi, then leader o f the National 
Islamic Front (NIF), and the implementation of Islamic federal model.
A. POPULAR PARTICIPATION
The first impact concerns the extent to which the GOS was able to establish some 
form o f democratic elections. Even if the elections were not done according to the 
Westminster model and thus considered by this author as mere cosmetic exercise, 
this thesis nevertheless argues that the GOS attempts to implement its Islamic 
version o f democratic governance was indeed an indication o f the effects of 
humanitarian principles. As sanctioning devices for donor governments, 
humanitarian principles were said by some diplomats to have moved the Islamist 
regime towards some form of democracy .638 In rejecting donor community call for a 
Western-based multi-party democracy, President Omer Beshir argued that Western 
democracy based on political parties was too divisive. He wanted unmediated 
“popular participation” to manage, build, and secure the country .6 3 9  The logic 
behind this “popular participation” is that a mobilised public would fight corruption
638 I n te rv ie w  w ith  a n  E r itre a n  E m b a s s y  o f f ic ia l ,  N a iro b i ,  Ju n e  14, 1998
639 Al-Dustur, 4 September 1989 (JPRS-NEA-89-069)
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and promote economic production. The Islamist within the establishment argued that 
the people could be wielded into a harmonious unity to promote virtue and prohibit 
vice, as required by Islam .640 As stated in chapters 1 and 2, these concepts meshed 
with Hassan Turubi’s criticism of European democracy for dividing people 
artificially through political parties and fostering amoral political behaviour. It is 
obvious in chapter 2 that for many NIF followers, economic dependence has brought 
subservience to Western economic interests and political pressures, including 
demands for evidence o f good governance, which had increasingly involved the 
introduction o f liberal democratic procedures. That means that the right o f 
democracy is both a means and an end in the struggle for human rights with freedom 
o f conscience, expression, religion, right to fair trial, and security. As one US State 
Department official puts it:
Although the Article 21 o f the Universal Declaration provides that the 
will o f  the people shall be the basis o f  the authority o f  government 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections, too many governments 
continue to speak o f democracy, even as they rig elections and suppress 
dissent...For our purpose democracy is not just developing and holding 
elections but respecting human rights in a robust civil society 
characterised by the rule o f law, healthy political institutions, 
constitutionalism, and independent judiciary with open and competitive 
economic stmctures, an independent media capable o f engaging in 
informed debate with freedom o f religion and belief mechanisms to 
safeguard minorities in fu ll respect for women's and worker's 
rights... These are the principles, which together with elections form the 
basis o f  a culture o f  democracy.641
As mentioned in chapter 2, these external pressures were seen by the Islamist 
government in Khartoum as Western conspiracy to undermine the emergence o f an 
Islamic state in Sudan. A further problem for liberal democracy among Islamists is 
associated with its secular ethos, and in particular materialism that flies in the face 
o f fundamentalist religious government. The resurgence o f fundamentalist political 
Islam and the subsequent impact o f Islamism, presented a further challenge to what
640 A l-D u s tu r ,  S e p te m b e r ,  1989
641 H a ro ld  H o n g ju  K o h , (A s s is ta n t  S e c re ta ry  fo r  D e m o c ra c y , H u m a n  R ig h ts  a n d  L a b o u r ) ,  P ro m o tin g  
H u m a n  R ig h ts  in  th e  P u rs u it  o f  P e a c e : A s s e s s in g  2 0  y e a rs  o f  U S  H u m a n  R ig h ts  P o lic y ,  s p e e c h  
d e liv e re d  a t  th e  U n i te d  S ta te s  In s t i tu te  fo r  P e a c e ,  17 M a rc h , 19 9 9 , p. 9
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Mike Mannin called “liberal triumphalism” .6 4 2  Thus, in GOS thought, democracy is 
associated with secularism and is, therefore, a transgression o f Allah 's (God) law. 
But the discussions o f democracy in Islam raises questions about the status o f 
religious minorities. As stated in chapter 2, dhimmi status often meant political 
discrimination against non-Muslims. The unfortunate thing is that Qur’an provides 
little guidance regarding the form of government God ordains for self-styled Islamic 
leaders such Turabi. Not surprisingly, the abuse o f human rights in the context o f the 
war is directly related to the lack o f democratic Islamic institutions in the Sudan. 
Sudan case shows Islam has a totality o f view, exclusive o f other beliefs which 
militates against full participation in electoral democracy. As Turabi has stated 
above, multi-party politics is erroneous and inimical to Islamic values. In 
consequence, the incompatibilities of Islamic and liberal philosophy preached by 
Western scholars, exacerbated by the emergence o f extremist parties such as NIF, 
can be identified as a major threat to democratic freedoms.643 Bernard Lewis, for 
example, summarises Islamic fundamentalists’ attitude to the electoral process as 
“one man, one vote, once” .644
Gilles Kepel and Lewis contend further that liberal democracy is incompatible 
with neither Islamic fundamentalism nor Islam itself.645 According to Amos 
Perlmutter, the true nature o f Islam is not merely resistant to democracy but wholly 
contemptuous o f and hostile to the entire democratic political culture; it is “an 
aggressive revolutionary movement as militant and violent as the Bolshevik, Fascist, 
and Nazi movements of the past; it cannot be reconciled with Christian, secular 
West, as such, the United States should make sure the movement is stifled at 
birth” . 646 Although such statements represent an aggregated image o f Islam, they do, 
to some extent, confirm the kind of pronouncements made in this thesis by the 
Sudanese Islamic leaders. In fact, the Islamic democratic system, as seen above, 
seems to have left little scope for popular participation in politics. By virtue o f their
6 4 2  M ik e  M a n n in ,  “ G lo b a l  I s s u e s  a n d  th e  C h a lle n g e  to  D e m o c ra tic  P o l i t ic s ” , in  C h a r lo t te  B re th e r to n  
&  G e o f f r e y  P o n to n  (e d s .) ,  G lo b a l  P o litic s :  A n  In tro d u c tio n , O x fo rd , B la c k w e ll  P u b l is h e rs ,  1 9 9 6 , p . 6
643 B e rn a rd  L e w is , “ I s la m  a n d  L ib e ra l D e m o c ra c y ” , Atlantic Monthly, F e b ru a ry ,  1 9 9 3 , p . 91
644 Ib id .
645 K e p e l  a rg u e s  fu r th e r  th a t  “ re je c t io n  o f  e v e n  a  c h im e r ic a l  n o t io n  o f  d e m o c ra c y  is a c tu a l ly  in h e re n t  
in  Is la m ic  r e lig io u s  d o c tr in e ” . S e e  h is  T h e  R e v e n g e  o f  G o d : T h e  R e s u rg e n c e  o f  I s la m , C h r is t ia n i ty  
a n d  J u d a is m  in  th e  M o d e m  W o r ld ,  A la n  B ra le y ,  P e n n s y lv a n ia  S ta te  U n iv e r s i ty  P re s s ,  1 9 9 4 , p.  194; 
L e w is ,  “ I s la m  a n d  L ib e ra l  D e m o c ra c y ” , p . 93
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enforcement o f the Sharia law, President Beshir and his ministers were owed 
obedience. They were not obliged in any way to consult the Sudanese people, and 
though they were supposed to rule justly, there was no mechanism to remove the 
regime. However, in spite o f this troubling side o f Islamic version of democracy, 
international pressure in the form o f shaming and sanctioning the behaviour o f the 
Sudanese government had forced the Islamists within the establishment to make 
some cosmetic reforms. For example, in October 1989, the GOS set up “popular 
salvation committees” to help distribute relief food and maintain security in their 
localities . 6 4 7  Based loosely on the Libyan model, they were trumpeted as a crucial 
step toward democracy. This approach was systematised during the conference for 
National Dialogue on the Political System held from July to October 1990, which 
decided that 9,000 local communities would select representatives for district-level 
committees and town assemblies who would then form a regional parliament. In an 
attempt to sweeten up his Islamic version of democracy, President Beshir stated that 
some delegates would be elected by direct elections while others would be elected 
indirectly by economic congresses and societies for women and youths. 6 4 8  Such 
cosmetic changes were not enough to persuade the donor community, which was 
concerned with the obstructionist humanitarian relief policies o f the Khartoum 
government.
Then in January 1992, following threats from the donor governments that 
development aid would be withheld unless the Khartoum regime returned the 
country to multi-party democracy, the government established a 330-member 
Transitional National Assembly (TNA ) . 6 4 9  This was the first all-appointed 
parliament since the Islamist-inspired military regime came to power in June 1989. 
Despite limited information on the workings o f the TNA, one can glean examples o f 
dissent within its committees. Most government bills were passed without serious 
debate, but some members expressed concern that drafts were introduced by NIF 
task forces without the knowledge o f either the attorney general o f the relevant TNA
646 A m o s  P e r lm u tte r ,  “ W is h fu l  T h in k in g  A b o u t I s la m ic  F u n d a m e n ta l is m ” , Washington Post, 19 
J a n u a ry ,  199 2
6 4 7  A1 S h a rg -a l-A s w a t,  11 O c to b e r  1989  (F B IS -N E S -9 1 -1 9 4 , 7 O c to b e r  1991)
6 4 8  A l-S a f i r ,  2 4  F e b ru a ry  1993  (F B IS -N E S -9 3 -0 4 1 , 4  M a rc h  1 9 9 3 )
6 4 9  O m d u rm a n  ra d io , 4  J a n u a ry  1992  (F B IS -N E S -9 2 -0 0 4 , 7  J a n u a ry , 19 9 2
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committee .6 5 0  Since the appointed TNA lacked credibility and legitimacy, the 
government continued to talk about elections. President Beshir claimed to favour 
elections that would be “open to all citizens in all areas” .651  By 1993, the GOS 
moved another step forward by holding grassroots elections. During this period, 
GOS officials claimed that 1,600 basic congresses were held in villages and districts, 
in which more than five million citizens participated . 6 5 2  No political parties were 
allowed since the government argued that congresses provided the best way to 
express the pluralism of opinions. When the local elections were finally held in 
1994, the government suffered its worst results since coming to power by force; 
opponents o f the government defeated NIF candidates. For example, in Atbara - the 
main industrial and railway city, which had a history o f politicised trade unionism - 
most NIF candidates lost to members o f (illegal) Communist and Democratic 
Unionist Parties.6 5 3  Regional-level elections in 1995 were also problematic, even 
though the government tried to avoid the previous fiasco by requiring candidates to 
support government policies. President Beshir declared that those elected would 
“uphold justice” and proclaim “There is No God but Allah” . 6 5 4
We want deputies who will sti~uggle for Islam and are ready to sacrifice
their lives and wealth fo r  the sake o f sharia.... The office o f a deputy....is
a trust to which one will be answerable on the day o f judgement. It is an 
oath taken before God and allegiance to God the most high and not 
selfish gains but fo r  service to the faith and the adherents o f the faith .655
Such rhetorical statements reflects the humiliation the GOS suffered during the 
grassroots elections. Ghazi Salah al-Din spelled out NIF’s approach to democracy: 
“We must unify the country through a divine Islamic policy open to all...Elections 
are being held...not on the basis o f the party system but on the basis that the entire 
Muslim society belongs to one party, the party o f God” . 6 5 6  However, problems o f 
registering voters delayed elections until 8  March 1995. A long-delayed elections for
6 5 0  In te rv ie w  w ith  L a w re n c e  L u a l L u a l, M e m b e r  o f  th e  T ra n s it io n a l  N a t io n a l  A s s e m b ly , N a iro b i ,  
A p r i l  8 , 19 9 7
651  S u d a n  N e w s le t te r ,  F a ll,  19 9 3 , p p . 1-4
6 5 2  T N A  m e m b e r  to  O m d u rm a n  ra d io ,  K h a r to u m , 2 M a rc h  1993 (F E B IS -F E S -9 3 -0 4 2 )
6 5 3  S H R  V o ic e ,  K h a r to u m , 13 D e c e m b e r , 1994
6 5 4  P re s id e n t  O m a r  B e s h i r ’s sp e e c h  to  L a h a m d a  tr ib e  o n  O m d u rm a n  ra d io ,  8 J a n u a ry  1995  (F E B IS -  
F E S -9 5 -0 1 3 ,  2 0  J a n u a ry  19 9 5 )
6 5 5  Ib id .
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the 400-member national assembly and the presidency were held from 6  to 17 
March 1996. But it was boycotted by all major political parties. President Beshir ran 
for presidency against 49 other candidates. President Beshir won 75.7 percent in the 
general elections in which election officials claimed that the turnout was 72 percent 
whereas opposition politicians argued that 95 percent o f the public boycotted the 
polls .6 5 7  Whatever the arguments, and counterarguments about the nature and the 
merits o f the Sudanese Islamic democracy, the GOS was able to claim some political 
ground. The GOS claimed that it allowed elections to go on, but that the opposition, 
bent on removing the government by force, boycotted it. In fact, outside Khartoum, 
there were apparently greater efforts to ensure that representation on local and 
regional councils reflected the area’s ethnic and tribal composition and therefore 
would acquire legitimacy. Through its powers to appoint 10 percent o f the members, 
the government also guaranteed that even fractions o f ethnic groups would be 
represented . 6 5 8
In addition to establishing the facade of a mass base and electoral legitimacy, 
the GOS sought to create the appearance o f geographically decentralised rule. Its 
federal system was based on N IF’s Sudan Charter, which called for the central 
government to retain authority over national defence and security, foreign policy, 
nationality, and so forth. Most importantly, Khartoum controlled the judiciary and 
legal codes, the financial system, economic planning, and education. 
Decentralisation was tightly circumscribed. These views were reflected in the 
recommendations o f conferences on the peace process (October 1989) and the 
political system (October 1990), which led to decree o f a federal system on 4 
February 1991.659 The elections sought to put a veneer o f legitimacy on the 
political system. The thesis understands that elections and top-down efforts to 
promote democratic change are themselves insufficient and must be complemented 
by grassroots level democracy and peacebuilding. As one SPLM/A official told this 
author in Nairobi: “The Sudanese people will continue to suffer as long as ordinary
6 5 6  A l-A h d  (B e iru t ,  L e b a n o n ) ,  21 A p r il  1995 (F B IS -N E S -9 5 -0 9 0 , 10 M a y  19 9 5 )
6 5 7  L e  M o n d e , P a r is ,  M a rc h , 1 9 9 6 , p p . 2 4 -5
6 5 8  A h m e d  E in a s ,  “ T h e  D y n a m ic s  o f  L o c a l  P o li t ic s  a n d  th e  S e a rc h  fo r  L o c a l L e g i t im a c y  in  K a s a la  
S ta te ” , U n p u b l is h e d  p a p e r  d e liv e re d  a t th e  In te rn a tio n a l  S u d a n  S tu d ie s  A s s o c ia t io n  C o n fe re n c e ,  
C a iro ,  E g y p t, Ju n e , 1 9 9 7 , p . 7
6 5 9  B e n a ia h  Y o n g o -B u re ,  “ S u d a n ’s D e e p e n in g  C r is is ” , M id d le  E a s t  R e p o r t,  N o . 172 , S e p te m b e r-  
O c to b e r ,  19 9 1 , P- 12
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citizens are not given the opportunity to participate freely in the conduct o f 
democratic elections” .660 This patrimony o f political intolerance clearly reveals itself 
in the country’s undemocratic institutions, which favour the authoritarian Islamic 
model o f democratic governance and is viewed as normative instrument o f political 
control. Such elections can become a means not to reconcile differences but to 
solidify them. Instead o f consolidating the regime’s legitimacy, however, the 
election emphasised its narrowly partisan and ideological nature. In other words, 
GOS Islamic version o f democracy has failed to meet the conditions set by liberal 
democracy. From liberal perspective, a transition to democracy is the move from 
authoritarian (Islamic) rule toward more democratic rule which includes a gradual 
relaxation o f civil, political restraints and the existence of free elections. It was not 
surprising that donor states, no longer driven by polarised ideological 
considerations, were unimpressed and unwilling to buttress authoritarian and 
illegitimate Islamic regime in Khartoum. The continuation o f economic sanctions is 
a clear sign that donor states remained unimpressed about the mixed signals coming 
from Khartoum.
B. IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURS
The second impact is that at least at the top leadership o f the government these 
devices had encouraged serious debate on whether the GOS should go ahead with its 
radical version o f Islamic system of governance or not. The power struggle between 
President Omer el-Beshir and Hassan al-Turabi and the expulsion o f Turabi from 
government, can be seen as evidence that international pressure had some effects on 
the behaviour o f GOS. As stated in chapter 2, President Beshir wanted a more 
moderate form of Islamic state that would be attractive both nationally and 
internationally, but Turabi wanted a comprehensive imposition o f an Islamic state in 
the Sudan. After nearly a decade o f isolation, the Sudanese President started to make 
overtures to governments in the region, but his efforts were undermined by Turabi 
and NIF supporters. Following the sacking of Turabi on 12 December 1999, 
President Beshir moved on to impose a three months state o f emergency and
660 Interview with Elijah Malok, SPLM/A Political Adviser, Nairobi, July 26, 1998
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dissolved parliament pending new elections.661  Significantly, Beshir’s showdown 
with Turabi had implications for regional stability and security. As discussed in 
chapter 3, relations between Sudan and its neighbours were at their ebb since the 
Islamist regime in Khartoum came to power in June 1989. However by the late 
1990s, Beshir’s power struggle with al-Turabi, was seen by many Sudan observers 
as a signal to neighbouring states and international community as a whole that 
Sudan had put aggressive Islamist policies behind and was trying to embrace 
international norms and live peacefully with its neighbours .662 Indeed, following 
Turabi’s departure from government in the year 2000, President Beshir visited or 
sent emissaries to several countries, including the Democratic Republic o f Congo 
(DRC), Egypt, Eritrea and Qatar. He also tried to improve relations with Ethiopia, 
Kenya and Uganda. By 1998, Beshir’s showdown with Turabi reversed a number of 
diplomatic relations in the region, with Asmara already moving toward to establish 
full diplomatic relations with Khartoum. These events would not have been possible 
if  it had not been because o f the shaming and sanctioning behaviour o f OLS and its 
donor governments. Therefore, humanitarian nonns and principles were useful in the 
Northern Sector operational environment. However, the prospects for democratic 
consolidation in the Sudan remain remote, as northern ruling elites seek to preserve 
dwindling economic privileges and contain the war in the south of the country.
C. ISLAMIC FEDERAL MODEL
The third attempt to placate international public opinion was in 1991 when the 
Islamist regime came with a federal system which will divide Sudan into 26 
autonomous regional states. During this year, President Beshir imposed an 
anomalous federal political system which is contained in the National Islamic Front 
(NIF) Sudan Charter. The core o f the Sudan Charter was twofold: the 
implementation o f Islamic Sharia Law and unequivocal opposition to secularism (no 
separation between religion and state). Turabi’s Islamic Charter was based on the 
principle that sovereignty is invisible.663 The Criminal Act o f 1991, emphasised
6 61  B B C  W o r ld  S e rv ic e , F o c u s  o n  A fr ic a , L o n d o n , D e c e m b e r  12, 1999
662 Ib id .
663 R e x  S. O ’F a h e y , “ Is la m  a n d  E th n ic ity  in  th e  S u d a n ” , Journal o f  Religion in Africa, V o l. 2 6 , N o . 
3 , A u g u s t  19 9 6 , p . 2 6 3
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huddud punishments.664 Despite the manifest aim to create a new Sudanese Islamic 
identity, which includes educational policies, monetary and fiscal policies, 
acculturation and war, yet the Khartoum government claims that the federal system 
it adopted was aimed at attenuating the Western and Southern discontent o f its 
Islamic orientation. There is no doubt that federalism was naturally welcomed in the 
Sudan. It is difficult to fathom an ‘Islamic Federal Model’, especially how it may 
operate, given Islam’s insistence o f governing according to the Holy Quran and the 
Suna and in a Unitarian fashion. Turabi federalism has four major weaknesses. First, 
it was designed for an Islamic state and perhaps could only operate within that 
sphere. Second, it lacks real distribution of real political power because power is 
concentrated in the centre and in the hands o f the Arab ruling elite. Hence, the 
proposed federal system does not in practice meet the basic principles o f self-rule 
and shared rule normally witnessed in formal federal arrangement. Third, the 
Khartoum government federal model lacks national consensus on the system of rule 
that should be instituted in the Sudan. Fourth, the 26 states proposed in the 
government federal system lack any economic, cultural, social and political 
autonomy normally expected in federal arrangements. States without state-rights 
diminishes the character o f federal design. As such, the Sudanese government 
Islamic federal model does not qualify as federation at all, rather it is an anomalous 
system which does not fit into a federal category, but an oligarchical, patrimonial 
and authoritarian one-party state.
Thus, those who support this option for a united democratic Sudan maintain 
that a decentralised polity will limit centrifugal pressures rather than exacerbate 
them; Southern Sudanese will want to remain within one country if  they find room 
for self-expression and self-rule instead of being pressured to assimilate and being 
denied their distinctive identities. That kind o f rational argument would have been 
welcomed by all the Southerners in the sixties when the region was desperately 
seeking for a federal status within the borders o f the Sudan. Now, Southern public 
opinion is no longer in the mood to accept the SPLM/SPLA proposal for a 
restructuring o f the political system of a state which they believe was constructed 
out o f sheer political trick and deception. It is important to emphasise here that 
southern Sudanese political culture has evolved since 1955 in a spirit o f rejection
664 O ’Fahey, “Islam and Ethnicity in the Sudan”, p. 263
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and oppression and with a strong sense o f cultural, traditional and territorial 
injustice. This culture indicates that the so-called Southern problem is primarily 
constitutional, being concerned with statehood and territorial sovereignty. The 
problem evolves into unyielding competition for political control and power. 
Control o f political system does more than safeguard citizenship and sovereignty; it 
gives to the power holders the right to distribute vital, but scarce, economic and 
social resources. The problem, therefore, has also become one o f access to such 
resources and bias in the resulting pattern of social and material wellbeing o f the 
Northern and Southern Sudanese. While there is no doubt that among proponents o f 
national unity there is now a better understanding of basic issues and even laudable 
proposals for solution to the challenges to the Sudan state, there are still many 
problems and obstacles on the path o f genuine dialogue which would create mutual 
understanding and respect and recognition o f the multinational character o f the 
country. This is because, each group in the conflict has a definite ends. Arab- 
Muslims, above all, want to maintain the link with the Middle East. In their view in 
defending the Arab-Islamic identity they safeguard their own and Sudan’s economic 
interests; they protect religion, as well as their social identity. In this situation both 
groups can only fear one another; the Southern Sudanese are afraid because they are 
subjected to marginalisation and discrimination because of their colour and religion; 
and the Northern Sudanese want to cling to power at any price in order to maintain 
their dominant values.
Inevitably, the two groups see one another through threatening and deforming 
stereotypes, and they nurtured no confidence in one another’s intentions. More 
profoundly, both groups confront one another in an embittering ambivalence that 
undermined every effort to reach understanding and agreement. Arab-Muslims 
cannot make up their minds whether they should go on regarding the African 
Sudanese in the south o f the country as anti-Islam, subversives or whether they 
should treat them equally as Sudanese citizens who have every right to religious and 
political freedom. It is clear from the above discussion that options for maintaining a 
united Sudan, whether democratic, as the unionist groups aspire for, or theocratic, as 
the Arab-Islamic nationalists require, are dissipating first with time as the African 
people in the South now call for nothing less than the right to self-determination 
through referendum contained in the IGAD Declaration o f Principles. The mounting 
pressure for secession in the South should be seen from the extent to which the
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current Islamist regime in Khartoum is equally determined to establish an Islamic 
state in the country. The call for secession became increasingly insistent during the 
1990s and remains the favoured option among the people o f southern Sudan. Even 
some Islamists have concluded that the North-South polarisation is so intense that 
the only solution is to divide the territory into two states, thereby ending the 
“illusion” o f a united, homogenous country.
5 . 3 . 3 .  THE PROMISE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
This section ends this chapter with a description o f non-governmental organisations 
advocacy, which is directed both to the creation and application o f humanitarian 
norms, principles and rules. 665 It explores how NGOs have contributed to the 
creation of democratic practices, the adoption o f community values and the general 
improvement o f human rights by addressing the Northern Sector’s operational 
problems. The impact o f non-governmental organisations advocacy efforts should be 
seen from the overall context of political reforms discussed above. Before those 
reforms, the NGO community’s greatest challenge in the OLS Northern Sector was 
to work towards ending the cycle o f violence, a scenario that has improved the 
human rights situation compared to the early years o f 1980s and 1992 where relief 
aid and those who provide it became deliberately military targets by the parties to 
the conflict. Non-governmental organisations played a historically important role in 
expanding OLS mandate o f 1989, which was narrowly defined in terms o f tradition 
relief aid, to include politically sensitive programmes such as good governance and 
protection issues.
Some NGOs argued that their principled assistance, by providing an example, 
has encouraged the host government to moderate its Islamic policies, particularly on 
the issue of amputations and access to the displaced persons .666 In fact, since the 
establishment o f OLS in 1989, NGOs made use o f these shaming devices not only to 
strengthen OLS protection mandate in the Northern Sector. Perhaps most
665 F o r  th e o re tic a l  a rg u m e n ts  o n  N G O s , se e  M a rg a re t  E . K e c k  &  K a th ry n  S ik k in k , A c t iv is ts  b e y o n d  
b o rd e rs :  A d v o c a c y  N e tw o rk s  in  In te rn a tio n a l  P o li tic s , I th a c a , C o rn e ll  U n iv e r s i ty  P re s s ,  1 9 9 8 ; J a c k ie  
S m ith  &  R o n  P a g n u c c o  w ith  G e o rg e  A . L o p e z , “ G lo b a liz in g  H u m a n  R ig h ts :  T h e  W o rk  o f  
T ra n s n a t io n a l  H u m a n  R ig h ts  N G O s  in  th e  1 9 9 0 s” , Human Rights Quarterly, V o l. 2 0 , N o . 2 , M a y , 
1 9 9 8 , p p . 3 7 9 -4 1 2
666 C h r is t ia n  N o n -G o v e rn m e n ta l  O rg a n isa t io n s ,  M e e tin g , K h a r to u m , A p r i l  2 0 , 1996
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importantly, NGOs in the Northern Sector collected the information necessary to 
reveal the truth about human rights conditions in both Northern and Southern Sudan. 
Thus, the many NGOs that were active in humanitarian affairs undoubtedly 
constituted an important part o f the global humanitarian network. In fact, one o f  the 
goals o f NGOs that worked within the umbrella of the OLS Northern Sector was to 
challenge the manner in which the war was being conducted on all sides. Effectively 
this means raising the importance of humanitarian principles, in contrast to the 
obsession with humanitarian aid. The OLS July 1996 review document 
acknowledged the contribution o f NGOs, which provided UN agencies and the 
donor governments with the early warning and monitoring services.6 6 7  These 
services were especially useful not only in alerting OLS about possible violations o f 
humanitarian principles, but also in peacemaking. As one NGO official told this 
author:
For eleven years since OLS was established we have done what we can 
within our means to act as a voice for the suffering people o f Southern 
Sudan to the international community. In Britain and other Western 
capitals church organisations such as Christian Aid and CAFOD have 
met many influential people, including the media, to sound out about the 
appalling situation in both northern and southern Sudan. Through our 
press releases and brochures we have been able to move the hearts of 
many politicians into action. Up today we are still committed to the 
people o f  southern Sudan.668
There is no doubt that NGOs, particularly ecumenical organisations, were in the 
forefront o f human rights campaign in the Sudan. Based on this author’s own 
experience, the Sudanese churches were successful in reviving traditional 
mechanisms for conflict resolution for three reasons. First, sourcing from within the 
community was an important factor. In establishing a Desk for Advocacy and Peace, 
the Sudan Council o f Churches (SCC) sought to identify and work through 
legitimate civil and religious leaders, those who command respect from social 
sectors, including local authorities. 669 Forging links with such leaders through their 
participation in the SCC Advocacy and Peace Desk helped to allay suspicions 
among the affected ethnic groups. The second significant reason is building co-
667  D H A , O L S  R e v ie w , Ju ly , 1996 , p . 93
668  I n te rv ie w  w ith  a  C h r is t ia n  A id  o f f ic ia l ,  N a ru s , so u th e rn  S u d a n , F e b ru a ry  5 , 19 9 6
669 S u d a n  C o u n c il  o f  C h u rc h e s  A d v o c a c y  R e p o r t,  K h a r to u m , M a rc h  12, 19 9 5 , p. 4
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operative relations with local authorities. SCC also sought to avoid antagonising 
local authorities, instead trying to provide them with the opportunities to appreciate 
the important contributions that the churches can make in a society. Maintaining 
good relationships throughout the community permits SCC to work actively with 
numerous local institutions and affords disenfranchised ethnic groups the change to 
influence these institutions. The third reason for the SCC success in bottom-up 
grassroots peacemaking is serving as local civic structure for international 
ecumenical assistance. A major obstacle to encouraging broad community 
participation in a Church activities is overcoming the inertia that plagues 
communities habituated to a political system that demands loyalty to its war 
objectives. Moreover, international ecumenical agencies are given opportunities to 
channel their help in a way that can promote the development o f local civic 
infrastructure and avoid the gridlock that often blocks implementation o f their 
projects. Serving a local partner for an ecumenical assistance and reconstruction 
projects can actually empower the war-victims to participate in the rebuilding o f 
their community. These reasons and others show that churches have traditionally 
been viewed as places o f stability and strength in times of hardships. The Sudanese 
churches, through the material assistance of bodies such as the World Council of 
Churches (WCC), was able to mobilise grassroots people for peace action because 
Church membership provide individuals a frame for receiving the message and 
meaning o f peace .670 It is frequently noted that NGOs provided information to 
various UN agencies, and IGOs (inter-governmental organisations) that were 
charged with monitoring tasks.
It is thus arguable that the development of humanitarian principles made room 
for NGOs to make their voices heard at the political and diplomatic levels. 
Humanitarian players, including academics, and the media, used these international 
norms to further their causes and to pressure the donor governments to change their 
policies and approaches towards the humanitarian disaster relief in the Sudan. The 
fact that these norms and principles provided an additional weapon to NGOs’ 
advocacy efforts, means that humanitarian values are not trivial in the international 
system. The experience of OLS/NGOs has shown that civil war problems, such as
670 Interview with a Presbyterian Ministers, Ler, New Sudan, March 16, 1997
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peace-making, and gross violation of human rights cannot be adequately solved by 
governments alone, but require popular mobilisation.
5 . 4 .  PROBLEMS OF STATE/CIVIL SOCIETY RELATIONS
This section confirms the findings contained in the OLS Review document671 
regarding relational problems between the sovereign authorities in Khartoum and 
civil society. Although most ‘failed states’ in Africa welcome the flood o f money 
and development introduced into their war economies by NGOs, they are less 
hesitant to embrace political or advocacy-oriented NGOs. They have embraced 
NGOs as partners in rehabilitation and development but also seek to control NGOs 
through some form of legislation, administrative co-option. In Sudan, relationship 
between GOS and NGOs was characterised by suspicion and mistrust. There was a 
trend o f logic in the government circle which saw international NGOs as crusaders, 
claiming to do good and to have all the answers to the Sudanese woes. The reaction 
o f the Sudanese authorities to NGO community’s human rights campaign against 
President Omer al-Beshir regime was swift and resulted to not only to restriction of 
access but also to the expulsion o f many Western NGOs and personnel from the 
Northern Sector.672 Prior to 1989, for example, several INGOs, the ICRC, and a 
number o f Sudanese Christian NGOs were supporting relief operations in the north. 
However, during the early 1990s, there was a marked change in the composition o f 
the NGO community in the Sudan .6 7 3  As shown in Figure 2 below, the number o f 
international NGOs operating in the OLS Northern Sector declined, while the 
number o f Sudanese and Islamic NGOs increased. There were two main reasons 
which led to the decline non-Muslim NGOs.
671 S e e  D H A , O L S  R e v ie w , Ju ly , 19 9 6 , p p . 4 6 -5 0
672 G o v e rn m e n t  o f  S u d a n , A  C o d e  o f  C o n d u c t:  P r in c ip le s  a n d  g u id e lin e s  g o v e rn in g  N G O  W o rk  in  
th e  S u d a n , K h a r to u m , J a n u a ry ,  1 9 9 3 , p . 7
6 7 3  D H A , O L S  R e v ie w , p . 4 7
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A . NGO VIOLATION OF GOS SOVEREIGNTY
The first reason which made GOS resistant to humanitarian principles concerns 
NGO advocacy efforts in support of the logic o f negative sanctions, which the 
national authorities said violated Sudan territorial integrity . 6 7 4  The Khartoum 
government’s charge against NGOs is not far from the truth. From this author’s 
experience, NGOs providing relief aid in the Sudan combat zones tended to be less 
concerned about sovereignty, although, as with political matters, their approaches 
were divergent. Some recognised Khartoum as much as the SPLM/A (Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement and Army). That is, NGOs in government controlled 
areas worked with the knowledge and consent of the authorities. Those who worked 
in the SPLM/A controlled areas have obtained the consent o f the rebel movement. 
However, the majority o f NGOs were less respectful o f sovereignty than were UN 
agencies and other international bodies such as the International Committee o f the 
Red Cross (ICRC) because they claimed to express humanitarian concerns of their 
supporters that have strong moral underpinnings. Throughout the beginning o f 
conflict in 1983, these organisations were involved in advocating against Sudanese 
government war policies in Southern Sudan. Accordingly, the primacy of 
humanitarian principles over state imperatives as traditionally understood, was 
demonstrated by non-governmental organisations. NGO intervention by means of 
cross-border operations, carried out without the consent o f the government which 
claims control of the territory, is based on the notion that common bonds of 
humanity override the obstacles o f nation-state boundaries.
Thus, GOS was forced to monitor the international press in order to counter 
NGO accusations o f human rights abuses and allegations o f interference in relief and 
rehabilitation efforts. NGOs were effective in shaming their home governments not 
only to impose economic sanctions against the country, but also to internationally 
isolate the Islamist regime in Khartoum. They made use o f international media to 
put their message across effectively” . 6 7 5  Moreover, coalition building among local 
Christian NGOs in the Northern Sector was seen as an effective means o f protection
6 7 4  T h e  1993 G O S /IN G O s  A g re e m e n t a llo w e d  N G O s  to  w o rk  in  th e  S u d a n  o n  c o n d it io n  th a t  th e ir  
a c t iv it ie s  w e re  e n d o rs e d  b y  th e  K h a r to u m  g o v e rn m e n t.  G O S , C o u n try  A g re e m e n t  o n  th e  e n try  o f  
In te rn a tio n a l  O rg a n is a t io n s  to  O p e ra te  in  th e  S u d a n , K h a r to u m , J a n u a ry ,  1993
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against government interference. The fact that many o f the humanitarian NGOs were 
o f  Western and Christian extraction was also significant. Humanitarian aid work 
does affect the situation on the ground. In a conflict situation people are kept alive 
and sustained, and to the Sudanese authorities this assistance was defined in terms o f 
Christian evangelism in the mainly Muslim dominated Northern Sudan. This 
enhanced NGO role was also one practical manifestation o f the challenge to GOS 
sovereignty. However, as anticipated by realists, NGO’s confrontational advocacy 
strategies, while successful in persuading donor community to impose development 
aid embargo on Sudan, did not lead to improved humanitarian access in the Northern 
Sector. Humanitarian access was increasingly accompanied by severe restrictions, 
and expulsion of NGOs themselves. As two humanitarian practitioners and scholar 
puts it: “The growing involvement o f NGOs in disaster relief since the mid-1980s 
has also had a profound effect on North-South relations. NGOs, by their nature and 
by their mandates, have the ability to form contracts with the people rather than 
states. The enhanced role of NGOs in Southern Sudan is a practical manifestation o f 
the challenge to sovereignty which has emerged. NGO involvement in Africa’s 
internal wars has had the effect o f bypassing local states and bringing the plight of 
civilians directly into the international arena” . 6 7 6
Indeed, the case o f Sudan has shown that NGOs tend not to recognise the 
claims o f sovereign political authorities only to the extent that they reflect humane 
values. For example, Medecins Sans Frontiers groups, whose name signals their 
unwillingness to allow political boundaries to limit humanitarian action, based their 
activities in the Sudan on humanitarian principles and rules. NGOs viewed the 
principles as imposing important limits on the unrestrained sovereignty of states. 
Thus, such NGOs saw themselves as expanding the limits o f humanitarian ethic 
rather than being constrained by the Westphalian nation-state norms . 6 7 7  This is 
highly problematic because it puts NGOs in direct confrontation with the national 
authorities, which is determined to defend its territorial sovereignty. The INGOs 
attempt to have the GOS isolated both economically and diplomatically was seen by
6 7 5  In te r v ie w  w ith  R e v . C le m e n t  J a n d a , S e c re ta ry  G e n e ra l ,  A ll A f r ic a  C o n fe re n c e  o f  
C h u rc h e s ,N a iro b i,  F e b ru a ry  7 , 1997
6 7 6  D u f f ie ld  M . &  P re n d e rg a s t  J ., “ S o v e re ig n ty  a n d  In te rv e n tio n  a f te r  th e  C o ld  W a r:  L e s s o n s  f ro m  
th e  E m e rg e n c y  R e l ie f  D e s k ” , 19 9 4 , p . 11
6 7 7  IN G O s , L e tte r  to  C h r is to p h e r  Ja e g e r:  F o rc ib le  M o v e m e n t  o f  D is p la c e d  S q u a t te r  C o m m u n it ie s  
w i th in  G r e a te r  K h a r to u m  A re a , K h a r to u m , J a n u a ry  2 4 , 1995
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Khartoum as a clear evidence o f NGO community lack o f respect for the territorial 
integrity o f the country:
The sovereignty, territorial integrity, laws and norms o f the country 
should be respected and safeguarded. The NGOs should comply with the 
relevant laws, regulations and agreements. Humanitarian work should 
not be used as a cover for any political activity or to propagate ideas, 
ideologies or political positions on local or international issues. 
Humanitarian work should not be used to gather information irrelevant 
to the delivery o f the assistance, or utilise the need fo r  such assistance to 
reflect in the media as distorted and demeaning to the dignity o f the 
country ot its citizens.678
Even after OLS was established with its consent, the Sudanese government was 
uneasy about the role o f NGOs , and in fact the policy debate in chapter 2  is an 
example of how Khartoum wanted to increase its control to regulate or at least check 
the influence the NGOs had (via their contacts abroad) on the image or behaviour of 
the government. To maintain such control, GOS used sovereignty and the alleged 
non-universality o f international norms to hamper, disturb or expel NGO personnel. 
In fact, GOS challenged the credibility or legitimacy o f most foreign NGOs by using 
its sovereign prerogatives to expel pro-active human rights NGOs such as MSF, 
World Vision International and many others. 6 7 9  With the inclusion of protection 
issues into the OLS humanitarian relief programmes in 1993, the Sudanese 
government became hostile to international NGOs, and it relied on Sudanese NGOs, 
particularly the Islamic agencies. The dislike of NGOs by the GOS can be put 
briefly into perspective. According to some scholars, associational life prospers in 
large part in relation to existing structures of domination or hegemony . 680
Within the emerging system o f democratic governance described in this 
thesis, NGOs play a clearly subordinate (and not quite autonomous) role, operating 
mostly at the behest and discretion o f the institutions o f  the international system. 
Perhaps more importantly, NGOs are often dependent on financial support from 
governments and other IGOs. As discussed above, the EU and other agencies often 
promote the role o f NGOs, thereby driving a wedge between the NGOs and
678 Q u o te d  in  D H A , O L S  R e v ie w , p p . 4 8 -9
6 7 9  S e e  J e a n  F . (e d .) ,  L ife , D e a th  a n d  A id : M e d e c in s  sa n s  F ro n tie re s  R e p o r t  o n  W o r ld  C ris is  
In te rv e n tio n , L o n d o n , R o u tle d g e , 1 9 9 3 , p . 2 0
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governmental departments in the poorer nations, and increasing the pressure on the 
state to open up both to external intrusions in the form o f foreign capital and 
domestic collaboration with such capital. Hence, NGO anti-poverty efforts and 
human rights activism was seen by the Sudanese government as familiarly 
interlinked with the subordination o f the country to Western interest. The logic here 
is that under the auspices o f a Western operating humanitarian relief system, the use 
of humanitarian norms and principles are conterminous in the Sudan with either the 
progressive dismantling of state structures or subordination to external management.
Figure 2
Agency Budget USD million Employees
CARE 3.5 160
SCF (US) 1.5 70
Oxfam (UK/I 3.0 2 0 0
Dawa al Islamia 6 . 0 600
Muwafag 1 .0 2 0 0
IARA 2 . 0 500
Sudanaid 1 .0 1 0 0
ECS/SUDRA 1.5 1 1 2
YMCA 0.7 115
SOURCE: DHA, Operation Lifeline Sudan Review, Nairobi, July, 1996
B . NGO USE OF HUMANITARIANISM FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES
The second reason for GOS violation o f humanitarian principles concerns the issue 
o f religion. In the Sudan, where religious differences was one element in the civil 
war, the involvement o f religious NGOs, Christian and Muslim alike, has political 
implications. It was clear from this author’s experience in the field that religious 
groups in the two OLS operational environments approached their humanitarian
680 S e e , fo r  e x a m p le , M u s ta fa  K . P a s h a  &  D a v id  L . B la n e ly ,  “ E lu s iv e  P a ra d is e :  T h e  P ro m is e  a n d  
P e r i l  o f  G lo b a l  S o c ie ty ” , Alternatives, V o l. 2 3 , 1 9 9 8 , p p . 4 1 7 .4 5 0
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mission from a variety o f perspectives. 681 Some viewed providing aid as an end in 
itself, a genuine but disinterested expression o f religious commitment. These types 
o f church NGOs included Christian Aid, Dutch Inter-Church Aid and so forth. These 
agencies made available relief aid to people irrespective o f the religion o f the 
recipient. Others such as World Vision International, ACROSS (Association o f 
Christian Relief Organisations for South Sudan) and Norwegian Church Aid, saw it 
as a more explicit statement o f faith and an overt invitation to others to embrace 
their viewpoint. These types o f NGOs were committed to strengthening local 
religious institutions to carry out a range of community -  and religious -  activities. 
All the NGOs from the new Christian religious movements framed their purpose in 
the SPLM/A areas as that o f identifying with the oppressed, regardless o f their 
tribal, ethnic, political, or denominations. Their activities were carried out through 
Sudanese religious institutions and such activities included support for pastors, their 
families, and pastoral work. It was these kinds of activities done in the name of 
impartial humanitarianism which made the GOS to view relief aid as essentially 
religious and political. In Islam, the borders between religion and politics does not 
exist; all are o f the same coin. It is not surprising that the Khartoum authorities saw 
OLS itself, and not just religious NGOs, as an expression o f the religious and 
political agenda o f Christian West.6 8 2  The circumstantial evidence is compelling: 
chapter 3 has shown that Western nations with predominantly Christian populations, 
channelled funds through Christian NGOs to churches engaged in religious activities 
in areas in rebellion against a Muslim government yearning for an Islamic state. In 
fact, one Sudanese embassy official told this author in Nairobi in 1996 that the 
Sudanese government was a victim of Western Christian world conspiracy.
We are told we are crazy Islamic fanatics, we are terrorists, and that we 
are trying to annihilate the Christian population in southern Sudan. 
Nobody is prepared to listen to our side o f  the story or to acknowledge 
the changes going on in our country. We have come a long way since 
1989. You have been a BBC stringer fo r  Sudan and as an editor o f  a 
Catholic Newspaper in South Sudan you used to report about 
amputations and hangings, can you tell me from your heart that these 
things are still going on in our country? Since 1994 our government has 
made serious steps towards reconciliation, we have participated in the
681 A m e r ic a n  N G O s  w e re  p ro b a b ly  th e  w o rs t  in  u s in g  r e l i e f  fo o d  fo r  r e lig io u s  p u rp o s e s .  C h u rc h e s  
su c h  a s  th e  C h u rc h  o f  th e  B re th e re n , a n d  N G O s  s u c h  a s  W o r ld  V is io n , B re a d  o f  th e  W o r ld  
u n s h a m in g ly  u s e d  fo o d  e v e n  to  p o a c h  o n  C h r is t ia n s  f ro m  o th e r  d e n o m in a tio n s .
6 8 2  U N H C U , B a c k g ro u n d  P a p e r :  G O S ’s P o s i t io n  to w a rd s  O L S , K h a r to u m , A p r i l  1, 1 9 9 6 , p . 9
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IGAD peace talks with a sincere commitment to resolve the problem o f  
southern Sudan, and yet everywhere our delegation tours Europe to try 
to explain the changes and the opportunities now available in the country 
fo r  a peaceful settlement o f the conflict, these NGOs go around 
campaigning against our country. Everywhere in the European capitals 
we are told we are persecuting and destroying the churches, and that we 
are violating our international obligations. We blame the Christian 
NGOs fo r creating this negative image o f our country. 683
It is true that the government made cosmetic changes in response to international 
criticism of its human rights record that culminated in a UN General Assembly 
resolution on 18 December 1992. In April 1993, the GOS convened two conferences 
on religious tolerance and peaceful coexistence684, and in October 1994 on religious 
dialogue, designed to persuade international community that the government did not 
discriminate against non-Muslims. According to the Sudan Embassy bulletin, the 
Khartoum government has tried its best to prove to the non-Muslims that their fears 
of an Islamic state in the Sudan were unfounded . 6 8 5  Thus, the statement above 
reflects the depth o f hostility the GOS had, and it indicated the extent to which INGO 
operations were reduced, and the extent to which Sudanese Islamic NGO operations 
grew. NGO activity in Sudan was highly restricted. Categorising the war as a jihad 
(holy war) made Christian churches special targets.
In October 1995, all churches were told to register with the Sudan Council of 
Voluntary Agencies (COVA). This requirement would have given the churches the 
status o f INGOs subject to regulation by COVA. According to the Organisation of 
Voluntary Work Act 1994, churches must register with the state. Their application 
could be amended or rejected. The government could change their constitutions and 
bylaws, alter their boards of directors and personnel, investigate their sources of 
income and expenditures, and confiscate their property. The Roman Catholic Church 
spearheaded a hostile reaction to this development on behalf o f the churches, arguing 
that the churches could not be classified as NGOs and emphasised the importance o f 
freedom of worship, evangelism, and charity, and their connection to an international 
hierarchy .6 8 6  Since the Church is of divine origin, they maintained, a government
6 8 3  In te rv ie w  w ith  a  S u d a n e s e  e m b a s s y  o f f ic ia l ,  N a iro b i,  A p r il  12, 1996
6 8 4  S u d a n  E m b a ss y , B u lle t in , L o n d o n , 13 A p r il  19 9 3 , p p . 1-2
6 8 5  Ib id .,  p . 2
686  “ C h u rc h e s  o p p o s e  R e g is tra t io n  P o l ic y ” , M id d le  E a s t  T im e s ,  11 J u n e , 1 9 9 5 , p. 4
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bureaucrat could not determine its nature and organisation. Subsequently, the 
government was unable to implement its policy due to the international outcry. 
However, the churches opposition to the GOS policy provoked expulsion o f a 
number o f priests and an escalation o f pressure. During 1991-3, the government 
closed more than thirty churches in Khartoum that served the internally displaced 
persons from the south and west, and suppressed Christian humanitarian 
organisations that assisted displaced children .6 8 7  When the government forcibly 
relocated squatters from the capital to remote sites, it blocked churches from 
assisting the people and operating schools and provided social aid, through which 
they encouraged conversions to Islam. While detail analysis o f ethno-religious 
conflict in the Sudan is beyond the scope of this study, it is important to point out 
here that despite GOS effort to present a tolerant image, policies became increasingly 
restrictive. However, by early 1994, following the UN Security Council threat to 
impose arms embargo against Sudan, the GOS softened its attitude towards Christian 
and NGOs . 6 8 8  Thus, the failure o f the GOS to register churches can be interpreted as 
a clear sign that NGO community pressure was also necessary to keep the GOS on 
the defensive all the time.
Although constant harassment was the hallmark o f churches and their activities, 
both religious and humanitarian, large Christian relief agencies continued to operate
-  for example, Sudan Aid, a consortium of Catholic relief agencies and SUDRA 
(Sudan Development Agency), relief arm of the Episcopal Church. Church-related 
NGOs were afforded a limited measure o f protection by their respective churches. As 
sources o f food, the churches exercised considerable influence throughout the north, 
which Khartoum had tried to curtail by commandeering the food to distribute 
through its own Islamic agencies .6 8 9  Taking the cue from the local churches, the 
government sought to use Islamic values for its own interest. For example, Islamic 
NGOs, inspired by similar values as the regime, were encouraged and promoted with 
regard to relief activities. Hassan Turabi was uncompromising on this issue: “The 
country is....an Islamic republic for all effective purposes regarding the 
implementation o f Islamic values in the political, economic, social and humanitarian
6 8 7  T e s t im o n y  to  th e  U N  C o m m is s io n  o n  H u m a n  R ig h ts , G e n e v a , F e b ru a ry  1 9 9 3 , p p . 4 -1 2
688  A l-H a y a t ,  28  A p r il ,  1 9 9 4 , p . 6
6 8 9  T h e  F u n d  fo r  P e a c e ,  R e p o r t  o n  a  P ro g ra m m e  o f  H u m a n  R ig h ts  C a p a c ity  B u i ld in g  w ith  N o n -  
G o v e rn m e n ta l  O rg a n is a t io n s  in  H o rn  o f  A fr ic a , N a iro b i ,  D e c e m b e r  1 9 9 5 , p.  11
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fields. At present, Islam is ruling Sudan; Islamic values prevail in society and Islamic 
injunctions are being implemented in all fields” . 6 9 0  Relief and propagation o f Islamic 
values in non-Islamic areas went hand in hand. The largest o f the rehabilitation and 
relief agencies was the Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA), which had a presence 
in 17 countries. Dawa Islamic (Islamic Call) was the other dominant agency. As 
shown in the figure 2 above, these Islamic NGOs could not match the financial 
power o f the local Christian NGOs, which received support from their mother 
churches in Europe and America. Consequently, the GOS gave more access to the 
Islamic organisations than to the Christian ones. This concentration on access had 
profound implications on how aid was organised in the Northern Sector. But 
international presence was useful in ensuring that the Sudanese government respects 
its international obligations.
5 . 4 . 1 .  OLS DIPLOMACY AS FACTOR TO NORM SALIENCE
OLS use o f humanitarian norms and principles to shame a sovereign government 
constitute an important development in humanitarian intervention. The experiences 
o f the UN in Somalia, and Rwanda, to mention a few, show that in a combat zone 
there are no quick fixes; only consensual and pragmatic diplomacy can have a 
chance o f success. OLS has shown that it is possible to work within a sovereign state 
environment, and by accommodating the various interests that have been identified 
by constructivists. OLS ad hoc humanitarian diplomacy was based on non-military 
humanitarian action, which emphasises the pacific activities o f the UN member 
states, international organisations and NGOs in delivering humanitarian relief aid 
and facilitating peacemaking at the grassroots and regional levels. Using norms as 
devices for communication, OLS had successfully worked with the GOS, as well as 
the opposition movement, often in the context o f shifting territorial claims and 
where population displacements were among the central objectives o f the war. OLS 
based itself on the practices o f the International Committee o f the Red Cross (ICRC) 
that normally only operates with the consent o f sovereign governments. In terms of 
its successes, many local and international officials believed that OLS ad hoc 
diplomacy has realised its objectives, and that it was a unique achievement in
6 9 0  H a s s a n  T u ra b i  in  K e y h a n  (T e h ra n ) , 1 M a rc h  1993 (F B IS -N E S -9 3 -0 4 4 , 9  M a r c h  19 9 3 )
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political and historical terms. OLS humanitarian diplomacy was successful for four 
practical reasons.
The first practical success concerns the extent to which OLS used international 
norms, backed by material resources and diplomatic skills, to expand the space 
available for humanitarian operation while still working within the constraints o f the 
Sudanese sovereignty. The strength o f this creative success can be seen from the fact 
OLS operated in an environment constituted by incompatible perceptions o f the 
conflict situation itself. OLS was seen by the Islamist regime in Khartoum as an 
instrument o f Western foreign policy, and by the opposition movement to be serving 
hostile GOS interest. Despite GOS doubts of its normative position, OLS, through 
its pragmatic ad hoc diplomacy, won the agreement o f both the Sudan government 
and the opposition movement to respect the established corridors o f tranquillity 
through which relief aid convoys were allowed to pass with minimum interference. 
Another method that has proved successful was the humanitarian cease-fires. This 
involves an agreement between the UN, with political support from its member 
states in the region, and warring parties to call a halt to the fighting to allow aid 
agencies to reach imperilled civilians.
The second practical success o f this consensual diplomacy is the way OLS 
took the lead in galvanising international public opinion, and providing international 
presence. Admirers and detractors alike praised OLS for having put the Sudan 
disaster relief on the world map. Throughout much o f 1986-88, the extent of 
suffering was not widely known beyond relief agency personnel and Sudan 
observers. Frenetic NGO efforts to alert constituents and governments failed to elicit 
serious attention from the international community. After the Khartoum conference 
in March 1989 and the sending off o f the initial convoys in early April, international 
interest picked up perceptibly. Throughout the six months o f the year, international 
coverage o f relief activities in Southern Sudan was extensive. And by the middle o f 
1990s, as OLS stabilised the situation o f the internally displaced persons, and the 
working parties changed their policies to a more humane ones, the media clamour 
for news also decreased substantially. Whatever the level o f existing public 
awareness, OLS provided a vehicle for educating the international public about the 
Sudan humanitarian emergency. This represented a small achievement, but not one 
that may be replicable elsewhere
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The third practical success o f OLS diplomacy is the extent to which it provided 
international presence, which exercised a restraining influence on the Khartoum 
government, both in the treatment o f civilian populations and in the conduct o f the 
war. The presence of foreign relief organisations in the war zone has countered rural 
devastation and depopulation not only by providing material relief but also by 
deterring, or at least publicising, human rights abuses in Southern Sudan. Although 
the UN indeed lacked autonomy in one sense, in other important ways it used the 
Sudan sovereign state environment to increase its operational autonomy. The UN 
secretariat in Nairobi, Khartoum, New York and Geneva spend great amount o f time 
and energy in the ritual co-ordination meetings with the GOS and the major Western 
donors, establishing agendas, developing technical assessment data for specific 
organisational purposes, and generating consensual ground rules and resolutions. 
These functions legitimise the demands or interests of IGOs as they search for 
external resources. One could not really understand this elaborate ritual o f 
humanitarian diplomacy without seeing it as a mechanism by which the UN used 
state sovereignty to increase its own autonomy.
The fourth success o f OLS diplomacy is the presence of the international civil 
servants in areas where the displaced people lived in Southern Sudan. Part of the 
aim o f the war is to secure international recognition for the rebels and to draw 
attention to abuses against southern Sudanese. Aid operations in the Southern Sector 
were seen as having helped in these endeavours. In particular, the presence of 
foreigners in the south was seen as providing a forum for southern Sudanese to voice 
their grievances against the Sudan government, and allowing foreign aid workers to 
get first-hand information about the atrocities o f the Sudan government. The very 
basis o f OLS was considered a diplomatic achievement by the SPLM/A. This was 
the first time a government had acceded to a UN operation aimed at rebel areas, and 
this was seen as giving the rebel movement a degree of international recognition. 
The presence o f the head offices of both OLS and the SPLM/A in Nairobi gave the 
opposition movement the opportunity to meet foreign diplomats to explain its side of 
the story. The SPLM/A was able to talk with representatives o f  the donor 
governments who fund OLS, often assisted by its contacts with humanitarian 
agencies. However, not all the insurgent movements will be as concerned for 
international standing as OLS found in southern Sudan.
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5 . 6 .  CONCLUSION
The conclusion of this chapter is that international humanitarian norms had effected 
some changes in the way the Sudanese government treats its citizens, and challenge 
the pluralist view that sovereignty can impose a major constraint on humanitarian 
operation in foreign lands. The analysis of the performance of the UN in the 
Northern Sector was set within the context of the difficulties imposed by working 
under the conditions o f a sovereign government that is a party to war. The extent to 
which the UN maintained a humanitarian space in this context, and to defend the 
principles which it both advocated and secured agreement on, was the central issue 
in this chapter. The difficulty of asserting humanitarian norms and principles in an 
operational environment in which a sovereign authority still in control underlines the 
fact that the international protection of human rights even in a situation o f non-civil 
war is a difficult task not only because human rights are regarded as part of the 
domestic jurisdiction o f governments but also because governments themselves 
abuse rights.
The GOS did not directly challenge humanitarian principles. Rather, its 
violations o f these principles should be seen from the extent to which the Khartoum 
government saw itself as a victim o f a Western conspiracy. Accordingly, there were 
three reasons for which humanitarian norms were not effectively asserted in the OLS 
Northern Sector. First, donor governments’ decision to impose economic embargo 
on the Khartoum government made the authorities to feel that they were being 
targeted because o f their Islamic values and ideology. The extent to which donor 
states have compromised the Westphalian state system in the Sudan was evident in 
chapter 3 and it was determined primarily by power and interests o f the donor states.
Second, the world Christian community -  local and international ecumenical 
organisations -  used humanitarian relief aid to separate the Christian south from the 
mainly Islamic northern Sudan. Third, the GOS saw OLS, not as a humanitarian 
programme as contained in the 1989 UN Plan o f Action, but as a Western policy 
instrument. There was not much OLS could do more than it has done in such kind of 
operational environment. As stated in this chapter, pragmatists within the UN 
system in the Sudan were right to accommodate to the political realities in the 
Northern sector. This pragmatic strategy of dealing with a sovereign government is, 
indeed, what defined the OLS Northern Sector. Accordingly, the original framework
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o f OLS, which defined the operation as a government programme, focused on 
achieving and reinforcing government objectives with regard, among other things, to 
its agenda for development. This developmental agenda - for example, the attempt to 
establish self-reliance among internally displaced populations through settlement 
schemes - fitted well with the OLS mandate o f a relief-to-development continuum 
approach. It thus provided a means for the UN to continue working within a highly 
constrained and politicised context of North Sudan. In this regard, I believe that it is 
not entirely correct to say that the UN was a hostage to the demands o f sovereignty 
in the Northern Sector. Rather, there was a convergence of interests between UN 
and GOS - and indeed donor community - objectives with regard to developmental 
programmes. On the other hand, it is also fair to argue that the UN’s adoption o f a 
developmental agenda eclipsed the need to strongly assert humanitarian principles 
in a continuing political emergency. This is especially true because OLS 
developmental programmes in the Northern Sector were deeply flawed, as a 
consequence o f their intimate connection with the war and the broader political 
agenda for the country. Moreover, the operational distinction between relief and 
development programmes did not lie in the content of the programmes themselves, 
but rather in the different strategies that were employed in their delivery. In 
particular, ensuring the neutrality o f relief operations was contingent on a more 
proactive and discriminating approach to the selection and monitoring o f 
implementing partners. While the UN cannot proceed to intervene in a country 
without the government’s tacit permission, it may respond creatively, as in 
Operation Lifeline Sudan. OLS Northern Sector dealt with sovereignty issues 
without seriously challenging the fundamental authority o f states.
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SUMMARY AND FINAL CONCLUSION 
6 . 1 .  SUMMARY
The aim o f this concluding chapter is to reflect on the theoretical and empirical 
analysis in this thesis. The experience o f humanitarian relief charity in Sudan from 
1986, the creation o f Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in April 1989 and its 
experience to 1996 have demonstrated that the usefulness o f norms in a civil war 
operational environment strengthens the case against the realist denial of norms 
significance under conditions o f anarchy, and pluralist argument that principles o f 
sovereignty and non-intervention make humanitarian intervention in state’s domestic 
affairs difficult. Chapter 1 has shown how Pluralist International Society Theory and 
and Realism continue to limit the possibilities o f international community 
recognising humanitarian action as a legitimate normative practice. These two 
theories seek to interpret the cases we have discussed in this thesis as confirming 
their different theoretical positions. Realism purports to describe and explain the 
realities o f how warring parties and donor governments behave but the problem with 
this claim to objectivity is that it is the realist mindset which has constructed the 
very practices that realist theory seeks to explain.691 Realism identifies some 
important objections to international norms, but this thesis has argued that Pluralist 
international society theory is essential to any understanding of why the society o f 
states was reluctant to intervene in the Sudanese domestic affairs during the period 
1986-88. Pluralists reinforce the dominant practices of the society o f states which 
continue to subordinate humanitarian concerns to state sovereignty.
But crucially, there is nothing natural or inevitable about the hierarchy 
between order and justice. Indeed, changing values and norms could lead to the 
growth o f new solidarist sentiments which produce a just world order. This author 
shares constructivist perspective. In this thesis I have suggested that humanitarian 
norms are essential elements o f international relations. Although some scholars may 
not explicitly attribute donor policies toward humanitarian relief crisis to 
international norms given the multiple agendas, OLS has obviously demonstrated 
that moral norms can provide the fundamental direction and inspiration for official
691 T h is  th e s is  f in d in g s  a re  in  l in e  w ith  N ic h o la s  W h e e le r ’s o w n  re s e a rc h  f in d in g s  c o n ta in e d  in
260
actions taken by the donor governments, and the subsequent acceptance by the 
warring parties that humanitarian norms should underpin OLS relief operation. Even 
if one case is not sufficient to confirm this argument, the study provides 
substantiation for it and indicates it is worth further research .692 The question here is: 
under what conditions can humanitarian norms and principles be effective? The 
cases o f OLS Northern and Southern Sectors have offered some evidence of these 
conditions. Evidence in these two OLS sectors have shown that both humanitarian 
and material interests of the parties to the conflict are necessary for a successful 
humanitarian operation. The theoretical implications of this development for our 
understanding of international relations can be explained briefly in the section 
below. It must be stated here that o f all the theoretical perspectives mentioned in the 
introduction, constrictivist approach has been useful in making sense out o f the 
complex humanitarian war environment because it takes into consideration actors’ 
political and material agendas. Both pluralist, realist and solidarist perspectives 
cannot account fully o f how norms are internalised into the domestic sphere, and 
how they affect state sovereignty.
• CHANGING NATURE OF SOVEREIGNTY
In understanding why international community failed to intervene in the Sudanese 
crisis o f 1986-88, Pluralist international society theory has been useful in locating 
the problem to the constitutive principles o f state sovereignty. Pluralists’ claims 
about sovereignty are strong because they represent shared understandings and 
expectations that are constantly reinforced both through the practices o f states693 and 
the practices o f international bodies and NGOs. Accordingly, pluralist’s claim 
challenges the legitimacy o f the United Nations, donor states or other humanitarian 
players concerning themselves with relieving suffering in Sudan. According to this
692 A  r e s e a rc h  o n  w h y  h u m a n i ta r ia n  n o rm s , ru le s  a n d  p r in c ip le s  fa ile d  to  h a v e  a n y  e f fe c ts  o n  th e  
b e h a v io u r  o f  w a r r in g  p a r tie s  in  S o m a lia , R w a n d a  a n d  S ie ra  L e o n  c a n  b e n e f i t  o u r  u n d e rs ta n d in g s  o f  
th e s e  im p o r ta n t  in te rn a t io n a l  p o l ic y  in s tru m e n ts , a n d  p ro v id e  a  f ra m e w o rk  fo r  fu tu re  h u m a n i ta r ia n  
in te rv e n t io n  a n d  o p e ra tio n .
693 W e n d t  s tre s s e s  th a t  s o v e re ig n ty  is a n  in s t i tu t io n  th a t  e x is ts  “ o n ly  in  v i r tu e  o f  c e r ta in  
in te r s u b je c t iv e  u n d e rs ta n d in g s  a n d  e x p e c ta t io n s ;  th e re  is  n o  s o v e re ig n ty  w ith o u t  a n  o th e r ” . H e  a rg u e s  
th a t s o v e re ig n ty  n o rm s  a re  n o w  so  ta k e n  fo r  g ra n te d  th a t  “ it  is  e a s y  to  o v e r lo o k  th e  e x te n t  to  w h ic h  
th e y  a re  p r e s u p p o s e d  b y  a n d  an  o n g o in g  a r tifa c t  o f  p r a c t ic e ” . S e e  A le x a n d e r  W e n d t,  “ A n a rc h y  Is 
W h a t S ta te s  M a k e  o f  It: T h e  S o c ia l  C o n s tru c tio n  o f  P o w e r  P o l i t ic s ” , International Organization, V o l. 
4 6 , S p r in g  19 9 2 , p p . 3 9 1 -4 2 5
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perspective, outsiders should respect the moral autonomy of the Sudanese state. In 
short, international humanitarian norms should not be a question for foreign policy 
or international politics. Indeed, the Sudan humanitarian crisis o f 1986-88 has 
demonstrated that there was no consensus within the international community on the 
issue o f non-intervention, while “atrocities reported daily by world news media 
created popular expectations that something more than respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, which have become virtually sacrosanct notions, should guide 
state policy”. 6 9 4  It is not surprising, therefore, that the provision of humanitarian 
assistance involves the most immediate and dramatic confrontation between a state 
right o f sovereignty and the will and authority o f the international community. 
Although the narrow concept of sovereignty remains a major obstacle to assisting 
and protecting victims o f internal conflicts, this thesis has proved that it is no longer 
as insurmountable as it once was claimed by pluralists. This author, however, shares 
the solidarist (English School) view that Sudan humanitarian crisis had called into 
question the ability o f the Sudanese governments to meet obligations to its 
populations or to international society and thus to enjoy the full privileges o f 
sovereignty. As Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General puts it:
This developing international norm in favour o f intervention to protect 
civilians from wholesale slaughter will no doubt continue to pose 
profound challenges to the international community. Any such evolution 
in our understanding o f state sovereignty and individual sovereignty will, 
in some quarters, be met with distrust, scepticism, even hostility. But it is 
an evolution that we should welcome. Why? Because, despite its 
limitations and imperfections, it is testimony to a humanity that will do 
more, not less, to end it. It is a hopeful sign at the end o f  the twentieth 
century.695
Annan’s, statement above supports the proposition that the practice o f humanitarian 
action has represented a new solidarism and constructivism in the society o f states. 
Indeed, OLS case study has shown that international activities to protect human 
rights work presupposes that it is legitimate and necessary for states and of nonstate 
actors to be concerned about the treatment o f citizens o f other states. Therefore, it is
6 9 4  F o r  a  d e ta i le d  e x p la n a tio n  o f  th is  a rg u m e n t,  s e e  R o b e r t  J a c k s o n , Q u a s i-S ta te s :  S o v e re ig n ty ,  
In te rn a tio n a l  R e la t io n s  a n d  th e  T h ird  W o r ld ,  C a m b r id g e , C a m b r id g e  U n iv e r s i ty  P re s s ,  1 9 9 0
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arguable that OLS is a pioneering example because o f its ability to strike a balance 
between sovereignty demands (as articulated by pluralists) and the right o f 
international community to assist war-victims (as claimed by solidarists). From the 
constructivist perspective, OLS was aware o f concerns for power and prestige and it 
found the margin o f humanitarian endeavour in a milieu of realpolitik and partisan 
politics. Thus, this thesis suggests that the application o f humanitarian principles 
depend for its legitimacy upon both political and moral authority. The reason why 
some UN interventions failed in conflict situations is because moral authority was 
being moved away from political authority in the name o f impartial 
humanitarianism. In other words, the point of any project of legal reform is not 
solely about convincing states, but about supplying justifications through reasons 
which would potentially convince all affected players. In contrast to pluralist, realist 
and solidarist perspectives, the debate over the universality of norms suggests that 
humanitarian action depends for its legitimacy in this context upon an inclusive and 
participatory process which includes input of the affected state as well as the players 
and victims of the conflict. Without this emphasis on participation and a culture of 
justification, the trust needed to operate in sovereign state environment will not be 
easy.
• EFFECTS OF NORMS ON DONOR STATES BEHAVIOUR
The contention that the practices o f the society o f states are norm-governed raises 
the question as to whether state leaders are conscious that they are following norms. 
It was clear from chapters 1 and 3 that the post-Cold War era has presented 
numerous expectations and opportunities for donor states humanitarian involvement. 
For the Western industrial democracies, this has presented an opportunity o f using 
the UN to enhanced and legitimise their geopolitical ambitions in Sudan. This is 
how realists would conceive o f international society in that they would argue that 
governments pursue their interests while paying lip-service to the norms. This realist 
view that international norms do not matter in international affairs has been objected 
by this thesis. The constructivist ontology provides a perspective in international 
relations which confronts the political practice o f states with an ideal alternative
695 Q u o te d  in  N ic h o la s  W h e e le r , S a v in g  S tra n g e rs :  H u m a n ita r ia n  In te rv e n tio n  in  In te rn a tio n a l  
S o c ie ty , O x fo rd ,  O x fo rd  U n iv e rs i ty  P re s s ,  2 0 0 0 , p . 2 8 5
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policy. Rejecting each extreme, the realist, in which power is the only and central 
force in international relations, and the utopian (solidarist/idealist) perspective, with 
its call to revolutionise the international system o f states, constructivism recognises 
that both self-interests and altruism can combine to make humanitarian intervention 
a success. Constructivists maintain that the construction o f a stable international 
order is dependent upon the successful linkage of state interests to international 
legitimising norms and principles. Evidence in this thesis has proved that it is very 
difficult to find an example o f a state intervening on an apolitical manner, wholly 
guided by humanitarian concerns. Thus, the usefulness constructivist approach is 
that it does not rule out realist view that selfishness, power, and conflict are 
inescapable aspects o f human nature and perhaps especially o f international politics. 
Furthermore, realists are right to say that good and evil, right or wrong are not easily 
segregated nor easily discerned in this post-Cold War world. But the problem with 
realist school is that it has come, for the most part, to a position o f moral scepticism, 
to the view that humanitarian nonns and principles are either inapplicable or have a 
pernicious effect on international politics.
This realist position, while valid as an indictment o f the abuse o f humanitarian 
principles, does not constitute a case against their proper place. The thesis argues 
that, in spite o f human weakness, humanitarian norms and principles can, should, 
and do play a positive role in international politics. Although states are merely a 
construction, decisions about states’ affairs are made by human beings. According to 
the English School (solidarists), donor states’ policy makers are first human beings 
above all elses and thus shares solidarity and universality with those in peril. 
Second, decision makers are better placed than ordinary citizens to assist and defend 
other human beings in the international society. There is therefore an obligation to 
do whatever is possible to protect human rights in the abusing states. In this case, 
donor states’ political and security agendas weighed in favour o f the Sudanese war- 
victims. Accordingly, the record o f co-operation and altruism discussed in this thesis 
strengthens the case against the realist denial of humanitarian behaviour under 
conditions o f anarchy. Moreover, moral and legal recognition o f common values, 
such as the protection o f human rights, and the delivery of humanitarian relief aid 
without the consent o f the Sudanese government, has created incentives for donor 
states to broaden their conception o f national interest to accommodate collective 
efforts to address Sudan domestic. OLS experience shows that there are two reasons
264
why realist position is not useful for understanding ethical reasoning in international 
affairs. First, many donor states have had few commercial interests in Sudan, and 
were unable to secure any kind o f international influence other than what they have 
already had as advanced industrial democracies. Second, a substantial portion of 
donors’ money was channelled through NGOs and multilateral organisations such as 
EU and the UN agencies themselves. Any benefit that donors might have got from 
supporting UN programmes in Sudan seems to be insufficient to justify the 
argument that humanitarian norms do not count very much in the international 
system. This thesis also shows that there were also other pressures that influenced 
donor states’ decision to intervene in humanitarian crisis in violation o f the 
Sudanese sovereignty.
The first pressure came from the emotional reactions o f foreign citizens, who, 
when confronted with the images o f suffering, if  only to remove the horrific images 
o f the Sudanese war-victims from their television screens and newspapers. These 
pressure, while arguably based on emotional and superficial sentiments, nonetheless 
exerted powerful pressure on governments, forcing them to take action to satisfy this 
emotional outburst. A second pressure arose from citizens and governments acting 
in response to moral and humanitarian norms. This pressure is more than simply an 
emotional tap turned on and off by media images. It is a phenomenon that appears to 
be growing throughout the world, and the emergence of a caring global community 
that, while relatively small in numbers, is nonetheless motivated by sentiments of 
empathy and moral obligation to respond to human suffering wherever and 
whenever it may occur. This type o f pressure is most commonly found within non­
governmental organisations and the many volunteers who support them. It is evident 
from this thesis that it is a sentiment that has also been cited by some politicians and 
government officials. Though small, this group has an effective influence on 
government policy because o f the intensity o f its views and its willingness to 
mobilise international norms to put sustained pressure on governments.
• IMPORTANCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY
Standard international relations thinking (Realist perspective) assumes a hierarchy 
among instruments o f power: military force rank highest, then economic resources, 
then — far the down the list, if  mentioned at all -  such “soft” instruments as norms or
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the power o f persuasion. The Realists would see the role o f civil society as 
insignificant. But in this thesis, the author has shown that civil society have 
attempted to shape the evolution o f humanitarian norms -  that is, standards about 
how the parties to the Sudan conflict and intervening states ought to behave. The 
experience o f civil society in Sudan has also disproved pluralist argument that the 
norms o f state sovereignty and non-intervention will make it difficult to for 
international community to intervene in Sudan on humanitarian grounds. Hence, this 
thesis has demonstrated that a growing consciousness of common humanity 
permeates the emerging civil society. In the case of OLS, civil society has attempted 
to shape these norms and rules in two ways: directly, by persuading Sudan warring 
parties, and donor states’ policy makers to change their minds about what is the right 
thing to do in a civil war situation; or indirectly, by altering the public’s perception 
o f what donor governments and the parties to the conflict should be doing to relieve 
the suffering o f Sudan war-victims. In this case, the currency of its power is not 
force, but credible information and moral authority.
Thus, the success o f NGOs in mobilising humanitarian norms and rules to 
shame Sudan warring parties, the UN and member states has implications for 
International Relations theory. Scholars working in the liberal tradition or coming 
from a social construction perspective have found that socialisation can occur as a 
result o f the actions o f nonstate actors and may involve use o f “soft” power 
resources, such as moral leverage and technical knowledge.696 In a study of the 
diffusion of international science norms, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink have 
identified transnational advocacy networks as another avenue where states come to 
adopt international norms. These transnational groups succeed not only “by holding 
governments...accountable to previous commitments and the principles they have 
endorsed”, but also framing their ideas in ways that “resonate or fit with the larger 
belief system” o f the target state .697 This thesis finding agrees with Sikkink’s 
argument that human rights policies and practices are contributing to a gradual, and 
significant transformation o f sovereignty in the modem world and that this shift
696  R ic h a rd  P r ic e ,  “ R e v e rs in g  th e  G u n  S ig h ts : T ra n s n a tio n a l  C iv il  S o c ie ty  T a rg e ts  L a n d  M in e s ” , 
International Organization, V o l. 5 3 , N o . 3 , 1 9 9 8 , p p . 6 1 3 -6 4 4 ;  A m y  G u ro w itz ,  “ M o b il is in g  
In te rn a tio n a l  N o rm s : D o m e s tic  A c to rs , Im m ig ra n ts  a n d  th e  J a p a n e s e  S ta te ” , World Politics, V o l. 5 1 , 
N o . 3 , 19 9 9 , p p . 4 1 3 -4 4 5
697 M a rg a re t  K e c h  &  K a th ry n  S ik k in k , A c tiv is ts  b e y o n d  B o rd e rs :  A d v o c a c y  N e tw o rk s  in  
In te rn a tio n a l  P o li tic s , I th a c a , N e w  Y o rk , C o rn e ll  U n iv e rs i ty  P re s s , 1 9 9 8 , p p . 2 0 1 -2 0 4
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cannot be explained without taking into account the role of transnational nonstate 
actors .698 It is clear from this thesis that NGO network developed formal procedures 
to discuss and publicise human rights violations in Sudan. Their commitment made 
both the GOS and the SPLM/A repressive practices visible and salient to respond. 
Because o f this, the Sudanese government and rebel movement tried to provide 
justifications for their violent tactics against their civilian population. In the give- 
and-take o f exposing violations, demanding explanations, providing justifications, 
and changing practices, states and NGOs gradually questioned traditional 
understandings o f sovereignty and began constructing the elements o f a modified 
sovereignty .699 The experience o f OLS require that NGOs be credited for having 
contributed to this universal culture of humanitarianism. This contribution was 
substantial to the extent that some form of democratic governance took place in the 
OLS Southern Sector. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were instrumental 
in pushing the Sudanese government and the rebel movement to seek justifications 
for their violations o f international norms and principles. Indeed, the experience of 
NGOs in the Sudan shows that human rights advocacy offers such a possibility.
698 S ik k in k , “ H u m a n  R ig h ts , p r in c ip le d  is su e -n e t  w o rk s , a n d  s o v e re ig n ty  in  L a t in  A m e r ic a ” , p . 411
699 Ib id .,  p . 4 1 4
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6 . 2 .  FINAL CONCLUSION
The experience o f OLS has wider implications for international relations theory, as 
well as for the humanitarian community. It is clear from the introduction that a 
major academic debate is now under over whether and how norms matter in 
international relations. Realist scholars used to focus primarily on military or 
economic levers o f power, ignoring questions of how states and other actors would 
decide what they wanted to do with that power. A new school o f thought called 
social constructivism focuses on questions of how international humanitarian actors 
“construct” their interests -  that is, how they determine what they want to do and 
why those goals change. Constructivists point out that structures -  those entities 
with the most military, economic, or other resources -  have to interact with agents -  
people and institutions that shape international norms about what behaviour is 
acceptable and what aspirations are legitimate. In the case of OLS (Operation 
Lifeline Sudan), those agents are UN agencies and non-governmental actors that are 
quite consciously attempting to bring about a global political and humanitarian 
change. In an attempt to demonstrate the significance of humanitarian norms, I argue 
that OLS experience 1989-96 and the Sudan crisis o f 1986 generally has provided an 
important case study in the mixture o f motives and views current in contemporary 
international affairs. Social constructivism has provided this thesis with a clear 
understanding of how OLS managed to reconcile humanitarian norms with the 
constitutive principles o f Westphalian state sovereignty; it used norms o f behaviour 
to reach a reasoned consensus (communication and dialogue) with the host 
government and the rebel movement.
The evidence in this thesis illustrate how arguing (communicative action) 
provides a mechanism for both learning and norms socialisation and 
operationalisation in a civil war setting. International norms often have to take their 
course through a filter o f various domestic structures to become accepted by states 
as guiding political devices. From the constructivist perspective, there were three 
reasons which made it possible for the Sudanese government and the opposition 
movement to accept and respect humanitarian norms. First, they were forced to 
through political pressure or economic sanctions as neorealists claim; second, 
because it was in their interest as neoliberalists maintain; third, because they 
perceived humanitarian norms as legitimate. These were different degrees to which
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humanitarian principles and rules were internalised, While solidarists will go for the 
third degree, which is that the Sudanese warring parties really identified with these 
norms, this thesis agrees with the constructivists that all the three degrees are 
essential elements for a norm internalisation. This usefulness o f constructivist 
approach can be seen from the extent to which OLS has made important 
contribution to the growing significance of humanitarian norms and principles, 
because the domestic debate discussed in this thesis provided the context upon 
which the international norms and principles were operationalised. As Larry Minear 
and Thomas Weiss concluded six years ago that “there may never be another Sudan, 
but there will need to be other Lifelines” . 7 0 0  Both OLS and the donor states used 
international norms to shame and sanction the behaviour o f the warring parties, and 
these political devices constitute an important development in humanitarian action. 
Indeed, the experience o f OLS has highlighted the regulative functions o f 
humanitarian norms in international relief system, and has challenged the structural 
realist paradigm, which focuses mostly on the effects o f variations in the distribution 
o f capabilities among states under anarchy. 701
Moreover, emergence o f these nonns of international behaviour, and their 
application in the Sudan war environment, has challenged pluralist the notion that 
sovereignty provides governments with insulation against accountability provided 
that their actions are confined to the territorial limits, and their leaders have 
immunity respected throughout the world. Concentrating on the impact ot norms on 
international relations, recent social constructivists have maintained that 
transnational processes o f diffusion and persuasion socialise less democratic 
governments to accept norms . 702 This thesis has also proved that the success of 
norms as devices for communication and dialogue depends on the image of the 
humanitarian actors, who promote them. Empirical findings in this thesis seem to
7 0 0  T h o m a s  G . W e is s  &  L a rry  M in e a r , “ D o  In te rn a tio n a l  E th ic s  M a tte r?  H u m a n ita r ia n  P o l i t ic s  in  th e  
S u d a n ” , E th ic s  &  In te rn a tio n a l  A ffa irs ,  V o l. 5 , 19 9 1 , p p . 1 9 7 -2 1 4 ; L a rry  M in e a r ,  H u m a n ita r ia n is m  
U n d e r  S ie g e : A  C r i tic a l  R e v ie w  o f  O p e ra t io n  L ife l in e  S u d a n , T re n to n , N .J .,  T h e  R e d  S e a  P re s s ,  1991
701 T h e  s tru c tu ra l r e a l is t  p a ra d ig m  is  m o s t p e r s u a s iv e ly  d e ta i le d  in  K e n n e th  W a ltz ,  T h e o r y  o f  
I n te rn a tio n a l  P o li tic s , R e a d in g , M a ss .,  A d d is o n  W e s le y , 1979 . Im p o r ta n t  c r i t iq u e s  th a t  in  v a r io u s  
w a y s  fo c u s  o n  th e  n o rm a t iv ity  o f  th e  in te rn a tio n a l  s y s te m  in c lu d e  H e d le y  B u ll ,  T h e  A n a rc h ic a l  
S o c ie ty : A  S tu d y  o f  O rd e r  in  W o r ld  P o li t ic s ,  N e w  Y o rk , C o lu m b ia  U n iv e r s i ty  P re s s ,  1 9 7 9 ; R o b e r t  W . 
C o x , “ S o c ia l  F o rc e s , S ta te s  a n d  W o rld  O rd e rs :  B e y o n d  In te rn a tio n a l  R e la t io n s  T h e o r y ” , Millennium: 
Journal o f  International Studies, V o l. 10, 1 9 8 1 , p p . 1 2 6 -1 5 5
702 S e e , fo r  e x a m p le , M a rg a re t  K e c k  &  K a th ry n  S ik k in k , A c tiv is ts  B e y o n d  B o rd e r s :  A d v o c a c y  
N e tw o rk s  in  In te rn a tio n a l  P o li tic s , I th a c a ,  C o rn e ll  U n iv e r s i ty  P re s s , 199 8
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verify that donor states have a deep impact on norms-intemalisation as others. In 
general, donor states are states, states, which promote social norms independent o f 
their own material interests. Nonetheless, for humanitarian norms to be accepted by 
the warring parties, their meaning has to be mediated in the international sphere 
through reasoned consensus or communicative action and social practices. Within 
the process o f opinion and identity formation, in which meaning and validity o f the 
norm itself can change, argumentation and persuasion is an indispensable condition. 
In the case o f this thesis, even less powerful actors such as NGOs or advocate 
networks had effectively used the power o f reasoned consensus to forced the 
warring parties in Sudan to accept the universality o f humanitarian norms. For 
example, the hard-line Islamist regime in Khartoum was extremely concerned about 
international human rights condemnations and pressures. Perhaps, as noted above, 
the significance o f  humanitarian principles is a consequence o f communicative 
action mounted by activists in civil society. This means that norms, whether 
domestic or international, can make room for new voices by altering contexts and 
making new types o f action. For example, in the absence o f any norms about the 
rights o f war-victims to relief food, displaced persons claims about starvation cannot 
be heard. It might be argued that the use of international norms to back political 
solidarists and constructivists claims is unsurprising, since it may be the case that 
activists will use any argument that works. While perhaps not surprising from this 
perspective, the fact that humanitarian norms provide an additional weapon in the 
arsenal o f claims that solidarists can make and the fact that they sometimes work are 
not trivial points for many reasons.
As discussed in chapter 2, the socialisation of humanitarian norms is not 
explained as an outcome o f interaction, but as an interaction-process with an open 
end, in which communication and dialogue are important mechanisms in the 
internalisation o f a norm, and therefore, change actor interests and identities. 
Communication and dialogue were seen by OLS agencies and donors as necessary 
for encouraging the host government to accept its domestic and international 
obligations. Hence, the rise o f human rights expressed new modes of transnational 
political action, relying on networks, norms, information and media access as 
instruments o f persuasion, to challenge GOS obstructionist policies. At times, these 
challenges converged with geopolitical pre
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ssures as discussed in chapter 3. With humanitarian norms having been legitimated 
by the Sudanese government, the claims for implementation by NGOs were difficult 
to discount altogether, especially when joined with grassroots opposition to 
oppressive rule and to an awareness of abuse made manifest by a gradually more 
attentive global media. All in all, international humanitarian norms may remain the 
most comprehensive effort at global management o f internal population 
displacement. Though very far from being a humanitarian regime like those of 
human rights , international norms of behaviour will increasingly acquire some 
degree o f moral legitimacy and may shape how future humanitarian players think o f 
internally displaced people. Hence, there are lessons which the wider international 
community needs to learn from the experience of OLS.
271
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AGENCY MATERIAL
Abu-auf, Ibrahim, Letter to Christopher Jaeger, United Nations Committee for 
Emergency Relief Office: The Establishment of Humanitarian Principles 
Committee, January 4, 1995
Abu-auf, Ibrahim, Letter to Mr. Akiwumi UNHCR Representative: Movement of 
Displaced, Khartoum, July 30, 1995
Adelrahama, Abu-Doun, Letter to Per Jandid, Khartoum, June 23, 1994
Akol Lam, Letter to Philip O ’Brien: Membership o f FRRA on the Steering 
Committee o f the OLS, Nairobi, November 11, 1994
Allen, Tim, War and Peace in Southern Sudan, Kampala, Uganda: Makerere 
Institute o f Social Research, 1987
Amin, Ali Elzein, Second Round o f Nutritional Survey o f Children Under Five 
Years o f Age in Wau Town and Displaced Camps, Wau, United Nations Children 
Fund, 1995
Awad, Khalifa Musa, Letter to Director of Operations, World Food Programme, 
Khartoum, Relief and Rehabilitation Commission Representation in Lokichoggio, 
October 12, 1993
CARE, Situation Report -  Khartoum Displaced, Khartoum, CARE, May 5, 1995
Christian Non-Governmental Organisations, Meeting, Khartoum, April 20, 1996
Catholic Relief Service, Catholic Relief Service Quarterly Report, April-June 1995: 
Emergency Operation Plan, Nairobi, Catholic Relief Service, April/June, 1995
Cohen, Robert, Strengthening United Nations Human Rights Protection for 
Internally Displaced persons, Washington, D.C., Refugee Policy Group, February, 
1993
Department o f Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency 
Appeal for Sudan, January-December 1996, Geneva, Department o f Humanitarian 
Affairs, February, 1996
---------------  United Nations 1995 consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal: Sudan,
Geneva, Department o f Humanitarian Affairs, January, 1995
..................... Records o f  the Donor Consultations on the Sudan, Geneva, Department
of Humanitarian Affairs, May 4, 1995
----------------  Operation Lifeline Sudan Review, Department o f Humanitarian
Affairs, Nairobi -  Geneva, July, 1996
Deng, Kut Daniel, Letter from SRRA Accountant to WFP, Nairobi, November 16,
1989
---------- ----- UN Emergency Unit Situation Report: Bahr el Ghazal-Wau, Nairobi,
United Nations Emergency Unit, Nairobi, July 4, 1990
272
----------------  Wau Situation Report, Nairobi, United Nations Emergency Unit,
October, 1991
...... ..............  Wau Situation Report, Nairobi, United Nations Emergency Unit,
January, 1992
Donor Group, Sudan Donor’s Meeting, 23 March 1989, New York, March 28, 1989
..................... Aid Memoir, Khartoum -  Nairobi, November 17, 1992
Duany, Aker Julia, Making Peace: A Report on Grassroots Peace Efforts, Nairobi, 
New Sudan Council o f Churches, October, 1995
European Commission Humanitarian Office, Global Plan I: Global Humanitarian 
Plan In Favour o f the Affected Populations of the Sudan, Nairobi -  Brussels, 
European Commission Humanitarian Office, April, 1994
------------------ , Global Plan II: Second Global Package o f Humanitarian Aid to the
Sudan and the Sudanese Refugees, Nairobi -  Brussels, December, 1994
---------------- , ECHO Global Plan III: Funding Proposition for a Global
Humanitarian Aid Plan in Favour o f the Affected Populations o f Sudan Both within 
Sudan and in Uganda, Brussels, European Commission Humanitarian Affairs, May, 
1995
----------------- European Global Plan IV: Funding Propositions for a Global
Humanitarian Aid in Favour of the Affected Populations of Sudan Both Within and 
in Uganda, Brussels, European Commission Humanitarian Affairs, December, 1995
----------------  ECHO Global Plan V: ECHO Funding Proposal for Humanitarian
Operations in Sudan and Northern Uganda, Junel996 -  March 1997, Brussels, 
European Commission Humanitarian Office, April, 1996
Food and Agriculture Organisation/World Food Programme, Report o f the 1991 
Sudan WFP/FAO Crop and Food Need Assessment Mission, Rome, Food and 
Agriculture Organisation/World Food Programme, December, 1991
Government o f Sudan, Country Agreement on the entry o f International Non- 
Governmental Organisation to Operate in the Sudan, Khartoum: Government o f the 
Sudan, January, 1993
----------------- A Code o f conduct: Principles and guidelines governing NGO Work
in the Sudan, Khartoum: Government o f the Sudan, January, 1993
...... ........... — Statement to the 49th Session of the UN General Assembly Under
Agenda Item 37: Co-ordination o f Humanitarian Assistance, New York: Sudan 
Permanent Mission to the United Nations, November 23, 1994
........ .............. Aide Memoir: OLS Flights in southern Sudan, New York -  Nairobi,
Sudan Permanent Mission to the United Nations, December 2, 1995
---------------- Phase I: The Document o f the government of the Sudan on the OLS
Review & Par II: replies o f the Government of the Sudan to Questions Posed by the 
OLS-Operations Team, Khartoum, Government o f the Sudan, April, 1996
Government o f Sudan/None-govemmental organisations/United Nations, 
Agreements Adopted by the Joint GOS/NGOs/US Meeting, 25-28 January, 
Khartoum: January, 1993
273
Government o f Sudan/Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/United Nations, Relief 
Supplies and Humanitarian Assistance to the War Affected Area, Nairobi: OLS, 
March 23, 1994
Hansen, Peter, Letter to Christoph Jaeger, United Nations Development Programme 
Resident Representative Sudan, Khartoum, July 31, 1995
International Non-Governmental Organisations, Aide Memoir to Jan Eliason, 
Khartoum -  Nairobi, September 5, 1992
..................... - Letter to Christoph Jaeger: Forcible Movement o f Displaced Squatter
Communities within Greater Khartoum Area, Khartoum, January 24, 1995
----------------- A Strategy Paper for Khartoum Displaced and Squatter Populations,
Khartoum: July, 1995
---------- ------  Briefing, Khartoum: March 27, 1996
Jaeger, Christopher., Letter to Akiwumi UNHCR: Supreme Council for Peace 
Initiative for Movement o f Displaced Persons to Agricultural Production Areas, 
Khartoum, July 20, 1995
-------------- Letter to Peter Hansen on “Capacity Building”, Khartoum -
Nairobi, December 21, 1995
Introductory Remarks to the United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for 
the Sudan, Geneva: United Nations Development Programme/United Nations 
Committee for Emergency Relief Organisation, January 30, 1996
Lamuniere, Charles., Mission to Sudan and Kenya: 28 to 30 November and 4 to 6  
December 1992, Geneva, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, December, 1992
Levine, Ian, Memo to Philip O’Brien: Definition of Counterparts, Some Preliminary 
thoughts, November, 24, 1994
-----------------  Capacity Building: OLS Presentation Notes, Nairobi, April, 1996
Mohamed, el Badwai, UNICEF Emergency Unit: Khartoum Displaced Report, 
Khartoum, United Nations Children Fund, April, 1995
Muor Muor, Mario, SRRA Position Paper on Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) 
Southern Sector, Nairobi, Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association, November 
27, 1995
New Sudan Council o f Churches, Report on Interpositioning, Nairobi, Peace and 
Human Rights Desk, March 15, 1996
--------- ---------  The Sudan At War: In Search o f Peace, Report o f a Consultation
Convened by Churches and Christian Councils o f the Great Lakes-Hom of Africa 
Region, April 7-8, 1998, Nairobi, April, 1998
O ’Brien, Philip, Fax to Peter Hansen: IGADD Talks, Nairobi, August 1, 1994
-------- ------------ Letter to Gerald Lewis on “Letter o f Understanding”, Nairobi,
September 29, 1995
----------------------- Letter to Peter Hansen on Capacity Building/Cash Payment to
Counterparts, Nairobi, January 3, 1996
—-.......................Letter to Christopher Jaeger, Nairobi, January 3, 1996
Office o f US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Humanitarian Relief
274
Operation Lifeline Sudan, 1992 Emergency Needs Assessment and Appeal, Southern 
Sudan, Nairobi, United Nations Children Fund/Operation Lifeline Sudan, December,
1991
Operation Lifeline Sudan Southern Sector, Situation Assessment, Nairobi. United 
Nations Children Fund/Operation Lifeline Sudan, February, 1993
------------------------ 1 9 9 4  Assessment, Nairobi, United Nations International Children
Fund/Operation Lifeline Sudan, October, 1994
------------------------ 1 9 9 4  Assessment in Southern Sudan: The Transitional Zone and
the Khartoum Camps, Nairobi, United Nations Emergency Unit, January, 1995
Operation Lifeline Sudan, 1995 Needs Assessment: Final Draft, Nairobi, November, 
1995
.................... ........... Trip Report, Washington D.C., July, 1993
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission/United Nations/Non-Govemmental 
Organisations, Annual Needs Assessment: Wau and Displaced Camps, Khartoum, 
October 1/8, 1995
Save the Children Fund (United Kingdom), Ed D a’eim Dinka Displaced and Host 
Population Nutrition and health survey, Darfur, SCF-UK, August, 1993
Scott-Villiers, Report Submitted to V.O. Reilly, Nairobi, United Nations Children 
Fund/Operation Lifeline Sudan, April 21, 1988
Simonse, Simon, Human Rights and Cultural Values on Relief Operations in South 
Sudan, Nairobi, United Nations Children International Fund/Operation Lifeline 
Sudan, 1995
Solvic Drako, Notes on the Mission to Sudan of Ambassador Drako Silovic and Mr. 
James Baker, September 3, 1992
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army, Press Statement on the Corridors 
o f Tranquillity, Nairobi, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army, October 
19, 1991
---------------------  SPLM/A First National Convention: A Major Watershed -
Resolutions Appointments and Protocols, Chukudum, New Sudan, March 12, 1994
---------------------- Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to the New Sudan: A
Partnership for the New Sudan , Chukudum, Facilitated by the Sudan Relief and 
Rehabilitation Association, Nairobi, September 21, 1995
Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association, Communication to WFP, Nairobi, 
November 10, 1996
Traxler, Vieri., Mission o f Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs for the Sudan, 
Ambassador Vieri Traxler, Geneva, Department o f Humanitarian Affairs, August 5, 
1993
........... ....................  Mission o f Special Envoy for Humanitarian Affairs for the
Sudan, Ambassador Vieri Traxler, Geneva, Department o f Humanitarian 
ffairs,December 7, 1993
-------------------------  Memo to Jan Eliason: Increased Use o f Land Routes for
Humanitarian Operation in the Sudan, Geneva, Department o f Humanitarian Affairs, 
January 27, 994
275
............ .........................Summary of DHA’s Negotiations with the Government o f  the
Sudan -  from August 1993 to April 1996 -  on the Issue of Humanitarian Access to 
People in the Area o f the Nuba Mountains, Geneva, Department o f Humanitarian 
Affairs, May 13, 1996
United Nations/Operation Lifeline Sudan, An Investigation into Production 
Capability in the Rural Southern Sudan: A Report on Food Sources and Needs, 
Nairobi, June, 1990
--------------------------  Minutes o f the Meetings between United Nations Under
Secretary Mr. James Jonah and Representatives of Government o f Sudan and Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement, Nairobi, October 19, 1991
United Nations General Assembly, Report on Refugees, Displaced Persons and 
Returnees, prepared by Jacques Cuenod, E /1990/109/Add, New York, June 22, 1991
United Nations, Emergency Situation in Sudan: Urgent Humanitarian Requirements, 
Geneva, Department o f Humanitarian Affairs, November 10, 1988
-------- ------- —  Emergency Relief Needs: Immediate Food and Non-Food Relief
Requirements for the period April to November 1989, Khartoum, March 8 , 1989
----------- -----------Plan o f Action: Sudan Emergency Relief Operations, Khartoum,
March 14, 1989
--------------------- Operation Lifeline Sudan: Phase Two, Khartoum, March 14,
1990
--------- ----------—  Summary of Operation Lifeline Sudan, Nairobi United Nations
International Children Fund/Operation Lifeline Sudan, September 3, 1992
 -  .......... Joint Statement o f the government of Sudan and the United
Nations on Humanitarian Assistance to the Sudan, Khartoum, September 16, 1992
........ ------- ----------United Nations 1992 Consolidated Inter-Agency appeal: Sudan,
Geneva, United Nations/Department of Humanitarian Affairs, January, 1993
...... .............. .......Operation Lifeline Sudan Phase II: Background Appeal Document:
Immediate Food and Non-Food Requirements, Khartoum, March 26, 1990
....................-........  Operation Lifeline Sudan: Draft Plan o f Action: Operational
Framework, key principles and Specific Agreements to Enable Effective Food and 
Non-Food Relief to All Target Populations, Khartoum, March 26, 1990
---------- ------------ Operation Lifeline Sudan II: Draft Plan o f Action, Khartoum,
Government o f Sudan and the Donor Consultation Meeting, March 28, 1990
.............................-  Operation Lifeline Sudan: Framework for Accessing people in
Need, Khartoum, Office o f the Special Co-ordinator for the UN Secretary General 
for Emergency and Relief Operations in Sudan, July, 1992
........ .............. ........  1992-1993 Situation Assessment, Nairobi, February, 1993
 -  -...........  Strengthening the Co-ordination o f Humanitarian and Disaster
Relief Activities o f the United Nations, including Special Economic Assistance to 
Individual Countries or Regions: Emergency Assistance to the Sudan, New York, 
United Nations Secretary General, September 12, 1994
-------------------- Operation Lifeline Sudan (Northern Sector): 1994 Assessments in
Southern Sudan, the Transitional Zone and the Khartoum Displaced Camps, 
Khartoum, January, 1995
276
United Nations/Operation Lifeline Sudan, OLS Southern Sector Needs Assessment 
for 1995: Final Draft, Nairobi, November, 1995
United Nations Emergency Unit, Khartoum Displaced and Squatters: Current Status 
and Suggested Action, Khartoum: United Nations Emergency Unit, March 23, 1992
United Nations Committee on Emergency Relief Office, File Note: NGO Liaison in 
Operation Lifeline Sudan, Khartoum, 1990
— .......... Briefing Notes About the Khartoum Displaced Population, Khartoum,
Office o f the UN Co-ordinator for Emergency and Relief Operations in Sudan, 
Khartoum, January, 1996
United Nations Development Programme, Planning and Project Emergency 
Assistance for the Displaced: Project Revision Document, Khartoum, August 9, 
1989
........................... Minutes o f Inter-Agency Meeting, Khartoum, May 21, 1990
............... ...........  General Briefing Note, Khartoum, Office of the Special Co­
ordinator for the UN Secretary General for Emergency and Relief Operations in 
Sudan, September 4, 1992
........................... Internal Displacement in Sudan, Khartoum, 1993
-------------------- Urban Displaced Squatter Settlement Project, Khartoum, 1994
.............. .............  Pilot Phase for the Implementation o f the Agricultural
Rehabilitation Project in Wau (Western Bahr el Ghazal State): Project No. 
SUD/94/001/02/99, Khartoum, March 2, 1995
-------- ------------Minutes o f Inter-Agency Meeting, Khartoum, June 7, 1995
United Nation Development Programme, Progress Report (1st July to 31s1 December 
1995): Wau Agricultural Rehabilitation Project (SUD/95/002) Western Baher el 
Ghazal State, Khartoum, December, 1995
.............—........ — Towards a Workable Strategy on the Internally Displaced persons in
the Sudan: A Proposed Workplan o f an Assignment to be submitted to the UNDP 
Khartoum, 1996
........ -....................  Culture o f  Peace in the Sudan: Symposium on Fundamental
Development Issues o f the Sudan, Khartoum, March 28, 1996
United Nation Emergency Unit, UN Position And Agency roles in Displacement 
Issues in Sudan, Khartoum, February 4, 1992
.............................. Mission to Ed Da’eim 8-9 June 1992, June 8/9, 1992
-----------------------Khartoum Displaced Squatter Population: Priority Activities 1994,
Khartoum, 1994
---------------------- Minutes: Meeting on the Issue of Internally Displaced Persons,
Khartoum, June 27, 1995
--------- ----------— Summary o f Planning for 1995 Assessment Ex-Khartoum,
Khartoum, 1995
------------------------Note for the File, Khartoum, March 20, 1996
---------------- ------ - Chronology o f the Khartoum Displaced, 1983-1996, Khartoum,
February, 1996
277
—-........................  Background Paper: GOS’s Position towards OLS, Khartoum,
April 1, 1996
United Nations International Children Fund/Operation Lifeline Sudan: Workshop on 
Lessons Learned, Copenhagen, 14-15 December 1989, Nairobi, United Nations 
International Children Fund, March 1, 1990
---------------- Report on Workshop on Humanitarian Principles for Sudanese NGOs,
Nairobi, April 5, 1995
..................... Review o f the 1994 OLS Agreements on the Delivery o f Humanitarian
Assistance in Southern Sudan, Nairobi, April, 1996
........... ..........Note for Record: Two Meetings with SPLM-United, Nairobi, May 16,
1995
------------------ OLS Agreements on Ground Rules, Nairobi, July/August, 1995
------------------ Report on Visit to Ganyliel, Nairobi, August 6 , 1995
------------------  Report on SPLM Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance, Nairobi,
September, 1995
------------------- Note for Record: Meeting Between the UN and the Sudan Relief and
Rehabilitation Association, Nairobi, December 7, 1990
---------------------- N 0 te for the Record: Meeting Between UN and SPLM
Representatives, Nairobi, United Nations International Children Fund/Operation 
Lifeline Sudan, September 8 , 1991
----------------------- Minutes o f a Meeting Between Dr. Garang de Mabior and
Michael Priestly, Nairobi, May 19, 1990
--------------------- A Critical Review o f the Management and Impact o f Seeds and
Tools Programmes in Southern Sudan, Nairobi, October, 1990
 —  OLS Principles, Nairobi, 1990
 —  ------------SPLM/OLS Agreement on Grounds Rules, Nairobi, June, 1994
........—.............— Ground Rules, Nairobi, May 1, 1993
United Nations International Children Fund, A Proposal: Restructuring Operation 
Lifeline Sudan as a Regional Emergency Unit, Nairobi, August, 1991
----------------------Sudan Annual Report 1994, Khartoum - Nairobi, September, 1994
------- ------- ------ OLS Annual Review, Khartoum - Nairobi, October, 29-31, 1994
---------------------- First Draft Report of the Secretary General on Operation Lifeline
Sudan, Nairobi, 1989
.............................—  1995 Programme Review, Khartoum, 1995
.............................Sudan Annual Report 1995, Khartoum, December, 1995
........ ....................  Comprehensive National Strategy to Achieve Self-sufficiency in
Food Production, Khartoum, 1996
 —  - ............. Situation Analysis o f Children and Women in Sudan, Khartoum,
March, 1996
United States Embassy, Cable Released, Khartoum, May 12, 1994
278
......... ................Fax to Secretary of State, Washington: Sudan-Khartoum Displaced
Update Khartoum, United States Embassy, February 2, 1991
United States Agency for International Development/Bureau for Humanitarian 
Response, Situation Report No. 4: Sudan, Nairobi -  Washington D.C., United States 
Agency for International Development, April 12, 1989
---------- ----- —  Situation Report No. 2: Sudan, Nairobi -  Washington D.C.,
February 13, 1993
------ ----- -..........Sudan Situation Report No. 3, Nairobi -  Washington D.C., May 26,
1991
United States Agency for International Development, Nutrition in terms o f Disaster, 
Report o f an International Conference, Geneva, September 27-30 1988 Under the 
Auspices o f the United Nations with partial Support from United States Agency for 
International Development, Geneva, 1989
.......................... Khartoum Urban/Displaced: Possible Actions for USAID/Sudan,
Khartoum, February 15, 1990
United States Office o f Foreign Disaster Assistance, Humanitarian Relief 
Operations in Sudan: Field Trip, Nairobi -  Washington D.C., July, 1993
Villiers-Scott, The EPAG Livestock Redistribution Project 1993-1995: Augmenting 
Pastoralist Survival Systems in Situations in Natural Disaster and Conflict, Nairobi, 
UNICEF/OLS, April, 1996
Wagner, Gordon, Situation Report, Wau, United Nations Emergency Unit, August 
13,1990
World Food Programme, Preliminary Report: Food Needs Assessment Survey, 
Eastern Operation Area, Khartoum, November 13, 1989
.................. -............. Report WFP/NGOs/Donors Food Aid Assessment Mission
Sudan, 27 November-19 December 1990, Khartoum, December 19, 1990
----------- -------------  Food Aid in Emergencies Book A: Policies and Principles,
Rome, September, 1990
-......... ------ ------- Visit to el-Rahmania Peace Village, Khartoum, November 15,
1992
........ ------- --------- World Food Programme, Site Reports, Nairobi, 1993
------------------------  1 9 9 3  Assessment, Executive and Regional Summaries, Nairobi,
1993
........... .................... Annual Report, Khartoum, 1995
----------------------- Note for the File: Joint RRC/NGO/UN Mission to South
Kordofan, Khartoum, April, 1995
----------------------Letter o f Understanding, Khartoum, June 6 , 1995
......... -.......... .......... Barge Operations Voyages Summary July 5, 1991 through
December 31, 1995, March 26, 1996
-------------------------  Workshops for Food Monitors, Lokichoggio, Kenya, April 9,
1996
279
BOOKS
Africa Rights, Food and Power in Sudan: A Critique of Flumanitarianism, London, 
Africa Rights, 1997
Ahmed Abel Ghaffar and Sorbo Gunnar (eds.), Management o f the Crisis in the 
Sudan, Bergen, University o f Bergen, 1989
Amnesty International, Sudan Human Rights Violations in the Context o f Civil War, 
New York: Amnesty International, 1989
Amstutz, R. Mark, International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global 
Politics, Boulder: Rowman & Littlefields Publishers, 1999
Ayubi, N., Nazih, Political Islam: Religion and politics in the Arab World, London, 
Routledge, 1991
Badal, Koba, “Oil and Regional Statements in Southern Sudan”, Discussion Paper 
No. 80, Syracuse, Department o f Geography, Syracuse University, 1983
Barsella, Gino & Ayusu A. Miguel, Struggling to Be Heard: The Christian Voice in 
Independent Sudan, London, Paulines Publication, 1998
Beshir, Mohammed Omer, The Southern Sudan Background to Conflict, London:
C. Hurst & Co., 1968
------------------- “Sudan, aid and external relations: selected essays”, Monograph No.
9, University o f Khartoum Graduate College, London: distributed by Ithaca Press, 
1984
Beyer, Peter, Religion and Globalization, London, Sage Publication, 1994
Bin, Sayyed, Western Dominance and Political Islam: Challenge and Response, 
Albany, State University o f New York Press, 1995
Bretherton, Charlotte & Ponton Geoffrey (eds.), Global Politics: An Introduction, 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996
Burr, Milliard, Khartoum’s Displaced Persons: A Decade o f Despair, Washington 
DC., United States Committee for Refugees, August, 1990
----------------  Sudan 1990-1992: Food aid, famine, and Failure, Washington DC:
United States Committee for Refugees, May, 1993
Cahill, Kevin, M., (ed.), A Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, and 
Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters, New York: A Joint Publication 
o f Basic Books & the Council on Foreign Relations, 1993
Caplan, Lionel (ed.), Studies in Religious Fundamentalism, London, Macmillan, 
1987
Carton, James, Operation Lifeline Sudan: Workshop on Lessons Learned, 
Copenhagen, 14-15 December, 1989, New York -  Nairobi, United Nations 
International Children Fund, March 1, 1990
Che, Guevara, Che Guevara Speaks, London, Pathfinder Books, 1967
Copland, Miles, The Game o f Nations: The Amorality o f Power Politics, London, 
Weiddenfeld & Nicolson, 1969
280
Daniel, Norman, Islam and the West: The Making o f an Image, Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press, 1990
Deng, M. Francis, War of Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, Washington
D.C., Brookings Institution
Deng, Francis, M. & Minear Minear, The Challenges o f Famine Relief: Emergency 
Operations in the Sudan, Washington, DC.: Brookings Institution, 1992
De Waal, Alex, Famine that Kills: Darfur, Sudan, 1984-1985, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1989
Dicklitch, Susan, The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa: Lessons from Uganda, 
London, Macmillan Press LTD., 1998
Djait, Hichem, Europe and Islam: Cultures and Modernity, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, University o f California Press, 1985
Donnelly, Jack, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University, 1989
Dower, Nigel, World Ethics: the new agenda, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press, 1998
Doxey, Margaret, P., International Sanctions in Contemporary Perspective, New 
York, St. Martin Press, 1987
------------------  Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, New York,
Oxford University Press, 1971
Duffield, Mark, “Containing Systemic Crisis: The Regionalization o f Welfare and 
Security Policy”, in Pierterse Nederveen Jan (ed.), World Orders in the Making: 
Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond, London, Macmillan, 1998, pp. 80-110
Duffield, Mark & Prendergast John, Without Troops & Tanks: Humanitarian 
Intervention in Ethiopia and Eritrea, Lawrenceville, NJ., The Red Sea Press, 1994
Dutch Government, A World of Difference; A World o f Dispute, The Hague, 
Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, 1993
Efithia, Voutira & Brown A. Shaun, An RSP Report for the Economic and Social 
Research Council o f the Overseas Development Administration Conflict Resolution: 
A Review o f some Non-Governmental Practices -  A Cautionery Tale, Oxford, 
Oford University Press, 1995
Eltigani Eltigani (ed.), War and Drought in Sudan: Essays on Population Dispute, 
Florida, University Press o f Florida, 1995
Enayat, Hamid, Modem Islamic Political Thought, Austin, University o f Texas 
Press, 1982
Ephraim, Isaac, “Humanitarianism Across Religions and Cultures”, in Thomas G. 
Weiss & Larry Minear (eds.), Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining 
Civilians in Times o f War, Boulder - London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993, pp. 
13-22
Esposito L. John, Political Islam: The Challenges o f Change, Annandale, VA., 
United Association for the Studies o f Research, 1995
-------- -------  The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, New York, Oxford University
Press, 1992
281
Falk, Richard, Human Rights and State Sovereignty, New York: Holmes & Meier 
Publishers, 1981
........ .................... “Human Rights, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Sovereignty o f
States”, in Cahil M. Kevin (ed.), Framework for Survival: Health, Human Rights, 
and Humanitarian Assistance in Conflicts and Disasters, New York, A Joint 
Publication o f Basic Books and the Council of Foreign Relations, 1993, pp. 27-40
Fawaza, A. Gerges, America and Political Islam: Clash o f Cultures or Clash of 
Interests?, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999
Forbes, Ian & Hoffman Mark (eds.), Political Theory, International Relations and 
the Ethics o f Intervention, London: Macmillan, 1993
Forsythe, David, Humanitarian Politics: The International Committee o f the Red 
Cross, Baltimore, MD.: The John Hopkins University Press, 1977
Fukuyama, Francis, The End o f History and the Last Man, London, Hamish 
Hamilton, 1992
Garang, John, The Vision o f the New Sudan: Questions of Unity and Identity, Cairo 
& Nairobi: Consortium for Policy Analysis and Development Strategies, 1997
Gadis, John Lewis, The United States and the End o f the Cold War: Implications, 
Reconsiderations, Provocations, New York, Oxford University Press, 1992
Geerez, Cliford, The Interpretation o f Cultures, New York, Basic Books, 1973
Government o f Sudan, A Draft Provided by the Ministry o f Social Welfare, Zakat 
and the Displace regarding the Government’s General Policy towards the Displaced, 
Khartoum: Government o f the Sudan, September 22, 1988
---------------------- Statement by Dr. Ibrahim Abu auf, Commissioner Relief and
Rehabilitation Before the Second Committee o f the UN General Assembly at its 47 ' 1 
Session, New York: Sudan Permanent Mission to the United Nations, November 16,
1992
Guelf, Richard & Adam Roberts, Documents on the Laws of War, Oxford 
University Press, 1989
Halliday, Fred, Islam and the Myth o f Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the 
Middle East, London, I.B. Tauris, 1995
Harriss, Johnson (ed.), The Politics o f Humanitarian Intervention, London: Pinter, 
1995
Harrel-Bon, E. Barbara, Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees, Oxford, 
Oxford University, 1996
Hastedt, P. Glenn (ed.), American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ., Prentice-Hall, 1997
Hartx, Louis, The liberal Tradition in America, New York, Harcourt Bruce & 
World, 1955
Hunt, H. Michael, Ideology and US Foreign Policy, New Haven, CT., Yale 
Unversity Press, 1987
Prendergast, John, Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids in Sudan and Somalia, 
London, Pluto Press, 1997
282
---------------Fronline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa, London
& Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996
Kans, P. Margaret, “The Changing Architecture of World Politics: Multilateralism, 
Co-operation, and Global Governance”, in Thomson W. Kenneth (ed.), Community, 
Diversity, and a New World Order: Essays in Honor o f Inis L. Claude Jr., Boston, 
University Press o f America, 1994, p. 274
Keck, Margaret & Sikkink Kathryn, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks 
in International Politics, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1998
Kindleberger, Charles, Power and Money: The Economics o f International politics 
and the Politics o f International Economics, New York, Basic Books, 1970
Krasner, Stephen (ed.), International Regimes, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University 
Press, 1983
Kratochwil, Friedrich, Rules, Norms, and Decisions: On the Conditions o f Practical 
and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989
Lederach, Paul, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, 
Washington D.C., United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1997
Little, David, “Islam and Society: The Sudanese Experience”, Washington D.C., 
United States Institute o f Peace, 1998
.......................  “Islamic and Christian Cross-Currents in Sudan”, lecture notes,
Washington D.C., United States Foreign Service, April 3, 1997
Lumsdaine, Halloran David, Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid 
Regime, 1949-1989, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993
Lyons, M. Gene & Mastanduno, Michael, Beyond Westphalia? National 
Sovereignty and International Intervention, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1993
Macalister-Smith, Peter, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief 
Actions in International Law and Organization, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985
Mackinnon, S. Michael, The Evolution of US Peacekeeping policy Under Clinton: A 
Fairweather Friend?, London, Frank Cass, 2000
Macrae, Joana & Swi Anthony (eds.), War and Hunger: Rethinking International 
Responses to Complex Emergencies, London: Zed Books, 1994
Manning, Mike, “Global Issues and the Challenge to Democratic Politics”, in 
Charlotte B. & Geoffrey P. (eds.), Global Politics: An Introduction, Oxford, 
Blackwell Publishers, 1996, pp. 220-246
Mayal, James, The New Internationalism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in 
Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1996
Minear, Larry, Humanitarianism Under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation 
Lifeline Sudan, Trenton, NJ, The Red Sea Press, 1991
........ ..........— Helping People in an Age o f Conflict: Towards a New
Professionalism in US Voluntary Humanitarian Assistance, New York and 
Washington, DC.: InterAction, 1988
283
Minear, Larry & Weiss G. Thomas, Humanitarian Action in Times o f War: A 
Handbook for Practitioners , Boulder, Lynne & Rienner Publishers, 1993
National Population Committee, The Registration System, socio-economic and 
Demographic Characteristics o f Al-Salam Omdurman and Jebel Awliya Displaced 
Camps, Khartoum, CARE, December, 1992
Nederveen, Pieterse Jan (ed.), World Orders in the Making: Humanitarian 
Intervention and Beyond, London: Macmillan Press, 1998
New Sudan Council o f Churches, Here We Stand United in Action for Peace, 
Nairobi, Peace and Human Rights Desk, 1996
Nyok, Peter, “The Ties that Will Not Bind: Conflict and Racial Cleavages in the 
Sudan”, in Anyang-Nyongo (ed.), Arms and Diggers in the Heart o f Africa, Nairobi, 
African Academy o f Sciences, October, 1993
Onuf, Nicholas, World o f Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and 
International Relations, Columbia, S.C., University o f South Carolina Press, 1989
------- ------------Report o f the Secretary General o f the United Nations, New York,
September-October, 1991
Pugh, Michael, From Mission Cringe to Mission Creep? Implications o f New Peace 
Support Operations, Oslo, Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, 1997
Rahman, Fazher, Islam, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1979
Ramsbotham, Oliver & Woodhouse Tom, Humanitarian Intervention in 
Contemporary Conflict, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996
Reychler, Luc, “Beyond Traditional Diplomacy”, Discussion Paper No. 17, 
Leicester, Diplomatic Studies Programme, Leicester University, 1996
Rittberger, Volker (ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1993
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army, Constitution o f the Sudan Relief 
and Rehabilitation Association, Nairobi, SRRA, November 27, 1995
Thomas, Caroline and Reader Melvyne, “Human Rights and Intervention: A Case 
for Caution”, in Pierterse Nederveen Jan (ed.), World Orders in the Making: 
Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond, London, Macmillan Press, 1998, pp. 114- 
137
Thompson, W. Kenneth (ed.), Community, Diversity and a New World Order: 
Essays in Honor o f Inis L. Claude Jr., Maryland: University Press o f America, 1994 
United Nations, Press Release, Khartoum, December 5, 1992
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Operational Experience 
with Internally Displaced Persons, Geneva, Office o f the High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Division of International Protection, September, 1994
United States Department o f State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices for
1992, Washington D.C., 1993
------------- ------  Country Human Rights Reports 1997: Sudan, Washington D.C.,
1997
Wondu, Stephen , IGADD: No Quick Fix for Sudan, Nairobi, Beta Technology 
Systems, April, 1995
284
Wai, M. Dunstan, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, London: Holms & Meier 
Publishers, 1981
Wheeler, Nicholas, “Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics”, in John Bay & 
Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 391-408
Weiss, G. Thomas & Minear, Larry Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining 
Civilians in Times of War, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993
Zartman, William (ed.), Collapsed States: the disintegration and restoration of 
legitimate authority, Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 1995
DOCUMENTS AND REPORTS
Abu, Salim, Speech in Opening Session, Khartoum: government o f the Sudan. 
January, !993
Adly, Khalid Letter to the GOS State Minister for Social Planning, Food Deliveries, 
Khartoum: World Food Programme, March 4th, 1995.
----------------  Leter to Y. Mengesha, Regional Manager, WFP Rome, on “DHA
Appeal-Sudan 1996
Africa Rights, Humanitarianism Unbound? Current Dilemmas Facing Multi- 
Mandate Relief Operations in Political Emergencies, Discussion Paper No. 5, 
London, November, 1994
------------------- Sudan’s Invisible Citizens: The policy o f Abuse Against Displaced
People in the North, London, African Rights, February, 1995
Africa Watch, Sudan: Refugees in their Own Country: Forced Relocation of 
Squatters and Displaced People from Khartoum, London, Africa Watch, July 10,
1992
---------------------  Sudan: A Human Rights Disaster, London, The Africa Watch
Committee, 1990
Almquist, Kate, “Religion and Politics in Sudan: A Humanitarian Agency 
Perspective”, Washington D.C., paper presented to the United States Institute of 
Peace, September 16, 1997
Biro, Gaspar., Situation o f Human Rights in the Sudan, New York/Geneva: United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights, February 1, 1994
Bodansky, Yossef, Target America: Terrorism in the U.S. Today, New York, S.P.I. 
Books, 1993
British Foreign Office and Commonwealth Office, “Beyond B rief’, London, 1991 
British Foreign Affairs Committee, London, 1988
British Foreign Secretary’s Keynote Speech, “Human Rights Reports into the New 
Century, London, July 17, 1997
British Foreign Office Mission Statement, London, May 12, 1997
285
Brooklet, Rene, “From a Co-operative Towards a Conditional Strategy: Background 
Paper on IMF Policy Regarding Sudan”, Copenhagen, Dan-Church Aid, April 4 
1995
Carstensen, Nils, Southern Sudan: Report on a Forgotten Crisis, Copenhagen, Dutch 
Churchaid, September 16, 1992
Duffield, Mark, Sudan: Unintended Consequences o f Humanitarian Assistance: 
Field Evaluation Study, A Report to the European Community Humanitarian Office, 
Dublin, The University o f Dublin, Trinity College, November, 1999
Einas, Ahmed, “The Dynamics of Local Politics and the Search for local Legitimacy 
in Kasala State”, Paper delivered at the International Sudan Studies Association 
Conference, Cairo, 1997
Africa, Brussels, December, 1995
--------------- Commission Communications on the European Union and the Issue o f
Conflict in Africa: Conflict Prevention and Beyond, Brussels, March, 1996
-------------------  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Commission of the European Communities on Linking Relief, 
Rehabilitation and Development, Brussels, European Commission o f the European 
Communities, April 30, 1996
European Commission Humanitarian Office, ECHO Strategy 1997: Working Paper, 
Nairobi - Brussels, European Commission Humanitarian Office, February 24, 1997
Fund for Peace, Report on a Programme of Human Rights Capacity Building with 
NGOs in the Horn of Africa, Nairobi, December, 1995
General Assembly Resolution 2816 (XXVI) o f December 14, 1971 (Assistance in 
the Case o f Natural Disaster and Other Disaster Situations), New York, 1971
--------- --------------  Resolution 46/182 o f December 17, 1991 (Strengthening ot the
Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance o f the United Nations), New 
York, December 17, 1991
Government o f Kenya, Second Draft, Nairobi: Government o f Kenya, January 21,
1994
........................... Relief Supplies and Humanitarian Assistance to the War Affected
Areas, Nairobi: Government o f Kenya, March 23, 1994
Minear, Larry, Weiss G. Thomas, & Kurt M. Campbell, Humanitarianism and War: 
Learning the Lessons from Recent Armed Conflicts, Occasional Paper, No. 8 , 
Thomas J. Watson Institute, 1991
Ministry o f Social Planning, Briefing, Khartoum, GOS, March 31, 1996
Moreels, Reginald, Ideas on Humanitarian Aid, Interventions and Field Diplomacy, 
Paper presented at the International Alert Conference, London, 1997
National Development Foundation, Briefing, Khartoum, March 28, 1996
Prendergast, John, “Diplomacy, Aid and Governance, Washington D.C., Centre of 
Concern, 1995
Refugee Policy Group, A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan: A Report to 
Aid Agencies, Washington D.C., October, 13, 1990
286
The Economist Intelligence Unit, Sudan: Country Report, London, Third Quarter
1993
------------------- Sudan: Country Report, London, Third Quarter, 1997
United States Government, Breaking the Cycle of Despair: President Clinton’s 
Initiatives on the Horn of Africa, Washington D.C., June, 1994
..................... .......Strategy o f Enlargement and Preparedness, Washington D.C., 1995
United States Congress, 106th Congress: Concurrent Resolution 75, Washington
D.C., June 15, 1999
United States Department o f Defense, United States Security Strategy for Sub- 
Sahara Africa, Washington D.C., 1995
United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Africa Sub-Committee, 
Hearings on Sudan, 102nd Congress, Washington D.C., May 1992
United States National Security Council, ‘A National Security Strategy for a New 
Century, May, 1997
World Vision, Sudan: The Cost o f Continuing Conflict, London, Policy Report, 
1997
Working Group on International Refugee Policy, Report o f the International 
Conference on the Protection Mandate o f UNHCR, The Hague, September 18, 1998
JOURNAL ARTICLES
Baker, Tom, “On the Geology o f Moral Hazard”, Texas Laws Review, Vol. 75, 
1996, p. 237
Barkin, J Samual, “The Evolution o f the Constitution o f Sovereignty and the 
Emergence o f Human Rights Norms”, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, 
Vol. 27, No. 2, 1998, pp. 229-252
Bratton, Michael, “Politics o f Govemment/NGO Relations in Africa”, World 
Development, Vol. 17, No. 4, April, 1989
Brown, Chris, “Cultural diversity and International Political Theory: from the 
Requirement to ‘Mutual Respec’?”, Review o f International Studies, Vol. 26. No. 2, 
April, 2000, pp. 199-213
--------------- “History Ends, Worlds Collide”, Review o f  International Studies, Vol.
25, Special Issue, December, 1999, pp. 41-57
Buzan, Barry, “New World Realpolitik: New Patterns o f Global Security in the 
Twenty-First Century”, International Affairs Journal, Vol. 67, No. 3, July, 1991, pp. 
431-52
Campbell, Colin & Debborah Scorggins, “Officials: US May Welcome Coup in 
Sudan; Military Rulers Might Improve Famine R elief’, Atlanta Journal and 
Constitution, 27 January, 1989
Campbell, David, “Why Fight: Humanitarianism, Principles, and Post­
structuralism”, Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1998, 
pp. 497-521
287
Clarke, Johnathan, “The Conceptual poverty o f US Foreign Policy”, The Atlantic 
Monthly, March, 1993, pp. 54-66
Cliffe, Lionel & Luckham Robin, “Complex Political Emergencies and the State: 
failure and the fate o f the state”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1999, pp. 
27-50
Crawford, Gordon “Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues o f Effectiveness 
and Consistency”, Democratization, Vol. 4, No. 3, Autumn, 1997, pp. 69-108
De Waal, Alex & Omaar Rakiya, “Can Military Intervention Be ‘Humanitarian’?”, 
Middle East Report, March-June, 1994, pp. 3-8
Deng, M. Francis “The Sudan: Stop the Carnage”, The Brookings Review, No. 12, 
Washington D.C., Winter 1994, pp. 6-11
Donnelly, Jack, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign 
Policy: law, morality and politics”, Journal o f International Affairs, Vol. 37, 1984, 
p p .311-28
-------------------  “Human Rights, Humanitarian Crisis and Humanitarian
Intervention”, International Journal, Vol. 48, No. 4, 1993, pp. 607-40
Duffield, Mark, “Complex Political Emergency: An Exploratory Report for 
UNICEF With Reference to Angola and Bosnia”, Birmingham, School o f Public 
Policy, Birmingham University, March, 1994, pp. 1-125
........ ................. -  “NGOs, Disaster Relief and Asset Transfer in the Horn: Political
Survival in a Permanent Emergency”, Development and Change, Vol. 24, No. 1,
1993, p p .131-57
—.............  “Sudan at the Cross-Roads: From Emergency Preparedness to
Social Security”, Institute o f Development Studies, Discussion Paper No. 275, 1990
--------------------- “The Symphony of the Damned: Racial Discourse, Complex
Political Emergencies and Humanitarian Aid”, Birmingham, School o f Public 
Policy, Birmingham University, Occasional Paper No. 2, 1996,
Duffield, Mark, & Prendergast John, “Sovereignty and Intervention after the Cold 
War: Lessons from the Emergency Relief Desk”, Middle East Report, March-June,
1994, pp. 9-15
Checkel, T., Jeffrey, “Norms, Institutions and National Identity in Contemporary 
Europe”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 43, 1999, pp. 83-114
----------------- “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist-
Constructionist Divide”, European Journal o f  International Relations, Vol. 3, 1997, 
p p .473-495
Cortel, P. Andrew & Davis, W. James, “How Do International Institutions Matter? 
The Domestic Impact o f International Rules and Norms”, International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 40, 1996, pp. 451-478
Falk, Richard, “The Pursuit of International Justice: Present Dilemmas and An 
Imagined Future”, Journal o f  International Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 2, Spring, 1999, 
pp. 399-441
Gordenker, Leon & Weiss G. Thomas, “Devolving Responsibilities: a framework 
for analyzing NGOs and services”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1997, pp. 
443-455
288
Gurowitz, Amy, “Mobilizing International Nonns: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, 
and the Japanese State”, World Politics, Vol. 51, April, 1999, pp. 413-45
Global Humanitarian Emergencies, New York: US Mission to the UN, January,
1995
Haiden, William, “The Kosovo Conflict: The Strategic Use of Displacement and the 
Obstacles to International Protection”, Civil Wars, Vol. 2, Spring, 1999, pp. 35-68
Hartigan, Kevin, “Refugee Policies in Mexico and Honduras”, International 
Organization, Vol. 46, No. 3, 1992, pp. 709-730
Hawkins, Danen, “Domestic Responses to International Pressure: Human Rights in 
Authoritarian Chile”, European Journal o f  International Relations, Vol. 3, 1997, pp. 
403-434
Huntington, Samuel, “The Clash of Civilizations”, Foreign Affairs, 1993, pp. 22-49
Hurd, Douglas, Speech at Royal United Services Institute, 13 October, 1992, Arms 
Control and Disarmament Quarterly Review, Vol. 27, 1992, pp. 34-5
Hurd, Ian, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics”, International 
Organization, Vol. 53, No. 2, Spring, 1999, pp. 379-408
Inter-Governmental Agency on Development, Forth Meeting of the Committee on 
Sudan o f the IGAD Partners’ Forum, Oslo, March 10, 1999
Jean, Francis (ed.), Life, Death and Aid: the Medecins Sans Frontiers Report on 
World Crisis Intervention, New York, Routledge, 1994
Kamal, Mustafa Pasha & Blaney L David, “Elusive Paradise: The Promise and Peril 
o f Global Civil Society”, Alternative, Vol. 23, 1998, pp. 417-450
Keen, David, “Disaster for Whom?: Local Interests and International Donors During 
Famine among the Dinka of Sudan”, Disaster, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1991
— ........ -.......—  The Benefits o f Famine: A Political Economy of Refugee Flows
from South-West Sudan, 1986-88, Geneva: Discussion Paper No. 39, November,
1992
Klotz, Audie, “Norms Reconstituting Interests: Global Racial Equality and US 
Sanctions against South Africa”, International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3, 1995, 
pp. 451-478
Legro, W. Jeffrey, “Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the ‘Failure’ of 
Internationalism”, International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1, 1997, pp. 31-63
Lowrey, William, The Role o f Religion in Peacemaking and Reconciliation: A Case 
Study Among the Nuer in Sudan, Discussion Paper, Nairobi, New Sudan Council of 
Churches
Lyons, Gene, M., & Michael Mastanduno, “International Intervention, State 
Sovereignty and the Future o f International Society”, Journal o f  International Social 
Sciences, Vol. 45, 1993, pp. 517-531
Lindsay, M. James, “Trade Sanctions as Policy Instruments: A Re-examination”, 
International Studies Quarterly, No. 30, June, 1986, pp. 155-56
Loescher, Gil, “Refugee Movements and International Security” , Adelphi, Paper, 
No. 268, 1992
289
Minear, Larry & Weiss, G. Thomas, “Groping and Coping in the Gulf Crisis: 
Discerning the Shape o f a New Humanitarian Order”, World Policy Journal, Vol. 
IX, No. 4, Fall/Winter, 1992-1993, pp. 755-788
Minear, Larry, “Humanitarian Intervention in a New World Order”, Discussion 
Paper No. 1, Washington, DC., Overseas Development Council, 1992
Moravcsik, Andrew, “Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal 
Theory and Western Europe”, European Journal o f  International Relations, Vol. 1, 
No. 2, 1995, pp. 157-189
Munslow, Barry & Brown Christopher, “Complex Emergencies: the institutional 
impasse”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1999, pp. 207-221
Raustiala, Kal, “States, NGOs, and International Environmental Institutions”, 
International Studies Quartely, Vol. 41, 1997, pp. 719-740
Nyers, Peter, “Emergency or Emerging Identities? Refugees and Transformations in 
World Order”, Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1999, 
pp. 1-26
Rengger, Nicholas, “Justice in the World Economy: Global or International, or 
Both?”, International Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 3, 1999, pp. 469-471
Roberts, Adam, “Humanitarian Action in War: aid, protection and impartiality in a 
policy vacuum”, Adelphi, Paper No. 305, 1996
Sharp, Paul, “For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International 
Relations”, International Studies Review, Vol., Spring 1999, pp. 33-57
Scheffer, J. David, “Towards a Modem Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention”, The 
University o f Toledo Law Review, Vol. 23, 1992, pp. 253-293
Sikkink, Kathryn, “Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in 
Latin America”, International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1993, pp. 411-441
Sudan Democratic Gazette, London, April, 1993
Sudan Embassy, Bulletin, London, April 13, 1993
Sudan Update, Vol. 25, London, September 9, 1992
Yango-Bure, Benaiah, “Sudan’s Deepening Crisis”, Middle East Report, No. 172, 
September-October, 1991
Wallensten, Peter & Axel Karin, “Armed Conflict at the end o f the Cold War”, 
Journal o f Peace Research, Vol. 30, No. 3, August, 1993, pp. 331-346
Weiss, G. Thomas, “Principles, Politics, and Humanitarian Action”, Ethics &
Weiss, G. Thomas & Minear Larry, “Do International Ethics Matter? Humanitarian 
Politics in the Sudan”, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 5, 1991, 197-214
Weiss, Thomas, T. & Chopra Jarat, “Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: 
Codifying Humanitarian Intervention”, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 6 , 1992, 
pp. 95-117
White, Peter, T., “A Little Humanity Amid the Horrors o f War”, National 
Geographic, Vol. 170, No. 5, November, 1986
White, Philip, “The Role o f UN Specialised Agencies in Complex Emergencies: A 
Case Study o f FAO”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1999, pp. 223-238
290
MEDIA INFORMATION
Abdel, Ati, “The Developmental Impact o f NGO Activities in the Red Sea Province 
o f Sudan: A Crtitque”, Development and Change, Vol. 24, 1993, pp. 103-30
Al-Duster, September 4, 1989
Al-Hayat, April 28, 1994
Al-Ald, Lebanon, April 21, 1996
Al-Safir, February 24, 1994
Al-Sharg-al-Aswat, October 11, 1989
Al Sudan A l Hadith, “Colonel Mohammed A1 Amin Khalifa Spoke About Nairobi 
Negotiations”, Khartoum: Al Sudan Al Hadith, September 12, 1989
“Arms against sea troubles”, Africa Confidential, Vol. 37, No. 23, 1996
“An American in Africa”, East Africa, Nairobi, 14-20, 1996
British Broadcasting Co-operation, Summary of World News Broadcast, London, 
October 14, 1996
Bonner, Raymond, “Famine”, The New Yorker, March 13, 1989 
HAB, Vol. 5, 1993
IGAD, “IGAD Forges Regional Co-operation”, Nairobi, Inter-Governmental Agency 
on Development Newsletter, June, 1996
Keyhan, Khartoum, March 1, 1993
Omdurman Radio, January 4, 1992
Operation Lifeline Sudan, “UNICEF and WFP Request Urgent Funding for War- 
Torn Southern Sudan”, Nairobi, Press Release, February 14, 1994
........ ................Nairobi, Weekly Update, May 31, 1994
Perez de Cuellar, Javier, “The Limits o f Sovereignty: UN Focus on Human Rights, 
New York, United Nations Newsletter, 1991
SEPHA Bi-Monthly Report, No. 14, April 5, 1992
Sheila, Rule, “Khartoum Suspected o f the Role in Raids on African Tribes men”, 
International Herald Tribune, May 7, 1986, p. 11
SHR Voice, Khartoum, December 13, 1994
INTERVIEWS
Christopher Jaeger, Representative in Sudan, United Nations Development 
Programme Resident, Nairobi, March 12, 1996
Philip O ’Brien, Chief Co-ordinator, United Nations Children International 
Fund/Operation Lifeline Sudan, Nairobi, February 6, 1997
291
Ian Levine, Humanitarian Principles Officer, United Nations Children International 
Fund/Operation Lifeline Sudan, Nairobi, October 13, 1996
Hamish Young, Humanitarian Principles Officer, United Nations Children 
International Fund/Operation Lifeline Sudan, Nairobi, November 20, 1996
Nichol Paullet, Programme Co-ordinator, United Nations Children International 
Fund/Operation Lifeline Sudan, Nairobi, November 24, 1996
Sally Bumheim, Communication and Media Co-ordinator United Nations 
International Children Fund/Operation Lifeline Sudan, Nairobi, April 14, 1996
Bortel Con, Geneva, March 15, 1996
Johnson Harris, United States Envoy to the Sudan, Nairobi, May 12, 1997
Inga Bjork Klevby, Swedish Humanitarian Envoy to East Africa, Nairobi, 
November 11, 1998
Lucion Vanderbroucke, US Embassy Political Adviser Great Lakes Region, Nairobi, 
July 14, 1997
Norman Anderson, former United States Ambassador to Sudan, Washington, March 
4, 1996
Dr. Bonaya Godana, Kenya Foreign Minister, Nairobi, August 10, 1997
Dr. Mustafa Osman Ismail, Sudan Minister for External Affairs, Nairobi, May 15, 
1997
Elijah Malok, Political Adviser, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army, 
Nairobi, March 24, 1996
Bishop Gabriel Roric, Sudan Deputy Minister o f Foreign Affairs, Geneva, May 13,
1996
Ambassador Bathuel Kiplagat, Consultant, Sudan Working Group, Nairobi, March 
12, 1997
Allan Zachariades, Co-ordinator, Greater Horn of Africa, (Britain) Department of 
International Development, London, August 21, 1997
Dr. Samson Kwaje, Secretary for Information and Culture, Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement and Army, Nairobio November 12, 1997
Martin Okeruk, Secretary General of the National Liberation Council, Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement and Army, Nairobi, July 19, 1997
Commander Pierre Ohure, Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Nairobi, March 6 , 1996
Abu-Shama, former Sudan Ambassador to Britain, Nairobi, July 26, 1996
Ibrahim Tayib, Department o f Internally Displaced Persons, Geneva, March 5, 1996
Lawrence Lual Lual, Member o f National Assembly, Nairobi, March 7, 1996
Commander Abu-John, Governor of Equatoria Region, Yambio, June 19, 1996
Prof. David de Chand, Ambassador, Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Nairobi, April 8 ,
1997
Nereo Lope, Member o f National Assembly, Nairobi, January 26, 1996
Paul Trivelli, United States State Department official on African Affairs, 
Washington, July 18, 1996
292
Heather Elkins, Delegation o f the European Community Commission, Nairobi, May
15.1996
Paul Filler, Delegation of the Commission of the European Community, Nairobi. 
May 24, 1997
John Prendergast, Director o f  Horn o f Africa Project, Concern, Lokichoggio, May
10, 1996
General (RTD) John Okwahi, Deputy Governor o f Equatoria Region, Yambio. 
August 26, 1997
Commander Deng Ayai, Sudan People’s Liberation Army, Nairobi, August 13, 1997
Ambrose Ring Thik, Chief Justice, Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army, 
Nairobi, September 10, 1997
Bishop Joseph Gazi, Chairman, Sudan Catholic Bishops’ Regional Conference, 
Nairobi, September 13, 1996
Rev. Mutava Musymi, General Secretary o f the National Council o f Churches of 
Kenya, Nairobi, April 8, 1997
Archbishop Paolino Lokudu, Vice President o f the Sudan Catholic Bishops’ 
Conference, Nairobi, August 15, 1996
Rev. Clement Janda, General Secretary of All Africa Conference o f Churches, 
Nairobi, February 7, 1997
Rev. Dr. Haruun Ruun, Executive Secretary of the New Sudan Council of Churches, 
Nairobi, June 18, 1996
Dr. Christie Mailhes, Lecturer, Department o f Law, Toulouse University, Paris, 
December 8, 1997
Robert Rees, Project Officer, Africa Desk, Catholic Fund for Overseas 
Development, Nairobi, December 15, 1996
Dr. Jim O ’Connel, Country Representative, Catholic Relief Service, Nairobi, August
14.1997
Jan Gruiters, Secretary General, Pax Christi-Intemational, Amsterdam, December
11, 1996
Prof. Macharia Munene, Dean of Division of Arts and Social Sciences, United 
States International University-Africa, Nairobi, May 8, 1997
Prof. Isaac Riak, Chair, Division of Business Studies, United States International 
University, Nairobi, April 12, 1997
Bona Malwal, Editor, Sudan Democratic Gazette, Oxford, August 20, 1996
Barry Wheeler, Country Director, United States Refugee Committee, Nairobi, July
6, 1996
I would have taken more than twenty pages if  I were to list all the people I had come 
into contact during my field work. Many UN and NGOs I met in Kampala (Uganda) 
and Nairobi (Kenya) preferred to remain anonymous for reasons best known to 
them. But I also omitted some names for security reason and these include displaced 
persons and local administrators I met in the opposition movement controlled areas.
